NEW TERRITORIES IN CRITICAL WHITENESS STUDIES

White Terror in the ‘War on Terror’

Madeline-Sophie Abbas
University of Leeds

One fantasy of whiteness is that the threatening Other is always a terrorist. This projection enables many white people to imagine there is no representation of whiteness as terror, as terrorizing (hooks 1992: 174).

Following bell hooks, I argue that Western and Muslim relations have operated through a civilising/terrorising binary. This framework enables acts of terror to be projected onto the bodies of Muslims whose presence is perceived as a threat to the ‘civilised’ world which must, therefore, be contained through any means possible. This article disrupts the civilising/terrorising binary by arguing that white terror is active in the schema of the ‘War on Terror’ and advances a conceptual framework for its operation that I term the ‘Concentrationary Gothic.’

Drawing on empirical evidence from 26 in-depth qualitative interviews conducted between 2010-11 in Leeds and Bradford in England, this article challenges conceptions of Muslims as a ‘threatening Other’ by exploring how Muslims experience terror in the post-9/11 context. I develop the concentrationary as a conceptual tool alongside the Gothic to examine how features of the Gothic—the monster, hauntings and the spectral, and abjected states—intersect with the state of exception to advance a complex investigation of the culture of fear discussed by participants and its effects on their lives in contemporary Britain.

Keywords: Concentrationary Gothic, inter-bodily-relational, Muslim, white terror, whiteness, War on Terror

Introduction

This article draws on Robert Mighall’s (1999: xviii, xxv) historical approach to the Gothic. He understands Gothic to represent the culture which carries the stigma of being “uncivilized, unprogressive or ‘barbaric.’” This representation shifts depending on the current socio-political and cultural attitudes so that at particular historical junctures, places, institutions and people are ‘Gothicized’;
that is, "they have the Gothic thrust upon them." Drawing on qualitative research from 26 in-depth interviews conducted with Muslims aged 18-46\(^1\) in 2010-11 in Leeds and Bradford in England, this article expands academic inquiry into how whiteness is experienced as terror by Muslims post-9/11\(^2\) and 7/7\(^3\) and advances a conceptual framework for the operation of white terror that I term ‘Concentrationary Gothic.’ This framework extends previous work on the concentrationary (Pollock & Silverman 2011a, b) and the normalisation of the state of exception (Agamben 1998, 2005; Mbembe 2008; Razack 2008) by considering the ways in which whiteness institutionalises itself and reproduces its dominance via the Gothic\(^4\) in the ‘War on Terror’ context.

The power to project terror onto the bodies of racialised Others through the Gothic enables whiteness to escape representations of terror (hooks 1992) as terror-inducing and allows its association with ‘civilisation’ and humanness to be maintained. Through the Concentrationary Gothic framework, I explicate how the Gothicisation of Muslims as ‘terrorist-monsters’ (Puar & Rai 2002; Puar 2007; Razack 2008) works to legitimate the state of exception experienced by Muslims. This juridical-political context informs the culture of fear expressed by participants where the ability of whiteness to exert its power with impunity through surveillance, detention and even death, haunts Muslims’ experiences, both materially and symbolically. By de-stabilising the equation of ‘Muslim’ and ‘terrorist,’ the Concentrationary Gothic framework exposes how terror circulates between bodies (see Puar 2007: 205). I term this phenomenon ‘inter-bodily-relational’—a site where the power of whiteness to define Muslims as ‘monstrous’ creates conditions in which Muslims experience themselves as threatening to, and at risk from, whiteness.

**The Racialisation of Terror**

Farooque: I said besides power [the ‘War on Terror’ is] a war against non-white people because ... you white people don’t think

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\(^1\) The sample was equally divided by gender. Half of the participants are from the Pakistani diaspora and a further 6 from other regions of South Asia, reflecting Britain’s colonial history. 24 of the 26 participants are British citizens, 17 of which are British-born.

\(^2\) Ruth Frankenberg (2005: 555) refers to the “instant ahistoricism” of 9/11 (and I would include 7/7), suggesting that these are universal turning points where the white world felt the effects of a particular sort of terror which takes primacy over other contexts of terror (including the subsequent ‘War on Terror’) and which function as “no fly zones around examination of its origins, its meanings and its consequences.”

\(^3\) 7/7 refers to the London bombings of July 7, 2005. These were a series of co-ordinated attacks by suicide bombers which targeted civilian populations on London’s public transport system. 52 people were killed and over 700 injured. These events are particularly significant for understanding the role of fear in the governance of Muslims in the United Kingdom. The UK includes England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and refers to the unitary state governed under a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system which has its seat of government in London.

\(^4\) See Richard Devetak’s (2005) examination of the “Gothic scene” of the ‘War on Terror.’

\(^5\) All participants’ names are pseudonyms to protect their anonymity.
non-white people are human beings—you treat them subhuman—that’s the sublime of your philosophy that’s instilled in your brain, that we whites are the superior beings ... our brains are superior...we are good ...

[Madeline] This idea that whites are superior ...

['Farooque'] Because it was in the text-book ... all the things were printed by white people ... because of the Raj$^6$ ... [British] history is marred with colonising people and marginalising them, taking away their languages—that’s the reason English is well spoken because they took away the language and culture and you were made inferior when you wore Shalwar Kameez$^7$ ... you were made superior when you wore trousers.

In this section, I explore how the ‘War on Terror’ should be located within a historical continuum of racialised terror against non-whites, enabling us to understand white terror as institutionalised rather than an aberration. ‘Farooque’ describes above how the ‘War on Terror’ is premised on a racialised distinction between whites and non-whites, founded on a further division between humans and sub humans. Central to these binaries is the “differential privileging of whites as a group in respect to nonwhites as a group” explored by Charles W. Mills (1997: 11, 18) in his notion of the Racial Contract. For Mills, the Racial Contract underpins a white supremacist system “in which the human race is racially divided into full persons and subpersons” (Sullivan & Tuana 2007: 2). The significance of this Contract is that it enables the “fantasy of whiteness” as beyond representations of terror (hooks 1992) to persist through “cognitive dysfunctions” that blind white people to the unjust racialised structures that they have been complicit in creating. This cognitive dissonance is evidenced by ‘Farooque’ when he says, “that’s the sublime of your philosophy that’s instilled in your brain.” As such, the Racial Contract:

Prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made (Mills 1997: 18).

Mills and hooks thus draw attention to the constructed, epistemological fantasy of whiteness that is perpetuated through control over representational economies that enables the social conditions under which whiteness is experienced as a form of terror by non-whites to persist. This position supports my claim that the boundary separating civiliser/terroriser is artificial, where whiteness must constantly work to conceal its practices of terror to maintain its pretence of being ‘civilised.’ This includes projecting terror onto the bodies of its Others—a performance which continues during the ‘War on Terror’ via the Gothic.

$^6$ British rule in the Indian subcontinent between 1858 and 1947.

$^7$ Traditional dress worn by men and women in South and Central Asia. It is the national dress of Pakistan.
Through this fantasy position, Western identity has developed synonymously with the notion of ‘civilisation’ which encompasses a normative perception of superiority over other ‘barbarian cultures’ that is central to colonial rule and its justification. ‘Farooque’ presents colonial rule under the British Raj as important contexts through which practices of white supremacy are performed. Whites could occupy the position of “superior beings” perceived as having greater propinquity for rationality: “our brains are superior,” ‘Farooque’ narrates. Under the pretext of ‘civilisation,’ practices of terror could be enacted against colonial subjects and importantly, legitimated, therefore perpetuating the association of whiteness with intrinsic moral superiority: “we are good.” ‘Farooque’s’ depiction of British rule contests the civiliser/terroriser divide informing the system of whiteness by highlighting how the dominance of European cultural forms involves practices of terror against colonial subjects through “marginalising them, taking away their languages” and making colonial subjects “inferior” when wearing traditional dress. Such practices are significant for understanding the racialisation of Muslims in the Concentrationary Gothic environment and contestations over British\(^8\) identity as this article examines.

**The Emergence of the Concentrationary Gothic framework**

The Jewish community were the scapegoat for Nazi Germany ... obviously it’s not an extreme situation like that but I think you’ve always got to have a scapegoat and I think unfortunately Islam is that scapegoat at the moment where anything we do, anything we say, any way we do it, even if we’re doing it peacefully, it’s just going to be seen as us doing something that contradicts being British and what epitomises to be British and therefore we need to be changed (‘Hamida’).

Having established that white terror has a racialised history, I move on to explore how the Concentrationary Gothic framework emerged from participants’ accounts. The concentrationary situates terror within a system of violence against racialised Others informing states of exception. Considering the concentrationary alongside the Gothic supports examination of how terror shifts across bodies depending on which group is charged with harbouring uncivilised and barbarous tendencies that make them unsuitable for inclusion in the national community and for whom the state of exception is reserved (Razack 2008: 6).

When conducting this research, I was struck by how hauntings of violence against racialised Others provided a vocabulary of terror through which participants constructed their understandings of the culture of fear experienced by them within the ‘War on Terror’ context. The strategy is comparable to the application of concentrationary memory used by Griselda Pollock and Max Silverman (2011b: 1) as:

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\(^8\) British national law is concerned with citizenship and British nationality, which is complex due to the UK’s historical position as an imperial power. ‘Britain’ refers to England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Participants used the term ‘British’ to discuss national identity rather than ‘English’ which they associated with having to be white.
At once a way of learning from the actual historical instance of what has taken place which is now part of the vocabulary of terror and power, and a prism through which to interrogate other politically-enacted breaches of humanity under other dictatorships, states of exception, or institutionalized terror in colonial and other relations of domination.

The figure of the Jew was a recurrent trope within participants’ accounts as examined above by ‘Hamida.’ That the Jewish experience might shape current articulations of the treatment of Muslims is perhaps not surprising since as David Theo Goldberg (2006: 346) notes, “So much has the figure of the Muslim been tied to Europe’s horror of death’s threat that the ‘Muselmann’ became the name for those Jews in the Holocaust camps that had left life behind but had not yet given in to death.” I am not claiming here that the situation of Muslims post-9/11 is equivalent to the singular horrors leading up to the Holocaust, but rather that images of the concentrationary are part of the cultural landscape for organising Muslims’ experiences of racial violence. Whilst ‘Hamida’ differentiates the current situation facing Muslims from the Jewish experience, she uses this example to structure her understanding of racial terror where the figure of the Jew represents the dangers of racialised violence when taken to its most horrific “extreme.” Her account illustrates how manifestations of the concentrationary seep into present accounts of racial terror.

The mechanisms through which the scapegoat operates within the national imaginary is significant for understanding how racialised communities can be excluded from the political community under the state of exception, which Giorgio Agamben (2005: 39) defines as “a force of law without law.” Examining how the concentrationary intersects with Gothic discourses (informing the Concentrationary Gothic) enables a better understanding of the methods used to scapegoat Muslims in the current socio-political political context which involves making Muslims ‘monstrous’ using Gothic discourses. Margrit Shildrick (2002: 3) observes that it is those that are considered monstrous which function as scapegoats carrying “the taint of all that must be excluded in order to secure the ideal of an untroubled social order.” Central to the intersection of these representational frames is challenging the equation of Muslims with terror by examining how such projections make them vulnerable to practices of white terror. Shildrick is useful here since she draws together concepts of vulnerability and monstrosity to trouble the “binary structure of the western logos.” For her, vulnerability is “an existential state that may belong to any one of us, but which is characterised nonetheless as a negative attribute, a failure of self-protection, that opens the self to the potential for harm” (2002: 1). What is missing from her analysis is the function of power which renders certain bodies more vulnerable at particular historical junctures; an aspect that the Concentrationary Gothic addresses.

9 Whilst the etymology of ‘Muselmann’ is contested, Giorgio Agamben (1999: 45) argues that a possible explanation comes from the “literal meaning of the Arabic word Muslim: the one who submits unconditionally to the will of God.” This meaning, he continues, “lies at the origin of the legends concerning Islam’s supposed fatalism, legends which are found in European culture starting with the Middle Ages.”
'Hamida’ draws attention to how the parameters of the Gothic can help us to understand the historical operation of racialisation, which shifts not only from ethnicity to religion, but between racialised groups. She tells us that “you’ve always got to have a scapegoat,” where scapegoating shifts across bodies at different historical moments. The circumstances leading up to the Holocaust were in part supported in the British context. Jewish minorities were portrayed as scapegoats of racial decline in fin-de-siècle Gothic discourses in Britain (see Halberstam 1995; Smith 2004). The Aliens Act 1905\textsuperscript{10} was enforced in January 1906 which restricted further Jewish immigration and illustrates how scapegoating functions to exclude certain populations from the political community and is enforced through law. At different historical junctures, shifts in Gothicisation between racialised populations have occurred in Britain in response to ‘alien invasions’ from migrant populations including nineteenth-century Jewish migration, Black post-war migrations, and later migrations from South Asia. This latter shift is significant for understanding how racialised histories inform current perceptions of Muslims in the wider national context of Britain as well as the local contexts of Bradford and Leeds.

The shifting parameters of race and religion are important for understanding the production of Gothic representations of Muslims in Britain. Following the Second World War and the demise of the British Raj, Pakistan was created in 1947 as an independent nation for Muslims from the eastern and western regions of India. As members of the Commonwealth, Pakistani immigration to Britain increased, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. Many settled in northern towns to work in the textiles industry, including Bradford. Philip Lewis (1994: 24) writes that "Muslim communities from South Asia have largely dictated public perceptions about Islam in Britain. In this regard no city has featured so centrally and consistently in shaping such attitudes as Bradford." Bradford is known in popular parlance as ‘Bradistan’ with the greatest percentage of the total population in England from Pakistan (15%, Department for Communities and Local Government 2009). 82% of the total population of Muslims in Bradford are Pakistani and 65% in Leeds (Department for Communities and Local Government 2009) which informs how Muslims are racialised in these contexts as ‘South Asian looking’ and more specifically, of Pakistani heritage.

Claire Alexander (2006: 267, 266) examines the overlapping trajectories of Muslim and South Asian identities following the 1989 Rushdie Affair and the Gulf War demonstrations through to the Bradford ‘riots’ of 1995 and 2001 using two ‘folk devils’: ‘the Asian gang’\textsuperscript{11} and ‘the fundamentalist.’ The Rushdie Affair was

\textsuperscript{10} The Aliens Act 1905 introduced immigration controls and registration for the first time in Britain. It provided the Home Secretary with overall responsibility for concerns relating to nationality and immigration. Its main objective was to contain Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe.

\textsuperscript{11} Whilst earlier accounts have associated Asian gangs with drug crime, a more recent manifestation gaining notoriety has been the Asian sex gang (more specifically, Pakistani heritage males). Mohammed Liaqat and Abid Saddique were jailed in 2011 for being the ringleaders of a gang that groomed and abused girls aged 12 to 18. This case sparked controversy after former home secretary, Jack Straw, stated that there was a “specific
important for understanding this latter figure. It involved protests in Bradford against ridicule of the Prophet Mohammed in Salman Rushdie’s (1988) novel, *The Satanic Verses*, which included burning the book and effigies of Rushdie. Modood et al. (2006) argue that these events constituted Muslims as a political community in Britain that appeared to resist inclusion within a society that was not centred on Islam (Khan 2006: 182). Despite different inflections of racial and religious identifiers, both folk devils are connected to violence and criminality and contribute to the Gothicisation of Muslims as a national threat.

Central to the shift to Islam as the current scapegoat observed by ‘Hamida’ is that Muslims are perceived to be incompatible with life in Britain, underpinned by the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis (Huntington 1996). This thesis frames Muslims’ actions so that even when acting “peacefully”, as ‘Hamida’ describes, they are seen as a threat. Since Muslims are positioned as beyond the normative boundaries of the ‘white’ (non-Muslim) Briton, they must “be changed” and brought in line with the dictates of British society. This involves subjection to methods of governance which re-work Muslim identities in normative terms comprising the moderate Muslim subject position that must differentiate itself from the violent excesses of the Islamic extremist. This category thus functions as part of the racialisation of Muslims that extends governmental control by defining the parameters under which Muslim identities can be performed. The effect is to make Muslims “more easily governable rather than more ‘British’” (Tyrrer 2008: 62-3). Whilst Alexander argues that the racialised Muslim male is the principle target, as will be revealed later, my research shows that conceptions of the Islamic terrorist also encompass the female Muslim terrorist (see also Williamson & Khiabany 2010; Franks 2000: 924).

**The Racialisation of Muslims through the Gothic Framework**

I think the faith came in later on, you know after the whole September 11th and all the rest, it became massive. Before that it wasn’t, before that you were just a “Paki…” You weren’t a Muslim, you weren’t a “raghead,” before that you were just a “simple-arse Paki…” just a “dirt Paki.” But after September 11th you became an enemy then, not someone they could bully and pick on, someone they actually despised and disliked … it was a massive turning point because people were like look at these Muslims causing trouble … and it’s hard brandishing a whole billion people because of a few. But it was you know, and I think the way the media portrayed it created such an enemy (‘Moustafa’).

‘Moustafa’s’ words show us how the Gothic operates visually. As I have discussed, the racialisation of Islamic terrorists in the British context draws on previous encounters with ‘brown bodies’ informing the ‘Pak’ identity. Prior to being identified as a Muslim, ‘Moustafa’ was ascribed with the derogatory label of “Paki” amongst British Pakistani males who “target vulnerable white girls” (*BBC News* 2011). This racialised account draws on broader understandings of South Asian Muslim cultures as misogynistic and highlights the ongoing processes of criminalisation experienced by South Asian Muslim communities in Britain.

12 “Paki” is a derogatory racial term that is used to refer to people perceived to be of South Asian origin.
“dirt Paki” and as such, identified as a (racialised) body that is already recognised as “matter out of place” (Douglas 2002: 44). The subordinate status of the “Paki” indicated by the prefixes “just a” and “simple-ar$$e” that located him within the “received schemas for racialised classification” (Tyrer 2008: 48) as less advanced than whites, enabling the hegemonic status of whiteness to remain in place.

David Tyrer (2008: 48) argues that being categorised as Muslim re-works “the language of ‘race’” and thus the “strategies of white governmentality” (see Hesse 1997) as they are applied to the governance of Britain’s internal racial colonies. This informs how the shift from ‘Paki’ to ‘Muslim’ is also paralleled by the movement from “victim” to “aggressor” status (Alexander 2006: 266). Emerging from a subordinate status in the social order, ‘Moustafa’ narrates how he is now perceived as “not someone who [non-Muslim Britons] could bully and pick on” which posits him, along with other Muslims, as a threat to the social order.

Tyrer (2008: 48) observes that attempts to re-centre ‘race’ inform the persistence of the power of whiteness to represent the Other. These practices operate through the racial profiling of Muslims via stereotyped assumptions of a “racialised regime of visuality” that “effectively constitute, regulate and determine what it is we see” (Pugliese 2006:7). ‘Moustafa’ illustrates the racialisation of the Muslim terrorist through the Gothic iconography of the “raghead” as a symbol of uncivilised and barbarous Muslim populations that is activated through a “regime of visuality”— “look at these Muslims causing trouble.” The hyper-visibility of the enemy Muslim denotes the performative power of whiteness to “produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler 1993: 2). This representational power is augmented by sustained media images of the Muslim as “such an enemy.” The enemy is abstract and de-personalised, “an enemy,” that can attach itself to anyone pertaining to the image of ‘Muslim.’ The effect is that Muslims are “brandished” en masse as trouble-makers.

**The Spectral Terrorist**

(Mis)recognition of the brown body as already a threat to the social order provides the necessary conditions for the category of Muslim to become over determined as a dangerous identity after the traumas of 9/11 and 7/7. Such conceptions have been compounded by the plethora of anti-terrorism legislation produced in Britain since 2001. These include the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Terrorism Act 2006 and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 which have legislated increasingly stringent restrictions on civil liberties and have criminalised Muslims in Britain as potential terrorists (see Fekete 2004). The emergence of the subject position of the ‘home-grown-terrorist’ following the London bombings epitomises the internal threat which Muslims are understood to present to the nation. The attacks were
reported as having been carried out by seemingly integrated ‘cleanskins’ who “plan[ned] their assaults from the cover of outwardly unremarkable existences” (Valier 2002: 322). These developments have particular significance for understanding how the culture of fear operates in Leeds following its infamous connection to 7/7 as the home to three of its perpetrators, including the leader, Mohammed Sidique Khan.

The production of the ‘monstrous Muslim’ as an “omnipresent enemy who could be anywhere, and strike at anytime, and who in fact could be ‘among us’” (Crandall & Armitage 2005: 20) is central to the operation of white terror in the Concentrationary Gothic environment. This production draws on predicates of the Gothic where, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2006: 30) argue, there is “something monstrous in this abstract, aural enemy.” Importantly, the haunting presence of an elusive yet ever present enemy functions to “prop up legitimation [of practices of white terror] where legitimation has declined”. UK counter-terrorism strategies reflect this ideological frame. In the following excerpt, ‘Zanaib’ examines how the 2011 Prevent Strategy (HM Government 2011b), the preventative strand of the UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST (HM Government 2011a), has operated. She uses the analogy of the McCarthyist witch hunt to illustrate how Muslims are criminalised and made indiscriminate targets of the (white) gaze:

I just think it’s been 10 years of real intensity and I think the UK is ... I think with this new you know having this twenty-five cities that they’ve got to be wary of it’s almost like, it’s a different type of McCarthyism so you have the witch hunts er you know the enemy is a different enemy but it’s still a witch hunt (‘Zanaib’).

Prevent has identified both Leeds and Bradford among the twenty-five cities designated as “priority areas” for tackling terrorism. The strategy contributes to the production of the “enemy” Muslim as carriers of terror within these geographical contexts that “they’ve [non-Muslims] got to be wary of.”

The use of “intensity” by ‘Zanaib’ highlights the accumulated effect that state practices have had on Muslim communities. It draws our attention to how whiteness “infuses state making” (Hunter, Swan & Grimes 2010: 409), such that it is acutely felt by those outside of whiteness who are at the receiving end of its measures. Such policies contribute to the fracturing of community relations as boundaries of inclusion/exclusion are reconstituted. A further corollary is that projecting terror onto the bodies of Muslims obscures other forms of terror. For instance, Prevent continues to target Islamic terrorism as the principle national threat despite aggressive anti-Muslim protests being held by right-wing (predominately white) extremists, the English Defence League (EDL), throughout the country, including Leeds and Bradford. Reports in the local media following the release of Prevent which identified Leeds as a “terror hotspot” (Igbal 2011) and Bradford as “at risk” (O’Rourke 2011) from Islamic extremists further contribute to constructions of Muslims as the principle national threat.

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13 This phrase gained currency in Britain following 7/7 to denote that the bombers did not fit the expected terrorist profile and were thus unknown to security services.
Historical practices of witch hunts that ‘Zanaib’s’ analogy draws from prompts us to consider how extra-legal procedures have been used to substantiate unfounded accusations against groups constructed as a threat by the state. The turn towards pre-emptive counter-terrorism measures imagines a subject where there is no subject since there is no crime, and yet there is a spectral body that haunts the scene where “imaginary future harms” (McCulloch & Pickering 2009: 2) are committed by Muslim bodies. This situation is comparable to the “ghostly moment” described by Jacques Derrida which involves a “return to the body, but to a body that is more abstract than ever” (1994: 126). Likewise, the spectral terrorist that precedes the offence is always already Muslim. This situation as David Tyrer (2010: 9) argues, underpins the “racist’s fantasies about the other” where the conflation of one Muslim with all others is “central to racism itself.” What is significant for understanding the state of exception is that terror for Muslims comes not from fear of punishment following disobedience of the law but “from knowing that there is no law to transgress” (Diken & Laustsen 2002: 291). It is this situation which re-defines the parameters of risk experienced by Muslims within the Concentrationary Gothic environment.

Following 7/7, heightened fear of being subjected to police surveillance and home raids for being identified as Muslim without committing an offence haunted participants’ experiences as an impending possibility. In the following excerpt, ‘Leila’ discusses the fear she felt whilst living in Leeds of being targeted by the police as a terrorist. Significantly, as a ‘visible Muslim’ woman, she illustrates that the terrorist profile does not only affect Muslim males since the women in my study also feared being identified as terrorist suspects:

There was a time when I felt really scared and I even felt quite scared from the police because they were raiding into people’s homes and just dragging them away in the middle of the night. And I was really frightened that that could happen to anyone at anytime. Because they were randomly going into Muslim people’s homes that were no risk at all and just maybe, you know, attended a demonstration and as a result of that they were getting victims—you know, targeted as being a terrorist and you know their homes were raided. And a lot of people have been kidnapped in the middle of the night and that made me very frightened for a time (‘Leila’).

The haunting fear of being dragged away “in the middle of the night” draws together elements of the Gothic and the concentrationary. The concentrationary imaginary encompasses bodies being taken against their will and made indiscriminate targets of racial violence. In conjunction, darkness has historically featured in Gothic texts as the repository of fear where social order is transgressed and humanity’s baser instincts, which are ordinarily repressed in the light of day, are revealed through torment, punishment and corruption (Cavallaro 2002: 27). Moreover, darkness is the locus of unrepresentability. The nature in which white terror escapes identification as terror in dominant knowledge (hooks 1992: 174) informs its operation as Steve Garner (2007: 14) observes as an “unchecked and untrammelled authority to exert its will; the power to invent and change the rules and transgress them with impunity.” Joseph Pugliese’s (2007: 3) examination of the torture at Abu Ghraib provides such an example of how white terror is able to disassociate itself from
accusations of terror. He refers to the “white mythologies that the west never tires of telling itself: of the temporary descent into darkness ... that is always ready to be redeemed by the white light of official procedure, investigation and reports.”

As Michael Gunder (2008: 194) contends, it is from the “non-space of non-representation” that those subjected to (the fear of) white terror experience “the affect of fear and anxiety [which] arises and causes psychic pain.” This is because fear results from the inability to anticipate or control the risks from white terror. ‘Leila’ describes how raids are “randomly” carried out, informing her haunting sense of fear that “it could happen to anyone at anytime.” Fear under such conditions functions as a spectral phenomenon that troubles spatio-temporal boundaries since, as Sara Ahmed (2004: 65) discusses, it “impresses upon us in the present, as an anticipated pain in the future.” The ambiguous and enduring state of being at risk over-turns the boundaries of real and imagined fears since the feeling of fear in the absence of an object of fear is nevertheless experienced as a physical reaction in the present. ‘Leila’s’ present safety thus offers little protection because in such instances, fear is intensified by “the ‘passing by’ of the object” (65). This helps to explain how Leila experiences fear as a persistent affective state: “that made me very frightened for a time.”

As Martin Heidegger (1962: 179-80) discusses:

That which is detrimental, as something that threatens us, is not yet within striking distance, but it is coming close ... As it draws close, this ‘it can, and yet in the end it may not’ becomes aggravated. We say, 'It is fearsome.' This implies that what is detrimental as coming close by carries with it the patent possibility that it may stay away and pass us by; but instead of lessening or extinguishing our fearing, this enhances it.

In situations where adhering to the law is no protection from the force of law, and where pre-emptive measures are legitimated against those (Muslim) bodies profiled as terrorists, there is always the risk that being targeted as a terrorist is within “striking distance.” The mobility of fear, drawing closer in certain situations only to pass by, heightens rather than reduces fear.

Having demonstrated that terror is racialised, it follows that the state of exception imposed by the juridical-political practices of whiteness will have a differential effect on those defined as outside whiteness. Cheryl Harris provides an excellent genealogy of the performance of white terror through law. She explains how white identity operates as a form of property that defines social relations that are legitimated within law as “a type of status property” (1993: 1714). A central feature of this practice is the ability to exclude non-whites from the privileges of whiteness and assigning them “a separate and unequal place in the law” (Razack 2008: 150). Under the state of exception, the boundaries of risk are re-drawn. This is because the profile of being Muslim precedes ‘Leila,’ enabling her to be subsumed under the rubric of ‘risky Other’ based on racialised ways of seeing. As Judith Butler (2004: 77) notes, although categorising somebody as dangerous “is considered a state prerogative ... it is also a potential licence to prejudicial perceptions and a virtual mandate to heightened racialized ways of looking and judging in the name of national security.” ‘Leila’ observes
that it is not the actions of particular Muslims who are the target, but anyone pertaining to the profile of Muslim (male and female) which enables the police to raid Muslims’ homes who “pose no risk at all.” The police feature not as figures of protection, but as operatives of the system of white terror who put ‘Leila,’ and other Muslims, at risk. It is here that the Gothic nature of the law is exemplified in monstrous police powers. These include ‘shoot-to-kill’ practices under Operation KRATOS. 14 As Garner (2007: 14) writes, “the arbitrary imposition of life and death is one end of the spectrum of power relations that whiteness enacts.” Hence we can extend Shildrick’s (2002: 1) presentation of vulnerability as a “failure of self-protection” by identifying practices of white terror which produce the conditions by which certain bodies are made vulnerable through, as ‘Leila’ discusses, “getting [its] victims.”

Such policies are underpinned by racist fantasies of the Other that erase their individual identities by pre-emptively constructing them as dangerous bodies, as spectral terrorists. This connection is explored by Pugliese (2006: 9, 7) in his discussion of the mistaken police shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in 2007 under KRATOS. He describes how the racially determined visual asynchrony between self-perception and how the Other is perceived enabled Menezes to appear as “Orientalist spectre, terrorist phantom, suicide bomber” that comprised an extended signification of an already dangerously coded body, “an ambulatory ticking bomb,” that required that he be shot dead.

“Unlivable” Bodies

The Menezes case provides a significant illustration of how the re-drawing of borders separating (un)safe spaces accompanies the redefinition of risk experienced by those (mis)recognised as ‘Muslim’ where everyday spaces become potential sites of racial violence, and the borders which define who (does not) belong are destabilised. Under such conditions, abjection works to separate “unlivable” and “uninhabitable” zones of social life (Butler 1993: 3). This situation can be explored through ‘Moustafa’s’ account of how a mundane altercation in a supermarket car-park between a white woman and a young Muslim girl led to the aggressive declaration by the white woman: “you’re all terrorists why don’t you just go back home and kill yourselves.”

The practice of classifying someone as ‘out of place’ who should thus “go back home” are practices which are based on three interconnected nationalistic practices examined by Ghassen Hage (1998: 28). These include “an image of national space,” “an image of the nationalist himself or herself as master of this national space” and “an image of the ‘ethnic/racial other’ as a mere object within this space.” Here, the white woman attempts to achieve “mastery over the nation” by turning the Muslim girl into an object that can be removed from that space. The Muslim girl’s exclusion is based on a denial of a common humanity

where the “you’re,” “you” and “yourselves” operate to mark a symbolic boundary between the white woman and the Muslim girl.

In accordance with Kristeva’s abjection, the Muslim made abject has “only one quality ... that of being opposed to I” (1982: 1). Unable to be assimilated into the social space that the white woman inhabits, the girl’s legitimacy to belong is called into question through the invocation for her to “go back home.” This banishment is not enough since the abject recurs because it resists expulsion. By being re-inscribed as a terrorist, she poses a perpetual threat to the nation which must be continuously resisted, hence the use of the plural “kill yourselves.” Yet whilst Kristeva abjection posits the abject as posing a threat to the subject, the ontological violence to which the Muslim girl is subjected comprises an act of terror. The Muslim girl is produced as an unlivable life that must be expelled, not as a form of protection, but which enables the white woman to assert her dominance.

Shildrick’s (2002: 1) argument that vulnerability can “belong to anyone of us” is inadequate for understanding the operation of vulnerability where lives are deemed unlivable. As Butler notes (2004: 43), vulnerability requires recognition for it to “come into play in an ethical encounter” (43). Claiming that all Muslims are terrorists prevents Muslims from occupying the position of vulnerable which is reserved for the white subject, presenting a challenge to Shildrick’s claim. It legitimates a violent policing of social space to demarcate (un)livable and thus (un)grievable lives as examined here. What is required therefore is an alternative knowledge framework that can incorporate the terror experienced by Muslims as bodies made vulnerable within the Concentrationary Gothic environment.

**Conclusion: Inter-bodily-relational**

I think there is fear, there is definitely fear and it was so horrid what happened in 2005 but the sad thing is that ... people failed to acknowledge that there was a mixed bunch of people that died ... and I think sometimes people forgot that and people needed to be constantly reminded (‘Zanaib’).

This article has developed the Concentrationary Gothic as a productive framework for explicating how whiteness operates as terror in the ‘War on Terror’ in Britain through its ability to conceal practices of white terror by Gothicising the (racialised) Muslim Other as ‘monstrous.’ The Gothicisation of Muslims draws on earlier racialised conceptions of South Asian, particularly Pakistani cultures, as ‘out of place’ in Britain. Challenging the axiomatic connection between Muslims and terrorism reveals that the binary of civiliser/terroriser informing the ‘War on Terror’ context is artificial and must be constantly maintained as the “fantasy of whiteness” (hooks 1992: 174).

The culture of fear discussed by participants result from the indiscriminate targeting of Muslims through state and non-state practices where Muslims experience themselves as a body to be feared but which also feels fear. These experiences challenge the civiliser/terroriser divide operating within the ‘War on Terror’ and supports the development of what I term an ‘inter-bodily-relational’
approach for understanding how terror moves between bodies. This relational and bodily understanding of fear offers a more complex assessment of how racial terror is mobilised affectively through the ‘War on Terror.’

‘Zanaib’s’ quote that begins this section identifies how affective relations between bodies need to be re-thought so that fear can be understood as a condition that arises from a common experience of vulnerability to terrorist attacks. To enable recognition of the “mixed bunch of people that died” during the 7/7 terrorist attacks requires that vulnerability be recognised as an ontology that can unite rather than divide people from each other. The failure to acknowledge the vulnerability of Others is constitutive of the sadness ‘Zanaib’ expresses following from an asymmetry of grief where not all bodies are accounted for as grievable.

Such acknowledgement of the vulnerability of the Other is necessary as Butler (2004: 43) contends, for an “ethical encounter” to come into being. It requires the adoption of a different frame of reference based on an inter-bodily-relational approach that can enable us to understand how our ontologies implicate us in the lives of others and are constitutive, and constitute relations between us. Shildrick takes this contention one step further in her ethical proposal that requires acknowledging vulnerabilities “in our own embodied being” so that we can recognise that the monstrous “cannot be confined in the place of the other” but is also the “other within” (2002: 4, my italics). This inter-bodily-relational understanding of terror is crucial for challenging the asymmetries that would deny the existence of white terror as a significant presence experienced by Muslims in contemporary Britain.

Author Note

Madeline-Sophie Abbas is a PhD candidate at the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom in the department of Sociology and Social Policy where she also teaches Critical Race Studies and sociological understandings of identity, difference and inequality. Her research explores the experiences of Muslims living in contemporary Britain and engages with debates surrounding race, whiteness, Islamophobia, governance, citizenship, identity and power. She is involved in activist work and is a board member for JUST West Yorkshire, which promotes racial justice and protection of civil liberties. She is also editor/contributor to the book The Big Society: The Big Divide? which challenges the effects of the Coalition Government’s ‘Big Society’ agenda on Britain’s racial communities. Contact: msa030908@hotmail.co.uk

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NEW TERRITORIES IN CRITICAL WHITENESS STUDIES

Locating Douglass Fitch: The Roots of Colour and Activist Traditions of United States Critical Whiteness Studies

Say Burgin
University of Leeds

This paper has two related aims: first, to highlight the privileging of academic knowledges within United States critical whiteness studies (with an understanding that such knowledge is not wholly distinguishable from other forms of knowledge); second, to underscore the necessity of recognising and engaging with the activist roots of critical studies of US whiteness, particularly those within black freedom efforts. Reflecting an understanding that personal experiences often serve as the building blocks of knowledge, I envelope my own experiences as a white racial justice activist and academic into my arguments. I illustrate the significance of activist knowledges on whiteness by examining the contributions of two black freedom activists—Douglass Fitch, a black reverend, and Bob Terry, a white minister—who lived and were active in Detroit in the late 1960s and early 70s. By asking how these activists came to interrogate whiteness and how they understood it, I demonstrate that they prefigured many of critical whiteness studies’ key tenets developed from the early 1990s on. Without incorporating and building off of these activist knowledges, I argue that the field not only moves at the snail’s pace of the academic imaginary, but also reproduces the racial power relations that the field as a whole attempts to challenge.

Keywords: Whiteness Studies, knowledge construction, Black Power, Douglass Fitch, Bob Terry

Introduction: Finding Douglass Fitch through Bob Terry

When I began my postgraduate studies in critical race history several years ago, I moved not only eastward—from the Rustbelt of the United States to the Yorkshire Dales of England—but also across occupational frontiers. I had been a community organiser in Pittsburgh, working largely with youth on service
learning projects, and much of the rest of my time was devoted to feminist and racial justice organising within what my friends and I simplistically called ‘the radical community’. In the months before I left Pittsburgh, I had been co-leading a discussion group on racism for whites¹ within this community. As white individuals, we felt that it was important that we teach ourselves and each other about race and racism within the US and not look to peoples of colour to do this schooling for us. In this small group, we tried to educate ourselves about the social construction of race and the history of white supremacy in the US. We debated the racist and classist dimensions of cultural appropriation and gentrification, and as we read about the intersections of race, sex, class and sexuality, we reluctantly trudged through conversations about how we had marginalised peoples of colour in our feminist, environmental or queer social justice work. Throughout these ten weeks of learning (un-learning, re-learning), we relied on a broad range of readings—articles from leading scholars like Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) and George Lipsitz (2006), memoirs and essays by grassroots activists such as Mab Segrest (1994), and blogs from the likes of AngryBrownButch (‘Jack’ 2006, 2007). More than a diversity of perspectives on racism and racial justice, this varied and rich body of writings offered an array of ideas about racist practices and systems, including many views on how to undo these systems. These ideas, these different explanations for the realities of racism and racial justice, were not wholly disconnected from each other though. Rather, like the hundreds of bridges that famously landscape Pittsburgh, these ideas were constructed for similar purposes and often seemed a great deal alike, even while they spanned different social terrains.

Six months after this discussion group, now steeped in a history master’s course on the other side of the Atlantic, I had largely given up the community centre for the library and the workshops for the classroom. However, my interests, which were now framed as scholarly, were still focused on the processes of teaching and (re- or un-)learning that white individuals in the US underwent in order to more fully understand racism, usually as part of a struggle against it. I read a provocatively titled book, For Whites Only, that had been penned in 1970 by a white man I had never heard of—Robert (Bob) Terry. Here, Terry proposed the development of a “new white consciousness: an awareness of our whiteness and its role in race problems” (17) amongst whites as crucial to dismantling US racism. The ideas in For Whites Only formed the crux of Terry’s racial justice work. As a self-described “social justice change agent” (Terry 1973: 420) working for a Christian-based organisation in Detroit in the late 1960s and early 70s, Terry designed and led workshops on racism and race relations for white-collar management in the city’s large corporations. More than this, as a highly-educated, white and middle-class man coming to racial consciousness through both the larger Black Power movement and within the Detroit-specific context of race rebellions and deindustrialisation, he was concerned with the role of US

¹ I use the terms ‘whites’, ‘blacks’ and ‘peoples of colour’ primarily because of their common usage in the US context. I use the term ‘peoples of colour’, as opposed to ‘people of colour’, as a reminder that this term refers to numerous different groups of people who cannot be homogenised. I use this term rather than ‘non-white peoples’ to avoid defining different peoples in relation to what they are not.
whites in the perpetuation and dismantling of racist practices and systems (Burgin 2009).

As I excitedly poured over the pages of Terry’s book, I was struck in two ways. First, although the seminars he led were surely precursors to today’s ubiquitous diversity and sensitivity trainings (Burgin 2009), Terry’s racial analysis was far more radical than many similar workshops I had either attended or read about. His work focused heavily upon relations of racial power within institutions, policies, cultural mediums, and political systems. He talked very little about the kinds of overt racism (e.g., racial epithets) that are dwelt upon in so many contemporary workshops. Even the language he used—consciousness, redistributing power, white racism—belied any assumptions I carried that Terry’s consultative work must have simply been part of what Mohanty (1993: 43) calls “the race industry”. The lucrative enterprise that “is responsible for the management, commodification, and domestication of race”. To me, Terry starkly represented what Meyerson and Scully (1995) refer to as a “tempered radical”, which is to say that he was committed to his social justice organisation at the same time that his deep commitment to racial justice often found him frustrated with the culture of that organisation and its slowness in taking up the anti-racist mantle. Still, I wanted to know the source of his radicalism.

In my attempts to understand the influences that came to bear on this now-deceased figure, the mark of Black Power—noted by its insistence on political self-determination and pride in black culture and aesthetics (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 1966)—became obvious. Terry’s discussion on the importance of self-determination—“a recognition of one’s own power and importance” (1970: 31)—and of the “structurally violent” (79) patterns of racism enacted on peoples of colour in the US echoed for instance Carmichael and Hamilton’s ideas in Black Power (1968). I did not immediately notice Terry’s reliance on these shifting goals in the black freedom struggle, however. I initially glossed over the book’s dedication: “To Douglass Fitch, a black man who confronted me with my whiteness and challenged me to come to terms with it” (5, emphasis in original). In my quest to ascertain the roots of Terry’s radicalism, I returned to this statement. A Methodist pastor and black freedom activist, Douglass Fitch, I later learnt, had been hired in 1968 by the Detroit Industrial Mission (DIM) as that organisation’s first black staff member, and Fitch’s racial insights profoundly influenced Terry (Terry 1973; Burgin 2009). Not only had he “challenged” Terry and others at DIM to “come to terms” with whiteness, he had captured the ideological shift represented by Black Power as “new black consciousness” (Fitch 1969; Terry 1973: 356, 390).

While my first observation was made through the lens of my activist experiences in Pittsburgh, my second, more worrying observation arose as I thought of Terry and Fitch’s work in relation to the academic field with which I had become increasingly engaged—critical whiteness studies. If Terry, Fitch and I had been working towards the same goal—namely, raising the racial consciousness of a specific group of white individuals in order to propel them into US racial justice activity—was this an indication that white racial justice activism had not evolved much in the past four decades? If so, why? Though I was not as-yet sure why,
what seemed clear to me was that educational endeavours like those Terry, Fitch and I had led continued to be important in ongoing struggles against white racial dominance in the US. However, I was still puzzled as to why I had never heard of Terry, despite the fact that his ideas and his work strongly resonated within both the readings my small group had engaged and in the contemporary scholarship on whiteness. And, now thoroughly steeped in the academic study of whiteness, it was his absence in this latter body of work that particularly troubled me. What could explain the absence of this activist’s ideas from critical whiteness scholarship in the US?

This article reflects my awareness that the issues and questions that were raised for me throughout the above experiences are related to larger questions about the kinds of knowledge that are privileged within academia in general and US whiteness studies more specifically. I have come to this realisation not only through my experiences transitioning from activist to academic spaces, but also by engaging with the rich tradition of critiquing the power relations embedded within the production of academic knowledge on race. The ideas that I construct here build on this tradition. This is to say that the questions that were raised for me while reading Terry’s book and discovering the roots of his ideas in Black Power were not necessarily specific to my experiences; rather, as I began to engage with writings that critically examined the (re)production of race knowledge in the academy, I started to see the ways in which my previous ignorance of this important tradition was itself in part a reflection of the academy’s practice of marginalising or minimising certain kinds of knowledge. Despite the fact that US whiteness studies remains part of the academy’s critical tradition, with few exceptions (Leonardo 2004; Swan 2010; Pederson & Samaluk 2012) the academy itself has not been a central concern within this field.

**Academic critical whiteness studies in the United States**

I maintain that US whiteness studies overlooks or marginalises non-academic knowledges, especially activist knowledge, to its own detriment. I frame this article in terms of my own personal experience so as to situate myself as a specific knower, one with roots in racial justice and feminist activism and presently resident within the United Kingdom academy. I understand my activist experiences, as much as my postgraduate studies, to have shaped my scholarly inquiry, including this article. This is to say that the race knowledge I produce here has been constituted by both activist and academic processes—processes that have sometimes intertwined and sometimes remained separate. Though the academic study of whiteness has expanded its focus (traditionally around the US, UK, and Australia) and now includes a variety of other contexts (O’Connell 2010; Steyn & Conway 2010; Ribeiro Corossacz 2012), in this article I focus on whiteness studies in the US because it has been my experiences with US activist and academic traditions that have produced the ideas set forth here. This is not to say that I do not utilise the work of whiteness scholars outside of the US or that transnational trends have not developed (Ahmed 2004; Nayak 2007; Hunter et al 2010; Pederson & Samaluk 2012); I acknowledge that US whiteness studies does not stand in for the field globally. I am concerned with US whiteness studies
not simply because I engage with it. I am convinced of its potential to be part of what Banks (1993: 5) has referred to as a “transformative tradition” of knowledge within the academy, one which shifts dominant paradigms and epistemologies, challenges canons, and produces social change. Moreover, I concur with Steyn and Conway’s (2010: 285) contention: “Illuminating whiteness invokes the question of what political or social strategy is needed to provoke change”. While I do not want to exaggerate the transformative possibilities that I believe lay within this field, critically investigating whiteness can propel progressive change and hopefully promote racial justice—in our political, social and intellectual worlds. I maintain that this potential may be more easily fulfilled when and if the field begins a more open exchange with activist knowledge on whiteness, particularly those stemming from freedom struggles led by peoples of colour.

Critical whiteness studies across the globe has “been tracking its own development in the last two decades with some interest” (Steyn & Conway 2010: 283). Within the US, such cautious appraising has largely concerned itself with the field’s purpose, limitations and legitimacy (Ignatiev 1997; Wiegman 1999; Hill 2004). I offer a different kind of intervention or critique. I seek to understand the connections between the field of US whiteness studies, the production of different knowledges on whiteness, and the rich history that critiques the production of academic knowledge on race. In particular, I aim to highlight the detrimental effects of privileging certain kinds of knowledge—namely academic knowledge—over others within this field and ask what we might gain if scholars put to greater use non-academic knowledges, particularly knowledge produced through racial justice activism. A driving question throughout will be: What does the privileging of academic knowledges within critical whiteness studies signify? In this essay, I take Banks’ (1993: 5) definition of knowledge as “the way a person [or specified group] explains or interprets reality”. Knowledge thus represents the meaning that is made of experiences, events, and social and political relations.

Below I discuss the relationship between racial justice activism and US whiteness studies before considering the epistemological practice of ‘objectivity’ within the academe as a key site of contestation. I outline the effects that such a practice has on the production of academic knowledges on race and racism, and how it has given rise to a tradition of critiquing the production of academic knowledge on race that has taken place within the academy itself. This helps me to contextualise the problem of privileging academic knowledge on whiteness within larger problematic practices in the academy’s production of race knowledge, and it situates my critique within the literature that draws attention to and challenges those practices. I then further explore the roots of Bob Terry’s work, particularly For Whites Only, in the US black freedom struggle of the late 1960s and early 70s. I conclude by interrogating the connections between these two practices—academic insistence on objectivity and exclusions of activist knowledge within critical whiteness studies.
Locating racial justice activism in critical whiteness studies

Knowledge does not exist in a vacuum but rather reflects knowers’ (or a knower’s) positions within various sets of power relations, as well as knowers’ values and priorities (Foucault 1980; Gordon et al 1990; Collins 1991). As I discuss in greater detail below, many scholars before me have detailed the racial—and, often, racist—implications of the academy’s mainstream epistemologies and its historical construction of knowledge on race. These academics (Gordon et al 1990; Collins 1991; Banks 1993; Scheurich & Young 1997) have pushed for the inclusion of alternative knowledges on race and alternative ways of knowing about race within the academic world. Moreover, many of these same scholars have shown how their ideas about race and racism are shaped by their personal experiences of both enduring and struggling against racism. As Collins (1991: 5-6) wrote: “This dialectic of oppression and activism, the tension between the suppression of Black women’s ideas and our intellectual activism in the face of that suppression, comprises the politics of Black feminist thought.” In situating her theorising within struggles against the suppression of her own and other black feminists’ thought, Collins points to the ways in which black feminist knowledge is constituted by both activist and academic processes.

Collins thus shows that activism and academia are not distinctive spheres and do not always create different bodies of knowledge. In this essay, I distinguish activist knowledge from academic knowledge by understanding the former’s production through sites of resistance or struggle, in particular social movements, groups and organisations concerned with racial justice. I do this even while I acknowledge that there are, in fact, deep connections between the production of activist and academic knowledges. Apart from activism’s moulding of some of the political contours of academic institutions and intellectual processes (Collins 1991; Banks 1993), these connections are attested to by the number of academic fields that have roots in racial justice struggles. Foucault (1980) locates the critical tradition within sites of struggle. Banks (1993: 5) recognises a “transformative tradition” within the US academy and situates it within the move towards “ethnic studies and multicultural education” that began in the 1970s. US ethnic studies—including Chicano/a, Native American, African-American, and other areas of study—were established through struggles by students (most of whom were of colour) who demanded that universities instruct students on the histories and contemporary realities of minoritised racial groups within the US (Okihiro 1989; Yang 2000). In the same way, women’s studies in the US got its start through a burgeoning demand from women’s liberationists insisting on the development of courses pertaining to women’s historical and current social and political situations (Boxer 1982). That these fields persistently face marginalisation within universities means that they continue to rely on activism for their survival (Sexton & Wilderson 1999), even while a number of activists and academics alike point to the ways in which these fields have not done enough to subvert dominant power relations of race, class and gender (Thompson 2001: 207).

In many ways, then, academic knowledge owes much to activist ideas, processes and entities, even though such acknowledgement is not always forthcoming. For
instance, in my time as an undergraduate student of both women’s studies and US racial and multicultural studies (at a US institution), the roots of these academic fields in women’s, black freedom, Chicano/a and other liberation struggles were rarely recognised. True, histories of these movements were taught in many courses, but they were conceptualised as separate from, even parallel to, the academic activity we were carrying on. Meyer (2002: 20) identifies academic ‘professionalism’ as a key force in the deteriorating “divisions between activists and academics”. As Maddison and Scalmer (2006: 38) point out, the creation of academic knowledge through and with activist processes and knowledge has changed as academics’ energy and attention have strayed from “the passion and tumult of the streets” and been given over to the “grants to win and papers to publish; theoretical accounts to fill out; vain enemies to puncture”. As a result, “[t]he accumulation of knowledge ha[s] become an end in itself”. Even while many academics remain active in social movements, including racial justice movements, and even see their work, as Collins does, as part of activist processes, on the whole there exist deep divisions between the academic and activist realms. Academic work has severed many (though certainly not all) of its earlier, intimate connections to activist processes (Maddison & Scalmer 2006), and this includes the co-engagement of the knowledge produced within each realm. Despite Collins’ (1991) insistence upon the centrality of activism to the production of black feminist thought in and out of the academy, in many ways the production of academic knowledge on race in the US has divorced itself from its activist roots and from a parallel body of knowledge that has been created through direct experiences within contemporary and historical racial justice struggles.

As for US critical whiteness studies, it is largely taken for granted that the field lacks activist traditions. As a whole, critical whiteness studies has aimed at “interrogating [whiteness as] the centre of power and privilege from which racialization emanates but which operates more or less invisibly as it constructs itself as both the norm and ideal of what it means to be human” (Steyn & Conway 2010: 284). Importantly, though, academics reveal whiteness “not as a thing in itself, but as an ongoing process, a way of becoming”, and in doing so, they have produced important “theoretical trajectories and debates” in the academy (Hunter et al 2010: 410). These scholars have recognised that the academy’s critical examination of whiteness, though certainly a more prevalent practice in recent decades, has a long history that most scholars date back to W.E.B. du Bois’ work on Black Reconstruction in the US (Leonardo 2002; Twine & Gallagher 2008; Hunter et al 2010). Twine and Gallagher (2008) have influentially conceptualised three waves of critical whiteness studies, with the third including current work within the field.

While helpful in terms of historically grounding the field, Twine and Gallagher’s framework itself points to the ways in which the US academy’s whiteness knowledge fails to incorporate ideas produced through racial justice activism. Though black feminists (Lorde 1984; hooks 1992; Morrison 1992) whose work, like Collins’, may be understood as a production of both activist and academic processes, are often included within what Ahmed (2004) referred to as “critical genealogies of whiteness studies” (see also Twine & Gallagher 2008; Steyn &
Conway 2010), this conceptualisation of three waves of whiteness studies does not account for the many significant moments in which whiteness has been interrogated outside of the academy, particularly at times during the US black freedom movement, when the political structures and policies of whiteness were highlighted and contested on a daily basis. That critical whiteness scholars have largely overlooked or ignored the knowledge on whiteness produced through these political contestations, for me, explains how I could immerse myself in critical whiteness studies yet know nothing of Bob Terry. I will return later to the question of how I could not know of Douglass Fitch.

Objectivity, power and race

Academics have for some time worked to illuminate the connections between power, academic knowledge production, and race. Though in reviewing this literature—some of it from the later 1960s, some from the past few years—I collapse the larger story of its development, such a survey contextualises my critique within this body of literature and illuminates gaps within the academic production of knowledge on whiteness. Much of this literature was produced over several decades in the fields of multicultural education, ethnic studies, and feminist and critical race theory, and it first occurred alongside or built on challenges to dominant academic epistemologies mounted by philosophers (Foucault 1980), educators (Freire 1970), and feminist theorists (Harding 1986; Haraway [1991] 2004). A key contribution of these thinkers, as well as those more pointedly interested in questions of race, came in the refutation of the mainstream academic principle of ‘objectivity’ (Stanfield 1985; Gordon et al 1990; Collins 1991; Haraway [1991] 2004). Building off earlier critiques (Freire 1970; Foucault 1980), a number of critical race academics challenged the notion that one could ever assume an objective stance, demonstrating how knowledge is formed by the social and cultural history of the society from which it emerges (Gordon et al 1990; Collins 1991) and how epistemologies, or how knowers interpret reality, also reflect the societies and subjectivities they represent (Stanfield 1985; Scheurich & Young 1997). Moreover, embedded within a given epistemology and body of knowledge are that society’s relations of power—the subjugating or privileging certain types of knowledge and certain knowers. Knowledge thus becomes a site in which those relations of power may be reproduced (Foucault 1980; Collins 1991). This is all to say, in the first place, that knowledge of any kind is a construction that is highly influenced by its producer(s), the socio-political landscape from which it stems, and that landscape’s power relations. For critical race academics this means, in the second place, that academic knowledge on race is both constituted by and constitutive of racial power relations, including systems and practices of racial injustice and resistances to those systems and practices.

Racial dominance is often perpetuated in and through academic epistemologies in ways that are productive of racist practices and knowledges within and outside of the academy, and the invocation of supposedly objective researcher stances often exacerbates such “epistemological racism” (Scheurich & Young 1997: 4). The marginalisation or suppression of race knowledge and the production of this
knowledge have been problems that have particularly impacted upon scholars of colour (Collins 1991; Banks 1993, 1995). Within the US academic corpus, which has historically comprised mostly of white men, Collins (1991: 201) says, “white male interests pervade the thematic content of traditional scholarship”. Scheurich and Young (1997: 9) point out that “the nature of the university and of legitimated scholarship and knowledge, and the specifications of different research methodologies are all cultural products of white social history”. Many academics ardently defend against the de-centring of these interests and methods. Patton (2004), a black woman academic woman, describes an instance in which a white, male colleague (‘Wayne’) in her department advised her (so to speak) on her research interests in race, which he said were not of interest to anyone. Here, ‘Wayne’ seemingly takes on an objective position whereby he speaks for an imagined research community. ‘Wayne’ does not own these sentiments as his own subjective interpretation but ascribes them to an unspecified community. This allows him to devalue and marginalise academic research and knowledge on race under the guise of a ‘neutral’, value-free viewpoint. Patton’s account intimates the connections between constructions of ignorance with regard to race and the putative objectivity of researchers. Swan (2010), a white academic woman, more directly hits upon such linkages. Her experience with an academic audit, in which she and two other researchers presented their findings on the increase in “multiple forms of racism” (492) within an education sector, entailed the auditors “call[ing] for quantification” (497) in the face of the researcher’s “messy” (496) and supposedly unreliable qualitative methods. “[T]he call to number the research functioned as a check on what was seen as highly subjective and political research”, Swan writes, and as such it “constitutes a form of wilful ignorance”, wherein data on race and racism is deliberately disregarded (496-97). Thus, epistemic ‘objectivity’ can be deployed in various ways that work to marginalise or discount academics’ knowledge on race and racism.

Academic knowledge on race also often ‘distorts’ realities and experiences (Collins 1991: 201; see also Stanfield 1985; Collins 1991; Banks 1995; Mills 1997). The evolution of historiography on US slavery clearly exemplifies this. Elkins (1959), white and male, wrote a highly influential and almost apologist account of slavery, in which he posited that the institution infantilised black subjects and created docile ‘Sambos’. Revisionists (Davis 1972; Parish 1989) have debunked the Sambo thesis and showed it to be “partly a black performance, partly a white invention” (Parish 1989: 69). Nonetheless, Elkins’ ideas went on to influence significant policymakers, such as Daniel Moynihan, whose infamous 1965 report, The Negro Family, blamed slavery for what he said was the perversion of the natural (read: nuclear) family order within black communities (namely, the development of matriarchal patterns). As Collins (1991: 74-75) points out, the image of the black matriarch bolsters relations of gender and racial power in ways that perpetuate the oppression of black women. The US academy’s production of race knowledge, thus, often distorts realities about peoples of colour in ways that “rationalize and justify colonialism, expansionism” and a host of other relations of global racial domination (Patton 2004: 189).
Meanwhile, research into US white experiences and realities are often seen as un-raced, representative of humanity and/or objective (Gordon et al 1990; Banks 1993, 1995; Scheurich & Young 1997). This tendency was made plain to me one day as I attended the talk of a white male historian who was presenting his research on the singer-songwriter Johnny Cash. He argued that Cash attracted such a wide fan-base because his moderate political views on issues like the war in Vietnam were representative of the US public and thus conferred on him a sense of ‘authenticity’. I posited that Cash’s whiteness and maleness also lent the singer a sense of ‘authenticity’ that neither his US public or this researcher read in him; after all, we were not speaking about any of the prominent, politically active black musicians of the time. This academic’s erasure of Cash’s raced and classed positions ascribed objectivity to Cash, a practice which, as Stanfield (1985: 389) argues, “is related intrinsically to the creation and reproduction of hegemonic racial domination”.

Significantly, the critical scholarly work outlined above has intervened in these normative productions of the US academy’s knowledge on race. Many of these scholars continue to mount such interventions through the creation of what Banks (1993: 9, 7) has referred to as “transformative academic knowledge” which “challenge[s] mainstream academic knowledge and expand[s] and substantially revise[s] established canons, paradigms, theories, explanations, and research methods”. I would argue that, at its best, critical whiteness studies forms part of this “transformative academic knowledge” in that it is, as Ahmed (2004) says, “deeply invested in producing anti-racist forms of knowledge and pedagogy”. Developing off of earlier attempts to interrupt supposedly ‘objective’ practices, scholars have advanced a number of researcher practices for countering the epistemic problems manifest in the academy’s mainstream research on race. These include standpoint theory and positionality. Standpoint theory empowers those subjugated by systems of oppression to develop ideas on these systems and argues that the oppressed have the best, or at least an exceptional, view of these systems (Freire 1970; hooks [1990] 2004; Harding 2004). In Harding’s (2004: 4) words, standpoint theory posits that the “social location” of the oppressed “could be the source of illuminating knowledge claims not only about themselves but also the rest of nature and social relations”.

Positionality requires that researchers explicitly position themselves—particularly in terms of their racial, gender, class and other identities—in relation to their research interests, methods, and ‘subjects’. In direct opposition to what Haraway ([1991] 2004: 86, 88) famously referred to as the “god-trick” of objectivity—“the distancing of the knowing subject from everybody and everything in the interests of unfettered power”—she argued for “situated and embodied knowledges” that can be held accountable to the power relations that inform them (see also Banks 1993).

Importantly, scholars have argued that sites other than the academe have often been important to the production of race knowledge (Collins 1991; Banks 1993), and they have sometimes emphasised activist locations in this. While Banks (1993: 6) has pointed out the role of homes/families, the media and schools in the (re)production of what he refers to as “personal/cultural knowledge” on race, Collins (1991: 31) highlights the importance of “alternative institutional
locations” such as the club movement in the creation of US black feminist thought. Gordon, Miller and Rollock (1990: 18) argue that “new or better insight, and often discovery are likely to come from atypical and nonconformist ways of viewing and thinking” and that “the creative thinker and the renaissance scholar must utilise multiple ways of knowing” (18). By recognising the value in engaging with multiple knowledges and epistemologies—including those produced and applied through activist processes—US whiteness studies may indeed arrive at ‘new or better insights’.

Reading Black Power through new white consciousness

Bob Terry was an ordained minister, who, from 1967 to 1972, worked at the faith-based consultancy Detroit Industrial Mission. Founded in 1956, DIM had striven to minister to the industrial sector by pointing to the ways in which a Christian ethic could be applied therein, but when in July 1967 Detroit witnessed the country’s largest race rebellion, DIM shifted its focus towards racial justice (Terry 1973; Burgin 2009). DIM began to design and facilitate antiracism workshops for white-collar management within Detroit’s largest industries. These workshops usually formed part of a larger consultation wherein DIM helped companies to develop affirmative action plans. DIM saw the anti-racism workshops as crucial to the successful and sustained implementation of effective affirmative action policies (Burgin 2009). Terry and Douglass Fitch co-created and led many of the Mission’s initial workshops. Throughout his time at DIM, Fitch immersed himself in Detroit’s black freedom efforts and encouraged the rest of DIM’s staff (all of whom were white) to reorient themselves vis-à-vis the ‘race problem’. Reflecting the Black Power shift occurring across the country (Carmichael & Hamilton 1968; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 1966), Fitch encouraged DIM to think of racism as a problem created and sustained by whites in the US rather than as a problem to be confronted within communities of colour (Terry 1973; Burgin 2009).

Terry enthusiastically took to Fitch’s ideas. For Whites Only laid out the theorising that he had done on the role of US whites in perpetuating the problems of racism. Terry wrote:

*What is at stake for white America today is not what black people want and do but what white people stand for and do.* The racial problem in American society is not a ‘black problem.’ It is a ‘white problem.’ If there are racial ambiguities, conflicts, and contradictions in black America, it is only because these factors are deeper and more far-reaching in white America ... We must shift the locus of the problem from black to white (Terry 1970: 15, emphasis in original).

Here, Terry’s overarching goal crystallised: he sought to reconceptualise the ways in which whites generally understood problems related to race in the US. Whereas whites typically viewed the US’s so-called ‘race problem’ in terms of black ‘pathology’ (e.g., Office of Planning and Research 1965: 218) or negative cultural traits (e.g., Banfield 1974), Terry insisted that institutions, systems and cultural practices created and sustained by US whites were behind racial inequalities and even the ‘conflicts’ arising in black communities in the late
1960s, such as the Detroit rebellion (Terry 1970, 1973). Whites in the US needed to re-direct their gaze on race relations, Terry urged, from the communities and cultures of people of colour (particularly blacks) to their own communities, institutions and culture.

Terry’s racial analysis did not address patterns of racial domination prior to his meeting Fitch though. Sympathetic to the idea of Black Power, DIM had hired Fitch specifically because he was “an advocate of black power [sic] and a man conversant with the militant struggle for justice in America” (Terry 1973: 383). Terry had in fact written and delivered a lecture entitled ‘Black Power: The White Hope’, in which he contemplated the ways in which whites should respond to this ideological shift (Terry 1968, 1973). While Terry emphasised that whites should embrace and not fear Black Power, Terry later wrote that it was not until Fitch pushed him that he considered the importance of whites taking ownership over racism and the implications that such ownership might have for white identity in the US:

[Fitch] felt that ['Black Power: The White Hope'] focused on the wrong group and would not provide directions for solutions to racial conflict. He suggested that the real issue for the white man was his stance toward himself, not blacks. He needed to work on his own identity in order to discern what he really stood for and what he was really about (Terry 1973: 357).

The issue that Black Power raised for whites like himself, Terry deduced from Fitch, was neither about responding to Black Power nor about aiding in the activist efforts of Black Power groups, but rather reorienting the racial gaze onto whites and whiteness. Fitch’s ideas complemented those questions famously pose by Carmichael and Hamilton (1968: xvii) in their tome on Black Power: “Can whites, particularly liberal whites, condemn themselves? Can they stop blaming blacks and start blaming their own system?”

Constantly thinking through the dynamics of separatist racial justice activism and the writings of Black Power advocates, Terry certainly suggested that the roots of his whiteness theorising lay in the advent of Black Power and its critique of integration—what he referred to as “the key word in the [white] liberal’s racial vocabulary” (Terry 1970: 55). Moreover, Terry recognised that Black Power itself grew out of the dialectical legacy of black efforts to integrate and the resulting white backlash: “Integration did not fail because blacks did not want it; whites refused it” (Terry 1970: 55). In this, too, Fitch had been influential. In a 1969 piece he had written for DIM’s newsletter, Fitch asserted this same sentiment: “Negroes discovered that integration failed to take place not because they did not want it, but because white society would not tolerate it”. However, Fitch specifically grounded Black Power in the black integration-white backlash conflict as it occurred in activist processes (rather than, for instance, in employment and housing practices):

Generally speaking the white response killed integration, non-violence and the so-called civil rights movement ... [A]ll the love down through the years flowing from the black community to the majority community, which is white, never gave the majority a sense of urgency about Righting a system in which men, women, and
children were being destroyed every day in our ghettos by white racist institutions. However, what those years could not do was done overnight by rebellions in our major cities and by the concept of Black Power—the politics of liberation in America (1969).

The black freedom movement, Fitch argued, had endeavoured to obtain greater rights and equality for blacks through a set of activist processes—integrationist efforts, nonviolent resistance—that bore little effect against a system of white racial domination that felt no “urgency” regarding the injustices and violence endured by blacks. Black Power—and its attendant critique of the “white power structure” as Carmichael and Hamilton referred to it (1967: 7)—evolved through the painful and recurring processes of black activism and white intransigence.

If whites were to take seriously the prerogatives of Black Power and begin to examine themselves, Terry argued that they would need to develop “new white consciousness: an awareness of our whiteness and its role in race problems” (Terry 1970: 17). Partly a reaction against the two dominant ways in which Terry felt US whites in the contemporary period positioned themselves in relation to race—discursive colour blindness and cultural appropriation vis-à-vis blacks—“new white consciousness” implied a way for whites “to understand ourselves simultaneously as white racists and as creators for justice” (Terry 1970: 20). Through this concept, Terry asked whites (his readers, workshop participants, work colleagues) to interrogate whites’ historic and contemporary involvement (implicitly or through more direct participation) in practices and systems that entrenched racial inequalities and injustice in the US; this would be the first step in redefining their place within systems of racial domination. The framing of this set of practices as a new racial consciousness borrowed significantly from Fitch’s work wherein he laid out the contours of Black Power. The ‘new era’ represented by Black Power, Fitch said, constituted ‘black consciousness’, an awareness on the part of US blacks that they would have to create for themselves the kinds of social and political transformations for which they had been pushing. As such, Black Power involved an awareness of “African history and the contribution of black men to the development of human culture”, the creation of a black aesthetic and the assertion of self-determination in black communities (Fitch 1969).

Aside from pushing Terry to interrogate whiteness then, Fitch provided a blueprint for the re-making of racial consciousness. If Fitch and other Black Power activists insisted on blacks’ need to understand the social and political contributions of blacks throughout time, Terry maintained that whites needed to confront the legacy of white racial domination in the US, often covered up through “historical myths” (for instance regarding manifest destiny and westward expansion) (Terry 1970: 44). If for Fitch a new black consciousness entailed a celebrated black culture and aesthetic, for Terry, new white consciousness had to deeply examine white cultural racism, which “imposes white standards on other racial groups” (though rarely explicitly understood as ‘white’) through mediums like language, media, dress style and a mythologised white past (Terry 1970: 46). And if Black Power’s most basic principle was the right for self-determination for blacks, new white consciousness represented the value of pluralism (Terry 1970: 34).
In the end, for Terry, the black freedom movement had shifted in such a way that it was working to reconstitute the meaning of blackness for US blacks, and this had consequences for whiteness. Carmichael and Hamilton had, after all, stated that “white people of good will need to redefine themselves” (1967: 7). Black Power did not come into existence in order to show whites, like Terry, that they had a racial identity and that whiteness was deeply implicated in the perpetuation of racism within the US. It had this effect on Terry (and many other whites) though. The very existence of *For Whites Only* attests to the ways in which Terry learnt the importance of interrogating the meaning of whiteness through his own and others’ black freedom efforts. I return to the dedication, as it may most concisely tell this story: “To Douglass Fitch, a black man who confronted me with my whiteness and challenged me to come to terms with it” (1970: 5, emphasis in original).

Clearly, Terry’s racial theorising, which he focused on US whiteness and white identity, was shaped at every turn by the ideas of black freedom activists—Black Power advocates in general and Fitch in particular. Though focused much more explicitly on black identity and political processes, his impact on Terry demonstrates that Fitch’s ideas also had deep implications for the understanding of relations of white racial domination in the US. Though lacking the complexity of present-day studies on whiteness within the academy, particularly the significant ways in which whiteness is fractured by lines of class, gender, and sexuality, the work of both Fitch and Terry suggests that an archaeology of whiteness studies within racial justice activist traditions may yield a rich bounty.

Clear parallels exist between these two bodies of knowledge (US critical race/whiteness studies and US black freedom activists’ ideas). During his time with DIM, Fitch practiced a central pursuit of academic whiteness studies—the naming or marking of whiteness (Frankenberg 1993). He and other Black Power activists sought to racialise relations of power, to call attention to the ways in which race continued to determine an individual’s relationship to larger US society, in many of the same ways that US academics still do (Lipsitz 2006). Fitch and other black freedom activists particularly highlighted the permeation of these power relations within cultural, social and epistemological practices. Critical race and whiteness academics remain deeply invested in this tradition, even when they do not recognise this earlier work (Bonilla-Silva 2011; Banks 1993; Sullivan & Tuana 2007). The very redirection of the white gaze urged by Fitch (and enacted in *For Whites Only*) pre-empts Nayak’s (2007: 738) contemporary description of critical whiteness studies as “a vital and necessary corrective to a sociology of race relations that myopically explored colour-based racisms with little attempt to reflect on constructions of whiteness”. The work of Fitch and Terry suggests that activists connected to racial justice struggles in the US are able to carry out powerful and innovative critiques of whiteness. More than this, they seem to prefigure those critiques that come out of the academy years later.
Conclusions: the roots of colour and activist traditions of US whiteness studies

I return to one of my guiding questions, writ anew: What explains Douglass Fitch’s absence from US critical whiteness scholarship? As I discuss above, the academic study of whiteness in the US is in many ways detached from (even if still invested in) racial justice struggles taking place outside of the academy, so much so that it does not even absorb knowledge produced in this realm that explicitly focuses on whiteness. Hence, it bears repeating, I could immerse myself in this scholarship and learn nothing of Terry. At the same time, whiteness operates within the larger academic context of this research to prize certain knowers, knowledges and epistemologies and to devalue, marginalise or ignore others. It also works to co-opt the knowledges of peoples of colour and thus obfuscate the foundations of this knowledge, as white academics (like myself) turn to one another as either experts or as an ‘objective’ community for understanding race, racism and whiteness.

I originally conceived of this essay as a piece on the ways in which activist accounts from the past often echo our analyses of whiteness within academia today—hence, my question on the evolution (or lack thereof) of white racial justice activism in the US over the past four decades. I had been concerned by what I perceived as the inability of US critical whiteness studies to engage with knowledge produced through historical and contemporary activist processes. Terry’s For Whites Only exemplified this for me as it did not show up in any of the contemporary US whiteness literature with which I was engaging. I did not initially recognise the ways in which black activists’ knowledge on race, specifically Douglass Fitch’s, shaped this work. This happened despite the fact that Terry clearly and frequently highlighted the implications of Black Power for understanding white relations of power in the US. I had in fact ignored Black Power and minimised the importance of Douglass Fitch in a way that whitened what I considered some of the important activist roots of US whiteness studies. My original analysis worked to subjugate the knowledge created through black activist processes and privilege the knowledge of white activist processes in a manner similar to the ways in which an epistemology of objectivity subjugates knowledge on race and racism, particularly created by academics of colour, within the academy.

I wish to drive this point home: the marginalisation of knowledge on race and racism within the academy parallels the marginalisation of black activist knowledge on race and racism within the academic production of race knowledge, particularly within the field of US whiteness studies. In both cases, relations of racial dominance/subjugation are reproduced. Artificial lines drawn between academic and activist knowledges within this field serve to obscure these roots. They give a false impression that the critical engagement of US whiteness studies is a fairly white tradition—a practice enacted largely through a white and academic corpus. Leonardo (2002, 2004) points out that whiteness is not something new to peoples of colour who, in and out of the academe, have been surviving, discussing and writing about it for some time. However, it is new, he says, “to white audiences who read mainly white authors” (2004: 142,
emphasis in original). In other words, I did not learn about the contributions of Black Power activists to a critical understanding of whiteness because US whiteness studies has not only privileged academic knowledges on whiteness but it has ignored the roots of its ideas in black activist traditions. Insofar as I have been absorbed in this scholarship and participated in these practices, I did not know of Douglass Fitch. Without building off of the work of activists like Fitch who inspired examinations of the meanings of whiteness in the US, critical whiteness studies in the US (and quite possibly elsewhere) progresses, to take from Leonardo’s phrase (2004), at the snail’s pace of the academic imaginary. Meanwhile, those activist-based discussion groups on race and racism that engage with widely divergent knowledge sources pass us by.

Author Note

Originally from the Midwestern United States, Say Burgin is near completion of her PhD in the School of History, University of Leeds. She works across disciplines, and her research interests lay at the intersections of race, knowledge production and social movements. Her doctoral research critically explores racial justice projects developed by white activists within the black freedom, women’s liberation and gay liberation movements in the United States from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Say currently teaches at the Universities of Leeds and York and leads the postgraduate arm of the White Spaces Research Network, which she helped to co-found in 2009. Contact: saynsb@gmail.com

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the other New Territories editors, my two reviewers, Anne-Marie Stewart, Kate Dossett and Simon Hall for their invaluable insight and engagement with this piece. I also thank all those who attended the ‘New Territories’ postgraduate conference for their feedback on an earlier version of this article.

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NEW TERRITORIES IN CRITICAL WHITENESS STUDIES

The Visibility of Whiteness and Immigration Restriction in the United States, 1880-1930

Robert Júlio Decker
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany

One of whiteness studies’ key theoretical concepts is that whiteness itself is unnamed, empty, or invisible, at least to white people, and that white identities are constructed via racial othering. By revisiting the definitions of whiteness in relation to immigration categories, this paper argues that whiteness in North America was far from unmarked in the period of 1880 to 1930. Its very nature and characteristics were constantly addressed, analysed and problematised in academic and political publications during this time. Social scientists conferred full whiteness to people of North-western European origin and argued for the restriction of immigration on racial grounds. In these discussions, American citizens of European origin were encouraged to identify as Anglo-Saxon and white—and to engage in political organisations to preserve a presumed Anglo-Saxon superiority. By analysing a range of historical sources, this article highlights one of the blind spots in the application of whiteness studies to North American history: the existent visibility of whiteness in certain periods and its significance for the wider theoretical framework of critical race studies. By applying a Foucauldian framework, we see that assumed crises of hegemonic positions do not repress discourse about their characteristics but foster discussions about their central features and meanings to eventually re-inscribe their hegemony. It is argued that in this particular period, discourses on the crisis of whiteness incited subjects to address their own and others’ racial identity and eventually led to the normalisation of Anglo-Saxonness as the ‘full’ white identity in North America.

Keywords: Whiteness Studies, Foucault, Governmentality, Immigration to the United States, Immigration History

Introduction
In his 1910 article *The Souls of White Folk*, W.E.B. Du Bois observed that “[t]he discovery of personal whiteness among the world's people is a very modern thing—a nineteenth and twentieth-century matter, indeed” (1970: 298). Ten years later, he noted that “[w]ave on wave, each with increasing virulence, is dashing this new religion [of whiteness] on the shores of our time”. America, Du Bois stated, not only resembled Europe in its colonial aspirations, but also “trains her immigrants to this despising of ‘niggers’ from the day of their landing” (2004: 21-22, 36).

The rereading of Du Bois’s works became the starting point for critical whiteness studies in the United States in the late 1980s. The first studies identified the socially and historically constructed nature of whiteness to disclose how it acts as an invisible norm and confers structural privilege (Frankenberg 1993; Morrison 1993; Roediger 1991). Historians concentrating on immigration to the United States applied the new framework to analyse how different immigrant groups were racialised and defined as “inbetween peoples” (Barrett & Roediger 1997). Experiencing discrimination and exclusion, immigrants ‘became white’ over time by participating in the construction of their own racial identity. They were positioned and positioned themselves within a “variegated whiteness”, to quote Jacobson (1998: 9), and learned to discriminate against black Americans (Allen 1995; Brodkin 1998; Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 1991; Shiells 2010). More recent research has pointed out that immigrants’ racialisation was accompanied by the rise of the transnationally constructed Anglo-Saxon identity (Lake & Reynolds 2008; Young 2008). For the United States, this discourse of whiteness has mostly been analysed from a perspective that focuses on immigrants’ reaction to and their agency in adapting to the discrimination they experienced.

One of whiteness studies’ key insights is the idea that whiteness represents the racial norm defined by appropriation and delineation from groups racialised as non-white. As an ‘unmarked marker’ or empty category, whiteness, with its attendant structural privileges, is assumed to be invisible, at least for its beneficiaries. Since whiteness has been established as the unspoken norm, “there is no discussion of white people”, to quote Dyer (1997: 3). The invisible nature of racialised power relations, it has been argued, is one of the very reasons for these norms’ effectiveness (Ahmed 2007; Brander Rasmussen et al 2001: 1-10; Chambers 1996: 141-151; Frankenberg 2001; McIntosh 1988; Morrison 1993).

The literature on the history of immigrant groups in the United States and their slow ascent to whiteness has investigated the contested nature of racial boundaries in detail. However, historians influenced by whiteness studies have mostly concentrated on the immigrants’ experience and their agency. This article suggests that attention to the periodic redefinitions whiteness itself underwent can help us understand the mechanisms by which whiteness maintains its dominant position. By focusing on the discussion of Anglo-Saxon identity between 1890 and 1930 in the writings of social scientists, it examines how the racialisation of the new immigrants in the United States occurred in conjunction with detailed descriptions of Anglo-Saxons’ supposed racial qualities. I will then connect this visibility of whiteness with the theoretical implications for
contemporary whiteness studies. Lastly, this article uses the correspondence and the publications of the Immigration Restriction League (IRL) to analyse how white Americans internalised this new definition of whiteness. Revisiting a well-researched area with a focus on the zones where whiteness became visible can thus add to the ways in which critical whiteness studies can be applied to the historical and contemporary investigation of racial formations.

The changing essence of whiteness

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Western definition of whiteness underwent several significant changes. Scientific racism, understood here as the “language, concepts, methods and authority of science [which] were used to support the belief that certain human groups were intrinsically inferior to others, as measured by some socially defined criterion” (Stepan 1987: IX), provided the methods to not only construct a black/white racial binary, but also to distinguish between several European races. Scientific racism was often augmented by discourses centred on the supposed cultural traits inherent to racial composition. In Britain and the United States, Irish immigrants were racialised as putatively inferior up to the 1880s (Ignatiev 1995: 34-59; Jacobson 1998: 48-52; Knobel 1996). From the 1860s, however, the definition of Englishness slowly began to include all inhabitants of the British Isles and the term Anglo-Saxon was established as generic racial referent for this group (Young 2008: 140-187). This new definition allowed for the inclusion of white settler colonials in the Anglophone world, bolstering Anglo-Saxons’ supposedly inherent drive for expansion in their civilising mission. Authors such as Edward A. Freeman, Charles Dilke, John Seeley or James Bryce published at length on Anglo-Saxons’ purported racial superiority, using history as both explanation and evidence for their dominance (Horsman 1994). Anglo-Saxon characteristics were described as a mixture of innate inclinations and specific cultural attributes that stretched beyond geographical boundaries. These authors argued that the invigorating effects of colonisation by “Saxon institutions and the English tongue” brought the Anglo-Saxon to the “full possession of his powers” (Dilke 1869: 260). As recent research has demonstrated, this new racial discourse circulated within the Anglophone world. Eventually, it led to the establishment of systems of border and population control excluding racially defined groups from immigration to these countries (Anderson 2009: 68; Bashford 2004; Boucher 2009: 54; Fairchild 2003; Young 2008: 196-207).

This new research helps us to understand the transnational entanglements of the discourse on whiteness in the Anglophone world, its specific meanings in particular national contexts and resulting biopolitical state interventions. However, research on the history of whiteness in the United States can also benefit from an analysis of the mechanisms by which notions of whiteness were transferred from the scientific discourse to citizens’ individual racial self-perception and subsequent political regulations of immigration. In the United States, this discourse focused on the so-called new immigrants from Eastern, South-eastern and Southern Europe increasingly described as a racially different and inferior when compared to Anglo-Saxons and the ‘old immigrants’ from
North-western Europe. Political scientists like John Burgess argued that the national state was “the creation of Teutonic political genius” and that white nations were thus entrusted with the “mission of conducting the political civilization of the modern world” (1890: 39, 44). The United States’ superiority was, according to historian John Fiske, demonstrated by its mission to “complete homogeneity of race” (1899: 144). This homogeneity, academics began to argue, was threatened by the new immigration.

Political economist Richmond Mayo-Smith published *Emigration and Immigration* in 1890, introducing the distinction between old and new immigrants. He presented the ostensibly pressing social problem of immigration in scientific analyses and suggested possible solutions for state intervention to avert the dangers of the new immigration. Setting the blueprint for later progressive-era treatises, his investigation included a history of immigration in the US, its racial composition, occupation and settlement patterns, and cultural attributes of immigrant groups. Mayo-Smith described the supposedly negative effects of immigration in detail, citing economic, social and political consequences (1968). Similarly, Francis Walker, superintendent of the census from 1870 to 1889 and a highly regarded social scientist, described the new immigrants as “beaten men from beaten races” (1971b: 447). Walker regarded the capacity for self-government, democracy and economic independence as inherent racial qualities of male Anglo-Saxons. In his opinion, these were endangered by the new immigrants’ “incapacity even to understand the refinements of life and thought” in North America (1971a: 424). In their racial classifications, both Walker and Mayo-Smith relied on scientific racism’s latest findings. In 1899, William Ripley summarised contemporaneous anthropological theories by declaring that three distinct races existed in Europe which could be ranked on a hierarchical scale: the superior Teutons or Nordics, the Alpines and the Mediterraneans (Ripley 1965).

These racial theories continued to be applied in the “racialization of foreignness” (Ngai 2011: 368) until the late 1920s. Scholars and political commentators described the so-called undesirable immigration in detail to racialise all new immigrants as inferior. Thus, the definition of ‘full whiteness’ in the United States was limited to Anglo-Saxons, who supposedly represented the highest evolutionary stage among Europeans. After the turn of the century, the discourse about the new immigrants’ assumed inferiority gained additional momentum through the emerging eugenic movement. Eugenicists assumed that environmental factors played an insignificant role in influencing human traits allegedly predetermined by genetic composition. In studies concentrating on ‘deficient’ families, they argued that characteristics such as pauperism, criminality and insanity were passed on over multiple generations thereby demonstrating the immutability of hereditary traits (Kevles 1985: 41-112; Ludmerer 1972: 7-43; Tucker 1994: 54-110). While the eugenic movement at first concentrated on economically marginalised rural whites and lobbied for the compulsory sterilisation of so-called ‘defectives’, the racial restriction of immigration served as a complementary governmental strategy in the quest for maintaining a ‘pure whiteness’. Excluding those deemed to be “not quite white” (Wray 2006) from immigrating and eventually blending into the white population,
was, progressive-era authors assumed, at least as important as preventing ‘deficient’ white Americans from reproducing (Chase 1977; Higham 2008: 264-330; Spiro 2009: 167-210).

Following Mayo-Smith’s example, a number of social scientists and political commentators published books on *The Immigration Problem* (1912), as Jeremiah Jenks and W. H. Lauck named their summary of a federal immigration commission’s findings.¹ Widely read books backed by their authors’ scientific authority such as John R. Commons’ *Races and Immigrants in America* (1907), Henry Pratt Fairchild’s *Immigration* (1913) or Edward A. Ross’s *The Old World in the New* (1914) perpetuated the alleged racial inferiority of the new immigrants. Phenomena such as low wages and deplorable living conditions were, according to these authors, not consequences of the United States’ rapid industrialisation but the natural display of the immigrants’ inherent social characteristics. Inspired by the new methodological possibilities provided by statistics, authors also argued that new immigrants were disproportionally insane, poor or criminal in comparison to the “native American” (Commons 1907: 160-78; Mayo-Smith 1968: 147-67). Their characteristics, it was argued, were not only dangerous for the stability of American society, but would also be passed on to the immigrants’ descendants, therefore resulting in a deterioration of the population’s genetic quality.

Prescott Hall, for example, stated that the economic benefits bought about by increasing immigration did not compensate for the “social degradation, political dangers and racial deterioration” it caused (1906: 121). Hall also emphasised that the new immigrant represented “not merely a change in race but in racial quality”. Since recent scientific findings had demonstrated that “in the long run heredity is far more important than environment or education”, Hall wrote, the United States should “exercise artificial selection on an enormous scale” by restricting immigration according to eugenic principles (1906: 99, 101). In addition to establishing a qualitative dichotomy between Anglo-Saxons and new immigrants and calling for a eugenic restriction of immigration, the use of the term “native Americans” for native-born white people also indicates that authors concealed the land appropriation by white settler-colonists and the marginalisation of Native Americans by naturalising Anglo-Saxons as the ‘original’ inhabitants of the United States.²

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¹ The book summarised the findings of the so-called Dillingham Commission, a federal investigation of immigration which published its findings in 1911.

² The authors cited here used the terms ‘native American’ and ‘native’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to refer to people of Anglo-Saxon descent born in the territory of the United States while using the term ‘American Indian’ for descendants of the original inhabitants of North America. Critics of restrictive immigration policies thus also often labelled anti-immigration movements ‘nativist’. In this article, I use “native American” to refer to people born in the United States and “Native American” to refer to the original inhabitants of North America and their descendants. Australian authors have recently pointed out that American scholars have failed to contextualise the nineteenth-century history of Native Americans with that of immigration and whiteness (Moreton-Robinson 2008; Shiells 2010: 793). While this gap in academic literature still exists, I cannot analyse the erasure of Native American history and the legitimisation of white American expansion in detail here due to the limited scope of the article.
Hall’s negative stance towards new immigrants was hardly surprising given the fact that he was executive secretary of the Immigration Restriction League (IRL), the country’s most active anti-immigration organisation between 1894 and 1924. The ideas he and other likeminded authors articulated were not extreme in their contemporary context, but slowly pervaded the political and public discourse about the new immigration. This characterisation is by no means intended to construct a single monolithic conception of whiteness. Multiple “variable, conflictual, and contested ... racial projects” (Winant 1994: 24, original emphasis) and definitions of whiteness coexisted in this period. The new notion of a whiteness restricted to Anglo-Saxons competed with the concept of the melting-pot, Americanisation and cultural pluralism along with their attendant scientific rationales and popular representations (Gerstle 2001; King 2000: 11-49). Although most of the IRL’s members were part of a small elite in the north-western United States composed of male academics, scientists, politicians and reformers, their writings and their influence indicate that a small regional group was apparently able to articulate concerns held by other white voters on a wider geographical scale. In order to gain the public’s and politicians’ attention and achieve legislative action, progressive-era social scientists and restrictionist organisations perpetuated images of the new immigrants’ supposed deviance, delinquency and racial inferiority in political and public debates.

The debates, however, went beyond the new immigrants’ racialisation. In the same publications, authors also discussed the racial characteristics of white Americans in detail. This indicates that racial discourse at this time was not limited to the construction of an Anglo-Saxon identity by the delineation from immigrant groups, but also advanced supposed white qualities and specific traits, redefining ideas about Anglo-Saxons’ uniqueness, their purported racial characteristics and gender roles. Authors emphasised that white Americans formed a part of the larger Anglo-Saxon ‘racial family’. The “original make-up of the American people”, Ross wrote referring to white settlers, was even superior to their English counterparts since life on the frontier had eliminated the “bad strains” and the “ruthless, high-pressure, get-there-at-any-cost spirit” had prevailed (1914: 23). This process of natural selection in frontier life augmented the one exercised in the early emigration from Europe, authors argued, and reinforced Mayo-Smith’s claim that only the “more energetic and intelligent of the working class” had undertaken the expensive and burdensome journey to America (1888: 61). Fairchild emphasised that the old immigration had been “predominantly English” or from “races closely allied to the English” that had formerly been “all one Germanic race in the forests surrounding the North Sea” (1913: 51). Madison Grant, who wrote the most notorious book on Anglo-Saxon identity and immigration, dedicated almost a third of The Passing of the Great Race to the description of ‘Nordic’ characteristics and history. Like the other authors, he underlined their racial singularity embodied in the “strong, virile, and self-contained race”. To maintain the Nordic’s strength and virility, Grant argued, the immigration of an “increasing number of the weak, the broken, and the
mentally crippled of all races drawn from the lowest stratum of the Mediterranean basin and the Balkans” had to be stopped (1916: 79, 152-53).³

Apart from perpetuating racial differentiation and Anglo-Saxons’ presumed superiority, the authors adopted historians’ claims that democracy was a racial trait. In 1873, Edward Freeman had argued that the roots of English political institutions could be found in “the Germany of Tacitus”, containing “the germs out of which every free constitution in the world has grown” (1873: 10). This argument had been taken up by Mayo-Smith and Walker, the latter claimed that only Anglo-Saxons possessed the qualities to “take up readily and easily the problem of self-care and self-government” since they belonged “to those who are descended from the tribes that met under the oak-trees of old Germany to make laws and choose chieftains” (1971b: 446). In this logic, the fitness for self-government was intrinsically linked to racial identity. Thus, Hall argued, Americans should preserve not only “the conditions necessary to successful democracy, but to develop here the fine race of men and the highest civilization” by restricting immigration (1906: 320-22). Only the Anglo-Saxons’ “superior qualities which are the foundation of democratic institutions”, especially their “intelligence, manliness, [and] cooperation” (Commons 1907: 7; 12) and their “independence of thought, moral conviction, courage, and hardihood” (Fairchild 1913: 51) guaranteed true democracy, the authors argued.

The common emphasis on virility, independence or manliness indicates that this discourse was not only concerned with questions of racial identity, but also intersected with class, gender and sexuality. As numerous scholars have pointed out, American masculinity and shifting gender roles were debated extensively in the progressive-era (Bederman 2000; Dyer 1980; Petit 2010; Rotundo 1993). When contextualised alongside immigration, scientific and political debates about whiteness were also centred on reproduction and sexuality. As superintendent of the census, Walker had noticed the falling birth rate of white Americans which coincided with the rising number of new immigrants. The mere correlation of these two phenomena prompted him to assume that they were connected causally. According to him, the new immigration had led to a decrease in the American wage level. The American white male, he argued, had then unconsciously refused to reproduce since he was “unwilling to bring sons and daughters into the world” and “shrank from the industrial competition thus thrust upon him” (1971b: 442). In 1901, Ross coined the term race suicide for Walker’s claims, stating that Anglo-Saxons’ “strong sense of its superiority” and “pride of blood” prevented them from keeping up with immigrants’ birth rate (1901: 88-89, original emphasis). The theme of race suicide was further popularised by Theodore Roosevelt, who believed that an ‘over-civilised’, decadent and selfish member of society who refused to reproduce was “in effect a criminal against the race” (Morison 1951: 355-56). Over-civilisation was consequently used to represent “whiteness as weakness” (Carter 2007: 42-45). In Roosevelt’s opinion, it could be overcome if Americans would revert to traditional gender roles: men

³ In contrast to most other authors writing about racial identity and immigration, Grant used the term ‘Nordic’ instead of Anglo-Saxon. For the most comprehensive history of Madison Grant, see Spiro (2009).
needed to be ready to fight and “anxious to be fathers of families” while women were meant to be “a good wife and mother” (Morison 1951: 355-56).

As Gail Bederman has pointed out, the theme of race suicide thus enabled white American middle-class men to voice concerns about shifting gender roles and simultaneously celebrate male sexuality as a public service to reaffirm “the sexual power of American manhood” (2000: 200-206). At a time when white middle-class women were entering the labour market in fields previously open only to men and had initiated a political struggle for emancipation, Walker’s argument indicates public anxiety around the loss of male economic independence, self-reliance and self-control (Hannah 2000: 182-185). Authors reduced women’s role in society to childrearing, invoked the family as the site of the race’s physical survival and equated heterosexual reproduction with the fate of the white race and nation (Carter 2007: 12; Irving 2000: 12; Michaels 1995: 11). Ross’ writings reflect these concerns: highlighting the danger of “underbreeding”, he ascribed declining birth rates to modern “democratic, individualistic, feminist, secular and enlightened” society. In his opinion, the increase in divorces, the emancipation of women and the growing number of working women had led to a higher average age at the time of marriage and therefore to a shorter reproductive period (1907: 83, 1912: 32-48, 64-82, original emphasis). Commons agreed that race suicide was “the most fundamental of our social problems”, which would “dry up the older and superior races” (1904: 218, 1907: 208). He thus connected his concept of a female heterosexual norm with a presumed responsibility for the future of the white race.

The intense discussion about Anglo-Saxon racial identity served several purposes. The inclusion of German and Irish immigrants in the Anglo-Saxon construct of whiteness necessitated a coherent theoretical background provided by scientific racism—the writings about a shared racial origin stabilised the former’s newly acquired status as white. Connections between race and an inherent disposition towards democracy were used to articulate concerns about racial purity and immigration, assuming that only a predominantly Anglo-Saxon population could guarantee the stability of the political system. Lastly, the idea of race suicide was employed to articulate a desire for a return to traditional gender and sexual roles, to bolster prevalent discourses on masculinity and to justify imperial expansion. Many scholars have pointed out the existence and the strategic function of these discourses. This redefinition of whiteness in the United States, however, has so far only been addressed in the contexts of the new immigrants’ racialisation and imperial expansion. The consequences of this historical redefinition of whiteness for the theoretical foundation of whiteness studies can help to provide scholars with additional insights about the mechanisms used to define the inclusion and exclusion of individuals in specific forms of whiteness.
The visibility of whiteness

The proliferation of transnational discourses on whiteness indicates that in this particular time-period, white racial qualities were the subject of elaborate scientific investigations. In the progressive era, whiteness was redefined and limited to Anglo-Saxons, a process that had to be negotiated through intense political and scientific discussion. Therefore, those who contributed to this discourse addressed whiteness itself and made it visible. This historical phenomenon seems to be in conflict with whiteness studies’ assumption that whiteness itself is an unmarked marker.

Although scholars have analysed the history of racial discourses at length, revealing the instability and “polyvalent mobility” (Stoler 1995: 204) of whiteness, whiteness’s visibility in this period has only recently been addressed. Scholars concerned with the history of immigration to America such as Valeria Babb acknowledge that in the early twentieth century, “ancestral underpinning made whiteness seem an ancient group identity to which any white, regardless of class or ethnicity, could belong”. Nonetheless, she argues that the “fundamental paradox of whiteness” is the “persistent need of nonwhiteness to give it form and expression” (1998: 41-42). More recently, however, scholars who have analysed non-American societies in this period have pointed out that whiteness did indeed come under close scrutiny by “a multitude of methods to examine, evaluate, compare and determine the degrees and shades of male whiteness” (Bischoff 2007: 428). In his detailed and insightful study of medical discourses on whiteness in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Australia, Warwick Anderson concludes that “whiteness was not an empty category, defined only in opposition to other races; rather, it was filled with flexible physical, cultural, and political significance” and was “generally heterogeneous and contingent” although it appeared to be stable (2006: 3, 255). Whiteness in this period was “far from being unmarked” (Vanderbeck 2006: 648); its nature and characteristics were discussed in publications concerned with an alleged crisis of white manhood and the supposed threats to the white race. Thus, scholars have argued for shifting the focus from the racialisation of non-white groups to whiteness’s role as “sovereign category” in determining white people’s identities (Carey, Boucher & Ellinghaus 2009).

Julian Carter has put forward the argument that the discourse on white health and bodies in the United States was crucial in establishing white heteronormative understandings of the ideal citizen between 1880 and 1940. He argues that the discussions about whiteness and its supposed crisis helped to construct white heterosexuality as the American norm and contributed to the “gradual discursive elision of white raciality”, incrementally transforming the explicit discussion of whiteness into an invisible norm of citizenship. The concept of normality, applied to sexuality and marriage, thus was at least at first “far from invisible or opaque” (2007: 1-6, 30-41). A similar case has been made by Radhika Mohanram, who argues that the British male body became invisible, normalised and universalised in its whiteness through discourses on imperial culture, sexuality and masculinity (2007: 3-25). If these arguments about the close connection between whiteness and (hetero)sexuality are considered, it can be argued that similar to the
permanent nature of the crisis of manliness, white identity formations require periodic discourses on their supposed endangerment and instability to re-inscribe the hegemonic position of white people. If we apply Foucault’s reading of the repressive hypothesis to interpret discourses on whiteness and immigration in the United States, it seems that between the 1880s and 1930s subjects were required to address their own and others’ raciality in ways that eventually led to the normalisation of whiteness.

Michel Foucault argued that the common interpretation of Victorian sexuality as repressed overlooks how censorship and public control did not result in a silence on sexuality, but rather produced discourse on the supposedly ‘forbidden’ topic in the form of scientific treatises and individual confessions about sexual conduct. As a result, rules and limitations did not have to be imposed by the state or the church, but were manifested in discourse and were adhered to in individual sexualities (1990). Foucault labels this integration of power relations into subjects’ mode of self-conduct as subjectivation, which he defines as the constitution of the self. In this process, the subjects’ self-conduct was determined by and derivative from surrounding power-relations. Over time, he argues, modern Western societies increasingly supplemented disciplining mechanisms by governmental management and modes of self-conduct (2003a: 242–254, 2007: 54-134). Modern forms of power, according to Foucault, should thus be understood with repression “only as a lateral or secondary effect with regard to its central, creative, and productive mechanisms” located in the subjects themselves, making them the nodal points where different technologies of power are intertwined (2003b: 52).

Several scholars have argued that whiteness studies can benefit from the application of Foucault’s theories of subjectivation (Elder et al 2008; McWorther 2005: 543-547; Moreton-Robinson 2006; Stoler 1997). Ionna Laliotou has argued that in the progressive era, popular discourses, scientific racism and government projects played a crucial role in identity formation in the United States, constructing newcomers “as migrant subjects”. Immigrants were perceived and perceived themselves as different from the prevalent racial and social norms. They became migrants in a process of subjectivation in their encounters in America (2004). If this line of thought is extended, it can be argued that these processes were not limited to immigrants constructing themselves as different but also served to produce the subjectivation of white, native-born Americans as Anglo-Saxon. In Foucauldian terms, we can understand this process as power’s productive side, transforming abstract discourses of racial identities into “productive new forms of ‘subjects’” (Yancy 2004: 107-108). The discourse on race and whiteness thus constituted subjects as “racial selves” (Stoler 1995: 95) via technologies of self-discipline and self-conduct. Since the hegemonic discourse on whiteness equated the American nation with Anglo-Saxons, citizens interpreted the protection of the state as a quest for racial purity. The application of Foucault’s theoretical framework therefore helps us to understand how and why the modern “citizen-subject”

4 For the argument that the crisis of manhood is permanent, see Martschukat & Stieglitz (2008: 64-73). For a discussion of the links between whiteness, (hetero)sexuality, bodies and gender, see also Dyer (1997: 1-40).
(Cruikshank 1999: 19-42) participated in processes of racialisation and the optimisation of the racial state.⁵

An analysis of the Immigration Restriction League’s (IRL) publications and correspondence elucidates how these processes of racial and state subject formation are linked to the intricate ways in which white males were constituted as racial selves and were reminded of their assumed responsibility for race and nation. The League’s sources show how a white and male elite in the north-east of the United States understood and defined ‘full whiteness’ as Anglo-Saxon and how its members were able to circulate their arguments to others in the progressive era. The IRL, founded in 1894 by Harvard alumni, lobbied against new immigration until the 1920s. It combined progressive approaches with nativist rhetoric, justifying restriction on basis of protecting alleged Anglo-Saxon virtues (Higham 2008: 97-105, 131-164; Solomon 1989). For many years, its main objective was the introduction of the literacy or reading test, requiring male immigrants and women unaccompanied by husbands or fathers between the ages of 18 and 55 to be able to read in their own language. Since illiteracy corresponded with criminality, insanity, and pauperism, the League argued, the test would reduce the potential for immigrants to become a burden on state and society. Simultaneously, it would not only exclude the “least desirable immigrants”, but also those “most alien to us in race, habits, and standards of living”. These were, the IRL claimed, the “Slav, Latin, and Asiatic races, historically down-trodden, atavistic and stagnant” (IRL 1895; Hall 1896).

IRL members interpreted their work as a “moral duty” to their country that had to “decide whether the new-comers add to or detract from decencies, the tastes, the intelligence, the force, the political understanding of our composite race” (Moors 1894). IRL executive Robert DeCourcy Ward wrote that every “citizen interested in the welfare of his country” (1905), every “citizen who wants to keep the blood of the race pure” (1914: 545) should support the call for immigration restriction. Prescott Hall assumed that “to point out wherein our immigration laws need strengthening for the better protection and preservation of the race is a duty” (Cance et al 1914: 297). IRL leaders did regard it to be their civic responsibility to take action to protect their race but also assumed that other citizens would, in return, fulfil their ‘duty’ if they were informed about new immigration’s consequences. Therefore, its publications with titles such as Twenty Reasons why Immigration Should Be Further Restricted Now or Study these Figures and Draw your Own Conclusions directly encouraged other white Americans to take action (IRL 1894a; IRL 1894b). In a 1904 article, Hall appealed explicitly to (white) citizens to become aware of their responsibilities as members of the Anglo-Saxon race and to engage in politics to urge more rigid restrictions:

We are the trustees of our civilization and institutions with a duty to the future, and as trustees the stocks of population in which we invest should be limited by the principle of a careful selection of immigrants (1904: 184).

⁵ For a fuller explanation of the concept of the racial state, see Goldberg (2002).
Hall tried to convince readers that it was not sufficient to talk of “regulating marriage with a view to the elimination of those unfit for other purposes than mere survival.” He stressed “that here in the United States we have a unique opportunity, through the power to regulate immigration, of exercising artificial selection upon an enormous scale”. Immigration regulation should therefore be used to limit the admission of “races ... not kindred in habits, institutions and traditions” to small numbers (1904: 170-71, original emphasis).

The IRL thus connected the notion of political involvement in immigration legislation as a civic duty with the protection of Anglo-Saxons’ assumed racial superiority. In 1910 and 1911, the IRL sent out questionnaires to prominent citizens to enquire about their attitude towards immigration restriction. The letters were addressed to a compilation of names taken from the Who’s Who and the New York Social Register, exclusively male doctors, lawyers, educators and businessmen, reflecting the gender and class dimensions of the IRL’s conception of civic relevance. Stating that the present laws were “inadequate to preserve our present physical, mental, and moral status of our people, to say nothing about eugenic improvement”, the League proposed different methods of restriction and enquired about the recipients’ opinion (Chatterton 1910; IRL 1911). Some of the answers were then used for the IRL’s statement to the so-called Dillingham Commission, a federal commission conducting a comprehensive study on immigration and its effects in North America (United States Immigration Commission 1911: 101-110).

The five hundred plus responses to the questionnaires demonstrate addressees’ reactions to IRL material and their reflections on their own raciality. In their replies, many of them explicitly referred to their status as members of a putatively superior race obliged to preserve their ‘racial qualities’ for future generations, reiterating statements similar to those made by the League and the social scientists mentioned above. Harvard president Lawrence A. Lowell, for example, wrote that “we are trustees for posterity, and for the principle of popular government” (1910), linking a racialised history of democracy to the future of the white race. Coming from a family that been “connected with the active development and the affairs of this country from the days of the very earliest settlers”, one Henry Hall from New York stated that it was impossible for him as “a real American to be indifferent to the flood of aliens ... and the evil consequences arising from the coincident importation of un-American ideas and morals” (1910). Former governor of Wyoming Fenimor Chatterton wrote that “[w]e owe this to those for whose future existence we are, must, under the existing conditions for our progeniture, be responsible” (1910). These statements indicate that the League’s agenda of exhorting other white males to embrace a civic responsibility to reject new immigrants had, at least in these cases, been successful.

Recipients not only referred to their responsibility as citizens but also incorporated the findings of scientific racism. One Rollin C. Ward was convinced

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6 For analyses of the IRL’s statement to the Commission, see Decker (2013), King (2000: 75-76), and Petit (2010: 31-58).
that unrestricted immigration threatened “Eugenic improvement seriously” and tended to lower the “present Eugenic condition of our nation” (1910). Others demanded to “exclude all types which cannot be readily assimilated by the Anglo-Saxon type” (Corbett 1910), arguing that with the disappearance of the frontier, the growth of cities, and the new immigration, “Anglo-Saxon institutions are put to the gravest tests” (Mills 1910). In order not to lose “our wonderful Anglo-Saxon power of assimilation” (Richardson 1910), citizens argued, immigration had to be restricted or “the United States will soon cease to be an Anglo-Saxon nation” (Turnbull 1910). This brief overview of individual contributions to the political discussion exemplifies how individuals adopted assumptions about the characteristics of whiteness and the assumed dangers posed by immigration.

**Conclusion**

Although these few voices represent only a snapshot of racial self-conception in the early twentieth century, they demonstrate that the IRL was at least partially successful in encouraging fellow citizens to identify as Anglo-Saxon and to become involved in the efforts for a racial restriction of immigration. The League thus contributed to the constitution of other racialised citizen-subjects as white and Anglo-Saxon by addressing them directly and adding to their awareness of the assumed threat to American racial integrity. While the questionnaires themselves obviously did not constitute the subjects’ racial self-perceptions, they provided the space and opportunity for the citizens to reflect on and enunciate their pre-existing racial conceptions. The replies to the questionnaires exemplify that whiteness in this period was not invisible or unnamed. On the contrary, it was addressed explicitly to mobilise others for political causes. Simultaneous to the racialisation of the new immigrants—and often directly connected to it—the new whiteness limited to Anglo-Saxons was discussed and shaped. While the roots for the new ideas about their racial characteristics can be found in the transnational discourse of whiteness during the second half of the nineteenth century, these ideas had to be transferred to domestic public discourse by progressive reform literature and IRL publications before they could result in the consensus that made the dramatic restriction of immigration possible.

This consensus was reflected in congressional voting behaviour in the enactment of the *Emergency Quota Act* in 1921, the *Johnson-Reed Act* in 1924 and the adoption of the national origins system in 1929. These acts not only put a cap on the total number of Europeans allowed to immigrate but simultaneously established a system that adversely affected those defined as not or not fully white. As several scholars have pointed out, the establishment of the quota system did not only coincide with the Supreme Court’s ruling that involuntary sterilisation was constitutional, but also with its decision to limit the eligibility to citizenship to Europeans and people of African descent, excluding Asians from immigration and codifying the racial requirements for citizenship (Haney López 1996; Kevles 1998: 215; Ngai 1999; Wray 2006: 94). The combination of these decisions thus resulted in new state interventions regarding the racial composition of the American population: it allowed for the ‘purification’ and
assumed improvement of native whites by eugenic measures, codified the racial requirements for citizenship and immigration and significantly reduced the number of new immigrants allowed to enter the country. As Mae Ngai and others have argued, the significant restriction of the new immigration and the establishment of a clearly drawn white/non-white binary allowed for the slow integration of the new immigrants into whiteness. Whiteness limited to Anglo-Saxons was slowly replaced by the Americanisation ideal, a discourse urging new immigrants to adhere to Anglo-conformity but also allowing for identities that incorporated ethnicity (Ngai 1999; Hattam 2007; Jacobson 1998: 91-135; Roediger 2005: 3-34). Again, the history of the Americanisation movement and its assimilation discourse could be described as a process where a new whiteness was explicitly addressed and became visible for a limited period of time before it was accepted and slowly became the new invisible norm.

While this article has shown how whiteness became visible in a particular period, further research on the production of explicit discourses on the characteristics of whiteness could help critical race theory scholars to develop a more detailed knowledge of the intricate ways racial privilege is perpetuated. Claims about a new or changing white identity, as recently made about the supposedly post-racial society in America, can thus indicate shifts that ultimately serve to modify but uphold structural privilege and its invisibility (Roediger 2010: 212-30). The argument that the United States is currently in a state of transition to a post-racial society can therefore be regarded as an attempt to establish what Étienne Balibar refers to as a “racism without races”, one that replaces biological markers with cultural attributes (1991: 21). Since changes in racial concepts not only occur in the racialisation of presumably non-white groups but also in the discourse on whiteness itself, the identification of the stages where whiteness is explicitly addressed and becomes visible in history as well as in our contemporary society can help us to analyse attempts to re-establish hegemonic positions in new forms. While redefinitions of whiteness might not be as clearly visible in political discourse today as they were at the turn of the nineteenth century, scholars can benefit from identifying other discourses and modes of cultural production of race to investigate the changes racial formations and racial privilege undergo within and outside the United States.

**Author Note**

Robert Júlio Decker received his PhD in history from the University of Leeds for his research on the Immigration Restriction League (IRL). He is currently developing a new project at the Technical University Darmstadt, Germany, on the global history of colonial railway projects conducted by the United States and the German Empire.

**Acknowledgements**
The author would like to thank Kate Dossett, Simon Hall, Olaf Stieglitz, David Roediger, Holly Randell-Moon, his co-editors and CRWS and its anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

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NEW TERRITORIES IN CRITICAL WHITENESS STUDIES

Hegemonic epistemologies in the context of Transformation: Race, space, and power in one post-apartheid South African town

Haley McEwen
University of the Witwatersrand

Melissa Steyn
University of the Witwatersrand

This paper examines space, identity and power in Prince Albert, a small town in the South African Karoo, through analysis of white representations of urban and social change in the town since the end of apartheid. In doing so, this analysis seeks to contribute to the growing stream of critical philosophy concerned with the relationship between racialised systems of inequality and ways of knowing. By representing Prince Albert as ‘tranquil’ and ‘charming’, semigrant power elites in the town legitimate their dominance and control over the town’s resources through spatio-temporal “epistemologies of ignorance.” Through analysis of semi-structured in-depth interviews with white residents and government and planning documents, this paper demonstrates the ways in which concepts of heritage and tourism, as Western ideological constructs that serve elite white interests, can be antagonistic to the broader South African national move towards Transformation.

Keywords: Transformation, South Africa, Heritage, Tourism, Epistemology, Social Justice

Introduction

Post-apartheid South Africa has come to be known internationally as the ‘Rainbow Nation’. The country is viewed as establishing a new democracy that has succeeded the racist apartheid regime and is now on the path towards what is known in the national lexicon as ‘Transformation’: the undoing of the legacy of
apartheid with the entrenchment of equal democratic citizenship for all South Africans. Transformation is widely understood to have two main functions: reconciliation and healing of a racially divided nation, and redress of the racialised economic inequality that structured apartheid. The reconstitution of spaces and identities has been key to the Transformation project because the regulation of spaced and raced hierarchies was apartheid’s central means of achieving and protecting white supremacist rule. This study, which was conducted as one case study in a larger project exploring the shifting dynamics of race and space in rural South African towns, examines white attitudes towards Transformation in Prince Albert, a small town in the South African Karoo. Fieldwork uncovered a small group of white residents attempting to develop Prince Albert’s tourism industry and to establish the town’s heritage value. Most of these residents had invested in the restoration of their properties and were owners of restaurants, shops, and bed and breakfasts in the town and believed that tourism would bring money to Prince Albert and ‘uplift’ the historically marginalised ‘coloured’ community. Prince Albert however, remains spatially segregated and the white community retains ownership of residential properties and businesses, and continues to enjoy positions of power and privilege in the town. Critical analysis of representations of Prince Albert promoted by white residents reveals that ‘heritage’ and ‘tourism’ as ways of knowing Prince Albert are related to racialised interests and power relations.

The questioning of knowledge and how the world comes to be known opens up useful ways of exploring the intersections of race, space, and identities. A critical approach to epistemology explores knowledge construction as maintained through power relations, allowing for an interrogation of the interests at stake in processes of meaning making. Exploration of dominant epistemologies and the material, symbolic and affective interests they serve are important areas of investigation in post-apartheid South Africa where the racial inequalities of

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2 The research used in this article was conducted as one case study in a larger project that examined race and space in South African small towns and was carried out by the Intercultural and Diversity Studies of Southern Africa research unit based at the University of Cape Town from 2007-2010. The research project was funded by The South Africa Netherlands research Programme on Alternatives in Development (SANPAD) and the South African National Research Foundation (NRF).
3 Acknowledging that racial categories are not biological, fixed, or essential truths, this article employs terms of racial identification as social constructions that have implications for lived realities, social positionings and life opportunities. The apartheid era Population Registration Act constructed racial categories in order to establish a system of racial hierarchy that, in many ways, continues to shape socio-economic opportunities in South Africa. The term ‘white’ is used to refer to those who would have been identified as ‘white’ under the apartheid Population Registration Act (1950) and therefore in positions of socio-economic privilege. The term ‘coloured’ is used to refer to those who would have been classified as ‘coloured’ under this act, which meant “any person who is not a member of the white group or of the native group”. The category of ‘Coloured’ was positioned in the racial hierarchy as being subordinate to Whites and Indians, yet superior to Bantu, or black ‘Native’, people. These terms are employed to accurately reflect the unequal power relations established between racial groups during apartheid.
apartheid endure nearly two decades after the first national democratic election in 1994. Critical philosophies of race, as an emerging stream of analysis within the traditionally race ignore-ant discipline of philosophy, offers new spaces in which questions around racialised ontologies and epistemologies can be considered. Charles W. Mills, for instance, argues that the Enlightenment era notion of the Social Contract, a theory legitimating the authority of the state over the individual, is implicitly structured by anti-black racism. Underlying the idea of the Social Contract, Mills writes, is a system constituted by “the differential privileging of the whites as a group with respect to the nonwhites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, and resources, and the denial of equal socioeconomic opportunities to them” (1997: 11). According to Mills, the Racial Contract is upheld by inverted ways of knowing or, epistemologies of ignorance, in which:

One has an agreement to misinterpret the world. One has to learn to see the world wrongly, but with the assurance that this set of mistaken perceptions will be validated by white epistemic authority (18).

Here, Mills makes the provocative argument that the Racial Contract is dependent on an epistemology of ignorance which allows white people to evade an acknowledgement of racialised structures of inequality and, as a result, perpetuate systems of white supremacy through the alleviation of the psychic burdens of shame and guilt.

Within the matrix of critical perspectives on race, critical whiteness studies is an important line of inquiry that has worked to decent white normative ways of knowing and being in the world. In the post-apartheid South African context, Steyn (2012) explores the intersections between epistemologies of ignorance and whiteness, arguing that “ignorance is both a function of and functional in racialized societies. Indeed, [an] ignorance contract may be regarded as a subclause of the racial contract” (21). In the following sections we will review existing scholarship on race and space in the context of Transformation and bring them into conversation with poststructural analyses of space and identity. We will then interrogate how tourism and heritage can be used to fix particular meanings to particular places, and how these meanings are infused with racialised relations of power in the context of Prince Albert. We argue that tourism and heritage mobilise understandings of the town that serve white interests. We conclude that far from being benign, ‘common sense’ means of achieving economic development in areas with weak economies, tourism and heritage must be critically interrogated as possible mechanisms and products of white epistemology.

Re-racing space in post-apartheid South Africa

While the new democratic South African Constitution enshrines the freedoms and rights of all citizens, scholars of post-apartheid South Africa have documented the social, economic, and political barriers preventing these rights from reaching a substantive level of political and social equality. Since the end of apartheid, various social vectors of equality have been subject to critique in terms of their
uneven achievement. Scholars have also explored post-apartheid identities in the context of formally desegregated South Africa. Spatial theorisation has provided an important entry into these investigations given the violent legacy of apartheid segregationist policy. Here, scholars have studied the challenges of achieving ‘deep’ Transformation through the unlearning of strongly entrenched beliefs about race and the identities that have come to correspond to racialised socio-spatial positionalities and identities.4

Post-apartheid South Africa is a compelling site for the study of whiteness, space and epistemics, as a white minority population renegotiates a sense of belonging in a new a black majority governed state. According to Steyn (2001: xxii), white South Africans are “Situated in an existential moment that combines unique intersections ofthrownness and agency, they are selecting, editing and borrowing from the cultural resources available to them to reinterpret old selves in the light of new knowledge and possibilities, while retaining a sense of personal congruence.” At the everyday level, this new social reality has been shaped by the removal of strict spatial legislation that rigorously policed the mobility of black people during apartheid. In response, many white South Africans have resorted to self-segregation, or semigration, in order to find ‘peace of mind’ through the establishment of access controlled and highly surveilled ‘fortified enclaves’ (Ballard 2004) or, in many cases, have left the country entirely in order to ‘escape’ the perceived threats of ‘criminal’ and ‘contaminating’ blackness. As Ballard reveals through the study of semigration, these patterns of white flight are shaped through spatialised perceptions of ‘difference’ and power. This is made evident through the fact that white South Africans have largely chosen to relocate to areas where there is a perceived sense of white ownership and control of space. Prince Albert arguably functions as a space where white South Africans can regain ‘peace of mind’, as will be explored through analysis of white residents’ motivations for moving to the town. And, in order to ensure that the town, as a new comfort zone, is protected, semigrants mobilise representations of Prince Albert through heritage and tourism that will legitimate the authoritative status of whites as the appropriate guardians of the town. Although this paper draws on empirical data from one small town in the Western Cape, the findings presented here speak to the broader national process of Transformation in which neoliberal economic policy has informed the renegotiation of raced and spaced identities (Padayachee 2006).

**The spatiality of racial identity and epistemology**

That ways of knowing the world are shaped by how one is located in it has been an idea central to both poststructural and postcolonial critique (although these approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive). Dwyer and Jones (2000) draw on these traditions in their study of the relationship between white socio-spatial epistemology and identity in order to present two epistemological dimensions of whiteness. First, consistent with much critical whiteness

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scholarship, they argue that the social construction of whiteness relies upon essentialist and non-relational understandings of identity, allowing those who can claim a white identity to efface, or ignore, its constructed-ness. For the authors, the invisibilising of whiteness and white privilege allows white people to “paradoxically hover over social diversity just as they become the yardstick for its measurement” (210). This non-relational identity facilitates the second dimension of white socio-spatial epistemology, a segmented spatialisation that “relies upon discrete categorizations of space—nation, public/private and neighbourhood—which provide significant discursive resources for the cohesion and maintenance of white identities” (210). This segmentation stamps identities and spaces with a fixed correlation: “every identity has its place” (152). Central to both dimensions of white socio-spatial epistemology is the “ability to survey and navigate social space from a position of authority and power” (210). Dwyer and Jones’ identification of white socio-spatial epistemology provides a helpful theorisation of how whiteness operates through particular ways of knowing space, making a socio-geographical contribution towards understandings of the construction of white identities.

The surveying, segmentation, and categorisation of space in relation to identities has been central to projects that serve white interests. Modernist geographic and anthropological traditions have, for instance, mapped ‘peoples’ regionally and culturally, ultimately policing the meanings and practices associated with particular spaces (Natter & Jones 1997: 152). Poststructural social analysis, which positions spaces and place identities as constituting factors in the construction of individual and group identities, acknowledges that hegemonic cultural practices attempt to arrange the complexities of spaces and identities within unbroken boundaries, equating “one place” with “one identity” (150). Critical of the ideological brick and mortar upon which built environments are erected, Natter and Jones argue that spaces are empty signifiers that social powers work to fill with meaning (150). Through this non-essentialist approach to spaces and identities, the authors employ the concept of “hegemonic spatiality”, which they define as “the categorically ordered possibilities for, and the construction of, meanings about any space” (151).

Tourism as an industry that relies heavily on the construction of ‘place identities’ and the transformation of spaces into destinations, provides an illustration of the ways in which spaces become filled with social meaning. As Ivanovic (2008) instructs in a textbook-style, ‘How-to’ approach to tourism development in South Africa, the conversion of cultural heritage assets into ‘attractions’ requires that cultural products and places be “remoulded to facilitate both tourism as well as tourist use” (168). This ‘remoulding’ of culture serves the purpose of “maximiz[ing] profit by facilitating easy consumption” of particular spaces and “requires releasing the value of culture … which in turn facilitates and enhances consumption of cultural experiences” (168). Here, the monetary interests guiding processes of meaning construction around particular spaces begins to emerge. The ability to generate profit through tourism is directly linked to the construction of meanings that are not only culturally acceptable, but also have potential commercial value.
The significance of South African place/d identities in relation to economic development is further evident in a recent study by Van der Merwe et al. (2004) in which tourism and heritage are positioned as indicators of the growth potential of small towns in the Western Cape. The need to construct profit generating place identities to promote tourism exists alongside, and sometimes in tension with, the Transformation imperative. We argue that representations of Prince Albert as a “Tranquil Karoo Town”, for instance, ignore the socio-economic deprivation afflicting the farm working community of North End (79). Representations of the town as a ‘charming’ tourist destination envision a form of development that will allow the current raced-spatialities of inequality to remain intact. In Prince Albert, the proposal to the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) for the town to be declared a provincial heritage site can be critically interrogated as fixing particular meanings to Prince Albert and protecting the interests of those who have recently semigrated to, and invested in, the town. Through the drawing of this symbolic boundary around Prince Albert, these residents, who all identified as white in the interviews undertaken for this study, categorised the town in ways that consolidate their grip over its resources and future development.

Method

Data Collection

While most studies of race, space, and identity in post-apartheid South Africa have been conducted in urban and suburban areas, this study examines these dynamics in a small rural town. In embarking on this investigation, we were interested in exploring the ways in which white residents in the town position themselves within, and make sense, of Transformation. Qualitative data in the form of in-depth interviews and government and planning resources were the primary sources of data, although participant observation by the first author also provided a general sense of everyday life in the town. Throughout the process of data collection, it became evident that a small group of property and business owning residents, who are referred to here as semigrants and/or power elites, wielded a significant amount of power in controlling the discursive construction of the town’s identity. Defined by van Dijk (1993: 303) as dominant groups and organisations who have “a special role in planning, decision-making and control over the relations and processes of the enactment of power”, power elites are of particular interest in the study of social inequality because they have “special access” to discourse (303). For the sake of brevity, description of the method of data collection will conclude here as further elaboration can be found in McEwen (2013).

Method of Analysis

Critical discourse analysis was selected as the method of analysis because of its capacity to advance the study of understanding prejudice and social inequality in contexts characterised by diversity (Riggins 1997). As Howarth and Stravakakis (2000) explain, discourse theory “offers novel ways to think about the
relationship between social structures and political agency, the role of interests and identities in explaining social action, the interweaving of meanings and practices, and the character of social and historical change” (5). Because discourse theory positions all objects and actions as meaningful and historically contextual, it brings into focus the ways in which social realities are contested or articulated through objects and practices of signification (2).

Proceeding from an awareness of the tenuous and problematic relationship between words and ‘truth’, critical discourse analysis focuses on the relationship between language, power, and privilege (Riggins 1997: 3). In performing such an analysis of the collected data for this study, it was necessary to identify the signifying practices employed by residents as they constructed meaning about social change in Prince Albert since the end of apartheid. To this end, ‘heritage’ and ‘tourism’ emerged as the most frequently deployed concepts amongst privileged residents as they described Transformation in Prince Albert. We will go on to examine the interests at stake in the deployment of discourses of heritage and tourism and the power relations these discourses maintain. The discourses of semigrant power elites in the town are of particular interest due to the fact that these residents were exceptionally active agents in constructions of the town’s identity. Analysis of interviews with these recently arrived residents reveals the interlocking dynamics of identity, race and space in the town, and how these dynamics operate through white, and privileged, epistemic frameworks.

**Analysis**

**Two tales of one town: Constructions of Prince Albert**

Two contrasting narratives currently construct Prince Albert. The first, an ‘official’ narrative promoted by the Local and Provincial municipalities, tells the story of a town in despair, characterised by poverty and lack of access to resources amongst the coloured majority population of Prince Albert. In contrast, the ‘unofficial’ story, told by an elite group of Prince Albert’s ‘semigrant’ residents, conveys a romantic description of the town’s ‘peacefulness’ and ‘old world charm’. How two completely different representations can coexist to describe one place can be explained by Steyn’s (2012) notion of the ‘Ignorance Contract’. For dominant groups, making sense of the world around them “is not as much about accuracy as about how they would like the world to be, and having the power and resources to impose their desires, drives and will upon the social field and to effect social control” (21).

According to government sources, everyday life is precarious for the majority of Prince Albert’s population—namely the historically marginalised black farm working community residing in the former Group Area, North End (*Prince Albert* 5)

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5 Group Areas were racially segregated residential areas established by the *Group Areas Act* (1950). They created separate residential areas for ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘coloured’, and ‘Indian’ people as established by the *Population Registration Act* (1950) which required
Local Municipality Integrated Development Plan (Draft) 2007-2011 [Prince Albert IDP] n.d.: 16). Low education levels, poor health services, a large housing backlog, and unemployment are cited as the primary reasons why the Provincial Treasury Social Economic Profile of 2006 ranked Prince Albert 17th on the Provincial Index of Multiple Deprivation. Prince Albert was the only Municipality in the Central Karoo that appeared on this list of the 50 most deprived Municipalities in the country (Prince Albert IDP n.d.: 13). Van der Merwe et al (2004: ix) provide insight into the broader regional context of the Karoo, reporting that towns in the region have the lowest growth potential as well as the worst quality of life due to high levels of socio-economic deprivation.

While government documentation characterises the town mainly through its social problems, the most prolific and audible public discourse is present in texts promoting Prince Albert as a tourist destination. The Prince Albert tourism information website exhorts visitors to come and “Discover our oasis in the Karoo—where sparkling water bubbles along the furrows, gardens bloom, fruit orchards flourish and peace will restore your soul” (Prince Albert Tourism Association 2008). The Prince Albert library holds a collection of magazine and newspaper articles about the town dating back to the 1980s, many of which give emphasis to the ‘magic’ and ‘charm’ of the isolated desert town. “Flanked by rugged mountains and endless desolate plains, the picturesque hamlet of Prince Albert has retained its old world beauty,” writes Alex Cremer in a 1986 South African Garden and Home article. Such romantic descriptions are common within the broader tourism promotion genre that aims to evoke nostalgia for ‘simpler’ times amongst a privileged Western readership. The prevalence of this discourse is evident in the numerous popular media sources which reiterate this particular way of knowing Prince Albert; in contrast to the government reports that are available and describe a very different picture of life in the town.

Although whites are in the demographic minority in the town, the special access to dominant discourses about Prince Albert is utilised by semigrant power elites to actively promote discourses which support both white identity and material interests. Elsewhere the first author has shown how heritage and tourism serve white material interests in the town (McEwen 2013). Here we are concerned with the particular ways of knowing employed by semigrant power elites and how these ways of knowing, which construct Prince Albert as ‘charming’, ‘old world’ and ‘peaceful’, can be understood through the lens of race and power in the context of Transformation.

The contrasting representations of the town reflected in government and tourism discourses materialise when one travels down the main road running through Prince Albert. Entering the South end of the town, the road is lined with signs of gentrification in the form of middle class enclaves such as antique shops, restaurants, galleries and cafés. ‘Quaint’ Victorian and Cape Dutch homes are situated on lush ‘town farms’, bordered by a water furrow providing the life-blood of small-scale agricultural production. As one proceeds North up this road, you
eventually notice the water furrow diverting East and West as the green vegetation vanishes into the dry and rocky terrain of the Karoo landscape. The end of the water furrow and the change in landscape mark the division between the South and North ends of the town. The former Group Area of North End is characterised by rows of low-income, prefabricated Reconstruction and Development Programme houses and is located across the road from a national grocery store franchise and liquor store.

Deserting Transformation

The whiteness of semigrant power elite’s epistemic construction of Prince Albert is revealed as residents explain their motivations for moving to the town. These recently arrived white residents frequently contrasted the town’s ‘peaceful’ rural attributes against the ‘chaotic’ nature of cities. For example, one resident explained,

I love living here because it’s peaceful and quiet, it’s slow paced, I couldn’t possibly live in the city with the rush, with the traffic lights, it’s a slow pace which suits me.

For Mills, the differences constructed between cities and towns are not strictly about geography, but also about racialised power relations in that ‘dark’ city spaces are “discontinuous with white privilege” (1997: 50). Such constructions of urban spaces are overlain with racialised discourses as cities are considered to be “intrinsically doomed to welfare dependency, high street crime, [and] underclass status, because of the characteristics of its inhabitants” (50). The resident’s desire to relocate to the rural ‘quiet’ of Prince Albert is underpinned by a ‘whitewashed’ construction of Prince Albert that invisibilises the racialised inequality present in the town. Another resident discussed the motivations of those, like herself, who have relocated to the town from urban and suburban areas:

I think Prince Albert has a very good energy and ... people who come here all have dreams of an idyllic life ... It’s almost as if it is good for your soul ... there is just something about it that gives you scope for doing what you want to do, or finding out who you are and what you want to be.

The sense that Prince Albert provides a location in which she has the freedom to live out fantasies that could not be realised in urban spaces reflects Mills’ argument that city spaces are seen to threaten whiteness and white privilege. The non-relationality of white identity as discussed by Dwyer and Jones (2001) is also illustrated here in the residents’ description of their attraction to the town. The silences around the reality that “idyllic” lifestyles in Prince Albert are available only to those who can afford them reveals how white non-relationality is central to the maintenance of an ignorance contract. As Steyn argues, “oppressor populations need ignorance to shield them from knowing the realities of the injustices that undergird their privileges for their psychological well-being and for the perpetuation of privilege to remain unquestioned” (2012: 21).
The resident elaborated further on her perception of how urban-like developments threaten the rural qualities of the town, which is what attracted her to it initially:

... I always had this deep seated dream, to just live simply off the land ... to eat the tomatoes from the garden, and herbs from the garden ... this is why we want to try and preserve this, we don’t want them to build up on the tracks of ground in the town, because it has always been this mixed um, agricultural and living, and that’s the essential part of ... living in Prince Albert, you can grow your own few veggies.

For this resident, Prince Albert allows the realisation of a dream which she sees as important to her identity and which was previously inhibited by city living. This way of knowing the town is facilitated by, and reinforces, ignorance of the challenges of daily survival experienced by the majority of the town’s population. As previously discussed, it has been well documented by government sources that the town’s coloured farm working community suffers equal, if not worse, living conditions than those of their working class counterparts in cities. When considering the everyday realities of North End evidenced in government documentation, the ways in which semigrants position themselves non-relationally in the town reveals an epistemic framework facilitated by an indulgent lack of cognisance of the realities of inequality as well as personal and collective participation in, and benefit from, the processes which have maintained white privilege (even as they position themselves against further economic development). Furthermore, Ballard’s notion of semigration emerges as a function of the Racial Contract in that semigrants seek to distance themselves physically and psychically from the perceived threat of blackness.

Knowing and forgetting: Power elites and history in Prince Albert

For the power elites of Prince Albert, the history of the town is both repulsive and valuable. As will be illustrated below, semigrant residents reject their relationship to recent apartheid history for strategic purposes in order to reframe white identities in the new South Africa. At the same time, they seek to invoke an earlier history through the construction of material value around the colonial era.

Ignore-ance of apartheid history

The spatial distancing which motivates, and occurs, through semigration to Prince Albert is paralleled by an attempt to create temporal distance between the recent apartheid past that threatens to invade the sense of ‘comfort’ that is maintained through the non-relational experience of the town as ‘peaceful’ and ‘tranquil’. As the residents quoted below shared their frustrations with the town’s coloured farm working community, they also indicated the sense of unease which accompanies encounters with the town’s underclass. As we will go to explain, it is as if these encounters haunt the (white) fantasies of the present realities the semigrants have constructed. The black farmworkers become living and breathing ghosts of a history that continuously threatens to reassert itself in the present context of Transformation towards a non-racial democracy.
When power elites in Prince Albert discussed their relationship with the coloured farm working community of North End they demonstrated an inverted epistemology, as theorised by Mills, in that they claim to not understand the attitudes and behaviours of these residents towards them. The 'confusion' of whites about the world they have made is, according to Mills (1997: 18), a pillar of the Racial Contract. The Racial Contract allows white people to ignore the existence and consequences of structural racism, and

prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made (18).

The following resident illustrates the ways in which ignorance can function to invisibilise horrors of the apartheid past, and thereby absolve white culpability in present racialised structures of inequality:

I saw a chap in the post office today, and you know, he was sort of wringing his hat and doing this thing to me, now only because he came out of the old apartheid days, and I am a white guy, and somehow, I represent that thing for him. I am not part of that, I have never been a part of it, I left South Africa during that political period.

This denial of involvement in apartheid history translates fluidly into contemporary denial of responsibility for the ongoing inequality between the town’s white and black communities. Here, these residents illustrate how “choices around ignorance and knowing are directly related to choices regarding acknowledgement or evasion of responsibility in relation to others” (Smithson in Steyn 2012: 22). The following resident further illustrates this point, explaining her frustration with the ways in which coloured residents of the town relate to her and other white people:

I get mad because I think it’s on both sides of the divide as well … it’s not just white people … someone will come to the door, or a child playing with his friends will have an attitude, and then turn to you and ask, in a grovelling way, for R5 [South African currency] or something, to go and buy bread, and to me, I am like, “Don’t talk to me like that, man” and it makes me so cross, and I lose my temper, and my blood boils, and that’s worse. Talk to me like we are both people, don’t grovel, it doesn’t suit you and it doesn’t suit me.

In attempting to flatten and therefore legitimate the unequal power relations in the town through the argument that the black community is responsible for its own subjugation and even the discomfort of white residents, both of the residents quoted above avoid acknowledgement of how contemporary white subjectivities have been shaped through the racial hierarchy and ongoing reverberations from apartheid. Here, Mills’ theory that white ignorance produces a “cultivation of patterns of affect and empathy that are only weakly, if at all, influenced by nonwhite suffering” (1997: 95) emerges through the voices of semigrants. By emphasising their frustration and confusion with the coloured
people of the town, it is evident that being reminded of master-slave subjectivities, and their enduring legacies in Prince Albert, destabilises white entitlement to dominate and control spaces and resources in a ‘comfortable’ way.

A more valuable past: heritage and tourism in Prince Albert

While the history of apartheid does not provide ‘positive’ self-images for white people in Prince Albert, aspects of the town’s past which symbolise colonial history are emphasised in the service of white identities and privilege. Power elite residents construct these aspects of Prince Albert’s history as possessing ‘heritage value’ which functions to secure the privileged status of whites in the town, much like when these symbols were first erected during the period of settlement and colonisation. As Steyn (2001: xxvii) discusses of the global power of whiteness, “the notion of whiteness, and the essential attributes that it is meant to signify, can be considered a core-organizing category in modern Western ideology.” The social formations produced through white Western ideology are “so powerful that they came to be taken as common sense” (xxvii). As a Western ideological construct, ‘heritage’ has increasingly become an international buzzword employed in attempts to preserve histories considered worthy of remembering. Much of this preservation happens within the broader framework of tourism and the tourism industry which seeks to create ‘destinations’ with unique cultural attributes in order to attract tourist dollars. In terms of our analysis here, we argue that ‘heritage’ not only serves white material interests, but also facilitates the construction of a whitewashed ‘feel-good’ history in Prince Albert (Mills 2008: 241).

In Prince Albert the concept of ‘heritage’ is appealed to as a common sense way of preserving and promoting ‘desirable’ aspects of the town’s history. Through their application to SAHRA to establish Prince Albert as a provincial heritage site, the authors, who are white residents of the town—many of whom can be considered semigrants—focus on aspects of the town’s past which have value to both white material interest and identities. Written collaboratively amongst residents concerned with the protection of the town’s heritage, “Prince Albert: Unique Karoo town at the foot of the Swartberg World Heritage Site: Proposal for protected status as a provincial heritage site”, argues that the town should be protected as a heritage site because:

the natural setting in which Prince Albert is embedded is an integral part of the heritage value of the town as it provides building-free vistas out onto the engulfing Karoo landscape and contextualizes the town structure in a very potent manner: the landscape which defines the town and the resources of the natural environment have directed the cultural activities that have marked the last 250 years, making it a truly symbiotic cultural landscape (3).

Through its emphasis on the town’s “cultural landscape”, the proposal seeks to establish distance between the town and post-apartheid South Africa through the silencing of current inequalities. The fact that “cultural activities” of the past 250 years included the alienation of indigenous people from their land so that Europeans could make use of it does not enter this narrative of the town’s history. The non-relationality of white identity surfaces in this representation of
Prince Albert through the familiar colonial narrative it invokes. In conveying white settler spaces as empty and unoccupied ‘virgin’ lands, this narrative functions to legitimate the presence of whites in the town under the presumption that they were its original occupants.

The affluent positionalities of the proposal’s authors emerges when one considers that only a minority of the town’s most privileged residents can enjoy “building-free vistas” and conduct small-scale farming activities on town farms. Further ignored are the circumstances through which these “vistas” were acquired in processes of land appropriation that resulted from the pre-apartheid Natives Land Act (1913) and later the Group Areas Act (1950), which created segregated racial residential areas through the forced removal of those classified as “black”, “coloured”, or “Indian” from areas the apartheid government sought to limit to “white” use. The Victorian and Cape Dutch homes that the proposal presents as evidence of the town’s heritage value further illustrates that the colonial era underpins the history deemed worthy of preservation by the resident-authors. For the semigrant power elites of Prince Albert today, these aspects of the town’s built and natural environment should be protected and packaged as ‘heritage assets’, omitting the details of the violent exploitation associated with colonial domination and rule. Fontein (2000: 62) provides insight into the power relations operating through these discursive constructions of heritage, explaining that the idea of ‘heritage’ is predicated on a concept of linear and progressive time in which certain kinds of knowledge are seen to have a particular authority. One of the authors of the proposal illustrates this aspect of Fontein’s critique as she claims that it is only newer residents who understand the value of the town’s heritage:

... it’s all people who came into town, who love it and think it’s beautiful. It’s very sad to say, the local community doesn’t realise what they’ve got, it’s very very sad.

Here, this resident legitimates the attempt to declare the town a heritage site through claims to a semigrant aesthetic authority ‘sadly’ not possessed by local residents. She positions the semigrant power elites as the most appropriate guardians of this heritage based on the knowledge they bring to the town.

Heritage as a way of knowing and representing history can be further interrogated in relation to Dwyer and Jones’ second dimension of white socio-spatial epistemology—segmentation. Dwyer and Jones (2001) argue that through the lens of whiteness, space is “understood as being comprised of discrete and bounded objects and spatio-temporal units can be readily delineated, known and assigned ‘attributes’” (212). This spatial epistemology “underwrites private property and the construction and orderly maintenance of segmented social space, from gated communities to redlined districts, from nature ‘preserves’... to office towers” (212). In their attempt to establish the town as a heritage site, because of attributes deemed to have historical, aesthetic and commercial value,

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6 Act No. 27 of 1913. The Act legislated that only 7% of the entire landmass of South Africa could be owned by natives and created a system of land tenure that had enduring socio-economic repercussions.
the power elites of Prince Albert create a conceptual boundary around the town. Within this boundary, these residents, as the ‘experts’ on the heritage and aesthetic value of Prince Albert, enforce a measure of control over the changes that can occur in the town. As explained by one resident,

this whole conservation thing is not to stop development, it’s just to manage it to the best advantage of everybody, to conserve this beautiful character that we have in town which attracts the tourists, and brings money to the town.

‘Managing’ the town’s heritage to the “best advantage of everybody” means the commodification of the town’s heritage assets in order to attract tourists and their dollars. However, as the final section will reveal, the benefits of the tourism industry are not evenly distributed across the town. “This whole conservation thing” in actuality, exclusively serves white interests even as the semigrants are ostensibly opposed to the corporate and commercial power of developers.

**Tourism and Transformation**

According to the resident-authors of the proposal to establish Prince Albert as a provincial heritage site, the purpose of preserving Prince Albert’s heritage is to develop the tourism industry in the town. At the global scale, tourism has become naturalised as a common sense means of achieving economic development, particularly in the so-called ‘developing’ world. The following semigrant power elite echoes this notion,

... it’s a known fact, worldwide, that tourism creates jobs, and I think something like, every 30 tourists that visit your town creates one job, that’s the international standard.

This belief draws on neoliberal discourses which position the industry as a cure-all for weak economies in the postcolonial world based on the idea that “tourism can contribute substantially to an improvement of the quality of life of all people” (Ferreira 2004: 301). However, critical study of the “world’s largest industry” has revealed the costs and conflicts that often accompany tourism (Robinson 2001). In revealing the ways in which world tourism has become a driver of cultural remaking and reinvention of identities, places, and objects, Robinson makes the important point that, by and large, tourism is a product of Western consumerist ideology. Pointing out that the majority of the world’s population does not engage in leisure tourism as participants, Robinson asserts that the culture of tourism remains firmly rooted in the Western world and forms part of its wider consumptive ideologies. Such ideologies reproduce practices which sustain an inequality between consumers and what is consumed. In the context of tourism, consumer practices perpetuate social distance between tourists and locals by empowering tourists’ ability to ‘gaze’ and ‘know’ the peoples and places around them at their leisure.

Tourism in South Africa, like other developing nations, is linked to economic imperatives to become globally competitive in the international tourist market (Viljoen & Tlabela 2006: 6). Cultural tourism, in particular, has become a leading
type of tourism internationally, making the establishment of heritage sites crucial in attracting tourists who seek ‘authentic’ cultural experiences. As revealed in Prince Albert, because tourism development, mobilised by constructions of the town’s heritage value, is a process driven and owned by the town’s power elites, it ultimately works against Transformation through the reproduction of apartheid-era racialised inequality and subjectivities. The maintenance of apartheid-era power relations is made evident in the following interview excerpt where the resident explains how tourism will ‘benefit’ the coloured community:

... it creates a lot of jobs, I mean, we have about 56 guest houses, they are not all big grand guest houses, some of them are just one or two rooms in a house that people let, but it creates a job for a coloured woman to come and do the cleaning.

Providing insight into the unequal dynamics of economic opportunity and mobility within the town’s tourism industry, this resident reveals the ways in which racialised apartheid-era subjectivities are reinforced and normalised through these proposed developments. At the same time, many semigrant power elites expressed frustration regarding the coloured community’s apparent apathy towards tourism. One semigrant power elite who was, at the time, in a leadership position within the Prince Albert Tourism Association, explained why this might be the case:

why don’t we have more involvement of coloured people in tourism? Maybe there is attempts to do it, but the fact of the matter is that the members of the tourism association pay their dues, are the people who are in businesses, and those aren’t people in North End.

Private property ownership, as a key structure in the tourism industry, precludes the ability of historically marginalised coloured residents to participate in the Association and planning decisions about the town. While this certainly provides some explanation for why coloured residents in the town are not more involved in facilitating tourism developments, the subtext of the resident’s comments reveals the deeper causes for this dynamic—private property as a common sense distributor of who can gain access to, and benefit from, the industry. The discursive deployment of tourism to frame development allows the elite residents to accomplish both epistemic and material control over the town while simultaneously facilitating the denial and occlusion of the inequalities the residents claim tourism will mitigate.

In establishing the heritage value and related ‘charm’ of Prince Albert through the hegemonic spatial epistemology of tourism, alternative processes to achieve socio-economic equality and justice are foreclosed (Natter & Jones 1997: 151). Review of the government generated Central Karoo District Municipality Integrated Development Planning 2007-2011 reveals the privileged status that tourism has achieved in relation to other social needs within governmental development planning. Within this period, tourism development was allocated a total of R5,248,903 (South African Rands). Comparing this budget allocation to the social, health, and environmental sectors reveals stark differences. For the same period, R1,500,000 was allocated to “social” areas for the development of a multipurpose centre in Prince Albert, the area of “health” received R1,232,000
for “moral regeneration/social cohesion” strategies, along with R444,000 which was to be allocated to HIV/AIDS prevention programmes. Lastly, the area of “environment” received R113,000. From this brief comparison, the prioritisation of the development of the tourism industry is clear—it received nearly double (R5,248,903) that of the “social”, “health”, and “environment” related areas combined (R2,845,000).

**Conclusion**

As Moreton-Robinson writes, “Whiteness is constitutive of the epistemology of the West, it is an invisible regime of power that secures hegemony through discourse and has material effects in everyday life” (2004: 75). Through analysis of the ways in which Prince Albert’s power elites construct knowledge of the town, we have sought to show how structural inequalities are maintained through racialised epistemologies which function to protect white privilege. We have traced the everyday, material consequences and ignore-ances sustained by these racialised epistemologies and how they operate in the service of white hegemonic identities and material interests. In particular, tourism and heritage are invoked as important aspects of the town’s identity as well as common sense and seemingly self-evident means of achieving economic development. However, if we look at the structural conditions that regulate who is able to participate in and benefit from tourism developments, we see that the economic boon envisaged by semigrant power elites is not distributed equally within the town’s residents. Heritage and tourism provide spatio-temporal epistemologies that function to maintain white privilege and power through their appeals to economic development in a neoliberal context of Transformation. Our analysis has revealed that in a postcolonial context such as Prince Albert, white epistemologies continue to naturalise white dominance.

**Author Note**

Haley is Research Coordinator in the Wits Centre for Diversity Studies (WiCDS) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. She is also a Sociology PhD student at the University of the Witwatersrand. Haley.McEwen@wits.ac.za

Melissa Steyn is Professor of Sociology, and director of Diversity Studies (WiCDS) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. She has written extensively on Critical Whiteness Studies and more recently, on Critical Diversity Studies. Melissa.Steyn@wits.ac.za

**Acknowledgements**

We would like to acknowledge the South Africa Netherlands research Programme on Alternatives in Development (SANPAD) which provided the funding to conduct
the research used in this article, as well as the Small Towns and Rural Transformation project steering committee for their feedback and guidance.

References


NEW TERRITORIES IN CRITICAL WHITENESS STUDIES

Shades of Whiteness? English Villagers, Eastern European Migrants and the Intersection of Race and Class in Rural England

Helen Moore
University of Surrey

White lives are lived and structurally positioned in multiple ways due to the intersection of whiteness with social class, ethnicity, gender, nationality, local and national political discourses and historical contexts. Taking this insight as my starting point, my article will explore Hartigan’s (1999) theory that different degrees or ‘shades’ of whiteness exist as variants of hegemonic whiteness by focusing specifically on the English countryside: a territory which remains largely unexplored by critical whiteness scholars. I examine the ways in which residents of a rural English village perceive Eastern European migrants who have moved to the area (since the expansion of the European Union in 2004) to undertake low-paid horticultural labour. My findings from twelve months of residential ethnographic research suggest that due to class-inflected discourses about clothing, hair, language, labour, and respectable and desirable ways of living, English village residents view Eastern European migrant workers as ‘not quite white’ enough to be accepted into rural village life. Based on an analysis of the discourses through which English villagers construct binaries of self/other and insider/outsider, I conclude that Eastern European migrants are subject to subtle and class-based processes of racialisation.

Keywords: Whiteness, social class, rural England, Eastern Europe, immigration, racialisation

Introduction
Since the expansion of the European Union (EU) in 2004,¹ large numbers of Eastern European migrants have found employment in the British agricultural and horticultural sectors, working in rural locations whose populations are almost exclusively white British. In the popular imagination, the English countryside is frequently evoked as a harmonious and traditional space: ‘picture postcard’ images portray rural areas as unchanging, epitomising a quaint Englishness frozen in time. Therefore, the inflow of Eastern European migrants to rural areas of England does not sit neatly with the romantic concept of the ‘rural idyll’ which is central to the image of English national identity. This is because such discourses construct Englishness as ethnically white. Issues of immigration and racial and ethnic diversity are often seen as being ‘out of place’ or irrelevant in the English countryside. The anti-racist policy document “Keep them in Birmingham” written by Eric Jay (1992), on behalf of the Commission for Racial Equality,² highlighted that in the rural imagination, black and minority ethnic people are confined to towns and cities representing an ‘alien’ urban environment, while the white landscape of rurality is aligned with ‘nativeness’.

Since Jay’s landmark publication, racial and ethnic minority exclusion from the English countryside has been afforded increasing academic attention, primarily from rural studies and social geography (see Agyeman & Spooner 1997; Neal 2002; Neal & Agyeman 2006). However, while this research has begun to tackle the issue of the marginalisation of minorities in rural areas, less attention has been paid to the source of the problem: the role of hegemonic whiteness in perpetrating and perpetuating exclusion. Tyler’s (2003, 2006) study of villagers’ attitudes to British Asians in the suburbs of Leicester began to address this issue. Yet, scant academic research has uncovered the role of hegemonic whiteness in marginalising ‘other’ whites such as new economic migrants from Eastern Europe. While these nationals may be viewed as unproblematically ‘white’ in their Eastern European homelands, they are apparently ‘not quite white’ enough to blend in to the English rural landscape unnoticed. In other words, while Eastern European migrants typically have the phenotypical features associated with white Englishness, they do not have the necessary cultural knowledge to perform ‘whiteness’ in the routine ways that English rural dwellers often take for granted. This article argues that English rural dwellers are able to construct different ‘shades’ of whiteness which serve to reinforce a social distance between themselves and Eastern European migrant workers, according to which social inclusion or exclusion is determined. I focus on a particular English village in

¹ In 2004 the European Union was enlarged to include Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia (known as the ‘Accession 8’ or ‘A8’ countries). With accession, residents of these 8 countries were granted the right to live and work in the United Kingdom. In 2007 two further countries, Romania and Bulgaria were granted accession. At present, Romanian and Bulgarian Nationals must obtain work permits to live and work legally in the United Kingdom, but this rule is due to be relaxed in January 2014.
² The Commission for Racial Equality has now been replaced by the Equality and Human Rights Commission in Britain.
rural Worcestershire as an ethnographic case study, which henceforth I will refer to as ‘Mayfield’.³

My aim in this article is to outline how white English villagers draw upon classed and ethnic markers of difference such as clothing and hairstyles, language, labour, and perceived poverty to position Eastern European migrants, who live and work on large fruit- and vegetable-growing farms situated in Mayfield, as ‘not quite white’ enough to be accepted into English rural life. During my twelve months of ethnographic fieldwork I was struck by how villagers’ construction of migrants as ‘not quite white’ was entwined with class markers of distinction, rendering the migrants ‘racially’ white but not culturally white. The villagers’ class status and local cultural knowledges combine in Mayfield to provide a kind of scaffolding, shoring up their position of hegemonic whiteness. Although Eastern European migrants are white-skinned, they are viewed by the villagers as a different ‘shade’ of white because ‘they’ do not perform whiteness in the same way as ‘us’. Despite this class bifurcation, the village itself cannot be described as ‘middle class’ in any traditional sense. That is to say, the villagers are heterogeneous in terms of their social, moral, and political values and diverse in their lifestyles, acquisition of material goods, and economic and educational positions. What the villagers do share, however, is an unspoken cultural understanding of how to fit into the local model of respectable rural living—a cultural knowledge encompassed by Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of ‘cultural capital’. In this article I adopt Bourdieu’s distinctive understanding of social class as rooted in and exhibited through nuanced social and cultural practices as well as economic resources as a lens through which to examine English village life. Processes of socialisation in Mayfield inculcate a distinctive class ‘habitus’ in the villagers. Habitus can be understood as a “system of durable dispositions of being and acting that represent the internalized embodiment of social norms and established patterns of behaviour” (Watt 2006: 777). The villagers’ shared dispositions equip them with the necessary social and cultural knowledge to embody and be accepted into village life. However, the migrants’ lack of such knowledge marks them out as cultural and ethnic ‘others’.

A Spectrum of Whiteness?

There are a number of studies in the United Kingdom that have engaged with the notion of ‘shades’ of whiteness. For example, sociologist Diane Reay has paid particular attention to the ‘value’ gained by white middle class pupils from multi-ethnic inner-city schooling, and middle class whites challenging socio-economic privilege and “doing whiteness differently” (Reay et al 2007; Reay 2008). Social and cultural geographers Anoop Nayak (2009) and Alastair Bonnett (1998) have also addressed the ways in which the white English working class have been perceived both as ‘white’ and ‘not-white’ in historical and contemporary contexts, shifting in and out of whiteness due to fluctuations in dominant political, colonial, capitalist, cultural and social discourses. However, it is the American

³ All given names and place names are pseudonyms with the exception of the English County of Worcestershire.
anthropologist John Hartigan’s (1999, 2003) work on shades of whiteness which I have found most useful in understanding the power dynamics and the daily, routine work of boundary maintenance between majority and minority white people in rural Worcestershire.

Hartigan (2003) explains that what counts as ‘white’ in many social situations and local contexts depends on class identity, and that the terms of racial belonging and difference are importantly inflected by the markings of class. Furthermore, in his study of “class predicaments of whiteness” in Detroit (1999), Hartigan proposes the idea that ‘shades’ of whiteness exist in American society. He states that lower-class whites are marked off from the privileges and power of hegemonic whiteness. It is the intersection of social class and whiteness that I seek to explore in relation to Eastern European migrants in the English countryside. In doing so, I investigate the classed markers of difference employed by white English villagers to define Eastern European migrants as ‘racially’ white, but culturally ‘other’ through clothing and hairstyles, language, labour, working conditions, and perceived poverty. While the historical, national, cultural and social context of Hartigan’s (1999, 2003) research is far removed from the twenty-first century English countryside, his conceptualisation of ‘shades of whiteness’ can be put to work here to explore how Eastern European migrants in rural England are being marginalised and excluded despite the fact that they are phenotypically ‘white’.

Bonnett (1998), Garner (2007), and Hartigan (2003) have argued that phenotypical appearances of whiteness can facilitate integration, assimilation, and privilege for some white subjects but others—such as poor whites and migrant whites—might also experience stigmatisation, deprivation, and subjugation. In rural England, Eastern European migrant workers occupy distinct social positions that are marginalised by the discourses and practices of hegemonic whiteness. In her study of migrant workers in Britain, McDowell’s (2008, 2009) findings indicate that continental European workers experience tenuous economic and social positions in England despite the fact that they are white. As Hartigan (2003) and Tyler (2006) have explained, what ‘counts’ as ‘white’ in many social situations depends on class identity, and the terms of racial belonging and racial difference are significantly inflected by the possession of ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu 1984). As became apparent during my research conducted in the village of Mayfield in Worcestershire, whiteness, as according to Frankenberg (1993), can be conceived of as a local phenomenon, which is complexly embedded in socioeconomic and cultural relations. As such whiteness too often goes unacknowledged and unnamed by village residents. For many of my interviewees, ‘race’ is an apparently distant and abstract concept. Consequently, the villagers’ whiteness is rendered invisible to them precisely through the unconscious assertion of its normalcy.

In Mayfield, the residents’ hegemonic white status is constructed collaboratively involving the people it excludes as well as those it includes. This hegemony comes in to being in relation to what it is not. As Knowles (2003) and Jenkins (2008) have argued, racial identity is relational and is constructed through social boundary activities. But whiteness is also produced in conjunction with other
social boundaries such as class, nation and gender, and it is the intersection of whiteness with class that I focus on in this paper. A number of theorists have also argued that whiteness is constructed through performativity (Warren 2001; Knowles 2003). This work does not posit that white people consciously perform 'whiteness', but as Alcoff (2006: 185) argues, white people's racial practices are based on 'common sense' discourses and assumptions about what appears to be 'obviously true' and what receives social and cultural consensus as 'whiteness'.

In his study of the performance of race in an American high school, Warren (2001: 92) agrees that "whiteness, while a systematic historical process that is diffuse and abstract" is also created through embodiment, by the repetition of mundane acts related to the ways in which people move, eat, sleep, labour, wash, dress, and conduct themselves in social relationships, rituals and etiquette. Each of these performative acts continually make and re-make whiteness, all the while remaining invisible to white people, eluding scrutiny and detection through their apparent normalcy. Warren argues that the concept of performativity provides a heuristic lens through which to view the ways in which whiteness "continues to construct itself as a privileged racial category" (2001: 97). However, as Alcoff (2006) reminds us, despite their embodied obviousness, the daily mundane acts which white people perform are always culturally constituted. By paying attention to the performance of whiteness we can observe how individuals make rhetorical choices about what a culture values. What I explore in this paper then, is the ways in which whiteness is performed and accomplished by the villagers of Mayfield according to apparently 'common sense' discourses about rural English culture.

Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ is also central to my analysis of whiteness in Mayfield. In his seminal book Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Bourdieu places great emphasis on the importance of a class-based ‘habitus’: “the embodied and unreflexive everyday mastery of culture” (Jenkins 2008: 79) which generates discourses and dispositions that individuals draw upon in their everyday lives. In Mayfield, the villagers’ collective habitus manifests itself in the form of what Tyler (2003: 396) has called “tacit cultural knowledges” about how to fit in to the local system of “respectable, desirable, and acceptable ways of living” that cut across the villagers’ class locations. Similarly, Alcoff (2006: 185) has suggested that white people's racial identity and “tacit but substantive racialised subjectivities” are correlated with gestural and perceptual practices and carried in the body. As I will go on to explain, in Mayfield, Eastern European migrant workers are seen to lack the culturally specific tacit gestural and perceptual knowledges that the villagers share, and are consequently positioned as a different ‘shade’ of white.

A small number of studies have documented the marginalisation of the white ‘other’ in British and American contexts including Bhopal’s (2006) research on traveller children in rural English schools, Hetherington’s (2006) study of new age travellers in rural Britain, Roediger’s (1991, 2005) studies of European immigrants and working class whites in the United States, and Hartigan’s research on ‘white trash’, ‘rednecks’ and ‘hillbillies’ in Detroit (2003, 2005). What these marginal groups share is that they are perceived by dominant whites as
‘not quite white’ enough to fit in with respectable mainstream society. Importantly, the groups studied in this research and the Eastern European migrants in Mayfield fall between the conventional racial dichotomy of black versus white. Racial distinctions made between different ‘shades’ of white in the English countryside are more nuanced: language, physical appearance, perceived ‘traits’ or ‘qualities’, and poverty are also markers of difference. Although the boundaries between the village ‘self’ and the migrant ‘other’ are ostensibly founded on class-based distinctions, there is a subtle and complex process of racialisation at work here. In her interview with Blaagaard (2011: 156), Vron Ware noted that in the UK, “anti-immigrant discourse has been articulated in racist terms, and the immigrant assumed to be dark-skinned”. However, for Eastern European migrants in rural Worcestershire, it seems clear that white skin and a common European heritage is insufficient for securing acceptance into rural English culture. In Mayfield, village residents thus draw upon a “racist rhetoric of difference” (McDowell 2008: 62) to talk about Eastern European migrants even though they are white. Garner (2007: 48) provides a helpful explanation of how minority whites, such as Eastern European migrants, can be racialised as ‘non-white’ in majority white landscapes such as the English countryside:

… race is not only to do with colour, but with tying culture to bodies in a hierarchical way … A neat line between ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ is not an accurate reflection of how people always talk or behave. Groups that are ostensibly ‘white’ can therefore also be racialised [as other] in majority white countries. In the British context this has historically included Jews, the Irish Catholics and other Eastern European migrants.

As this article will go on to explain, finely-tuned racialised and classed discourses are employed by the white villagers in Mayfield to maintain the social distance between them and the white Eastern European migrant workers.

**Eastern European Migration to the UK and the County of Worcestershire: Historical Context**

It is difficult to accurately gauge the size of the Eastern European population in the UK, partly because of the transient and diasporic nature of the population, and partly because of the conflicting figures given by different governmental and non-governmental agencies. It is estimated that over 400,000 Eastern Europeans settled in the UK between 1947 and 1951, the period immediately following the Second World War (Stenning et al 2006). This wave of migrants comprised a combination of post-war refugees and displaced persons as well as European Volunteer Workers (EVW’s) who arrived under a scheme, which permitted the immigration of thousands of workers who were directed to low-wage jobs in the agriculture, construction, transport and nursing sectors in regions with unmet demand for labour in post-war reconstruction (McDowell 2009: 20). Unlike migrants from the Caribbean, who were transported to the UK to assist with the post-war effort in metropolitan areas and some smaller industrial towns (Phillips 1998), schemes such as the EVW and the Polish
Resettlement Act (1947) enabled Eastern European migrants to spread across the UK so that communities were not just concentrated in urban areas.

Until recently, post-war migrants and their families made up the vast majority of the UK’s Eastern European population. However, in May 2004 when eight Central and Eastern European countries were granted accession into the EU, and the UK opened its labour market to the new ‘Accession eight’ (or A8) citizens, the Eastern European population in the UK rose sharply. According to information provided by the Workers Registration Scheme (established in 2004 to regulate A8 citizens applying to work in the UK), a cumulative total of 932,000 applicants applied to work in the UK between 1 May 2004 and 30th September 2008, 66% of whom came from Poland (Accession Monitoring Report 2009 cited in Kempny 2010: 28). At present the most recent Census data available is from 2001 so it is difficult to accurately gauge trends in migration and settlement in the UK over the last decade for this population.

Official information on the migration of Eastern Europeans to the county of Worcestershire is even more scarce. Again, this is due to the transience of the migrant population (many of whom only stay for 2-6 months for seasonal agricultural and horticultural work), and also due to the many practical difficulties associated with collecting such data. According to local government statistics the number of ethnic minorities living in Worcestershire is small. Predictions made by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) for mid-2009 state that 91% of people in Worcestershire are white British compared with 83% in the whole of England. In 2009 the largest ethnic minority group in Worcestershire was—using Census terminology—‘White Other’ (i.e. white persons originating outside of Great Britain and Ireland). The same ONS research estimated that the population of ‘White Others’ in Worcestershire increased from 6,900 in 2001 to 11,200 in 2009. While these figures may include Eastern European migrants, they must be viewed with caution as they are predictions, and do not capture temporary or seasonal migrant workers.

The Village of ‘Mayfield’: An Ethnographic Case Study

The village of Mayfield is situated in rural Worcestershire in the West Midlands region of England. It is approximately three miles away from the small rural market town of ‘Elmbridge’. The local economy has for centuries been reliant on the agriculture and horticulture industries. Mayfield is home to two small arable farms, and there are at least another six large fruit and vegetable-growing nurseries known as market gardens which supply large supermarkets across the country with horticultural produce such as asparagus, salads, tomatoes, cauliflower and bean sprouts. The majority of crops and plants are grown in vast

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4 See note 1.
5 See: Worcestershire County Council (2012). Since 2008 the ONS has published ‘predicted’ ethnicity statistics for each Local Authority in England. These predictions are based on the most recent (2001) Census survey, but they are only estimates and not actual figures.
glasshouses, which means that produce is grown all year round and is less affected by the seasons.

Despite the fact that the village has long been reliant upon and characterised by the agriculture and horticulture industries, only around 0.8% of Mayfield’s residents work in these sectors today. This statistic reflects the current trend whereby large farms and growers in Worcestershire are increasingly employing migrant workers from Eastern Europe to conduct unskilled manual labour rather than recruiting from local labour pools. Today the work of planting, tending, picking and packaging fruit and vegetables is deemed undesirable by local people. The residents of Mayfield have a number of explanations for this. Increased mobility in terms of car ownership has meant that people are able to seek work both further afield and in different industries, and the changing shape of the rural English economic landscape has meant that a wider variety of job opportunities are now on offer to Mayfield residents. The people who I encountered through my research are employed, for example, in retail, real estate, education, transport, communications and IT, finance, health and social services among others. Some villagers suggested that the prospect of earning minimum wage for such physically demanding work, which often entails long and anti-social working hours, has driven people away from the horticultural industry, and others suggest that other potential unskilled workers are able to derive a similar income on social welfare benefits (this may be conjecture, but is nonetheless an opinion expressed by some villagers).

At the time of the 2001 Census, the permanent population of Mayfield was approximately 800. According to official Census classification data, 99% of the population are white. Asian, black, ‘mixed’, and Chinese or ‘other ethnic group’ together make up the remaining 1% of the village population. In other words, 8 people out of a population of 800 self-identify as non-white. The majority (54%) of Mayfield residents are over 45 with the smallest group being those aged 16-29 (12.5%), and those in the 30-44 age group comprising 18.1% of the population. The low numbers of young adults reflects the fact that many school-leavers move away to university and do not return, many move away to find paid employment, and many move out of the village in search of more affordable housing. The 2001 Census also indicates that the social class composition of the village is mixed, with 20% of the village population categorised in the AB group comprising “higher and intermediate managerial and professional occupations”, 26% in C1 comprising “supervisory, clerical, junior management, and administrative” occupations, 22% in C2 “skilled manual workers”, 15% in D comprising “semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers”, and 16% in E which refers to those on state benefits, the unemployed, and “lowest grade workers”. The village population comprises a combination of families whose histories in Mayfield span several generations as well as more recent arrivals from other areas of the West Midlands, Southern Ireland, the South East, the South West, and the North of England including urban and rural areas.

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6 See: Office for National Statistics (2011). I intentionally identify the general source of these statistics here in an effort to preserve the anonymity of the village of ‘Mayfield’.  
The Eastern European migrants who work at Mayfield’s horticultural nurseries also live on the farms. The provision of accommodation is usually included in the workers contracts, and is most often provided in the form of static caravans shared between 4-6 people, or converted farm buildings. It is impossible to state exactly how many Eastern European migrants are living and working in the village at any one time because the migrant population fluctuates with the seasons, and no official data on migrants in Mayfield are held. However, from anecdotal evidence given by farmers and village residents who work in the agriculture and horticulture industries, the number may be somewhere in the region of three hundred in high season and between fifty and one hundred during the remainder of the year.

During my fieldwork in Mayfield I took lodgings with a white English family who have lived in the village for approximately nine years. Living in the village enabled me to meet and interact with a cross-section of residents in terms of age, class, and gender, and I built up a network of project participants by taking part in the social life of the village. My fieldwork included participant observation, thirty in-depth interviews with village residents, two in-depth interviews with Polish migrants who had each moved to the area within the last four years, and three focus groups with Eastern European migrants working on local farms. As a young white woman in my late twenties (at the time of my fieldwork) coming from London (though having been raised in rural Gloucestershire in south west England), being white, educated, and middle-class did not provide me with automatic social access to the white people I interviewed and observed: male and female, working- and middle-class, young, middle-aged, and older English villagers, and male and female Eastern European economic migrants between 18 and 45 years of age.

Whilst my whiteness may have marked me as a ‘racial insider’ during my research, as Frankenberg (1993) has observed, ethnic identity is complicated by other social variables such as age, gender, class, accent, nationality and sexuality. Therefore, my insider or outsider status shifted at different times, in different places, and with different people (I expand on this later in the article). No doubt the villagers and migrants made judgements about me based on my social characteristics, and it is doubtless that some people warmed to me and spoke openly to me about their experiences while others were more guarded and cautious when revealing personal aspects of their lives to a relative stranger. Due to my residence in the village I was able to develop closer relationships with the villagers than with the migrant workers whom I interviewed. This reflected the social division between the villagers and migrants, whose social networks rarely overlap.

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I have not included the Eastern European participants in this article because the focus of my argument here is the ways in which the English villagers of Mayfield construct their hegemonic white status in relation to the perceived Eastern European ‘other’, and the discourses which lead to the migrants’ social exclusion from the village.
Shades of Whiteness in Mayfield: Villagers’ Perceptions of Eastern European Migrants

As I will outline below, a social distance between the villagers of Mayfield and Eastern European migrants is perceived and maintained by the former using classed markers of distinction which render the migrants racially white, but culturally ‘other’. Three key markers of difference maintain this social distance: i) physical appearance, including clothing and hairstyles; ii) language and accent; and iii) the type of work migrants do and their perceived poverty (as a result of working for minimum wage or less). These markers of difference are inextricably bound up with ideas about class and ethnicity. By ‘othering’ migrant workers, the villagers’ normative status of English whiteness is affirmed and “protected from the ruptures of decorum that might undermine its hegemonic status” (Hartigan 2003: 110).

Clothing, Hairstyles and ‘Taste’

For the villagers, the most immediate and visible distinction between themselves and Eastern European migrants was that of personal appearance. The clothing and hairstyles worn by migrant workers were mentioned by almost all of my interviewees when I asked them about similarities and differences between the local and migrant populations. In the villagers’ opinion, the migrants’ clothing and hairstyles are outdated, unfashionable, and ‘tacky’ (cheap, vulgar and in bad taste). Village people regularly distanced themselves from migrant workers on the basis that they would not wear such clothes and hairstyles. For example Linda, a woman in her mid-forties who has lived in Mayfield for fourteen years said:

Linda: The Poles like the flashy stuff ... they haven’t got much taste really [laughs]. You can spot them instantly if you go to Tesco’s. They stand out a mile because of what they're wearing, their bad taste. They’re still into tracksuits aren’t they? 80’s shell-suits. They love the shiny stuff in the charity shops, sort of sequiny, diamante types of things the girls like.

Helen: Do you see them shopping in the charity shops then?

Linda: Oh yeah, all the time.

Linda shops in charity shops regularly and explained to me that the majority of the clothing she was wearing during our interview was second-hand. So it was not buying clothes in charity shops which Linda considered to be in bad taste, but the tracksuits, shell-suits, and “sequiny, diamante” clothing that many migrant women choose to wear. Linda twice mentions the concept of ‘taste’: a classed and cultural distinction she is able to make because of her cultural capital and knowledge of how respectable white women ought to dress in the village. By making a judgement about what is in ‘good taste’ and what is in ‘bad taste’, Linda positions herself in a location of class privilege and the migrant ‘girls’ as ‘other’, lower-class, and without the cultural capital to make the necessary judgements of taste.
Zoe, 40, who has lived in Mayfield for ten years, told me about two young Latvian women who attend her part-time accountancy course at the local college:

Zoe: They’re quite sweet both of them ‘cos they’re quite young so they’re quite trendy, but there’s a couple of other [English] girls on the course who are late teens, early twenties and their style is so different. You know, if you put the four of them together you’d know who’s English and who’s not. The other two just look like typical English in leggings and boots, and these [Latvian] girls look a bit like 80’s throwbacks, you know, they’ve got short hair on one side and long on the other, bright colours, you know … a very different style.

Helen: I guess that might be the height of fashion in Latvia? The style is just different. Or maybe they don’t have much money to spend on the latest fashions?

Zoe: Yeah, like a lot of the girls around here. But it’s a definite look they’ve got going on. They’ve made an effort, the hair is a style … it’s just very different. It just reminds me of the 80’s, it’s a bit David Bowie-ish. The one girl, she’s got it all down one side and then shaved on the other side and it’s all spiked up.

Helen: It sounds quite brave.

Zoe: Oh it is, very. They’re both very distinctive. They certainly don’t just blend in.

Zoe describes the Latvian women’s style as “distinctive”, but reminiscent of the 1980’s thus implying that they are somewhat ‘behind the times’. In these interview passages, Zoe and Linda construct a chain of dichotomies separating white English villagers from white Eastern European migrants. ‘We’ have ‘good’ taste whereas ‘they’ do not, ‘we’ look English whereas ‘they’ do not, ‘we’ dress fashionably whereas ‘they’ dress ‘like 80’s throwbacks’. This emphasis on Eastern European women’s clothing, hairstyles, and cultural and class difference serves to situate ‘them’ outside of the village, in a time and place characterised by ‘backwardness’. As Tyler (2012: 436) argues, the effect of such discourses is that “cultural superiority and classed value” are “attached to a set of white middle-class English ‘country’ ways of being” that is denied to Eastern European migrants.

Both Zoe and Linda’s accounts are clearly gendered descriptions of ‘others’ based on shopping practices and embodied characteristics such as clothing and hairstyles (none of my male interviewees appraised Eastern Europeans’ clothing and self-presentation in such fine detail). They position migrant women as lacking the necessary feminine cultural knowledge to dress themselves correctly, and in doing so, provide an example of how local people (or in these cases, women specifically) use their cultural capital to identify migrant workers and make a distinction between themselves and the migrants by making judgements about appearance.

Language
Command of the English language (or lack thereof) is another marker of difference between the local English people and Eastern European migrants. If an individual is unable to speak English, or speaks only heavily-accented or broken English, social distance is placed between those individuals and the white English majority. Not only are migrants marked out as ‘other’ by local English people on the basis of their language and nationality, but they are also treated as inferior and ‘stupid’. This sentiment was exemplified by Brian, a local man in his late forties who has lived in the village for fourteen years, who explained to me:

I don’t know what’s happened with the Polish community who have now come in. I personally haven’t had any reason to have much contact with them at all but I have witnessed people and the way they speak to them, and actually felt very uncomfortable because the assumption seems to be that these people are stupid but I know that a lot of them are anything but. Lots of them are very well-educated people who are doing the best they can and doing jobs that people here won’t do now … I have seen some very disrespectful behaviour—from adults, which surprised me very much—because they didn’t speak English, and you just feel like saying well, how’s your Polish?

Brian provides a reflexive response here, and speaks of his discomfort at other people’s assumption that Eastern European migrants are “stupid”. He also told me that he had witnessed disrespectful treatment of migrant workers in the village shop and Post Office, in one case when a young Eastern European woman who spoke little English was attempting to send a parcel to her home country, and on another occasion when an Eastern European man did not have enough money to pay for a loaf of bread, and after much embarrassment, left the shop with nothing. These anecdotes mirrored my own observations in the village and also in the local town of Elmbridge.

One incident in particular, which took place at Elmbridge train station is worth mentioning here. While I was waiting in the queue at the station ticket booth there was an Eastern European woman, probably in her late twenties, in front of me. She was asking the price of a return train ticket to one of the London airports. She asked whether she had to travel through central London as part of her journey and wanted to buy her ticket several months in advance of her travel date. The woman spoke reasonably good English but with a strong Eastern European accent, and it was clear (or I thought so at least) that she was unfamiliar with the somewhat complicated, expensive, and often infuriating British train ticketing system. The ticket seller became rude and grew impatient when the woman clearly did not understand what he was saying, raising his voice so that the entire ticket office could hear the exchange. At this point I stepped in to try to explain to the woman that tickets are not available to buy until six weeks prior to the travel date. She promptly left, and when I reached the ticket booth the seller rolled his eyes and let out a loud sigh as if to say ‘these bloody foreigners’, assuming that I would sympathise with him and consider his treatment of the woman to be justified. Uncomfortable with his assumption, I mentioned that his rudeness was unnecessary, to which he replied, “What do they expect if they don’t speak proper English?” The ticket seller thus erected a boundary between ‘they’/ ‘them’ (Eastern European’s who ‘don’t speak proper English’) and ‘us’ (British people who do).
This “boundary maintenance work” (Hartigan 2003: 96) serves to maintain a
distance and hierarchy between ‘them’ and ‘us’ where migrants are seen as
inferior and local people superior due to their command of the English language.
This incident also provides a valuable insight into how I was perceived by local
white English people during my fieldwork. The ticket seller’s non-verbal gestures
such as his loud sigh and rolling of the eyes suggested that he had made
judgements about me based on my Englishness and whiteness which led him to
believe that I would sympathise with and understand his frustration with those
who ‘don’t speak proper English’. Shared ethnicity and national identity meant
that most of my white English interviewees, and people I encountered through
my ethnography, assumed that I would not disagree with their views about
Eastern European migrants. My exchange with the ticket-seller at the train
station made me aware that I was perceived by others as possessing ‘good’
whiteness as opposed to the Eastern Europeans’ ‘not good enough’ whiteness. As
Hunter (2005) has highlighted, rather than necessarily creating comfortable,
trusting relationships, this realisation meant that, for me, research situations
were often characterised by anxiety and unease.

*Labouring on the Land, Attitudes to Work and Poverty*

The third way in which the Eastern European migrants were marked out as
different from the villagers is through factors related to their employment. First
and foremost, they are consistently defined and described as migrant workers,
thus apparently justifying but also limiting their reason for being present in
Mayfield and the surrounding area. Secondly, the actual labour that the migrants
undertake (fruit and vegetable planting, picking, processing, and packaging) has
become work that, almost without exception, migrants do. During my fieldwork I
came across very few local people engaged in this work (except at the
supervisory, managerial, and administrative levels). The fact that local people no
longer wish to do this work distances the migrants from village residents whilst
conferring on local people some sense of superiority—the work is considered
‘beneath’ the villagers and migrant workers have stepped in to fill a void in the
labour market created by local people shunning the work. Numerous Mayfield
residents told me that local people were not willing to accept the labour
conditions (strenuous physical labour, long and anti-social hours) for minimum
remuneration. While local people who used to work in horticulture have generally
moved on to find employment in other industries with better conditions, Julie the
postmistress and proprietor of the village shop told me that:

> It has become the work that migrant workers do now hasn’t it? I think even if
unemployment becomes a big problem in this area [during the current period of
recession] local people wouldn’t do the picking. I can think of two or three
youngsters in the village who are drawing benefits who could easily be doing that
work. Well it would be hard work, but they could do it if they swallowed their
pride and put their minds to it.

The physical labour of fruit and vegetable planting, picking, and processing has
become unpopular and stigmatised—so much so that a small number of
Mayfield’s residents apparently chose to accept unemployment benefits from the
state rather than doing this work. This also tells us something interesting about villagers’ imaginings of class difference and respectability: the ‘youngsters in the village’ see more dignity in drawing benefits (which is often seen as synonymous with a lazy, work-shy, persistently under-employed class in British society) than performing low-skilled manual labour. The notion that the ‘youngsters’ would have to ‘swallow their pride’ before doing this work suggests that among the villagers, agricultural and horticultural labour is considered good enough for Eastern European migrants, but undesirable and even unacceptable for villagers.

This ‘othering’ of the migrants allows the villagers to keep a social distance from the migrant workers who toil on the land but are still perceived as poverty-stricken due to the low wages they receive. To substantiate the perceived poverty of the migrant workers, many village people remarked to me that they would often see migrant workers walking down the main road from Mayfield to Elmbridge to shop at Lidl, a cut-price German supermarket. Both the act of walking the three miles into town and shopping at Lidl are seen by the villagers as signs of poverty: the migrants are not able to afford the bus fare and do not own cars, and many local people consider the products stocked at Lidl to be poor quality. The villagers do not take into account the fact that Lidl is by far the closest supermarket to the village for pedestrians—to go to Tesco, the supermarket popular with villagers—would be a further 20 minutes walk. What many of the village people also do not consider is that while many of the migrant workers live frugal lives in England, many save their earnings and send remittances home to improve their families’ quality of life. In my interviews and focus groups with migrant workers I also discovered that it is not uncommon for them to work for several summer seasons in order to save money to buy land and build their own houses in their home countries, which is the preserve of only the extremely wealthy in rural England.

All three of these markers of difference: clothing and hairstyles, language, and work and poverty are repeatedly drawn upon by the people of Mayfield to demonstrate the social distance between themselves and the migrant workers. What I have demonstrated so far in this article is that although the Eastern European migrants are phenotypically white, they are situated beneath the villagers of Mayfield in a hierarchy of whiteness due to judgements about cultural difference, ‘taste’, and respectability which cut across the villagers’ class locations.

**Maintaining Boundaries**

I argue then, that there exists a ‘spectrum’ of whiteness in Mayfield with the ‘most white’ at one end and the ‘least white’ at the other. The ‘most white’ are English, wear clothing and hairstyles thought to be ‘tasteful’ if not fashionable, speak English with a British accent, earn a living wage, or have an ‘average’ or higher than average income, own their own car, spend a significant portion of their income on food, clothing and other consumer goods, and live in a private (usually owned rather than rented) home. Their performance of whiteness is a reflection of their cultural capital, and is secured in relation to what it is not. At the other end of the continuum then, the ‘least white’ whites are not-English who
dress and style their hair in what is deemed by local people to be an unfashionable, old-fashioned way ‘without taste’, do not speak English or speak broken English with a heavy accent, appear poor and do not mirror the consumer habits of the white English villagers, and live in caravans or multiple-occupancy housing on farm land.

While the Eastern European migrants are ‘racially’ white, they are not considered to be ‘culturally white’ by the English villagers. While none of my interviewees quoted in this article explicitly talked about race, their construction of the ‘other’ is underpinned by a subtle process of racialisation that positions Eastern European migrants as ‘not quite white’. When mobilising these discourses of difference, villagers draw upon racist idioms and rhetoric, which are embedded in Britain’s colonial past and postcolonial present. As I have explained, the people of Mayfield do not fit neatly into any one category of social class, and conventional class markers such as income, property value, level of education, and occupation varies widely among them. Their class status is instead secured by what Tyler has called a “tacit cultural knowledge” about respectable and desirable ways of living (2003: 396). By contrast, the Eastern European migrant labourers who live and work on the village farms do not have the necessary cultural knowledge or cultural capital to fit in with this model of village life. The villagers engage in constant boundary-maintenance work to stabilise and reproduce discourses that serve both to highlight the ‘otherness’ of the migrant workers and project an image of themselves which is an ostensibly non-racialised (unmarked) social position of authority and dominance. In Mayfield the intersection of whiteness and class operates as an organising principle which enables access to some (the villagers) and limitations to others’ (the migrants) social movements and interactions.

Conclusion

In this article I have begun the task of unravelling the ways in which hegemonic whiteness operates to marginalise ‘other’ whites in the context of an English village in the Worcestershire countryside. I have sought to explain ethnographically how the villagers of Mayfield perceive Eastern European migrants who live and work on the village farms as ‘not quite white’ enough to integrate into the social and cultural life of the village. The villagers’ judgement of the migrant workers as a different ‘shade’ of white is entwined with class markers of distinction based on physical appearance, work, and economic standing, which render the migrants culturally ‘other’ while ‘racially’ white. The villagers use their cultural capital to employ discourses about respectability, ‘good taste’, and acceptable and desirable ways of living village life in opposition to Eastern European migrants who are fixed outside of white, English village hegemony. The boundaries between the village ‘self’ and the migrant ‘other’ are heavily founded on class-based distinctions, which are informed by village residents’ cultural, economic and social capital. However, there is also a subtle and complex process of racialisation at work here. Dominguez (1994: 334) provides a helpful summation of racialisation as the process whereby
... differences between human beings are simplified and transformed into Difference, overvaluing particular bodily differences by imbuing them with lasting meaning of social, cultural, political, economic, even psychological significance. Racialisation is produced and reproduced through ideological, institutional, interactive, and linguistic practices that support a particular construction of Difference.

As Hartigan (1999: 13) argues, there are copious distinctions between the ways whites and blacks are racialised and the social and political ramifications of these racialisations are hugely different. But by examining how whites are racialised—“always unevenly, always following the contours of class distinctions” (Hartigan 1999: 13)—we can think more clearly about the way white lives are lived differently in different social and geographical locations, and in relation to hegemonic forms of whiteness. In Mayfield, Eastern European migrants are constructed as a different ‘shade’ of white due to their failure to comply with villagers’ cultural constructs of normalcy, conduct and conventions, and a boundary of insurmountable “Difference” (Dominguez 1994: 334) is maintained.

Many parts of the English countryside, rural Worcestershire included, do not have histories of large-scale in-migration of non-British nationals, and so issues of race, ethnicity and multicultural present these areas with a set of new challenges in relation to intercultural meetings and community cohesion. To date, only a very small amount of empirical research has been conducted on the migration of non-British nationals to rural areas. Less still has addressed the specific experiences of white Eastern European migrants who have moved to various parts of the English countryside since the expansion of the EU in 2004. In her study of Eastern European migrant workers in the UK, McDowell (2008: 62) argues that:

A detailed study of contemporary migration from the accession states remains to be undertaken to establish in empirical details the ways in which degrees of acceptable whiteness are constructed and legitimated on the basis of the intersections between white skins and attributes such as gender, nationality and religion.

Here McDowell highlights an existing gap in empirically grounded academic knowledge about contemporary migration from Eastern Europe and the relationships between British and migrant populations. In response to her call for such a study to be undertaken, this article has taken a significant step towards achieving this goal. I have established in empirical detail “the ways in which degrees of acceptable whiteness are constructed and legitimated” (62) by the English villagers of Mayfield in response to Eastern European migrants. More specifically, I have explored how different ‘shades’ of whiteness are constructed on the basis of the intersection between white skin, nationality and social class.

**Author Note**
Helen Moore is a third-year PhD student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Surrey, UK. Her research interests include: processes of social inclusion and exclusion in the English countryside, rural racism, the migration of Eastern Europeans to rural England, and white class-inflected discourses of the ‘rural idyll’, ‘community’ and respectability. Helen currently teaches undergraduate modules on social research methods, classical sociological theory, and media, communications and society at the Universities of Surrey and Kingston. Contact: h.moore@surrey.ac.uk

Acknowledgements

Some of the key ideas that form the basis of this paper were presented at the New Territories in Critical Whiteness Studies postgraduate conference at Leeds University, August 2010. I am grateful to Say Burgin for her kind invitation to contribute to this conference and to become involved with the Critical Whiteness Studies Postgraduate Network. I also wish to thank Katharine Tyler, Sarah Earthy, Shona Hunter and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

References


What if the ground beneath our feet turns out to be the sea? (1).

In *Australia and the Insular Imagination*, Suvendrini Perera examines “the logic of insularity” (5) that governs the geopolitical and social imaginaries of Australia. A through-line of these imaginaries, both historically and contemporaneously, are British colonial concepts of sovereignty which construct ‘Australia’ as an island continent. While this version of sovereignty is predicated on holding territory, amassing and consolidating land boundaries, Perera looks at “this space of shifting coastlines and watery foundations as the site of an unattainable desire for insularity: *terra Australis incerta*” (1). Drawing on the work of Irit Rogoff (2000), *terra incerta* inverts the typical cartographical meaning of solid ground, *terra firma*, from which places, locations and borders can be charted and known. *Terra Australis incerta* reveals the contingency of spatialised sovereign arrangements as they work to constitute Australia “as a self-evident geographical entity, a body on the map” (18). As a ‘self-evident’ geographical body, Australia is constituted by its enclosed borders as a continent. These continental borders seal the nation off from the surrounding archipelagos, which in other histories and sovereignties form a different geography. While there has been much work on Australian tropes of landscape and place (see for example Ward 1958; Gelder & Jacobs 1998; McDonell & Deves 1997; Stratford 1999; Robin 2007),¹ bringing into view the oceanic environs of Australia puts into question its status “as a unitary, sovereign geo-body whose boundaries naturally coincide with its continental landmass” (61).

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¹ The song “Great Southern Land” (1982) by the Australian band Icehouse exemplifies this trope in popular culture.
In the book’s first two chapters, Perera argues that “insularity is the unique gift the colonizers bring to the land” (37) and traces the ways the island “in western epistemologies ... does the work of demarcation, producing order between land and ocean” (38). The declarative colonial act establishing this order for Australia was through fiction of *terra nullius*, “land belonging to nobody” (see Reynolds 1996), which constructed a landmass as empty and ready for filling with settlers, convicts and migrants. Later explorers would chart and map out the precise boundaries of this landmass that was to constitute ‘Australia’. As Perera points out, these early colonisers encountered signs of non-indigenous migrants and visitors to the island, suggestive of a different spatialised configuration of land, ocean and peoples, but chose to ignore them in the colonial imaginary of ‘discovery’. The insular boundary-marking and closing off of these oceanic networks established a two-fold spatial and carceral order that expelled ‘foreign’ bodies outward, by regulating the entry of non-white British subjects to the country, and enclosed “Indigenous peoples more closely within clearly demarcated national borders” (27). As a result, and in the Australian case, “the island and territorial nation-state are mutually reinforcing political formations grounded in the same spatial and geopolitical order” (39).

The separation of land and sea plays an epistemological as well as geopolitical role within modern sovereign conceptions of the nation-state. Continental insularity conferred on the British settlers and later Anglo-Australians a particular way of seeing Australia, in relation to itself and the rest of the world. These ways of seeing manifest themselves in Australian cultural and literary tropes around sea change, the beach and the oceanic sublime, which present these spaces as alternatively restorative and terrifying but nevertheless underpinned by the security of inland cultural and political economies (46). In the dominant white cultural imaginary, to go into the sea from the land is to encounter affective and aesthetic difference. In a similar vein, antipodal discourses which construct Australia as isolated and vulnerable to its wide oceanic expanse (see Blainey 1966) remove from view the web of geopolitical empires and economies that tightly control the country’s borders and its ‘place’ in the global world order. The privilege of encountering Australia’s borders as a form of sea change, antipodal isolation or oceanic sublime are put into sharp relief when compared to the asylum seekers who die with the water surrounding Australia in their lungs.

This entanglement of bodies, borders and water is understood by Perera, via Giorgio Agamben (1998) and Achille Mbembe (2003), as the enactment of sovereign forms of biopower that foster the lives of subjects who fall within the paradigms of a citizenship anchored to continent whilst neglecting those unfortunate enough to fall outside these legal-spatialised frameworks. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse what Perera refers to as the “season of boats” (55), a period during the early part of the last decade that saw the Howard government’s increasingly militaristic management of asylum seekers alongside a seemingly compassionate response to natural disasters, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, across the region. Recalling Western literary and aesthetic tropes about the oceanic sublime, Perera incisively writes, “the bare life located in dangerous geographies lack the ability to sublimate their environments and are condemned to an external, disposable victimhood from which only superior powers of reason,
and the scientific, medical and economic power it entails, can attempt to rescue them” (81).

But while this scientific, medical and economic power is propelled by a self-narrated heroism regarding the interstitial relations between those within and outside of Australia’s borders it is also cleaved by anxiety, “the island-nation must be fearful in order to be secure” (105). Chapter 5, entitled “The Gulliver Effect”, connects two different events, the SIEV X sinking\(^2\) and the 2002 Bali bombings, to show how “the bodies of moving people become entrapped in the violent logic of the border” (102). In spite of, or perhaps because, these events exemplify the shared vulnerability of bodies moving across watery borders, governmental policies at the time became mobilised around protection and security paradigms. Perera explains how the Howard government’s geopolitical and military participation in the sovereign affairs of Pacific nation-states such as the Solomon Islands after 9/11 can be understood as the fulfilment of a “racial mission at home and abroad” (118). Ostensibly concerned with the spreading of ‘democratic stability’, the Howard government’s foreign policy imperatives were positioned discursively as complementing the Bush Administration’s Middle Eastern interventions as part of the ‘war on terror’. At the same time, domestic political discourse concerning ‘failed’ Indigenous communities was used to legitimate a raft of invasive military and economic policies.\(^3\) Perera notes, “the parallels between dysfunctional Aboriginal communities at home and failing Pacific states abroad” (132) reiterates similar colonial tropes regarding the “white man’s burden” (120) to restore civilisation and order across the globe.

The book concludes with an acute examination of the 2005 race riots that took place on and around Cronulla beach in Sydney. The beach, Perera writes, “stands as the signal achievement of Anglo-Australia” (139). It is a space where “Dress and speech” can be “registered as acts of aggression” (143) against Anglo-Australian cultural norms and so forms the site of a “very Australian pogrom” (140). Rather than viewing the racism that fuelled this event as an atypical social occurrence, Perera locates this violence within Australia’s colonial heritage of

\(^2\) SIEV X refers to a boat that departed Indonesia on October 2001, carrying around 400 asylum seekers, the majority of whom drowned when the boat capsized. SIEV stands for ‘Suspected Illegal Entry Vehicle’ and the ‘X’ designating how the boat was apparently not recognised or registered with a number by the maritime authorities ‘protecting’ Australia’s borders.

\(^3\) The most notorious and shameful of these policies was the Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER), initiated by the Howard government in the lead-up to the 2007 Federal Election. Ostensibly designed to address sexual abuse committed against Indigenous children in remote Northern Territory communities, the NTER included alcohol restrictions, compulsory child health checks (this measure was later modified), quarantining of welfare payments, the abolishment of the permit system and a military presence to enforce these measures. In order to apply these policies to all Indigenous residents of the affected communities, irrespective of whether they had children or were victims of abuse, parts of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) had to be suspended. Intended as a temporary, emergency measure, successive Rudd–Gillard Labor governments have continued the NTER and many residents continue to live under the intense duress caused by these policies. For an account of the economic and ideological imperatives underpinning indigenous policy in Australia see Foley (2013).
boundary setting by drawing attention to the site’s history as the landing place for British settlers and convicts; an historical occurrence notably ignored (with few exceptions) in media reporting of the riots. “Terror against Aboriginal bodies remains one of the primary ways in which the boundaries of race and space are reproduced and policed” (141). Perera argues that “the homeland as such is a construct that generates racial terror” (p. 149) underwritten by an Australian citizenship that is “at once beleaguered, belligerent, and exclusionary” (153).

By unpacking “the watery foundations of this colonizing island-state” (162), Perera shows how Australia is “produced by a claim to racial-geographical exceptionalism (‘the island-continent’) based on insular consciousness” (163). It is a book whose careful and compassionate examination of the geopolitical contingencies that bind certain bodies together while fatally creating space between others, generates insights that will be of immense value for those working in the fields of critical geography, literary and fine arts, human rights, political science and communication studies. Examining Australia as terra infirma is to see how its “territorialized limits are repeatedly asserted and delimited” (2) by Indigenous and migrant communities, governmental bodies, sovereign acts, environmental crises, and border-crossings. Perera looks towards the Australian island from without, in order to contest insular attempts to shore up exclusive understandings of national identity, citizenship and belonging.

Author Note

Holly Randell-Moon is a Lecturer in Communication and Media studies at the University of Otago. She has published widely on race, religion and secularism in a number of journals and in the edited collections, Religion, Spirituality and the Social Sciences and Mediating Faiths: Religion and Socio-Cultural Change in the Twenty-First Century. Her publications on neoliberalism, higher education and research policy have appeared in the journals Ethics and Education and the Qualitative Research Journal and in the edited collection, Zombies in the Academy. She is the Editor of Critical Race and Whiteness Studies.

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BOOK REVIEW

Kyla Wazana
*Racial Indigestion: Eating Bodies in the 19th Century*
New York, NYU Press 2012
ISBN 9780814770030
RRP $24.00 (USD)

Tisha Dejmanee
University of Southern California

*Racial Indigestion* presents an argument for the ways in which food and eating have informed the political and racial identities of 19th century America. Tompkins weaves together images and ideas from a diverse range of different 19th century cultural texts to produce a narrative of how the literal, metaphorical and metonymical ways that eating, and its accompanying indigestion, produces a racialised, embodied dialogic between self and other. It is this tension and terror between the eater and the eaten that is a way of reflecting America’s racial politics in this era, particularly in its threat to the fantasy of the autonomous and ‘free’ liberal individual.

Tompkins’ arguments centre around the triad of eating, racial formation and political culture. However, she provides great depth and range to these ideas through the historically rich contextualisation of her artefacts and her elegant articulation of the cultural significance of her analyses. *Racial Indigestion* commences with the image of the hearth of antebellum America, which becomes a literal and symbolic focal point for the analysis of class difference and its racial implications. The second chapter revolves around the dietetic preaching of Graham, who linked the bodily practices of eating and sexuality to morality and, by implication, national formation. The third chapter covers the trope of the edible black subject, and the moments at which the black body proves to be indigestible. This is read as an affirmation of the white subject and its liberal interiority, as blackness is not ‘put on’, as in the traditional blackface routine, but ‘put in’. The fourth chapter looks at the cultural links between bread making, female labour and social freedom and democratic citizenship, primarily through the work of Louisa May Alcott. Finally, the fifth chapter is historically situated in the commodity-based, materialist America of the early 20th century and uses a close analysis of trade cards. Tompkins argues that these trade cards offer a
public discourse which reveal consumer desire, and cultural and racial conventions of the time.

Although these chapters are not necessarily sequentially nor thematically ordered, the book maintains a strong coherence through several recurring tropes that Tompkins uses as intellectual foundations for her work. One theme is a fascination with the interfaces, boundaries and processes of becoming that are so crucial to the racialised citizen as well as the developing nation state, as Tompkins imagines mapping bodily processes onto the metaphorical conception of the boundaries of one’s country as systems of mutual dependency. Another theme are the places in which eating and food preparation occur, as the transition from the antebellum hearth to more contemporary kitchens reveal how eating, space and identity operate as intertwined figures on multiple levels. Also, embodiment is an important motif in the intellectual project mapped by Tompkins, denoting its centrality to both digestion and race. Tompkins posits the mouth, and particularly the black mouth, as a site of political intensity. These complex themes reflect the thorough scholarship and historical research that undergirds this book.

A further strength of Tompkins’ work is its positioning at the juncture between critical race theory and food studies. Not only is this an area that is vastly underexplored, but the interdisciplinary approach to this research offers value to both of these relatively nascent fields. Distancing her work from the traditional food studies approach to food as object, Tompkins coins the term critical eating studies to embrace the social, political and historical materialities of eating while simultaneously invoking the imaginary and psychosocial realm that necessarily accompany these quotidian acts and rituals. Through focussing on eating as a process of identity and meaning making, including as one of the most primal expressions of social power, Tompkins unlocks the rich potential for critical cultural studies within the realm of food studies.

Furthermore, Tompkins does a commendable job in presenting her artefacts within a vivid historical context that not only brings to life the texts that she analyses, but also allows her to offer considered—at times antithetical—perspectives on their interpretation. For example, in her discussion of trading cards, Tompkins explains that many of the more overtly racist cards were destroyed, which she argues obliterates the history and struggle against racism. Tompkins asks instead for a move to resist such tendencies to sweep history under the rug by looking away from or through racist images, but instead interrogate these powerful examples of racial kitsch. In general, Tompkins’ discussion on trading cards is fabulous, as she spends some time detailing the cultural, economic and technological affordances that gave rise to their existence. This section is also bolstered through a selection of images from the author’s own collection which is subject to close analysis.

If any critique could be made of this book, it is perhaps the fact that it is not long enough (nor could one book possibly be) to cover all of the conceptual ground Tompkins alludes to in various points of this book. The fascinating insights that emerge allude to work not only within the field of critical race theory, but also
would be relevant to the fields of feminism, queer theory, cultural studies and political economy. For example, Tompkins raises the intriguing term *queer alimentarity* to indicate an ‘alignment between oral pleasure and other forms of non-normative desire’ (5) but is subsequently not really able to offer more than a perfunctory and fleeting treatment of this term. There are many interesting tangents that the author offers a glimpse of but ultimately is unable to follow.

Additionally, the conclusion to this book—while interesting—does not really respond to the immensity of the themes raised in its introduction. The notion of ‘indigestion’ which arises from consuming the black body, and the broader themes of subversion and rebellion, could certainly be elaborated on.

However, these concerns are so minor to the overall book, which is thoughtful and interesting and engaging to read, whether your interest lies in food studies, cultural studies, critical race theory or history. Tompkins’ work is original and insightful and convincing, and is a valuable contribution to both food studies and critical race theory.

**Author Note**

Tisha Dejmanee is a PhD student in Communication at the University of Southern California.
As I write this review, a man called Omid lies in an Australian hospital after more than 50 days on hunger strike. He had been transferred there from Nauru—where a number of other asylum seekers are also on hunger strike. They have been taken there following the Labor government’s re-opening of the detention centre there and on Manus Island, in policies that strongly echo, and at times seem to exceed those enacted by the Howard government in the previous decade.

The revival of these policies makes the release of Uncertain Lives unfortunately timely. A collection of essays written between 2006 and 2010, the book is an analysis of Howard era policies to regulate the border, and the cultural and political milieu in which these policies were enacted. In particular it articulates the various state practices through which the Howard government enacted its specific form of neoliberalism, and the impacts and effects of those policies for citizens and non-citizens within or at the borders of the state. It considers, furthermore, the ways in which migration and citizenship law was used to redefine understandings of sovereignty within this neoliberal regime.

The strength of this book is its approach to neoliberalism. Rather than focus on the reorganisation of the market or labour, Stratton clearly demonstrates how the effects of neoliberal rationalities extend the economic realm, and are used to produce and position diverse subjects in relation to the state. This extends beyond the commonplace argument that the good neoliberal citizen is a productive citizen, to focus on the particularities of this relationship under Howard. As he argues in the introduction, the form of cultural or social neoliberalism enacted by Howard established a form of ‘contractualism’ or ‘individualism’, in citizens were expected to be loyal to the state and to the self,
and to disregard other affiliations, such as race, ethnicity or religion. However, as Stratton demonstrates through each of the chapters, this neoliberal framework in fact worked to entrench an exclusionary and racialised social order through the very denial of that order.

This approach to neoliberalism holds together what is otherwise a sprawling book. Written as a collection of essays, each chapter reads relatively independently. Although there are a number of recurring themes, such as the Agambenian notions of exception and bare life, these themes are not explicitly developed across the book. Instead, each essay can be understood to foreground or background different aspects of the major themes of the book—culture, race and neoliberalism—arraying them within diverse constellations that highlight their specific intersections in relation to diverse circumstances.

Another element which links the diverse chapters is the aspect of culture, with Stratton weaving an analysis of key films into the broader discussion of race and migration within each chapter. Through the discussion of these films, he is able draw out the exclusionary hierarchy denied by the Howard government, with a particular focus on how this order is raced and oriented towards diverse types of ‘outsider’.

While this is, overall, an effective strategy for demonstrating how settler-colonial hierarchies have been transformed and incorporated by neoliberal policies, his analysis of the films is at times rather blunt. The focus is on reading the films as quite strictly evidencing the dominant cultural, social and economic ideologies that legitimised Howard’s policies, leaving little room to explore how these films might diverge or contest from these ideologies. Given the diversity of subjects that he treats throughout the book, such neat correspondence between the films, and the discussion of race and neoliberalism more generally, at times feels forced.

Furthermore, the sprawling scope of the book, and its focus on dominant cultures and ideologies that underpin the neoliberal practices of the Howard government, means that it rarely moves away from the categories established in policy (e.g. the asylum seeker, the skilled migrant), thereby obscuring the diverse subject positions that might be contained within these categories. This approach risks compounding the reification these groups as objects of policy, rather than as subjects that the policy effects. This is particularly pertinent when Stratton uses Agamben’s concepts of bare life and the Musulmaner in the discussion of asylum seekers. There is a risk here that these concepts reaffirm understandings of the asylum seeker as passive and voiceless, which in turn plays into political strategies that understand asylum seeker agency as manipulation or alternatively, as symbolising their unassimilability to Australian culture (as in the discussions of lip sewing or hunger strikes).

In using neoliberalism to underpin each of the chapters, Stratton is able to show how the border is used to differentiate between flows. This differentiation may be based on race—as in the discussion of the ‘unaustrialness’ of the Torres Strait Islanders early in the book—or it may also be in terms of skills—as in the
introduction of temporary work visas and the marketisation of education for international students in the final chapter of the book. Through an understanding of which subjects neoliberalism deems to be suitable citizens, Stratton is able to show how the increasing criminalisation of asylum seekers is linked to the growth in the modalities of working visas, without needing to argue that there is a casual relationship between these two groups.

The strength of an alternative approach, one which focuses on particular individuals in order to illustrate the subjectivities produced through state policies under Howard is evidenced in the first chapter. This chapter draws out understandings of ‘Australianness’ through an analysis of how Torres Strait Islanders were incorporated into the state of Queensland as British subjects, and in the process brought under the Aboriginal Protection Act, rendering them lesser British subjects. In focusing on the dual rescues of a family of Torres Strait Islanders and a group of miners, this chapter sets up an interesting relationship between inclusion and exclusion that draws out the complex topologies suggested by Agamben’s notion of the state of exception, but which are all too rarely drawn out.

Through the intersecting frameworks of race, culture, and neoliberalism, Stratton has written an important book that sheds new light on a transformative period in Australian political history. While at times the arguments aren’t fully developed, this is countered by the overall scope of the book, which brings together a number of issues that are rarely discussed together.

**Author Note**

Kate Hepworth is a human geographer with a background in urban studies. Her research is focused on the lived experience of those individuals and groups who are constituted as ‘objects of security’. From 2001 -2010 she was a member of boat-people.org, a gang of artists, activists and media makers that has been producing public work about race, nation, borders and history with the aim of disrupting and destabilising dominant Australian narratives of heroic pioneering and of benevolent nationalism. Their work has been featured in exhibitions across Australia and internationally. She is based at the University of Technology Sydney. Contact: katie@katiehepworth.net