Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Review Survey—
Monographs, Journals, and Theses, 2005-2014

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The inception of the Critical Race and Whiteness Studies journal in 2005 was a response to the need to critically challenge the ways in which racial privileges formed geopolitical, socio-economic, and socio-cultural ways of being, knowing, and becoming. At its genesis, this journal was named the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association e-journal and has since been renamed to account for the broader transnational scope of the articles and reviews in terms of critical race and whiteness studies (CRWS) scholarship. Through its ten year journey, Critical Race and Whiteness Studies offers critical snapshots of a larger picture composed of the various works that engage with CRWS. This review article aims to provide a bibliography of some of the monographs and books, journal articles and special issues as well as masters and doctoral dissertations that were produced from 2005-2014. Coinciding with the ten year anniversary of the Critical Race and Whiteness Studies journal, this bibliographic survey celebrates and reflects on the past ten years of CRWS scholarship.

Keywords: Critical race and whiteness studies, critical race theory, bibliography, survey, books, monographs, journals, dissertations

Introduction

The purpose of this review article is two-fold. Firstly, the survey aims to illuminate the critical, rigorous, and innovative work that has been developed from the inception of the journal Critical Race and Whiteness Studies in 2005 to
the present. The review coincides with the ten-year anniversary of the journal’s publication of critical race and whiteness studies (CRWS) scholarship. Secondly, this article offers a summative and representative guide for early and established scholars, community workers, activists, and students for researching texts that concern themselves with critical race and whiteness studies. The review article surveys monographs, edited book collections, journal articles and special issues, as well as masters and doctoral theses produced in the last ten years (2005-2014) which engage critical race theory and whiteness studies, or in the case of fictional novels, involve topics that deal with race and whiteness. Each bibliographical survey is accompanied by a summary that outlines some of the theoretical, geographical, and disciplinary concentrations and insights made within the field of CRWS.

The review article is divided into three sections: monographs and edited book collections, journal articles and special issues, and masters and doctoral theses. Once the CRWS literature was collated in these mediums, the authors used qualitative methods to assess and group the data into common themes based on theoretical and conceptual approach, disciplinary field, subject area, and geographical location. The review is summative and representative. Rather than collate all extant CRWS material into an exhaustive list (which was a daunting task), the authors decided to use the article and its findings as a representative sampling of CRWS scholarship. Undoubtedly, there are gaps in the bibliographic entries owing to the exigencies of the survey’s scope within a journal article format and the expertise of the article’s authors. The survey is problematically limited to European and English-speaking texts as the material was primarily sourced through open access databases. We have also not included blogs, artworks, video-games, or music. However, we encourage our readers to research and actively engage with the aforementioned texts, and perhaps, use our bibliographies as a means to critically engage with them. Despite the survey’s shortcomings, we hope the article’s findings prove productive for readers as a jumping off point for further interdisciplinary research.

Monographs and Edited Book Collections
Elaine Lafortezza

Since the establishment of Critical Race and Whiteness Studies there have been many seminal books and monographs published on CRWS theories, practices, and stories. This bibliographical survey lists some of this work from 2005-2014. It is by no means an exhaustive list of books/monographs that concern themselves with critical race theory, whiteness studies, and work that marks out racialised privileges, their effects and consequences. As stipulated in the Introduction to this article, the list is intended as a springboard for readers to undertake further research if they wish. Moreover, this bibliographical survey only includes texts written in English and focuses mainly on settler colonial nation-states and their citizens (both indigenous and migrants). It also does not include chapters within books that pertain to critical race and whiteness studies (CRWS), but does include edited collections that explicate the themes and motivations undergirding CRWS. The terms used in this survey are also problematic. Descriptors such as ‘non-white’ intimate whiteness as the basis from which identity can be catalogued. It is not my intention to replicate this bias, but rather to reflect on this racialised privilege by drawing on the lexicon of
racialised language that forms the vocabulary from which scholars can reflect on whiteness, identity, and representation.

Many of the books and monographs surveyed also pertain to my areas of interest. This strategy was not undertaken to reduce the focus of this survey, but rather to make my own subject positionality accountable in the process of this research. My areas of interest include: south-east Asian critical race studies (most particularly, Philippines-Australia relations), south-east Asian ‘beautification’ practices (for example skin-whitening, acquiring English language skills, etc.), and queer Asian-Australian studies. I am particularly interested in how Australian scholarship has investigated the aforementioned topics.

This survey incorporates books and monographs that deal with my research interests, but also includes a rich gamut of various research foci that range from essays about Chicana/Xicana consciousness (see Moraga, 2011), British negotiations of racial, linguistic, and ethnic diversity (see Herbert, 2008), institutional pedagogies and the formation of minority voices and disciplines (see Cooks & Simpson, 2007 and Ferguson, 2012), to cybercultures and racialisation (see the section on ‘Cybercultures’), Australian Indigenous histories of resistance and solidarities (see Heiss, 2012; Huggins, 2005; Behrendt 2009; and the ‘Indigenous histories and sovereignties’ section), the ‘war on terror’ (see the ‘Post 9/11 and the “War on terror”’ section), autobiographical accounts of being a racial ‘Other’ within dominant white societies (see Pung, 2008), and more.

While all these texts diverge into different socio-political issues, they coalesce in terms of their need to intervene into dominant discourses about race relations, challenge the privileging of whiteness, and their encouragement for readers to not simply take note of these experiences and messages, but to feel and embody the position of racialised (non)belonging. The autobiographical texts and works of fiction, for example, offer a creative ally for the academic texts in terms of ensuring reader interest and motivation to develop their own work in CRWS or to have CRWS inform their own work and perspectives on life. Overall, these texts, as well as the others listed in this bibliographical survey, bear witness to the racialised impositions and repositioning of bodies, whether individual or institutional.

In building this summary, I situate the practice of witnessing as a process of speaking back to, and beyond, hegemonic and reductive norms in all socio-cultural and political contexts. This differs from the literature on witnessing that focuses on the forms of testimony presented by survivors of wartime trauma (Agamben, 1999; Langer, 1991; Smith, 2007). In his book, Remnants of Auschwitz: The witness and the archive, Agamben questions whether the violence executed in the Holocaust camps can be represented through testimonial evidence. He asserts that the ‘true’ witness to violence is the one who cannot testify. Their silence is witness enough to the unspeakable horrors one has lived through. Agamben goes on to make a distinction between those who survived and those who were killed or traumatised to the point that they are

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1 The sections on witnessing in this summary can also be found in my book, Laforteza (2015).
rendered mute by their horrific experiences. He specifies, “the survivors speak in their stead, by proxy, as pseudo-witnesses; they bear witness to the missing testimony” (1999, p. 34). Bearing witness, in this case, signals what is not there and what cannot be vocalised, “The untestifiable, that to which no one has borne witness, has a name … it is der Muselmann” (p. 41). In engaging with Agamben’s work on der Muselmann, Anat Ascher states, “the only testimony they can provide is their silence, the fact that they do not testify. The paradox resides in identifying the Muselmänner, the ones who cannot bear witness, as the only true witnesses of the death camps” (2011). In line with Ascher’s conceptualisation of silence and testimony, Catherine Mills (2003, p. 1) argues that, “assuming the task of bearing witness in the name of those who cannot speak reveals that the task of bearing witness is at base a task of bearing witness to the impossibility of witnessing”. Understood within this literature, witnessing here evokes the problem of representation, or more precisely, its limits, wherein those who offer testimonies can only bear witness by proxy. This impossibility of witnessing takes a different form within the texts in this bibliographical survey.

In Agamben’s work about der Muselmann, silence is not tantamount to bearing witness. In this summary, I situate ‘silence’ as active and signifying assent to a normative social order that demands an acceptance of its norms. Acceptance, in this case, involves subjects who remain silent about the injustices that sustain a normative racialised social structure because people may not perceive that anything is unjust or their silence enables a lack of naming and therefore responsibility to address injustice. Critical race and whiteness studies presents a way in which to speak up, out, and against the ways this normative silence is encouraged and condoned. The texts listed in this survey bear witness to the injustices and resistances provoked by racialised privileges and violences by creating a literary nexus of critical assessment, inquiry, and challenge in different ways and through different praxis.

For example, many of the texts seek to make visible the invisibilised power of whiteness. These include, but are not limited to: Ravenscroft (2012), Tilley (2012), Lake and Reynolds (2008), and Riggs (2006). These texts seek to underscore the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association’s (ACRAWSA) mission statement that “naming whiteness enables a critique of the ways in which it operates as unearned privilege. Showing whiteness to be specific, rather than universal, also opens up opportunities for valuing non-white ways of knowing, thinking and being” (http://www.acrawsa.org.au/about/). This statement draws attention to specifying whiteness from the perspective of ‘non-white’ ways of knowing. These publications mark out how whiteness defines and adjudicates socio-cultural norms and therefore holds up whiteness as a process of structural privilege that can and should be challenged. This places a critical spotlight on whiteness in order to make it accountable for its impositions, rather than simply accepting whiteness as the standard, universalised norm (that remains ‘invisible’ and taken-for-granted) that does not need to be questioned from a critical, analytical gaze.

A different case is presented by ‘non-white’ authors. Many of them assert that whiteness has never been invisibilised for them, but rather they have always seen, felt, and were aware of the power and privileging of whiteness, often as the result of their own effacement within white zones and/or aspirational idealisations of whiteness. For example, Alice Pung’s edited collection (2008) of
stories told by Asian-Australians speaks of subjectivities that are very much aware of the privileging of whiteness. Whiteness, to them, is not an invisibilised presence, but one that is made visible through casting Asianness as ‘Other’. These types of findings are dominantly narrativised in books about ‘non-white’ individuals or groups within dominant white societies. However, in terms of Asianness and whiteness, much of the literature that traces the connection between CRWS and Asian-Australian relations, or Asia-west relations, and Asian nationalisms, are discussed in journal articles (for example, Ko, 2013; and Omi, 2008). In my research, there were not as many books related to this theme.

Many of the books that focus on CRWS as the framework in which to think through ideas of identity, nationalism, and agency focus on white/black relations. In Australia, this racialised binary usually refers to Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relations, interactions and disruptions, and enables a concomitant consideration of Indigenous-settler relations. In the United States, race-relations are dominantly discussed in terms of African-American and white-American relationships and negotiations (see Moreton-Robinson’s chapter, ‘Writing off Treaties: White Possession in the United States Critical Whiteness Studies Literature’ in Moreton-Robinson, Casey & Nicoll, 2008). It is rare to come across books and monographs that explicitly deal with various ‘non-white’ groups, including First Nations peoples, and/or individuals without the ‘foundational’ point of whiteness vis-à-vis blackness informing the overall analysis and discussion. Perhaps this is because the power and privileging of whiteness frames how ‘non-whiteness’ comes to matter, particularly in settler colonial nation-states.

Whiteness need not be conceptualised as the fundamental basis through which racialisation develops and establishes different subjective positionalities. For example, Peta Stephenson’s *Islam Dreaming: Indigenous Muslims in Australia* (2010) illuminates long standing cross-cultural interactions between Muslims and Indigenous-Australians. Stephenson’s aim is to explore what “Indigenous men and women from around Australia have to tell us about their varied encounters with Islam” (p. 1). A shared sense of Otherness to Anglo-Australian notions of normalised identity informs how Indigeneity and Islam are perceived within dominant Australian comfort-zones. Islamic faith and Muslim identities are dominantly understood in Australian (and in much of western discourses) as ‘non-white’ owing to a racialised opposition to Christianity. Regina Ganter’s *Mixed Relations: Asian/Aboriginal contact in North Australia* (2006) also offers an illuminating focus on various ‘non-white’ interactions. The subject of mixed relations is given an intimate and nuanced treatment through Ganter’s use of photographs and anecdotes.

Overall, I hope this list will be useful for those who are interested in the aforementioned areas of social inquiry. For this purpose, I have used sub-headings to organise the various books and monographs. These sub-headings do not indicate the only key theme in a book or monograph. For instance, Mel Chen’s book, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect* (2012), draws on sexuality, critical race theory, animality, affect, and disability studies. However, I have placed this book under the category of gender and sexuality in order to illustrate a defining point of that body of work. I have used labels throughout the bibliography as signposts for readers in relation to a specific area of CRWS work. Each topic is also listed in alphabetical order, with their corresponding titles also listed in alphabetical order. These formatting guidelines are utilised to make the list more accessible and comprehensive to readers as
well as offer a starting point from which to delve further into CRWS. In the same vein as the bibliographical surveys on journal articles and dissertations, this list also pays tribute to the work that has shaped the grounds in which to trouble dominant and domineering racialised zones of privilege, assimilation, and violence.

**Author Note**

Dr. Elaine Laforteza has taught cultural studies, critical race and whiteness studies, and communication studies at Macquarie University and the University of Technology, Sydney. She has published on race, disability studies, and the politics of aesthetics in peer-reviewed academic journals, such as *Law/Text/Culture*, *Somatechnics*, *Reconstruction*, *M/C Journal*, and *borderlands*. She writes for *The Philippine Community Herald* and has volunteered for the not-for-profit organisation, Gawad Kalinga, through which Elaine has gone to the Philippines to assist in building homes with poor communities. Routledge has also published her book, *The Somatechnics of Whiteness and Race: Colonialism and Mestiza Privilege* in 2015 (see: https://www.routledge.com/The-Somatechnics-of-Whiteness-and-Race-Colonialism-and-Mestiza-Privilege/Laforteza/p/book/9781472453075).

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**References** *(not including those listed in the bibliographical survey for books and monographs)*


Journal Articles and Special Issues
Lara Palombo

In this section I undertook a survey of special journal issues and articles that have been informed by whiteness and critical race theory since 2005. I collated sources using the databases Francis and Taylor online, Social Sciences Directory, Web of Science, Project Muse, Indigenous Collection, and International Bibliography of the Social Sciences and from here I followed bibliographies, journals, websites, and other relevant links. My searches worked with the primary term ‘whiteness studies’ and the secondary term ‘critical race theories’. The sub-headings of the sections that I used to aggregate the research move between demonstrating the conceptual developments within Critical Race Whiteness Studies (CRWS) and trying to keep coherence with the findings in the Monographs and Edited Book Collections and Masters and Doctoral Theses.

As CRWS is a growing field operating within but also at the edge of a range of inter/ cross/ disciplinary and geo-political spaces, I focused on producing an overview of some of the key conceptual formations and critiques of racism visible in the collated special issues and individual articles. My intention is to establish the significance of some of these formations rather than formulating a critical response to these approaches. This overview is by necessity incomplete and is driven by my own interests in questions over political sovereignties, diasporic embodiments, queer theories, political relations, and biopolitical technologies of gender, war, and governance.

My bibliography overall indicates that whiteness and critical race studies extends to a wide interdisciplinary field of enquiry. This is evident especially within the broad range of pedagogical essays (i.e. overviews of the field in essays by Leonardo & Zembylas, 2013; Sueyoshi, 2013 in the ‘Pedagogical Institutions’ section of the bibliography) as well as historical literature (see ‘Histories’ section of the bibliography). Marking the geographical range of these disciplinary essays is beyond the scope of this review and readers are referred to the supplementary bibliography. Of note is a proliferation of publications within the sections on ‘Indigenous Sovereignties and the Law’, ‘Borders, Crossing Borders’, ‘Empire/s and State Terror’, ‘Islamophobia and Gender’ and ‘Detention Camp/s’. The findings in these sections are directed by my own research interests but they also demonstrate how CRSW has been shaped by, as well as the ways it is leading the research on, configurations of colonial sovereignty, the settler state and the law, the racial criminalisation of migration and indefinite detention, the significance of the war on terror, and Islamophobia.

The varied themes of these studies also overlap with the very divergent research in both ongoing and more recently recognised fields of '(Settler) Homonationalism/s and Homophile Islamophobia', ‘Somatechnics’, ‘Neoliberalism and Biopolitical Racial Governance’, ‘Ontologies and Epistemologies of race’, ‘Post-Racial Europe’, ‘Affect, Race, and Whiteness’, ‘Orientalism, race and literary criticism’, ‘White Nationalism/s’, and ‘Phenomenology and Materialism/s’. In particular there are emerging publications on race politics as connected to post-Apartheid South Africa (see for example the article by Hannelie & Milton [2011] in the ‘Post-Apartheid South Africa and Race Politics’ section) and to the race politics of the state/settler states (see for example the range of articles in the special edition by Yue & Wyatt [2014] in the ‘Race Politics’ section).
emerging research areas include the examination of racial cybercultures (see for example the article by Young [2014] in the ‘Cybercultures’ section) and the role of racial politics in the re-signification of country, land, and ecologies (see for example the varied approaches outlined in the special edition by Dale & Henderson [2005] in the ‘Geography and Place’ section).

Whiteness and critical race theories remain central to questions over the assertion and rejection of Indigenous sovereignties and legal governance, knowledge/s, economics, and environmental laws. Like many scholars in Australia I was introduced to CRWS through the conceptual work of Aileen Moreton-Robinson. Her research maps and conceptualises the workings of ‘patriarchal whiteness’ as a hegemonic and colonially productive power that shapes the denial of Indigenous sovereignties. As Moreton-Robinson argues, the ‘possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty’ operates as an epistemological and ontological formation that “naturalise[s] the nation as a white possession” that works to delegitimise Indigenous sovereignties (2004, p. 2; 2006). Irene Watson (2009a, 2009b) has also powerfully contributed to this field by articulating the fiction of the lawful foundation of the state. She examines the forcefulness of a colonial law that reinstates the white supremacist sovereignty of the settler state partly through the demand to extinguish Indigenous sovereignties. Watson and Moreton-Robinson both insist on the continuities of Indigenous sovereignties, connections to country, and law even from a place inside the forceful ‘sovereign’ space of the state, a space that guarantees no power to determine law-full Aboriginal obligations to country (Watson, 2009c).

The legitimating function of international law in the state’s negation of Indigenous sovereignties has become central to CRWS. In a 2011 special issue of the Griffith Law Review, ‘The 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Indigenous Survival—Where to from Here?’, Watson brings together diverging international opposition to the conferring of sovereign authority to settler states via the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP). In this issue, Watson defines the Declaration as a ‘soft law’ that asserts settler state boundaries and does not acknowledge Indigenous law, governance, culture, and identity (2011a, p. 638). Sharon Venne provides an insightful critical history that on the one hand, acknowledges Indigenous Peoples’ collaborative input into this document, but on the other, notes that settler states like Canada have shaped its formulation and have persistently rejected their status as a colonial state. As a result, the Declaration is a ‘norm’ that Indigenous people can use that also limits Indigenous self-determination as nations and peoples (2011, p. 576). Steven Newcomb argues that although the Declaration is a consequence of colonial “domination”, none of its 46 Articles addresses this power. It does not hold the capacity to undo United States’ state laws’ “dual tradition of domination and de-humanisation” of Indian Nations and People (2011). Ward Churchill argues that the Declaration fails to fulfill the aspirations of activists and replicates the sovereignty of the settler state. It has “consecrated in [international] law the very structure of colonial domination and exploitation at the hands of state entities from which Indigenous nations have been struggling to free themselves” (2011, p. 527). For Moreton-Robinson, the Declaration reveals how the possessive logic of whiteness still remains the determinant of what constitutes Indigenous Rights (2011, p. 655). This determinant white logic is what Michael Mansell urges Indigenous people to reject (2011). Mansell emphasises the powerful call made by the Aboriginal Provisional Government to
position Aboriginal actions and knowledge/s alongside other Nations rather than in subordination to any of them. He advocates a position that reinforces the entitlements of Aboriginal peoples derived from previous exclusive rights to country. These, and other essays, within the edition create a powerful transcultural opposition to the way the reconfiguration of the sovereignty of the settler state by international law ignores the violent colonial relations/domination linked to the settler state and negates the self-determination of Indigenous people’s sovereignties over their territories and law.

How the distinction between state and law crumble to assert colonial self-determination is also central to Denise Ferreira da Silva’s research on the analytics of raciality. da Silva (2007) proposes that the affirmation of state’s sovereignty is grounded upon a western onto-epistemology of raciality that always writes the ‘others of Europe’ as the affectable racial bodies of colonial self-determination. As discussed in the essay ‘No Bodies, Law, Raciality and Violence’ (2009), da Silva demonstrates that in the geopolitical racial spaces of Rio de Janeiro the state’s repeated police and army occupations of “black and brown economically dispossessed neighborhoods (favelas)” (p. 213) are predicated on a raciality that annihilates the legal-juridical protection of its residents. Further, the police killings of brown residents within these spaces are written within the law as part of an onto-epistemology that always justifies the forceful self-preservation of state sovereignty within racial spaces. In the racial space of the favelas any “separation of the law and the state crumbles” because the administration of justice (judgment) and law enforcement (punishment) always resolve into the state’s self-preserving violence or sovereign force (p. 214). da Silva, Watson, and Moreton-Robinson demonstrate that the study of how the legitimating mechanisms of colonial law operate is a divergent point of debate within CRWS. There is however, a shared focus on how the administration of justice and law within colonial and racial terrains works to preserve the sovereignty of the settler and racial state and the undoing of Indigenous sovereignties and justice for racialised lives.

In theorising the deadly maintenance of borders, CRWS scholars also demonstrate that the configuration of sovereign violence is also based in part on the exceptionality of law (Perera & Stratton, 2009; Michalowski, 2008; Márquez, 2012). In the context of the racial criminalisation of migration, John D. Márquez (2012) argues that the strengthened militarisation of the US-Mexico borderzones to deter migration has elicited the death tolls of Latin American immigrants and has allowed no legal recourse for these killings in the US Courts of Law. Whilst da Silva’s theorising on the grounding of raciality within law bypasses Agamben’s state of exception, Márquez draws from exceptionality to frame the killings and suspension of legal justice for Latin Americans as a racial state of expendability. This expendability is the very foundational effect of the raciality that has underpinned the sovereignty of the US settler state and its violent treatment of “Latinidad” as “an ethno-racial signifier of peril” (p. 473). In a powerful analytical move, the relatives of the victims and activists are shown to question this racial expendability that negates the “anonymity” of the killers and exposes the violent mechanisms of the settler state. They verify that these deaths are not unintended consequences but, rather, they are deliberate acts of homicide. Furthermore, the theorising of borders as cultural historical racial zones of violent exceptionality is multi-directed in the growth of post 9/11 literature. In CRWS there is a focus on the violent spatialisation of the racial Camp of
indefinite detention for refugees that negates access to justice and exposes them to the violence of the camps (see Perera & Stratton, 2009; Perera 2013; Pugliese 2006; Giannacopoulos, 2013). These spaces are thoroughly racialised and form part of the necropolitical technologies of war. They constitute ‘black sites’ where the racialised and Orientalised figure/s of the suspected Arabic and Muslim terrorists or enemies of the west are disappeared and exposed to torture and death (see Pugliese, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2009b, 2013).

The literature on CRWS also plays a key part in conceptualising and interrogating Islamophobia (see Bazian & Leung, 2012; Meer, 2013). To mark this growing field of critical interventions, the inaugural issue of the Islamophobia Studies Journal in the Spring of 2012 called for the analysis of Islamophobia in its multiple manifestations and described the need to:

... closely interrogate the ideological, discursive, and epistemological frameworks employed in processes of ‘Otherness’—the complex social, political, economic, gender, sexual, and religious forces that are intimately linked in the historical production of the modern world from the dominance of the colonial/imperial north to the post-colonial south. (Bazian & Leung, 2012, p. 2)

This first edition re-publishes Ramon Grosfoguel’s theorisation of Islamophobia as a form of racism (based on religious, cultural, epistemic racism etc.) and as constitutive of a hierarchical world-system (i.e. modern/colonial westernised Christian-centric capitalist/patriarchal). Amongst its various articles, Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood introduce Islamophobia as form of racialisation that has a religious and cultural dimension with a phenotypical component. They argue that, similarly to anti-semitism, it took a long, non-linear history of racialisation to turn an ethno-religious group into a race (2012, p. 39). But contrary to anti-semitism, Islamophobia, is not given due consideration in the United Kingdom including by anti-racist intellectuals and legislators and is deemed less problematic (p. 37). The essay by Khaldoun Samman captures the persistent usage of a cosmology of time within colonial, racial, Orientalist, and developmental discourses that become part of the western temporal template that rationalises the colonial encounter through global hierarchies of the modern world-system (2012). Mohammad H. Tamdgidi centres a reflective call for revision and “re/deconstruction” of the binary framework that sustains the definitional and conceptual discussions of Islamophobia and Islamophilia (2012). Overall, the journal joins the breath of existing post-9/11 approaches to Islamophobia that have shaped CRWS. These varied publications include critiques of Orientalist feminism/s and the ‘rescuing’ of Muslim women, framed as ‘victims’ of Islam (Ho, 2010; Razack, 2005; Jiwani, 2005). Also, more recently, a series of essays have directed attention to how “accusations of women as perpetrators of Islamic extremism” are state based attempts to regulate what is a permissible form of democratic dissent (Hussein, 2013) and are part of accepting otherwise discriminatory acts against Muslim women legitimated by national security practices (Aziz, 2012).

Following these multidisciplinary critiques of Islamophobia after 9/11, Jasbir Puar (2005; Puar, Pitcher & Gunkel, 2008) in her analysis of the political articulations of queerness in a post-9/11 context, sketches the rise of the utility of gay rights discourse in US/ western imperial military and foreign policy projects. She extends the term homonationalism to name the replication of heteronormative
and Islamophobic ideals achieved through patriotic appeals to queer inclusivity. In this sense, the ‘war on terror’ is a temporal marker that for Puar reveals how the “retaining of queerness exclusively as dissenting, resistant, and alternative (all of which queerness importantly is and does)” is challenged by the “contingency and complicity [of queerness] with dominant formations” (2005, p. 122). For this reason, her work concentrates on ‘conviviality’ rather than oppositionality, resistance, subversion, or transgression—that sometimes dovetail with numerous narratives that claim exceptionalism and a celebratory queerness—that ground political change in problematic ways (Puar, Pitchel & Gunkel, 2008). An example of complicity with dominant forces is provided by Adi Kuntsman (2008) in an essay that examines how in Israel, queer immigrants participating in Russian-speaking media, seem to adopt ‘Europeanness’ as symbolic capital in negotiating their place in Israeli society and the GLBT scene. It is argued that racism and Orientalism work to locate new migrants with in both the Jewish-Ashkenazi elite and the globalised west fighting the ‘evil of Muslim terrorism’. Whiteness becomes a form of middle-class capital orienting migrants towards the tempting promise of belonging in the queer economies of Europeanness.

CRWS has also merged with the varied analyses of multicultural sites, neoliberal racial governance, and the examination of everyday affective and lived materialities of race and whiteness. Gilbert Caluya (2011) shows how the post-9/11 securitisation of intimate and affective relations is founded upon a white domesticity that renders racialised migrants ‘unheimlich’ to the nation. Audrey Yue (2008a) articulates the ways multicultural sexual health policy produces "new queer Asian Australian body aesthetics" based on biopolitical and Orientalist forms of conformity to state ideals of mobility. She reveals how “an upwardly mobile sexuality” is materialised by ‘Asia’ vis-à-vis privileged sites of access to health information (p. 241). Fiona Nicoll’s comparative transnational analysis of gambling and its relation to the economy in settler states concludes that in Australia, gambling operates as a white “fino power”. This is a power that governs Indigenous people as “consumers” who are “incapable of self-management”, located outside the “real economy”, and never situated within “redistributive justice” (2009a).

These approaches to everyday formations of racial security are concurrent with the ongoing studies of post-racial discourses within the US, United Kingdom, and Europe that claim the end of racism and decry the rise and fall of multicultural policies and their link to “inequalities” for white populations (see for example the edition by Lentin & Titley, 2012). Other related examinations include Sara Ahmed’s (2008) phenomenology of whiteness that exposes the way multiculturalism is attached to a promise of future ‘happiness’. This promise of happiness directs the re-reading and disappearance of historical forms of injustices. Moreover, the special issue of Darkmatter, entitled ‘Race/Matter—materialism and the politics of racialization’ edited by Dimitris Papadopoulos and Sanjay Sharma (2008) critiques the ‘hyper-productionism’ of constructionist approaches to race. The editors argue that “what’s at stake here is not so much how race is produced but how we confront racism in its multifarious materialities” (Papadopoulos & Sharma, 2008). That is, how is race un/done through the continuous re/formations of space and place through geographies of racism and arrangement of bodies and ‘events’ (see Saldanha, 2008) and through the ways communities shift the new (biologised) meanings of race in their everyday
practices and change the conditions of their material existence (see Pitcher, 2008; Riggs, 2008).

This survey demonstrates how CRWS has continued to examine the re-configuration of the sovereignty of settler states and negation of Indigenous sovereignties. This expansion of CRWS literature is partly informed by the proliferation of publications considering the force of colonial law, the crumbling of the distinction between law and the state, and the exceptionality of law within settler and racial geo-spaces. These strands within CRWS indicate how whiteness, raciality, and more recently Islamophobia—including its interface with race, religion, gender, and sexuality—centre divergent critiques of European onto-epistemologies that are constitutive and regulative of the legitimation of the violent negation of justice for colonised and racialised lives. Furthermore, the focus on the axis of multiculturalism as a post 9/11, neoliberal, biopolitical, and post-racial site and on the everyday materialities of race in their contrasting approaches to CRWS, allows for the recuperation of the attachments, negations, and undoing of race in everyday racial living.

Author Note

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References
(not including those listed in the bibliographical survey for journal articles and special issues)


Masters and Doctoral Theses
Holly Randell-Moon
This bibliographical survey summarises masters and doctoral theses produced in the last ten years (2005-2014) which engage with critical race theory and whiteness studies. The limitations of the survey are that only materials published in English and available through open access databases were sourced. As rehearsed above, the summary is not exhaustive. In collating materials for review, I endeavoured to provide a representative sample of postgraduate work. There is much important and detailed work carried out in the production of a thesis. Despite the survey’s limitations, it is hoped that the summary provides a helpful overview of disciplinary and subject area concentrations in postgraduate research that may prove useful for early and established scholars alike. As outlined above, sub-headings for the bibliography are in alphabetical order and organised according to the dominant disciplinary or theoretical theme (for example, my own doctoral dissertation focuses on questions of national identity and state sovereignty but uses religion as a key rubric to stage its analysis so I have categorised the thesis under ‘Religion’). It is hoped that this categorisation reflects the diversity of the theses collated and does not unduly circumscribe the otherwise overlapping areas of inquiry within each thesis.

Centring critical race theory on the formation of empire and settler colonialism enables a methodological recognition of the role of Indigenous sovereignties in shaping contemporary geopolitics, national cultures, the functioning of Eurocentric laws, systems of representation, and identity formation. Darryl Leroux examines how the 2008 Quebec City 400 celebrations were “premised on a shared understanding of the colonial-settler project in Quebec, organized around notions of whiteness, civilization, and territory” even as the celebrations ostensibly valorised cultural diversity and inclusion (2010). Janne Lahti looks at the representations and social experiences of the United States army during the Mexican War in the nineteenth century and finds that “White enlisted men, frustrated by their failures in colonial warfare and by constant manual labor, constructed worlds of resistance, whereas indigenous soldiers sought to negotiate the effects of colonialism by working in the army” (2009). Clemence Due uses the work of Aileen Moreton-Robinson and Giorgio Agamben “to examine the 'techniques of exclusion' available to the [Australian] nation-state as it attempts to produce a particular concept of (white) belonging, and to justify border security policies” (2010; see also Hoenig, 2012). In her thesis, Maria Giannacopoulos demonstrates how Australian law is underpinned by a white sovereignty that remains non-justiciable with respect to Indigenous sovereignties (2009). Robert Garbutt uses the notion of ‘white autochthony’ to explain how settler presence is normalised in Australia (2006). Probing anti-racist discourse and practice, Beenash Jafri considers how “anti-racism strategies deployed by people of colour can obscure their ‘settler privilege’ and invisibilize Indigenous peoples’ ongoing struggles for decolonisation” (2007; see also Salter, 2009). In a thought-provoking thesis, Bolette Benedictsen Blaagaard attempts to reconceive the objectivity and citizen-nation gaze of journalism “as becoming and as excess of relation” so as to challenge the reproduction of “a ‘white’ and homogenous social imaginary” in the context of post-colonial Denmark (2009).

Other theses consider the role of education in perpetuating colonial epistemologies through the negation of Indigenous authored histories in Canada (Balzer, 2006) and Chile (Martinez Trabucco, 2013). Susanne Waldorf finds that the curriculum used in teacher education programs in Canada “shies away from addressing the ways that Canadians are complicit in ongoing colonialism” (2012).
Theses also interrogate the ways education is premised on a deficient model that implicitly and explicitly codes scholastic success as assimilation into ‘white’ modes of knowing and learning (Rudolph, 2011; Spina, 2013) even as diversity work “is seen to be productive and inclusive” (Miller, 2013; see also Vass, 2013). Sheelah Rae Mclean argues that discourses of innocence and goodness permeate teacher identities and educational attempts to promote inclusiveness (2007). Undertaking research with a critical lens oriented toward Indigenous sovereignties is one way of exposing whiteness as an embodied and systemic site of privilege. Ann Milne used “kaupapa Maori and critical race methodology” in her examination of primary schools which allowed the reframing of “‘developing’ a cultural identity ... as a reclamation of educational sovereignty—the absolute right to ‘be Maori’ or ‘be Pasifika’ in school—and ‘mainstream’ schooling became better understood as the ‘whitestream’” (2013).

A concentration of theses produced in the United Kingdom focus on the racialised experiences of space and place in terms of the response of ‘local’ white residents to migration (see Moore, 2013), the appropriation of music and cultural signifiers of ethnic marginality by ‘white’ youth (see Laidlaw, 2011), the experiences of ‘mixed-race’ young people in Britain (Levy, 2011), the racialisation and alteration of surnames according to white Britishness (Wykes, 2013), and the relationship between whiteness and rurality in the English imaginary (see King, 2007; for an examination of the relationship between whiteness and rurality in Canada see Peddle, 2008, in the United States, see Hoops, 2012, and in Australia see Koerner, 2011). Others look at the ways “different forms of whiteness spatially intersect with sexuality” (Held, 2011, see also Suffee, 2013). What emerges from these theses is a portrait of white bodies and epistemologies as protectively constituted in relation to ‘difference’. For example, Richard Andrew Courtney’s thesis on the settlement of Black-British Nigerians in Thurrock, Essex finds that the white majority “responded to the new community with a defensive retort of English identity” (2009). For Robert Thomas Loughenbury, young white men bear “the burden of designs for the improvement of UK society” (2008) and in a thesis on whiteness, masculinity, and British cinema, Neil Slack finds protagonists “beset by crises” (2010).

In a different disciplinary terrain but with a similar through-line, Elaine Vautier examines how “White racialised resentments” were crucial to the 1992 US and 1997 UK election campaigns (2005). In a thesis on the Black Power movement and American politics, Thomas Davies finds that “mainstream whites ... successfully defend and assert their interests and resist transformative socio-economic and racial change” (2013; see also Burgin, 2013). According to Steve Asselin, white explorers in the Arctic and Antarctic are “confronted by competing ideologies wherein their whiteness is denied, or the very notion of white superiority is inverted” (2010). Young Canadians who teach English in Seoul respond to their vulnerability by relying “on various normative discourse of superiority to symbolically displace their actual marginal status” (Bains, 2009). Gwen Stefani meanwhile appropriates Harajuku signifiers “to save her from her dull whiteness” (Matlow, 2007). Susan Weitmann looks at the figure of the metisse in nineteenth century French literature as having the power “to dilute the ‘purity’ of her ‘white’ male victim” (2007). In a study of ‘poor whites’ in colonial Kenya (using patient records from a sanatorium), William Jackson undertakes a more circumspect approach to white privilege by arguing that these
subjects were not “agents of power but ... sentient, susceptible human beings” (2010).

Space, geography, and nationalism are central to the ways in which race and whiteness are experienced and embodied. Linda Sandberg looks at how whiteness mediates understandings of fear and masculinity in the Haga Man case in Sweden (2011). Shaun Naomi Tanaka explains how whiteness is implicated in the ways Japanese cuisine becomes “an accessible and readily available place to search for cosmopolitical identity making and performance of Otherness” in Toronto (2008). Others focus on diaspora, settlement, and whiteness in relation to Italian migrants in Canada (Pandolfi, 2009), the negotiation of Israel and Zionism for Ashkenazi Jews in Canada (Balsam, 2011), German-ness and British hegemony in Victoria, Canada (Richards, 2014), Swedish-ness and belonging for Kurdish young people (Eliassi, 2010), and how Arab immigrants in Detroit and Dearborn, Michigan, “actively participate in the construction of the meanings of Whiteness” (Abdulrahim, 2005). A group of theses examine transnational adoption in relation to whiteness and Norwegian national identity (Zhao, 2012) and Korean-ness, colonialism, and whiteness (Hubinette, 2005). Lindsay A. Shane critiques urban cycling projects as reliant on “the values and bodily disposition of the hegemonic white subject” (2009; for a critique of the ways whiteness underpins normative conceptions of ability see Murray-Ormandy, 2008, and transgender narratives see, Lair, 2009).

Trajectories of western and non-western imperialism thread through the contemporary geopolitics of space and identity formation. Michael Paul Besten explores how Khoe-San identities in South Africa have historically negotiated indigeneity in relation to both white and coloured notions of identity (2006). Elaine Laforteza develops the concept “mestizo/o whiteness” in order to understand “the historical links between the technologies of Spanish colonialism and US imperialism” in the context of Filipina skin-bleaching practices, bilateral relations between Australia and the Philippines, and Anglo-American language practices (2012). Asia Leeds looks at the geopolitics of fruit production in Costa Rica in the middle of the twentieth century, the employment of labourers of British West Indian origin, and “the encounters of U.S., Central American, and Caribbean ideas of race.” The thesis develops the term ‘redemptive geographies’ to map the negotiations made by the diasporic workers who “‘invented’ Africa in particular ways, highlighting legacies of greatness and civilization through the poetics and imageries of Garveyism to articulate black modernity and Afro-Costa Rican identity” (2010). David Christopher Atkinson focuses on “anti-Asian immigration restriction regimes in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States during the late nineteenth- and early twentieth- centuries”. He finds that “colonial and American legislature” transformed a ‘problem’ of Chinese migration “into a broader ‘Asiatic’ one that in turn, had implications for the restriction of Japanese and Indian immigration that effected relations between “Japan, India and the white Pacific powers” (2010; see also Naruta, 2006).

What Stuart Hall identifies as racialised “repertoires of representation and representational practices” (2013, p. 228) figure as significant sites through which ethnicity, identity, and whiteness are produced. Theses examine white masculinity in the American apocalyptic road movie (Wintle, 2013) and Australian outlaw Ned Kelly (Basu 2010). Another thesis “assesses the
development of cinema in a colonial setting and how its development disrupted notions of racial hierarchies” with respect to “transnational itinerant entertainment” in Southeast Asia in the late 1800s (Tofighian, 2013). Other theses consider the relationship between Australian soap opera, place, and whiteness (Dalgarno, 2006), the role of skin colour in visual constructions of femininity (Lori, 2014), female Italianness in Hollywood cinema in the middle of the twentieth century (Palmieri, 2011) and whiteness, femininity, and Disney heroines (Maplesde
in, 2009). Justine Toh considers the relationship between whiteness and American exceptionalism in post-9/11 media and museum remembrances (2009). By focusing on media portrayals of adolescent perpetrators of the Columbine High School shootings, Kimberley Tyrrell examines whiteness and monstrosity “as a site of contested and ambiguous contradiction” in order to de-naturalise whiteness as “a normative, monolithic status as the template of humanity” (2007). Theses also examined the role of whiteness and white privilege in national and cross-cultural literatures (see Lai, 2006; Kamali, 2007; Willanski, 2012; Demant, 2010; Miller, 2007).

Education is a formative tool of nation-building and inscribes citizenship with particular kinds of cultural values and histories. Arvinder Kaur Lander contends that initial teacher education in the United Kingdom simultaneously reproduces hegemonic whiteness in pedagogical experience and knowledge at the same time as tutors were expected to adhere to professional requirements of race equity (2010). She explains, “I had to look for the bridges and barriers within White ITE tutors’ narratives in order to identify why the Duty associated with the Race Relations Amendment Act had such a minimal impact on the training of teachers to work in an ethnically diverse society” (2010, p. 12). Other theses look at the function of ethnicity and whiteness in the formation of identity, participation, and teaching in early childhood classrooms (Barron, 2007; Heuschkel, 2013; White, 2009), secondary schools (Pettigrew, 2007), higher education (Downs, 2010; Smith, 2014; Kirshman, 2005), writing classes (Brimmer, 2005; Behm, 2008; Dessommes, 2006), pre-service teacher training (Royster, 2013), best practice models (Charbeneau, 2009; Hambel, 2007), and academia (Tufvesson, 2005).

In secular countries, religion is often constructed as a private choice and separate sphere of activity to that of the state. The historical processes of secularisation and nation-building are bound up in the production of race and racial identities. Sharon Elizabeth Smith’s thesis focuses on the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (FWBO) and finds that “there is an apparently hegemonic discourse of middle-class whiteness that people of colour and working class members of this movement have to negotiate as part of their involvement” (2008, p. 3). If one of the central tenets of whiteness studies is that whiteness is often ex-nominated as an ethnic marker in countries where a white national identity is valorised, such a process of racialisation is co-extensive with a religious ex-nomination of citizens with a Christian identity. As Smith explains, “Those from traditionally Buddhist contexts are often referred to as ‘ethnic Buddhists’ and are seen to be distinct from ‘convert Buddhists’ (those who have converted to Buddhism rather than growing up in a community that practises Buddhism) who are largely seen to be white, and by implication as lacking ethnicity or ‘race’ in their own right” (p. 11). This produces and normalises a set of racialised religious parameters where non-Christianity and non-whiteness are conflated; creating what Alia Imtoual refers to as religious racism (2005). As Smith points out, there “is a general tendency of American and European models
of religion to apply to white majorities. Where these models address factors of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’, they essentialise and marginalise non-white groups thus normalising and hegemonising white religion and white religious involvement” (2008, p. 18).

Historicising the social and cultural formations of whiteness alongside religion and Christianity is one way to undercut this hegemonising move. Christina Michelle Kleisath “investigates the history and current manifestations of white racial formations as they relate to Tibet from three interconnected ideological contexts: the United States, The People’s Republic of China, and Tibet in exile” in order to move beyond the black/white binary of racial discussions (2012). Elaine A. Brown Spencer studies the Black Oneness Pentecostal Church in Toronto and argues that while the Church resisted and negotiated “white racism, migration and colonization”, the later adoption of prosperity theology “as an impetus of colonialism has reshaped the social justice role of Black Churches” (2009).

Barbara Kameniar uses a poststructuralist approach to understand how religious education “racialises its subjects”. She argues “that ‘whiteness’, as a racialised position of institutional power and privilege exists as an absent presence in religion education curricula and that its dominance and privilege is reproduced through its (regulated) invisibility”. This happens when “teaching and learning about a religious tradition other than white Christianity” reproduces colonial ways of framing the Other. Kameniar advocates an approach to teaching where those belonging to a different faith than that of a student “can never be fully known and with whom dialogue can only ever be incomplete” (2005; see also Dewerse, 2011). My own doctoral dissertation examined the intersections between Christianity, whiteness, and settler nationalism in the context of the former Howard government (Randell-Moon, 2009).

The early work of United States’ critical race and whiteness studies scholars’ formed a key corpus of theoretical material for many of the theses discussed above (see Nakayama & Martin, 1999; Delgado & Stefancic, 1997; Fine, Weis, Powell Pruitt & Burns, 2004). Richard Dyer, Vron Ware, and Ruth Frankenberg were cited frequently. Frantz Fanon, Peggy McIntosh, and Gloria Anzaldua also served as the dominant reference points for colonialism’s impact on racialised subjectivities, white privilege, and conceptualising borders respectively. I hope you share my sense of astonishment and admiration for the range of political subjects and disciplinary areas covered by postgraduate students within the field of CRWS.

**Author Note**

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References
(not including those listed in the bibliographical survey for books and monographs)


The politics of good feeling

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This paper explores ‘the politics of good feeling’ with specific reference to debates about multiculturalism and immigration. The paper considers how certain bodies are seen as the origin of bad feeling, as getting in the way of public happiness, exploring the negative affective value of the figures of the feminist kill-joy, unhappy queer and melancholic migrant. Drawing on a reading of the film Bend it Like Beckham, the paper explores how the would-be citizen who embraces the national game is rewarded with happiness. The migrant who refuses to integrate becomes an unhappy object for the nation, as the cause of unhappiness, terror and insecurity. The film participates in a wider discourse that reads public speech about racism as melancholic, as the refusal to let go of suffering. The paper explores how this conversion between unhappy racism and multicultural happiness takes place, and in so doing, offers a critique of what we would call ‘the affirmative turn’.

Keywords: imperialism, multiculturalism, reconciliation, happiness, emotion

Introduction

... multicultural communities tend to be less trusting and less happy ... (Easton, 2006)

People, frankly when there are other pressures, like to love within a comfort zone which is defined by racial sameness ... people feel happier if they’re with people who are like themselves. (Trevor Phillips, as cited in Easton, 2006)

Trevor Phillips suggests that the problem with multiculturalism is that it makes people unhappy. Or we could say that multiculturalism becomes a problem by being attributed as the cause of unhappiness. When we are ‘in’ multiculturalism, we are ‘out’ of our comfort zone. Phillips made these comments in the third
episode of the BBC programme, *The Happiness Formula* aired in the UK in 2006.\(^1\) The episode argued that the social project “to make people happier” means to “make societies more cohesive”, or to “put glue back into communities”. The mission to put glue back into communities not only suggests that communities lack such glue, but also they once had it. Happiness becomes here like glue; we need to glue communities back together through happiness. The programme imagines a world where people are less physically and socially mobile as a happier world; for example, it describes a small French village, where people stay put over generations, as being the happiest possible way of living together. We might note here that such a nostalgic vision is a vision of a white community, of white people happily living with other white people. Likeness or racial sameness gets quickly translated here into whiteness. The programme mourns the loss of such a world implying that migration causes unhappiness by forcing people who are ‘unalike’ to live together.

The programme does not simply give up on multiculturalism but suggests that we have an obligation to make multicultural communities happy, premised on the model of ‘building bridges’. Trevor Phillips evokes unhappy instances of community conflict or violence between communities by claiming: “this is exactly what happens when people who look very different, and think they are very different, never touch and interact”. The ‘this’ stands for all that is unhappy, sliding into forms of violence that are evoked without being named (from personal distrust, to inter-group conflict, to international terrorism). Unhappiness is here read as caused not simply by diversity, but by the failure of people who embody that diversity, who are recognisable as unlike, to interact. Phillips recommends that communities integrate by sharing ‘an activity’ such as football, “that takes us out of our ethnicity and connects us with people of different ethnicities if only for hours a week”. If we do this, he says, “then I think we can crack the problem”.

We can see here that the shift from unhappy to happy diversity involves the demand for interaction. The image of happy diversity is projected into the future: when we have ‘cracked the problem’ through interaction, we will be happy with diversity. That football becomes a technique for generating happy diversity is no accident: football is not just a national sport, but is also proximate to the ego ideal of the nation, as being a level playing field, providing, as it were, a common ground.\(^2\) The fantasy of football is that it can take us ‘out of our ethnicity’. So we could say that diversity becomes happy when it involves loyalty to what has already been given as a national ideal. Happiness is promised in return for loyalty to the nation, where loyalty is expressed as ‘giving’ diversity to the nation through playing its game. We need to place this account of unhappy diversity within a wider context. I would describe this context as “the happiness turn” (see Ahmed, 2008), which has meant a return to classical questions of what is happiness, and what makes for a good life or a life good. In the past few years, numerous books have been published on the science and economics of

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\(^1\) Information about the BBC programme, *The Happiness Formula*, can be accessed at: [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/happiness_formula/](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/happiness_formula/)

\(^2\) I will not be considering the relation between football and multiculturalism beyond considering the symbolic function of football in the film *Bend it Like Beckham* (2002). For an important analysis of football in relation to racism and national identity see Back, Crabbe & Solomos (2001).
happiness, some of which are explicitly framed as revivals of nineteenth century English utilitarianism (Gilbert, 2006; Haidt, 2006; Layard, 2005). Within this new science of happiness, it is taken for granted that there is something called happiness; that happiness is good; that happiness can be known and measured; and that the task of government is to maximise happiness. These systems of measurement have been called “hedonimeters” (Nettle, 2006, p. 3), and are mostly based on self-reporting: what they actually measure is how happy people say they are. Happiness studies proceeds by looking for correlations between reported happiness levels and other social indicators, creating what are called ‘happiness indicators’.

The turn to happiness has involved a narrative of happiness as being in crisis. The crisis in happiness works primarily as a narrative of disappointment: the accumulation of wealth has not meant the accumulation of happiness. What makes this crisis ‘a crisis’ in the first place is of course the regulatory effect of a social belief: that more wealth ‘should’ have make people happier. For example, Richard Layard begins his science of happiness with what he describes as a paradox, “as Western societies have got richer, their people have become no happier” (2006, p. 1). The new science of happiness restores the expectation that happiness means wealth, even when it appears to uncouple happiness from wealth. The new science still locates happiness in certain places, especially marriage, widely regarded as the primary ‘happiness indicator’, as well as in stable families and communities, where that stability takes some forms and not others, as I have already suggested. Happiness is looked for where it is expected to found, even when happiness is reported as missing. Happiness is a kind of wish that motivates where we look for it. Simone de Beauvoir expresses this point powerfully when she says “how it is always easy to describe as happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others]” (1997, p. 28). Happiness translates its wish into a politics, a wishful politics: if we wish for happiness, we might also wish that others live according to our wish.

What is striking is that the crisis in happiness has not put social ideals into question, and if anything has reinvigorated their hold over psychic and political life. The demand for happiness is increasingly articulated as a demand to return to social ideals, as if what explains the crisis of happiness is not the failure of these ideals, but our failure to follow them. In this paper, I will consider how happiness functions as promise, which directs us towards certain objects which then circulate as social goods. My example will be the film, *Bend it like Beckham*. I have chosen this film not only given that it is a ‘happy film’; it is marketed as a ‘delightful, feel good comedy’, but also because it is one of Britain’s most successful films. It also tells a very happy story about British multiculturalism. My reading of the film will explore how multiculturalism is attributed with positive value through the alignment of a story of individual happiness with the social good.

**Happy objects**

If it is true to say that much recent work in cultural studies has investigated what we could call ‘the politics of bad feeling’ (shame, disgust, hate, fear and so on), it might be useful to take good feeling as our starting point, without
presuming that the distinction between good and bad will always hold. Of course, we cannot conflate happiness with good feeling. As Darrin McMahon (2006) has argued in his monumental history of happiness, the association of happiness with feeling is a modern one, in circulation from the eighteenth century onwards. If it is now hard to think about happiness without thinking about good feeling, then we can think about the relationship between feeling good and other kinds of goods. I would not begin by assuming there is something called happiness that corresponds to an object in the world. My starting point is the messiness of the experiential, the unfolding of bodies into worlds and what I think of as 'the drama of contingency', how we are touched by what comes near. It is striking that the etymology of 'happiness' relates to this question of contingency: it is from the Middle English 'hap', suggesting chance. Happiness would be about whatever happens. Only later, does 'the what' signal something good. Happiness becomes not only about chance, but evokes the idea of being lucky, being favoured by fortune, or being fortunate. Even this meaning may now seem archaic: we may be more used to thinking of happiness as an effect of what you do, say as a reward for hard work, rather than as what happens to you. But I find this original meaning useful, as it focuses our attention on the 'worldly' question of happenings.

What is the relation between the 'what' in 'what happens' and the 'what' that makes us happy? Empiricism provides us with a useful way of addressing this question, given its concern with 'what's what'. Locke argues that what is good is what is "apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us" (1997, p. 216). We judge something to be good or bad according to how it affects us, whether it gives us a pleasure or pain. Locke’s example is the man who loves grapes. Locke suggests that “when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in spring, when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more, but that the taste of grapes delights him” (1997, p. 216). When something causes pleasure or delight, it is good for us. For Locke, happiness is a form of pleasure: “the greatest happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasure" (1997, p. 247). Happy objects could be described simply as those objects that affect us in a good way.

Note the doubling of positive affect in Locke’s example: we love the grapes, if they taste delightful. To say we love what tastes delightful is not to say that delight causes our love, but that the experience of delight involves a loving orientation towards the object, just as the experience of love registers what is delightful. To be affected ‘in a good way’ thus involves an orientation toward something as being good. Happiness can thus be described as intentional in the phenomenological sense (directed towards objects), as well as being affective (contact with objects). To bring these arguments together we might say that happiness is an orientation toward the objects we come into contact with.

To describe happiness as intentional does not mean there is always any simple correspondence between objects and feelings. I would suggest that happiness

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involves a specific kind of intentionality, which I would call ‘end orientated’. It’s not just that we are happy about something, but some things become happy for us, if we imagine they will bring happiness to us. Classically, happiness has been considered as an end and not a means. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle describes happiness as the Chief Good, as “that which all things aim at” (1998, p. 1). Happiness is what we “choose always for its own sake” (Aristotle, 1998, p. 8). Anthony Kenny describes how, for Aristotle, happiness “is not just an end, but a perfect end” (1993, p. 16). The perfect end is the end of all ends, the good that is good always for its own sake. We don't have to agree with the argument that happiness is the perfect end to understand the implications of what it means for happiness to be thought in these terms. If happiness is the end of all ends, then all other things become means to happiness. As Aristotle describes, we choose other things “with a view to happiness, conceiving that through their instrumentality we shall be happy” (1998, p. 8). Aristotle is not referring here to material or physical objects, but is differentiating between different kinds of goods, between instrumental goods and independent goods. So, honour or intellect, we choose ‘with a view to happiness’ as being instrumental to happiness, and the realisation of the possibility of living a good or virtuous life.

If we think of instrumental goods as objects of happiness then important consequences follow. Things become good, or acquire their value as goods, insofar as they point towards happiness. Objects become ‘happiness means’. Or we could say they become happiness pointers, as if to follow their point would be to find happiness. If objects provide a means for making us happy, then in directing ourselves towards this or that object, we are aiming somewhere else: toward a happiness that is presumed to follow. The temporality of this following does matter. Happiness is what would come after. Given this, happiness is directed towards certain objects, which point toward that which is not yet present. Happiness does not reside in objects; it is promised through proximity to certain objects. The promise of happiness takes the form—that if you do this or if you have that, then happiness is what follows.

This is why the social bond is rather sensational. Groups cohere around a shared orientation towards some things as being good, treating some things and not others as the cause of delight. When we feel pleasure from objects that are agreed to cause happiness, we are aligned; we are facing the right way. We become alienated—out of line with an affective community—when we do not experience pleasure from proximity to objects that are attributed as being good. The gap between the affective value of an object and how we experience an object can involve a range of affects. If we are disappointed by something, we generate explanations of why that thing is disappointing. Such explanations can involve an anxious narrative of self-doubt (why I am not made happy by this, what is wrong with me?) or a narrative of rage, where the object that is ‘supposed’ to make us happy is attributed as the cause of disappointment, which can lead to a rage directed towards those that promised us happiness through the elevation of such objects as good. We might even become strangers, or affect aliens, at such moments.

So when happy objects are passed around, it is not necessarily the feeling that passes. If anything, what passes is the promise of the feeling, which means that feeling always lag behind the objects that are assumed to contain them. To share such objects (or have a share in such objects) means you would share an
orientation towards those objects as being good. We are familiar with the image of the happy family. This family is evoked by Toni Morrison in her book, The Bluest Eye: “here is the house. It is green and white. It has a red door. It is very pretty. Here is the family. Mother, Father, Dick and Jane live in the green-and-white house. They are very happy” (1979, p. 1). The familiarity of the story has affective resonance. The white nuclear family is happy not because it causes happiness, but because of a shared orientation towards that family as being good, as being ‘what’ would promise happiness in return for loyalty. Indeed, Morrison disturbs this happiness of the image by removing the punctuation from the sentence: “hereisthehouseitis” (Morrison, 1979, p. 2). Disturbing happiness requires disturbing the technologies through which we make sense; it requires blocking the passages of communication that allows happy messages to be sent out.

What passes through the passing around of happy objects remains an open question. Objects become sticky, saturated with affects as sites of personal and social tension (Ahmed, 2004, p. 11). After all, the word ‘passing’ can mean not only ‘to send over’ or ‘to transmit’, but also to transform objects by ‘a sleight of hand’. Like the game Chinese whispers, what passes between proximate bodies, might be affective precisely because it deviates and even perverts what was ‘sent out’. What interests me is how affects involve perversion; or what we could describe as conversion points.

One of my key questions is how such conversions happen, and ‘who’ or ‘what’ gets seen as converting bad feeling into good feeling and good into bad. We need to attend to such points of conversion, and how they involve explanations of where good and bad feelings reside. When I hear people say the bad feeling is coming from ‘this person’ or ‘that person’ I am never convinced. I am sure a lot of my scepticism is shaped by lifelong experiences of being an outspoken feminist, at odds with the performance of good feeling, whether at home or at work, always assumed to be bringing others down, for example, by pointing out sexism in other people’s talk. Let’s take the figure of the ‘kill joy feminist’. Does the feminist kill other people’s joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced or negated under public signs of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the bad feelings that saturate objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? The feminist is an affect alien for sure: she might even kill joy precisely because she refuses to share an orientation towards certain things as being good, because she does not find the objects that promise happiness to be quite so promising. Her ‘failure’ to be made happy by the right things is read as sabotaging the happiness of others.

We can place the figure of the feminist kill joy alongside the figure of the angry Black woman, explored so well by writers such as Audre Lorde (1984), Suneri Thobani (2003), bell hooks (2000), and Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2003). The

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5 The name of this game is, of course, problematic. Ballaster argues that “the sinophobic name points to the centuries old tradition in Europe of representing spoken Chinese as an incomprehensible and unpronounceable combination of sounds” (2005, pp. 202-203).
angry black woman can be described as a kill joy; she may even kill feminist joy, for example, by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics. The black woman might not even have to make any such point to kill joy, or to ‘ruin the atmosphere’. Listen to the following description from bell hooks:

a group of white feminist activists who do not know one another may be present at a meeting to discuss feminist theory. They may feel bonded on the basis of shared womanhood, but the atmosphere will noticeable change when a woman of color enters the room. The white woman will become tense, no longer relaxed, no longer celebratory. (2000, p. 56)

It is not just that feelings are ‘in tension’, but that the tension is located somewhere: in being felt by some bodies, it is attributed as caused by another body, who thus comes to be felt as apart from the group, as getting in the way of its organic enjoyment and solidarity. The black body is attributed as the cause of becoming tense, which is also the loss of a shared atmosphere. hooks shows how as a black feminist you do not even have to say anything to cause tension. The mere proximity of some bodies involves an affective conversion. To get along you have to go along with things which might mean for some not even being able to enter the room.

To speak out of anger as Black woman is then to confirm your position as the cause of tension. Black woman’s anger gets in the way of the social bond; it injures or hurts the feminist group. As Audre Lorde describes:

when women of Color speak out of the anger that laces so many of our contacts with white women, we are often told that we are ‘creating a mood of helplessness’, ‘preventing white women from getting past guilt’, or ‘standing in the way of trusting communication and action’. (1984, p. 131)

The exposure of violence becomes the origin of violence. The black woman must let go of her anger for the white woman to move on.

Some bodies are presumed to be the origin of bad feeling insofar as they disturb the promise of happiness, which I re-describe as the social pressure to maintain the signs of ‘getting along’. We could describe such bodies as blockage points, points where the smooth communication stops. Consider Ama Ata Aidoo’s wonderful prose poem, Our Sister Killjoy, when the narrator Sissie, as a black woman, has to work to sustain the comfort of others, which means working hard at not killing their joy. On a plane, a white hostess invites her to sit at the back of the plane with black people she does not know. She is about to say that she does not know them, and hesitates: “but to have refused to join them would have created an awkward situation, wouldn’t it? Considering too that apart from the air hostess’s obviously civilized upbringing, she had been trained to see the comfort of all her passengers” (1977, p. 10).

Power speaks here in this moment of hesitation. Do you go along with it? What does it mean to not go along with it? To create awkwardness is to be read as being awkward. Maintaining public comfort requires that certain bodies are kept out of view; for them to refuse to go along with this placement would be to seen as causing discomfort for others, as the origin of bad feeling. There is a political struggle about how we attribute good and bad feelings, which hesitates around the apparently simple question of who introduces what feelings to whom.
Feelings can get stuck to certain bodies in the very way we describe spaces, situations, dramas. And yes, bodies can get stuck depending on ‘what’ feelings they get associated with.

**Just happiness**

I have suggested that some objects more than others embody the promise of happiness. In other words, happiness directs us to certain objects, as if they are the necessary ingredients for a good life. What makes this argument different to John Locke’s account of loving grapes because they taste delightful, is that the judgment about certain objects as being ‘happy’ is already made, before they are even encountered: certain objects are attributed as the conditions for happiness so that we arrive ‘at’ them with an expectation of how we will be affected by them, which affects how they affect us, even in the moment they fail to live up to our expectations. Happiness is an expectation of what follows, where the expectation differentiates between things, whether or not they exist as objects in the present. For instance, the child might be asked to imagine the future by imagining ‘happy events’ in the future, such as a wedding day, the ‘happiness day of your life’. This is why happiness provides the emotional setting for disappointment, even if happiness is not given: we just have to expect happiness from ‘this or that’, for ‘this and that’ to be experiencable as objects of disappointment.

So when we find happy objects, we do not just find them anywhere. The promise of happiness directs life in some ways, rather than others. As I argued in *Queer Phenomenology*, for a life to count as a good life, then it must return the debt of its life by taking on the direction promised as a social good, which means imagining one’s futurity in terms of reaching certain points along a life course. If happiness might be what allows us to reach such points, it is not necessarily how we feel when we get there.

Happiness is not only promised by certain objects, it is also what we promise to give to others as an expression of love. I am especially interested in the speech act, “I just want you to be happy”. What does it mean to want ‘just’ happiness? What does it mean for a parent to say this to a child? In a way, the desire for the child’s happiness seems to offer certain kind of freedom, as if to say: ‘I don’t want you to be this, or to do that; I just want you to be or to do “whatever” makes you happy’. You could say that the ‘whatever’ seems to release us from the obligation of the ‘what’. The desire for the child’s happiness seems to offer the freedom of a certain indifference to the content of a decision.

Take the psychic drama of the queer child. You could say that the queer child is an unhappy object for many parents. In some parental responses to the child coming out, this unhappiness is not so much expressed as being unhappy about the child being queer, but about being unhappy about the child being unhappy. To give you just one example, take the following quote from the lesbian novel *Annie on my Mind* by Nancy Gordon:

‘Lisa’, my father said, ‘I told you I’d support you and I will ... But honey ... well, maybe it’s just that I love your mother so much and you and Chad so much that I have to say to you I’ve never thought people can be very happy—no children for
one thing, no real family life. Honey, you are probably going to be a very good architect—but I want you to be happy in other ways, too, as your mother is, to have a husband and children. I know you can do both.’ (1982, p. 191)

The father makes an act of identification with an imagined future of necessary and inevitable unhappiness. Such an identification through grief about what the child will lose, reminds us that the queer life is already constructed as an unhappy life, as a life without the ‘things’ that make you happy. The speech act, “I just want you to be happy”, can be directive at the very point of its imagined indifference.

One of the most striking aspects of the film Bend it like Beckham is how the conflict and obstacle of the film is resolved through this speech act, addressed from father to daughter that takes the approximate form: “I just want you to be happy”. Jesminder, a young Indian girl brought up in London loves to play football. Her idea of happiness would be to bend it like Beckham, which requires that she bends the rules about what Indian girls can do. The generational conflict between parents and daughter is also represented as a conflict between the demands of cultures: as Jess says, “anyone can cook Alo Gobi but who can bend the ball like Beckham”. This contrast sets up ‘cooking Alo Gobi’ as common place and customary, against an alternative world of celebrity, individualism and talent. So Jess’s love puts her in conflict with her family, who want Jess to follow family tradition especially as their other daughter Pinkie is about to get married. Jess is forced to play football in secret given her parent’s disapproval. In this secretive life she forms new bonds and intimacies: first with Jules who gets her on the girl’s team, and then with Joe, the football coach, with whom she ‘falls in love’. This other world, the world of freedom, involves proximity to whiteness.

It is possible to read the film by putting this question of cultural difference to one side. We could read the story as being about the promise of happiness for girls who bend the rules of femininity. We might cheer for Jess, as she ‘scores’ and finds happiness somewhere other than where she is expected to find it. We would be happy about her freedom and her refusal of the demand to be a good girl, or even a happy housewife. Yet, such a reading would fall short. It would not offer a reading of ‘where’ the happiness of this image of freedom takes us.

The climactic moment of the film is when the final of the football tournament coincides with Pinkie’s wedding. Jess cannot be at both events at once. She accepts her own unhappiness by identifying with the happiness of her parents: she puts her own desire for happiness to one side. But the father is not happy with her being unhappy, even though she wants him to be happy. He lets her go because he wants to see her being happy. He cannot be indifferent to her unhappiness: later he says to his wife, “maybe you could handle her long face, I could not”. Her long face might even “ruin the video”, getting in the way of picturing the family as happy, as being what causes happiness.

At one level, the father’s desire for the daughter’s happiness involves a form of indifference to ‘where’ she goes. From the point of view of the film, the desire for happiness is far from indifferent. After all, this moment is when the father ‘switches’ from a desire that is out of line with the happy object of the film (not wanting Jess to play) to being in line (letting her go), which in turn is what allows the film’s happy ending. Importantly, the happy ending is about the co-
incidence of happy objects. The daughters are happy (they are living the life they wish to lead), the parents are happy (as their daughters are happy), and we are happy (as they are happy). Good feeling involves these points of alignment. We could say positive affect is what sutures the film, resolving the generational and cultural split: as soon as Jess is allowed to join the football game, the two worlds ‘come together’ in a shared moment of enjoyment. Whilst the happy objects are different from the point of view of the daughters (football, marriage) they allow us to arrive at the same point.

And yet, the film does not give equal value to the objects in which good feelings come to reside. It is Jess that invests her hope for happiness in an object that is already attributed as happy: the national game. Jess’s happiness is contrasted to her sister Pinkie, who is ridiculed throughout the film as not only wanting less, but as being less in the direction of her want. Pinkie asks Jess why she does not want ‘this’. Jess does not say that she wants something different; she says it is because she wants something ‘more’. That word ‘more’ lingers, and frames the ending of the film, which gives us ‘flashes’ of an imagined future (pregnancy for Pinkie, photos of Jess on her sport’s team, her love for her football coach Joe, her friendship with Jules). During the sequence of shots as Jess gets ready to join the football final, the camera pans up to show an airplane. Airplanes are everywhere in this film. They matter as technologies of flight, signifying what goes up and away. Happiness in the film is promised by what goes ‘up’ and ‘away’. The desire to play football, to join the national game, is read as going up and away, and as leaving a certain world behind, as the world of tradition. Through the juxtaposition of the daughter’s happy objects, the film suggest that this desire gives a better return.

In reading the ‘directed’ nature of narratives of freedom, we need in part to consider how the film relates to wider discourses of the public good. The film locates the ‘pressure point’ in the migrant family; who pressurises Jess to live a life she does not want to live. And yet, many migrant individuals and families are under pressure to integrate, where integration is a key term for we now call in the UK ‘good race relations’. Although integration is not defined as ‘leaving your culture behind’ (at least not officially), it is unevenly distributed, as a demand that new or would-be citizens ‘embrace’ a common culture that is already given. The promise of happiness is located in the very aspiration to become British. The migrant daughter who identifies with the national game is thus a happy object for the nation; she becomes a sign of the promise of integration. The unconventional daughter of the migrant family may even provide a conventional form of social hope.

Melancholic migrants

I want to quote from one film critic, who identifies the film aptly as a ‘happy smiling multiculturalism’:

Yet we need to turn to the U.K. for the exemplary commercial film about happy, smiling multiculturalism. Bend it like Beckham is the most profitable all-British

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film of all time, appealing to a multicultural Britain where Robin Cook, former Foreign Secretary, recently declared Chicken Tikka Massala the most popular national dish. White Brits tend to love Bend it like Beckham because it doesn’t focus on race and racism—after all many are tired of feeling guilty.

What makes this film ‘happy’ is in part what it conceals or keeps from view—the negative affects surrounding racism. You might note that the negative affects are not attributed to the experience of racism, but to white guilt. The film might be appealing as it allows white guilt to be displaced by good feelings: you do not have to feel guilty about racism, as you can be ‘uplifted’ by the happiness of the story of migrant success. The film ‘lifts you up’.

Migrant success is read not only offered as a reward for integration, but also as ‘evidence’ that that racism can be and even has been overcome. In some of my earlier work on the politics of bad feeling (Ahmed, 2005), I explore how happiness or good feeling is attributed to the white anti-racist subject (a subject that is proud about its anti-racism). In turn, I investigated what it means for racism to be understood as being caused by depression. Not only does this allow racism to be located in the bodies of unhappy racist whites, but it also suggests that the unhappiness of those who experience racism can be overcome, in part through the agency of happy anti-racist whites. Happiness itself becomes a technology of reconciliation, which in allowing us to leave bad feeling behind, enables us to embrace a common good.

It might seem that today, we are a long way from such a happy smiling multiculturalism, as my opening remarks about unhappy diversity would seem to suggest. Paul Gilroy has noted how multiculturalism has been declared dead in the UK, and has been made responsible for segregation and terrorism. And yet, I would suggest that the film expresses the same rather deadly logic: multiculturalism can only be happy if migrants integrate. The happiness of this film is partly that it imagines that multiculturalism can deliver its social promise by extending freedom to migrants on the condition that they embrace its game. Those who refuse to embrace the game are attributed as the cause of unhappiness.

So although Bend it Like Beckham seems to be about the promise of happiness, injury and bad feeling do play an important narrative function in the film. As you know, I am interested in how bad feelings are converted into good feelings. What are the conversion points in this film? We can focus here on two speeches made by Jess’s father; the first takes place early on in the film, the second at the end:

When I was a teenager in Nairobi, I was the best fast bowler in our school. Our team even won the East African cup. But when I came to this country, nothing. And these bloody goras in the club house made fun of my turban and set me off packing … She will only end up disappointed like me.

When those bloody English cricket players threw me out of their club like a dog, I never complained. On the contrary, I vowed that I would never play again. Who suffered? Me. But I don’t want Jess to suffer. I don’t want her to make the same

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7 As Paul Gilroy (2006) describes “multiculturalism was officially pronounced dead in July 2005”.

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mistakes her father made, accepting life, accepting situations. I want her to fight. And I want her to win.

In the first speech, the father says she should not play in order not to suffer like him. In the second, he says she should play in order not to suffer like him. The desire implicit in both speech acts is the avoidance of the daughter’s suffering, which is expressed in terms of the desire not to repeat his own. For Jess to be happy, he lets her go. By implication, not only is he letting her go, he is also letting go of his own suffering, the unhappiness caused by accepting racism, as the ‘point’ of his exclusion.

I would argue that the father is represented in the first speech as melancholic: as refusing to let go of his suffering, as incorporating the very object of own loss. His refusal to let Jess go is readable as a symptom of melancholia: as a stubborn attachment to his own injury, as a form of self-exclusion, or even self-harm (as he says: “who suffered? Me”). The melancholic migrant holds onto the unhappy objects of difference, such as the turban, or at least the memory of being teased about the turban, which ties it to a history of racism. Such differences become sore points or blockage points, where the smooth passage of communication stops. The melancholic migrant is the one who is not only stubbornly attached to difference, but who insists on speaking about racism, where such speech is heard as labouring over sore points. The duty of the migrant is to let go of the pain of racism by letting go of racism as a way of understanding that pain.

It is important to note that the melancholic migrant’s fixation with injury is read not only as an obstacle to their own happiness, but also to the happiness of the generation-to-come, and even to national happiness. This figure converts quickly in the national imaginary to the ‘could-be-terrorist’. His anger, pain, misery (all understood as forms of bad faith insofar as they won’t let go of something that is presumed to be already gone) becomes ‘our terror’.

To avoid such a terrifying end point, the duty of the migrant is to attach to a different happier object, one that can bring good fortune, such as the national game. The film ends with the fortune of this re-attachment. Jess goes to America to take up her dream of becoming a professional football player, a land which makes the pursuit of happiness an originary goal. We should note here that the father’s experience of being excluded from the national game are repeated in Jess’s own encounter with racism on the football pitch (she is called a ‘Paki’), which leads to the injustice of her being sent off. In this case, however, Jess’s anger and hurt does not stick. She lets go of her suffering. How does she let go? When she says to Joe, “you don’t know what it feels like”, he replies, “of course I know how it feels like, I’m Irish”. It is this act of identification with suffering that brings Jess back into the national game (as if to say, ‘we all suffer, it is not just you’). The film suggests that whether racism ‘hurts’ depends upon individual capacity: we can let go of racism as ‘something’ that happens, a capacity that is both attributed to skill (if you are good enough, you will get by), as well as the

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8 For excellent readings of racial melancholia see Anne Anlin Cheng (2001) and David L. Eng and Shinhee Han (2003), “A Dialogue on Racial Melancholia” in David L. Eng and David Kazanjian (eds), Loss: The Politics of Mourning, Berkeley, University of California Press.
proximate gift of white empathy, where the hurt of racism is re-imagined as a common ground.

The love story between Jess and Joe offers another point of re-attachment. Heterosexuality becomes itself a form of happy return: promising to allow us to overcome injury; heterosexual love is what heals. It is worth noting here that the director of the film Gurinder Chadha originally planned to have the girls falling in love. This decision to drop the lesbian plot was of course to make the film more marketable. We can see here the importance of ‘appeal’ as a form of capital, and how happiness can function as a moral economy, a way of making what is good into things that can circulate as goods. Indeed, we could argue that the narrative of bending the rules of femininity involves a straightening device: you can bend, only insofar as you return to the straight line, which provides as it were our end point. So here girls playing football leads to the male football coach. Narratives of rebellion can involve deviations from the straight line, if they return us to this point.

Heterosexuality also promises to overcome the injury or damage of racism. The acceptance of interracial heterosexual love is a conventional narrative of reconciliation as if love can overcome past antagonism and create what I call hybrid familiality: white with colour, white with another. Such fantasies of proximity are premised on the following belief: if only we could be closer, we would be as one. Proximity becomes a promise: the happiness of the film is the promise of ‘the one’, as if giving love to the white man, as the ego ideal of the nation, would allow us to have a share in this promise.

The final scene is a cricket scene: the first of the film. As we know, cricket is an unhappy object in the film, associated with the suffering of racism. Jess’s father is batting. Joe, in the foreground, is bowling. He smiles as he approaches us. He turns around, bowls, and gets the father out. In a playful scene, Joe then ‘celebrates’ and his body gestures mimics that of a plane, in a classic football gesture. As I have suggested, planes are happy objects in the film; associated with flight, with moving up and away. By mimicking the plane, Joe becomes the agent that converts bad feeling (unhappy racism) into good feeling (multicultural happiness). It is the white man who enables the father to let go of his injury about racism and to play cricket again. It is the white man who brings the suffering migrant back into the national fold. His body is our conversion point.

Conclusion: Happiness and Reconciliation

It matters how feelings are distributed. It matters who promises our conversion. Some bodies become sore points, points of trouble, where communication stops. Other bodies become bearers of the promise of happiness. And yet, some critics suggest that we have paid too much attention to melancholia, suffering and injury and that we need to be more affirmative. Rosi Braidotti, for example, suggests that the focus on negativity has become a problem within feminism, calling for a more affirmative feminism. She offers a bleak reading of bleakness: “I actively yearn for a more joyful and empowering concept of desire and for a political economy that foregrounds positivity, not gloom” (2002, p. 57).
What concerns me is how much this turn to happiness actually depends on the very distinction between good and bad feelings that presume bad feelings are backward and conservative and good feelings are forward and progressive. Bad feelings are seen as orientated towards the past; as a kind of stubbornness that ‘stops’ the subject from embracing the future. Good feelings are associated here with moving up, and getting out. I would argue that it is the very assumption that good feelings are open and bad feelings are closed that allows historical forms of injustice to disappear. The demand for happiness is what makes those histories disappear by reading them as a form of melancholia (as if you are holding onto something that is already gone). These histories have not gone. We would be letting go of that which persists in the present. To let go would keep those histories present.

The history of happiness is inseparable from the history of empire, and this history is not behind us. We must attend to that history, as what shapes the ground in the present. It was worth recalling happiness was used to justify European imperialism as a moral project. Utilitarian ideas of maximising happiness were used to justify colonial rule, as can see in the quote from James Mill:

The pace of civilisation would be quickened beyond all examples. The courts, the knowledge, and the manners of Europe would be brought to their doors, and forced by an irresistible moral pressure on their acceptance. The happiness of the human race would thus be prodigiously augmented. (as cited in To Leung, 1998)

The civilising mission could be described as a happiness mission. For happiness to be a mission, the colonised other must first be deemed unhappy. The imperial archive is an archive of unhappiness. Colonial knowledges constitute the other as not only an object of knowledge, a truth to be discovered, but as being unhappy, as lacking the qualities or attributes required for a happy state of existence. It

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9 For a helpful account of the relationship between utilitarianism and British imperialism see Stokes (1959), p. 52-69. See also volume 9 of James Mill’s *History of British India*, where imperialism is justified via the greater happiness principle: “for, although the country has suffered, and must ever suffer, many and great disadvantages from the substitution of strangers for its own functionaries, its own chiefs, its own sovereigns; it has been, in some degree, compensated for their loss, by exemption from the fatal consequences of native mis-rule—by protection against external enemies—by the perpetuation of internal tranquillity—by the government of trade—the increase of cultivation—and the progressive introduction of the arts and sciences, the intelligence and civilisation of Europe” (1997, p. 396). Contemporary US led imperialisms use similar utilitarian cost-benefit logic: the suffering of war and foreign intervention is justified by the benefits brought by civilisation, democracy and freedom. Ideas of maximising happiness can become justifications for war

10 We can also consider the significance of the production of the myths of happiness, such as the myth of the happy slave, which is a myth that finds happiness in the violence of colonial subjection. See Saidiya V. Hartman’s powerful book, *Scenes of Subjection*, for a critique of this myth of happiness which reads slave songs not only as ‘songs of sorrow’ in Du Bois’s terms, but as involving opacity of feeling (1997, p. 48). The myth of the happy slave has a powerful function, even suggesting slavery liberates the other to happiness. Consider Fredrick Douglass’s debunking of this myth: “I have often been utterly astonished, since I came to the north, to find persons who could speak of the singing, among slaves, as evidence of their contentment and happiness. It is impossible to conceive of a greater mistake. Slaves sing most when they are most unhappy. The
was argued that through empire, the colonised other would acquire good manners, becoming elevated into a happier state of existence. As Homi Bhabha (2004) has shown us, the colonised other is required to mimic the coloniser by approximating their habits. Such mimicry produces a hybrid subject: *almost the same but not quite, almost the same but not white*. One wonders whether happiness for the colonised rests also on the hesitation of this almost: *almost happy, but not quite; almost happy, but not white*.

In the UK, imperial history is being remembered as a happy history; even as the gift of happiness, as a gift given to colonised others. One speech by Trevor Phillips, “we need a High-way code for a Multi-ethnic Society” (2005), evokes the history of imperialism in happy terms:

> and we can look at our own history to show that the British people are not by nature bigots. We created something called the empire where we mixed and mingled with people very different from those of these islands.  

Happiness works powerfully here: the violence of colonial occupation is reimagined as a history of happiness (as a story of mixing and mingling). Empire itself becomes a sign of a loving happy national disposition.

We need to challenge the presumed happiness of the history of happiness. We might speak with bad feeling, speak of our inheritance of unhappiness, and speak about racism and empire in the present. From where am I speaking, is a question I ask myself, as someone who lives and works in London, whose anti-racist work has primarily taken place in the UK. From where do I speak, as I write primarily about the politics of racism in Britain for an Australian journal, having first given this paper at a conference in Adelaide, the town where I grew up. A child of empire, I am, with my own family history carrying me from Pakistan, to England to Australia and back to England.

I no longer reside in Australia—and this simple fact does matter.  

 songs of the slave represent the sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved by them, only as an aching heart is relieved by its tears. At least, such is my experience. I have often sung to drown my sorrow, but seldom to express my happiness. Crying for joy, and singing for joy, were alike uncommon to me while in the jaws of slavery. The singing of a man cast away upon a desolate island might be as appropriately considered as evidence of contentment and happiness, as the singing of a slave; the songs of the one and of the other are prompted by the same emotion” (2004, p. 19). The defence of slavery insists on hearing misery as happiness. Defenses of slavery also relied on descriptions of the unhappiness of the to-be-enslaved others. A Pennsylvania surgeon, William Chancellor, in 1751 wrote “it is accounted by numberless people that a voyage to Africa in regard to the purchasing Slaves is very vile, but in my opinion, and I think I know, it is not in the least so, tis redeeming an unhappy people from inconceivable misery” (as cited in Blassingame, 1992). Descriptions of ‘the natives’ as unhappy peoples in need of liberation saturate the colonial archive. The Aboriginal peoples in Queensland were also described as ‘that unhappy race’ (see Reid, 2006).

11 This speech is available at: 83.137.212.42/sitearchive/cre/Default.aspx?LocID0hgnew07v.RefLocID-0hg00900c002.Lang-EN.htm  
12 It has taken me a long time, maybe even 15 years, to recognise that I now actually live in the UK and that I don’t just temporarily reside here. I had always thought of
saturated by Australia, the place I grew up, which has shaped my skin, my sense of myself. After all, I first learnt about whiteness in Australia. I learnt what it means not to be white. My experiences taught me all about being not. I also learnt about what it means to be a migrant, to be living on somebody else’s ground without permission. You inherit unhappiness when you walk on this ground. We need to recognise this inheritance without assuming our unhappiness means inhabiting the same ground. Non-white migrants need to recognise Indigenous sovereignty as the starting point, before we can begin the political work of troubling whiteness, where the trouble we can cause will depend on how we inhabit this not. We might need to be willing to be attributed as the cause of unhappiness, to be seen as ill-adjusted, making trouble, being trouble, and putting whiteness into trouble. We cannot let go of this history, we cannot give up labouring over its sore points, until the ground is recognised as Indigenous ground.

To learn from films like *Bend it Like Beckham* would be to learn how reconciliation as a fantasy is premised on happiness, on being reconciled into the nation, providing as it were its cover. As a fantasy, the moment of reconciliation is what creates the impression that the past is behind us. At this moment, in Australia, the risks of it being covered by happiness are clear. The recent apology by Kevin Rudd is an important political moment, in its recognition of injury, suffering and wrong. While it might not be a time for cynicism—although his emphasis on the ‘primal feelings’ of non-Indigenous Australians could make us cynical—it is a time for caution. The recognition of injury and injustice does matter—it matters to those who are recipients of the apology, Indigenous Australians who have carried the burden of this history for too long. The recognition of suffering and injustice matters, but it does not mean the overcoming of that suffering. Far from it. This is not a moment for national happiness, nor a moment to be proud of shame.

I was very struck by Tony Birch’s reading of the film *Dust* in his article in Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s wonderful edited collection *Sovereign Subjects*. As he argues so eloquently:

*Dust* concludes with the silent gathering of indigenous and nonindigenous teenagers. This is not a reconciliation moment; this is one composed of discomfort, fear and grief. Nothing is spoken between those present, and no neat conclusions are reached. *Dust* does not offer neat solutions to the problems confronting Australia today, and it is a better film for this. Unlike the formal reconciliation process, it is not an end-point either. It is the potential of a beginning, the commencement of an exchange, as it recognises that before dialogue about a future can be accomplished, Indigenous people who live on the ground and the past they inhabit need to be recognised and commemorated so that the burden carried by elders such as Aunty Ruby can be lifted. This can only

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myself as on my way toward going home to Australia. This recognition that England is where I live has affected my work—whilst in my earlier writing I mainly focused on the politics of racism in Australia, I now tend to focus more on the UK. This is not because Australian politics no longer matters to me, but because it does. I have come to believe that Australians who are non-residents of Australia have a responsibility to think and speak from the point of non-residence. This does not should mean a prohibition against thought or speech, but a call for a more responsible speech, a speech that responds to the places from which we respond.
be done when White Australia takes vigilant responsibility for the past. (2007, p. 114)

We need to find ways of gathering that do not allow us to cover over bad feelings and that the pasts they keep alive. To gather in this way is to offer, in Birch’s terms, the potential of a beginning, the commencement of an exchange. To gather in this way is not to turn over a page in history; it is not even to start a new page. To gather in this way is to attend to history, to what does not simply go away, in the moment of recognition of the unhappiness of that history. A concern with histories that hurt is not a backward orientation: to move on, you must make this return. We might need to hold onto histories of suffering, to stay as sore as our points. And we might even need to be prepared to kill some forms of joy.

Author Note

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References


Political Writing by Indigenous Australians (pp. 66-77). Carleton: Melbourne University Press.
This paper sets out to explore the meaning for the author, a white woman in contemporary Australia, of having a white father. It both follows and deviates from other work by white daughters about their white fathers—not seeking to defend the father, nor needing in particular to resolve grief, but like the other work, acknowledging pride, admiration and above all a major personal and cultural debt to the father. Notwithstanding this debt it sets out to clear a space where a white daughter’s relationship to Indigenous sovereignty is not mediated or protected by a relationship with the white father. The paper moves between history, theory, family archives, memory, stories, and reflection; it is fragmented. It is both personal and particular but also I hope of wider relevance to the project of moving Australia and white Australians, including myself, towards a post-colonial future. The paper risks all the pitfalls that Sara Ahmed outlines in her article on the non-performativity of antiracism but pins its hopes on her call to those in whiteness studies to “turn away from themselves and towards others” (2004, p. 59).

**Keywords**: memory, white fathers, white daughters, Gippsland, Gunaikurnai, anti-racism

**Inheritance**

A couple of years ago I wrote an article about the cultural politics of the resignation in 2003 of Peter Hollingworth as Governor-General of Australia (Baird, 2009). I located Hollingworth as the White Father of the nation, and following Fiona Probyn’s (2003) argument about the white nation’s need to disassociate from ‘bad white fathers’ in relation to the Stolen Generations, I made a lot of the nation’s need to remove Hollingworth from the centre stage. His presence there raised questions about national virtue that, from the white nation’s point of view, were best dealt with by his departure. It took a while to sink in that ‘the white father’ was not just a conceptual construct that I could
identify in national politics: I was/am a white daughter of a white father. That moment of recognition brought home to me a passage in the introduction to Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s book *Talking Up to the White Woman*. After discussing the work of some white feminists who have pioneered the area of whiteness studies, Moreton-Robinson qualifies:

> The work of these feminists recognises that white race privilege makes a difference to women’s life chances. Yet these authors fail to appreciate that their position as situated knowers within white race privilege is inextricably connected to the systemic racism they criticise but do not experience. (2000, p. xx)

This article continues thinking about my white father, as a material presence and provider and as a symbolic figure, about what it means for me to be his white daughter, and the relevance of these things to my position as an academic writer. In a response to an early version of this article a friend wrote:

> As someone who grew up without a white father (or any father) being present—I have always been aware of the provision and protection that the white father provides—something that was very much absent from my life and left our family very vulnerable. (S. Kurtzer, personal communication, May 7, 2008)

I take it as an obligation to reflect on what my white father has provided for me—and to reposition myself in relation to these provisions. This is the way here that I locate myself in the contradictory time and place of white Australia, now, where, as Alison Ravenscroft has described it, there is both fear and desire in moving “towards another future” (Ravenscroft, 2003, p. 239). To do this the paper moves between history, theory, family archives, memory, stories, and reflection; it is fragmented. It is both personal and particular but also I hope of wider relevance to the project of moving Australia and white Australians, including myself, towards a post-colonial future.

It needs to be acknowledged here that having a white father is no guarantee that one inherits his legacy of white privilege. For the many members of the Stolen Generations who were the children of Indigenous mothers and white fathers it was indeed this paternity that lead to their removal from family, community and culture, all too often into situations of abuse and deprivation (National Inquiry, 1997). Even for white daughters whiteness alone does not convey material security, although it usually helps. And plenty of white fathers do more emotional damage than they convey self-worth and a sense of entitlement. But that’s not my story. In my case having a white father has created more than a fair share of economic security and subjective self-possession.

Having said all that let me introduce my father, Ross Baird, because it is in relation to him that this article takes shape. He was born in 1913 in Melbourne. By my reckoning he was fourth or fifth generation Australian, descended on his maternal side from migrants who came to Victoria from England in the first twenty years of the colony, and on the paternal side from migrants who arrived in Melbourne from Scotland in 1854. After his father left them, when my dad was six or seven years of age, he was raised by his mother, with support from her family, in particular her sister. His mother supported the two of them by working as a tailoress. They lived in ‘rooms’. My father was academically gifted and I can only assume that his mother sacrificed her own comforts so that he could continue his education well beyond his years of compulsory schooling. After
qualifying from Footscray Technical College with a diploma in civil engineering in 1931 he gained employment in the newly developing kiln seasoning department in the Division of Forest Products at the CSIRO in Melbourne, and began a lifetime working in the timber industry. In 1934 he went to Adelaide to work in the kiln drying department at the Holden car factory. It was in Adelaide that he met my mother, Jean Taylor, whose people had come to South Australia from Wales and England in the 1880s and where they married in the Unitarian Church in 1936. My father’s work took the two of them and a growing family to Tasmania, back to South Australia and then to Victoria, and round again, through many small and medium sized rural timber-milling towns as well as Launceston and a short period back in Melbourne. My father did not go to war, his Unitarian faith leading him to conscientious objection (although he was in any case exempted from service because of his involvement in an essential industry). In 1950 he became manager of Glen Maggie Timber Limited, located in Heyfield in Gippsland, Victoria, a position he occupied for nine years and which developed into wider responsibilities for the company’s timber operations across Gippsland. While in Heyfield, then a town growing to well over two thousand people, my father served on the Management Committee of the Bush Nursing Hospital, for four years as Chairman, was a Justice of the Peace and a member of the Heyfield Masonic Lodge. The 1950s were the hey-day of Heyfield, and the period included the building of the Glen Maggie Weir about ten miles north of Heyfield. The weir was built with a significant migrant workforce and newly arrived migrants also worked in the timber industry. I’ll pause in this brief account here, because it was at the end of this period in Heyfield that I was born. In 1958 I arrived, after five boys, as my father’s first and only daughter.

This brief sketch of my father’s first forty-five years gestures towards many familiar aspects of Australian social history but does not, however, offer an account of the subjective dimensions of this history. And neither is an account of colonialism in twentieth century Australia apparent at face value. These are the issues that are at the heart of this article. But the point here is not only the social context of my father’s life, nor how he was able make sense of his circumstances. The issue is as much my inheritance from him, material and cultural, including my investment in a certain idea of my father, one for which he cannot be held entirely responsible. My mother’s repeated appreciative statement that my father had never been out of work for a single day in the whole time of their marriage is an example of how others’ views of my father became part of my view of him –good worker, good husband, good father. It is also a testament to the economic privilege of whiteness. Further, daughters’ ideas about (white) fathers are bigger than can be embodied in any one single white man. This is one point to be drawn from Katrina Schlunke’s story of feeling guilty after the distant sight of her father interrupts the skinny dipping in a river pool on her family’s property at her tenth birthday party. She goes on to write that “it took me a long time to realise that my parents found it funny. Only I thought of possible immorality” (2005, p. 26).

When I first presented the conference paper from which this article has developed, I finished my presentation with a photo of me, my father and my dog, taken by my girlfriend about six months before my father died. This photo means many things but I read it then in the context of a consideration of whiteness. It sits on the desk in my study at home—where I sit at my computer to write this article. I don’t have many photos of the two of us. It was only when
writing the paper that I noticed that, like the photos from my childhood, at 90 (I was 45) my father was still putting a protective arm around me, something I found comforting. A woman in the audience at the conference session suggested that even as my father was supporting me, in leaning in to him, I was also supporting my father. From his late eighties my father was reliant on the caring work of the women (and some men) employed at the modestly government-funded home where he lived and also emotionally reliant on my sister-in-law in particular. But even then, as throughout his life, my father could rely, as all white men can, on the privilege born of Indigenous dispossession. As he pulls me towards him in the photo, and as I lean I to support him, we could signify a history of the reproduction of this dispossession—first father to daughter, then daughter to father.

**Whiteness**

This article takes up the primary attention to the ongoing colonial nature of the Australian nation state and the ethical imperative for white Australia(ns) to establish a sense of accountability to Indigenous peoples that has distinguished the field of critical race and whiteness studies in Australia.

Given its first person address, consideration of intimate family relationships, and its use of family archival material, this article could be located in what Anne Brewster described in 2005 as “the turn to a personalized or autobiographical narrative mode” in “recent writing in Australia and elsewhere on whiteness” (2005, p. 1). Brewster located this ‘new whiteness writing’ in part as a response to the flowering of the personalised writing of Indigenous women since the 1980s. Brewster rehearses the claims and counter-claims made for the white subject’s project of particularising itself and acknowledges the limits, even self-delusions, of such alleged anti-racist projects. Her conclusion is to argue for ‘new whiteness writing’ as *complementary* to the project that Robyn Wiegman (1999) calls for—“the deconstructive one of scrutinising the limits of anti-racist projects” (Brewster, 2005, p. 11). She works hard to elaborate this ‘complementary enterprise’ which she identifies as one that “focuses on the intensity and immediacy of the relation of whiteness to its others” (Brewster, 2005, p. 11). At the end of her essay it still seems, to me, a fragile claim. Simply marking the indebtedness of the subject to its others, and its fractured nature, does not necessarily involve any shift in power relations.

This article certainly shares some of the features that Brewster observes in the small body of work that she writes of—a focus on ‘memory’ and “divided and dislocated forms of subjectivity” and use of “the trope of the self-addressed question” (2005, p. 9, p. 10). But despite this I want to resist the possibility that this article, like much writing by women and racialised others, especially that using the first person, will be *autobiographicalised* and so denied epistemological authority and complexity (Nicoll, 2000, p. 370). Yes, there are biographical and autobiographical elements to this article but, as Alison Ravenscroft writes of a piece of writing by Kathleen Mary Fallon, “to the extent that it might be ‘autobiographic’, it is the autobiography of all white Australians, the story of our own origins that we nevertheless disavow” (2003, p. 235). I take up the prerogative to tell aspects of my father’s life not to make him into the subject of a biography, or myself into an autobiographical subject, but to show precisely
how we are constructed not as individual unique subjectivities but as active place markers in the history of ‘patriarchal white sovereignty’, to use Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s term (2004a).

As Sara Ahmed writes in her article on the non-performativity of declarations of whiteness, white racism and privilege “may even be repeated and intensified, through declarations of whiteness, or through the recognition of privilege as privilege” (2004, p. 58). This article risks every one of the features that Ahmed argues mark the ‘non-performativity’ of anti-racist whiteness studies. Somewhat reluctantly, Ahmed concludes her article by saying that “whiteness studies should involve at least a double turn” (my emphasis).

The task for whiteness studies is to stay implicated in what they critique, but in turning towards their role and responsibility in these histories of racism, as histories of the present, to turn away from themselves and towards others. (Ahmed, 2004, p. 59)

Ahmed states that “the ‘double turn’ is not sufficient but it clears some ground, upon which the work of exposing racism might provide the conditions for another kind of work” (2004, p. 59). Indeed, Alison Ravenscroft writes that a new subject position for those located through white privilege “cannot yet be fully spoken” (2003, p. 239).

In writing about my father I attempt the ‘double turn’ that Ahmed writes of. In doing this I need to say that I am not setting out to disown my father. Quite the opposite. Lisa Slater notes that “ethical cross-cultural relationships ... require an understanding of one’s culture and heritage” (2010, p. 290). Understanding him is not, however, the same as defending him, but not defending him does not mean that I cannot record that I loved him. I wish to own my father and my debt to him, and understand my heritage, by turning away from him (and myself) to histories not heretofore understood as ‘ours’. And by asking questions that I have not previously asked, answers to which I cannot necessarily give, I invoke what Judith Butler describes as the conditions for an ethical stance. She writes “any effort to ‘give an account of oneself’ will have to fail in order to approach being true” (2005, p. 42). This failure comes from an openness to others and so to their (quite possibly) incommensurable knowledge of oneself, as well as from the constantly changing nature of oneself.

**Daughters and fathers**

This article is not the first piece of Australian writing about a white father written by a white daughter.¹ Judith Drake-Brockman’s *Wongi Wongi* (2001) is a nostalgic reminiscence of the life of her family—wealthy West Australian landowners and pastoralists—in the first half of the twentieth century. The book was published as a direct response to one of the early and most widely read

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¹ I do not claim this to be a comprehensive account of Australian writing about white fathers by white daughters. Mary Ellen Jordan, for example, refers to the death of her violent father in the middle of her account of spending a year in Manigrida (Jordan, 2005, pp. 124-126). She notes that it is not only Aboriginal families who lived with violence. See Probyn (2007) for an analysis of Jordan’s book that claims she reproduces a paternalist position.
examples of personalized writing by Indigenous women in Australia—Sally Morgan’s *My Place* (1987) (a response different, however, to that which Anne Brewster claims for other white writers). Morgan’s ground-breaking book includes the claim that Drake-Brockman’s father, Howden, fathered a child with an Indigenous woman who worked as a domestic on his station (1987, p. 325, p. 333), and suggests that he then incestuously fathered a child with this woman, his own daughter (p. 340). This woman and her child are Morgan’s grandmother Daisy and mother Gladys respectively. “Sally’s book discredits my family and casts serious aspersions on my father”, Drake-Brockman writes (2001, p. 138). Her account rejects Morgan’s story of her father and includes stories of events that appear in Morgan’s book, told from a Drake-Brockman point of view. She concludes that “I have discharged my bounden duty to the memory of my parents, to Daisy, to all my Aboriginal friends and to my family” (2001, p. 138).

Kim Mahood’s *Craft for a Dry Lake* (2000) is another book written by a white daughter about her white father. It is a story of the journey she took to mourn and understand her father in the wake of his death. *Craft* is about Mahood’s relationship with her father and also about her relationship with the Warlpiri people upon whose land she grew up in the 1950s and 1960s. The Warlpiri now legally own and manage the country that once legally belonged to her father as the station Mongrel Downs, in the Tanami Desert. Where Drake-Brockman wrote to defend her father, Mahood writes at one point that the book is about her struggle to tell the father in her head “that I no longer need him to authenticate me” (2000, p. 227). *Craft* has been received quite clearly as an engagement with whiteness, white masculine authority and the Australian colonial predicament. Lisa Slater, who includes reflections on her relationship with her own white father and other men of her childhood in her account of the book, appreciates Mahood’s narrative as one which attempts to “remake or rewrite her sense of belonging and identity” in relation to “the colonial imaginary” (2010, p. 288). On the other hand, Sonja Kurtzer, identifying as an Indigenous woman, whilst initially hopeful, is less appreciative. She notes that Mahood does not acknowledge her reliance on a white sense of entitlement in her literal journey across the country of others—specifically across “some of the few spaces in Australia which have been legally recognised as Indigenous space” (Kurtzer, n.d., p. 12; see also Kurtzer, 2004). Rather Mahood re-enacts “one of the privileges and stories of whiteness—to move into (an)other’s space in order to enlighten improve or transform the white self” (Kurtzer, n.d., p. 5). Neither does Mahood acknowledge the white privilege in the "stories of the triumph of the white, feminine self” (Kurtzer, n.d., p. 3) that are produced in the writing of the book. Slater acknowledges these aspects of *Craft* but sees success in ”what is revealed: a tale of white belonging and of the tenacity of colonial desire” (2010: 285). Kurtzer agrees that the book reveals this but does not cast it as success (n.d., p. 12).

I share with both Drake-Brockman and Mahood admiration for, pride in and a debt to, a white father—and no doubt the (past) desire for approval, too, that Mahood articulates (2000, p. 191). This field of writing is saturated with deep emotion, including, as Slater concludes, “a fear that we might have to abandon those, and that which, we love” (2010, p. 290). But I write as an academic, consciously taking up the tools of critical inquiry as much as I draw from personal and family archives and memories. It is not that academic writing is not partial or even emotional although its credibility and authority is usually staked on its claim to dispassionate objectivity. That I take up the first person voice is
an intervention into academic writing, not an autobiographicalisation of my father or myself. In this sense I am following Greta Bird’s discussion of becoming a white legal academic. Her account is certainly ‘autobiographic’, but she explains that one purpose of her storytelling is “to remove the cloak of reason woven in the academy and reveal my skin of spirit and emotion” (Bird, 2008, p. 3).

In a brief anecdote about her father in an essay where she writes about ‘coming out as a white woman’, Fiona Nicoll manages to place herself firmly in relation to Indigenous sovereignty without apparently abandoning her father (2000, p. 380). In fact she seems to escape this either/or predicament. Nicoll tells of attending a high school where her father was a teacher. Two Indigenous sisters came to the school and in the same year two new white girls also arrived, both demonstrating what Nicoll describes as ‘private school behaviour’. One day the younger Indigenous girl ‘decided to sort them out’ and Nicoll, upon observing the incident in the school yard, comes to the defence of the white girls, calling ‘that’s not fair’ as she rushes into the fray. In response the Indigenous girl takes Nicoll, physically, and pushes her into a rubbish bin. As she does this someone else yells to the Indigenous girl ‘watch it! … that’s Nicoll’s daughter’. The Indigenous girl replies ‘I don’t care whose fucking daughter she is’. Nicoll concludes the re-telling of this incident with the statement that, that sentence “will always encapsulate my experience of Indigenous sovereignty in Australia. Absolute defiance in the face of what Moreton-Robinson describes as a national ‘possessive investment in patriarchal whiteness’” (2000, p. 378). The purpose of my article is to acknowledge and promote what Nicoll remembers—a relationship to Indigenous sovereignty from which my relationship to the white father does not protect me.

**Knowing Heyfield**

I pick up my father’s story in Heyfield, the place where I was born, and look back, and forward, from there to challenge any idea that his, and so my, life is so far distant from Indigenous sovereignty, and colonialism, that these things do not shape my life today.²

Heyfield is on the land of the Kurnai people. In their book about the history of the Kurnai, local Indigenous man Philip Pepper and his co-author Tess De Araugo include a map which places Heyfield around the meeting point of the Brayakoloong, Moomooba Ngattapan and Wooloom ba Bellum Bellum clans of the Kurnai people (1985, p. 2). According to the Victoria Tourism website in 1841 an early settler, Malcolm (more usually named as James) McFarlane, “viewed a broad plain of waving grass, and chose the name ‘Hayfield’ as an apt description of the area” (Tourism Victoria, 2011). This was no doubt not how the country was known to the Kurnai who lived there before McFarlane came to ‘settle’.

Katrina Schlunke cites Paul Carter to urge attention to “the way places are simultaneously named and brought into an imagined space—of the picturesque,

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² I acknowledge here inspiration from Mick Dodson’s Coroborree 2000 speech at the Sydney Opera House. Dodson traced then Prime Minister John Howard’s life story alongside his own to show, through their shared time and space, Howard’s complicity in the Australian race relations that have dispossessed Indigenous peoples.
of domesticity, of nation building, for example” (2005, p. 47). How a whole district of bush in Kurnai country in 1841 could be described as like “a field of waving corn” as, on another website, McFarlane is credited with seeing (Central Gippsland Information Centre, n.d.), does suggest imagination—and intent, foresight, perhaps homesickness, delusion. ‘Hay’ became ‘Hey’ by the 1860s and the first post office opened in 1870 (Premier Postal Auctions, 2011). As the tourist history suggests, my father was not the first man of Scottish descent to go to Gippsland to contribute to the colonial settler project of exploiting the natural resources of the land that belonged to the Kurnai people. Angus McMillan and Lachlan McAlister were two of the earliest and boldest settlers in the Gippsland area. Pepper and De Araugo write that “it was Angus McMillan who gave the Kurnai their first lesson on the inviolability of white people’s possessions” (1985, p. 19). In 1840 in response to reports that Kurnai had scattered his stock, McMillan went on a hunt and “massacred any Aboriginal in sight to win back what he looked on as ‘his land’” (Pepper & De Araugo, 1985, p. 19). In 1843 McMillan and Macalister formed ‘the notorious private army called the Highland Brigade’. According to Bruce Pascoe, a man of Bunurong and Cornish heritage, this army was formed “for no other reason than to engage the Ganai [alternative spelling for Kurnai] (East Gippsland) warriors in warfare” (Pascoe, 2007, p. 159). Pascoe writes of the “close racial and family bonds coupled with shared military and colonial experiences” that enabled the establishment of this “well-trained armed militia” (2007, pp. 159-160). He writes that their first action lead to the massacre of at least sixty Ganai near Stratford, some say one hundred and fifty (2007, pp. 159-60). Some say one hundred and seventy (Ryan, 2010, p. 264).

Linking my father as a Scot to these early perpetrators of massacre and dispossession seems a bit far-fetched. Baird is a Scottish name and his/my paternal forebears came from Scotland but from an early age my father had very little to do with this side of his family and I never heard him claim any descent from the Scots. What this Scottishness might mean, and how it lives in me—I have little idea. It was not until the 1970s that family friends who had visited the UK brought back gifts of ties and scarves in the Baird tartan. It is even more recently that a Scottish-born friend said to me that I have Scottish eyebrows (yes, they are like my father’s). My argument, however, does not hang on genetic heritage or tourist tartans. The psychoanalytic idea of a ‘telescoping of generations’ has more purchase. Adrienne Harris draws this concept from H. Faimberg in her article about fathers and daughters to “describe the unconscious transmission of the psychic projects of one generation into the next” (Harris, 2009, p. 195). I stretch it to refer not just to families but also to communities and indeed nations.

My father’s management of men in Gippsland, and his oversight of the clearing of land for economic development, came only one hundred years after Angus McMillan, Lachlan McAlister and James McFarlane and their fellow pastoralists had pursued similar goals, a short time by some measures. Unlike those earliest Scots, however, my father encountered no overt opposition from the Indigenous owners of the land. But then that had been the case from the 1850s. In his history of Indigenous Victorians Richard Broome writes that the ‘wild times’ of frontier conflict had ended by the 1850s, by which time “white hegemony was extended over Victoria” (2005, p. 96). Pepper and De Araugo write that in 1842 ‘there were 1800 Kurnai’ (1985). By 1846 that number had dropped to thirteen
hundred. In 1854 there were 126. In 1855 there were 80 (1985, p. 19, p. 43, p. 112). It is not hard to recognise that the absence of any outright Indigenous opposition to my father’s activities in the 1950s was a direct effect of the brutal work of the white men who went to Gippsland before him.

Aborigines were killed; Lyndall Ryan identifies sixteen in the Gippsland area between 1840 and 1851 (2010, p. 264). A total of three hundred and ninety people were estimated to have been killed in this way during this time. Nine of these massacres occurred around the area bounded by the Avon River to the west and Lakes Entrance to the east. Heyfield sits at the eastern edge of this massacre zone, and many of the towns that live in my memory of my family’s stories of this area are right in the middle of it—Maffra, Stratford, Sale, Bairnsdale. Indigenous populations in Victoria were also vulnerable to disease—“as in any community devastated by mass killings over a short period” (Ryan, 2010, p. 270). There were also killings of Indigenous people by other Indigenous people, well into the 1860s (Broome, 2005, p. 86). The introduction of cattle and sheep saw the killing of kangaroos to protect pastures as well as the removal of Aborigines, and Phillip Pepper writes “that’s when the tribal fights got earnest ‘cos they had to hunt on some other tribe’s ground!” (1980, p. 38). Ryan argues that the term ‘massacre’ has been ‘under-used’ in accounts of nineteenth century settler-Indigenous relations in Victoria and that it was “a common tactic that was used by settlers and the agents of law and order to achieve the overall strategic objective of eliminating Aboriginal Victorians when they contested British settler occupation of their land” (2010, p. 270). The country of the Kurnai was quickly made unsafe for them as they continued to pursue and defend their economy, their law, their sovereignty. Bruce Pascoe works through the numbers and the statistics about Indigenous deaths in Victoria to come to the conclusion that “every adult Aboriginal male in Victoria was shot at between the years 1836 and 1845. Now tell me that there was no war in Australia” (Pascoe, 2007, p. 158).

I now know about some of the terrible violence of the early white history of Heyfield and surrounds. At the turn of the twenty-first century, historians determined to write about the Victorian massacres “found the conspiracy of silence about settler massacres still permeated the region 150 years after the incidents had taken place” (Ryan, 2010, p. 261). I do not know whether my father knew about this history of massacre and brutal violent dispossession of the first ten to fifteen years of white settlement of Gippsland. It is too late for me to ask him, or to tell him if he did not know, and hear his response. And if the massacres were acknowledged by white people at all in the 1950s, it is possible that this knowledge would already have been known “habitually and naturally” (Schlunke, 2005, p. 14), without moral consequence, without connection to the Indigenous people then living in Gippsland—many of them descended from the Kurnai.

In the 1950s, however, my father did know of the existence of the Aboriginal mission at Lake Tyers, about seventy miles from Heyfield, and of the small groups of Indigenous people living off the mission around Lake Tyers and in Orbost, a town some distance to the east of Heyfield but part of the country he travelled around for his timber work. One of my brothers remembers being told that Indigenous people seen walking along on the highway were ‘going to Lake Tyers’. He also remembers Indigenous football players in teams from Orbost that played against Heyfield. He remembers stories about them too. The Lake Tyers
settlement was initially established as a Church of England mission station in 1861, one of seven reserves established in Victoria. Richard Broome claims that the location of the Lake Tyers mission, known to the Kurnai as Bung Yarnda, had been determined by the Kurnai themselves, a sign of the limited but meaningful strategies available to them in responding to colonialism (Broome, 2005, pp. 125-126). It was made into a government station for Indigenous people in 1908 under the Board for the Protection of Aborigines and throughout the 1920s, when the other Victorian stations were being closed down, it became the “point of concentration for all reserve-dwellers” (Broome, 2005, p. 208). Lake Tyers is a place of memory for its Indigenous residents, including memory of family and community. But it was a harsh place of inadequate rations which were often reduced as a form of punishment (Landon, 1999, p. 43; Pepper, 1980, p. 91; Pepper & De Araugo, 1985, pp. 249-250), resulting in poor health and early death for many of its Indigenous residents (Pepper & De Araugo, 1985, pp. 249-257). It was also a place from where children were removed (Pepper & De Araugo, 1985, pp. 244-245). The people worked hard, building most of the infrastructure of the station themselves, but were paid below the basic wage. Their labour, on and off the station, was controlled and their attempts to support themselves and establish economic independence were repeatedly stymied by management, often at the behest of local white farmers (Pepper & De Araugo, 1985, pp. 242-258). While authority had been ‘contested daily’ at the station from the early 1920s (Broome, 2005, p. 219) Corinne Manning writes that “from the late 1940s, the Lake Tyers community had publicly criticised its management” (2002, p. 171). At that time conditions there were described in the Melbourne press as “atrocious”, and the people were reported to be “terrified of management” (Manning, 2002, p. 171). According to Pepper and De Araugo it was in these post-war years that “the general community began to take an interest in the conditions under which Lake Tyers people were living” (1985, p. 259). Between 1956 and 1965 the residents requested, protested and petitioned for Lake Tyers Mission Station to become an independent, Indigenous-run farming cooperative. These calls came at a time of significant shifts in Indigenous policy in Victoria, with assimilation becoming the dominant policy model nationwide. But, the attempt “to merge people into the mainstream met with great resistance from the non-Koorie population” (Mission Voices, 2011). Finally, however:

The protests at Lake Tyers were successful and in 1965 Lake Tyers Mission was declared a Permanent Reserve ... In 1970, under the Aboriginal Lands Act (1970), 4,000 acres of Lake Tyers Reserve were handed over to the Lake Tyers Aboriginal Trust. The Trust was made up of the Reserve residents and functions to this day ... A large community still live at Lake Tyers which is now known [again] as ‘Bung Yarnda’. (Mission Voices, 2011)

Both my parents were interested in current affairs and involved in community activities. Dinner table discussions about local and world events were commonplace. So of course my father would have known of some of the troubles at Lake Tyers. What and in what way he knew is another matter. Phillip Pepper, of Kurnai and Wotjoballuk descent, whose work has been ground-breaking in telling the history of Gippsland, was born just six years before my father. He tells a story involving Len Rule, the white manager from 1948 until the late 1950s, who had authority over one hundred people at the Lake Tyers station.
One time Dingo Hood was given a pass from the manager to do some bean pickin’ at Orbost … now, y’see, on the station the men got a pay a long way under what we was getting outside, and it wasn’t enough to get decent clothes for their families or extra food, so in the season they all tried to get permission to work on beans, maize and peas … so Dingo left his family on the station, but instead of going back when his pass was up, he stayed two more days and went back home with a fistful of money. Now that man had disobeyed rules and because he was late … he’d ‘ave got into trouble if he’d been two hours late if they’d caught him … Dingo was told to get off Lake Tyers. Rule hunted him off the station, he was hounded down like a dingo. Anyway he kept racin’ round, keepin’ behind them, they even fired off gunshots into the trees. What would have happened if he’d been up one of them trees? They got the police to get him off, and he wasn’t allowed back for a long time, but he used to sneak in and go to his house to give the family money he earned outside. (Pepper, 1980, p. 104, ellipses are in the original text)

This story includes many features of life for those who lived at Lake Tyers in the 1950s. Did my father ever hear of stories like this one, about incidents at Lake Tyers? If he did, who would have told it to him, and how?

In fact Phillip Pepper’s family and community history contains many elements in common with my father’s and my family’s life. My father would have shared an interest in football and cricket had he ever met Phillip Pepper. I am sure that they would have known some of the same people. They would have shared an interest in contributing to their community. Phillip Pepper recalls that, well before my father became involved with the Heyfield Bush Nursing Hospital, the people at Lake Tyers took on a fund-raising project to assist with the purchase of an X-ray machine for the Bairnsdale Hospital. The Lake Tyers concert group, which performed gum-leaf playing, sang and danced, travelled around Victoria and into New South Wales raising money. The community wanted “to show their appreciation for what the hospital did for them” (Pepper, 1980, p. 85; see also Broome, 2005, p. 223).

Knowing about the government’s management of Aboriginal people is one thing. I would be surprised if my father knew the name of the people on whose land he lived and worked and travelled freely. How he would have responded to the Australia Day speech by Pauline Mullett, a woman of the Brabuwooloong clan of the Kurnai, at Drouin on the western edge of Gippsland in 2000, I do not know.

I wonder if you realise that the Aboriginal people who have always lived in Gippsland are called Kurnai? We have always been here; we never left; we never returned; we have been here forever. I am proud to say I am Kurnai. I wonder if you know that on the Lake Tyers Mission Station we were not allowed to speak our language or perform our rituals or educate our children in our traditions? I wonder if you know that our implements, paintings, sacred symbols—our past—were locked up in the museum and kept away from us? (Mullett, as cited in Landon, 2006, p. 07.1)

I do remember my father telling me, probably during the 1970s or early 1980s, then in Launceston, that he had heard a Tasmanian Indigenous man speak at a meeting he had attended—it could have been a Rotary club meeting, or related to local government, or maybe it was a timber industry gathering, these were some of his areas of work and civic contribution. Speaking in the early years of the rapid growth of Tasmanian Indigenous politics (Ryan, 1996, pp. 263-289)
this man may have made similar statements to those made by Pauline Mullett.
He had spoken well, my father said, and put his case capably. But my father thought that his claims on late twentieth century Tasmania were—what? I cannot remember his words. I do remember he was unmoved.

I have written 'I cannot remember', 'I have little idea', 'I do not know': the question of knowledge and ignorance, memory and forgetting, are at the heart of questions of race and the nation. Writing from the USA of 'white ignorance', which he links to white supremacy, Charles W Mills notes that “the editing of white memory ... enables a self-representation in which differential white privilege, and the need to correct for it, does not exist” (2007, p. 31). In the light of this my repetition of 'I do not know' is wearing thin. Letting my father fade in relation to Australian colonial history through a haze of 'I would be surprised' and 'I forget' disengages us both from knowledge of and a place in colonisation. Jennifer Rutherford (2010) writes of this fading of the father in her psychoanalytic reading of a memoir by Rosa Praed, the colonial Queenslander who wrote at the turn of the twentieth century. Rutherford pursues this reading as a way of giving flesh and bones to the founding mythology of white Australian culture. Praed’s work has been celebrated as feminist and anti-colonial. But Rutherford qualifies her feminism by its “enthrallment to the father” (2010, p. 7) and shows how her memoir is literally based in her father’s memories (of an 1857 massacre of Indigenous people) which she incorporates as her own. Praed takes on his memories, however, in ways that obfuscate his role while maintaining him as “the romantic hero” (2010, p. 10). Rutherford writes of “organised” (2010, p. 8) and “cheerful” (2010, p. 17) amnesias and the detail of the father fades—or is faded—while his heroic dimensions grow.

I cannot remember my father’s exact words in his account of what I imagine was a confrontation with Tasmanian Indigenous sovereignty. But if my personal amnesia is a protection against having to face the implications of my father’s steadfast turning away from Indigenous sovereignty, that leaves me without having to consider exactly my own stand. The work of others—activists, writers, friends—steers me back to a staging of this confrontation. It is hardly fanciful to relate my father’s account as a passing moment where he performed, again, a masterful way of knowing that appeared fair, and recognised merit, whilst embodying what Aileen Moreton-Robinson calls ‘the possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty’. This logic is a way of knowing that "operates to discriminate in favour of itself, ensuring it protects and maintains its interest by the continuing denial and exclusion of Indigenous sovereignty” (2004a, p. 7). In taking up the project of writing about my father in this paper I assume the prerogative of telling my father’s story in ways that turn it towards the other, that take seriously the responsibility to engage with Indigenous sovereignty, even in the face of my memory of his unwillingness to turn.

Virtue

It is not that relationships between Kurnai and white people in Gippsland were all of a kind. As well as documenting the likes of Len Rule, Philip Pepper writes with fondness of and loyalty towards some of the white men who worked at Lake Tyers and others who employed him and other Indigenous people off the station. Clearly relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people have been
complex. Some Indigenous men worked, like my father, in the timber industry. Philip Pepper writes about working “cuttin timber” outside Orbost during the Depression (1980, p. 88). From 1939 until the early 1960s a community of Indigenous people lived at Jackson’s Track, outside Drouin, to the west of Heyfield. This was land owned and worked by two white men, the Tonkin brothers, who employed Indigenous men in falling timber and at their mill, a mutually satisfactory arrangement (Landon & Tonkin, 2000). Sue Feary’s research into Indigenous engagement in forestry on the south coast of New South Wales indicates that “during the 1950s and 1960s ... forestry was a major employer of Aboriginal people, in the sawmills and as fellers in the forests” (2008, p. 269). Many Koori men remembered it as preferable employment because it was not fraught with the racism and discrimination that characterised other kinds of (farm) employment open to Indigenous people in the area. Whether this situation was also true for Indigenous peoples living further south, in Gippsland, I do not know (there I go again).

I have no evidence (and again) from the various histories of Kurnai people, or from family memories, that my father ever worked with or employed Indigenous men. Whoever he employed, I have always thought that my father would be a good boss. He thought this too. I remember one morning in the years when my mother was still alive, but demented and living in an aged care facility, my father telling me and the woman who came to clean the house one morning a week, that fairness and even-handed-ness were the main principles of being a good manager. I cannot remember how this had become a matter of conversation but it was the kind of thing he would like to talk about, the kind of wisdom he liked to share, and he told the story with reference to his years as boss at the mill in Heyfield. We must have both then walked down to the place where my mother lived in time for lunch. Mealtimes in the dining room, with a group of people in varying stages of dementia, were often hard to organise but on this occasion there was an extra problem—not enough lunch had been delivered from the kitchen. My father and I sat down at the table with my mother and five other residents. When only one plate of sandwiches arrived at our table I was startled when my father grabbed it and placed it in front of my mother, for her alone. What of the fairness and even-handed-ness of the earlier part of the morning? If nothing else this incident confronted me with the gap between his public pronouncements and his actions in favouring those he cared for the most.

Fair or not, during the 1950s in Heyfield my father was a leading figure in the Gippsland timber industry and in local community affairs. After nine years in Heyfield he left for Launceston, to become general manager at a timber mill owned by the same company that owned the Gippsland business, Alstergren Pty Ltd. On our family’s departure the owner of the company, Mr Alstergren sent my father a letter to mark this career move:

> In thinking over the period of your service with us, I am mindful of the great development which has occurred at Heyfield both as a sawmilling centre and as a Victorian town. Heyfield has grown enormously over the period and I am pleased to remember that you and Mrs Baird were among its leading citizens. I am keen at all times for our Managers to establish themselves as leaders in the community because this puts our organization in the position to which its importance entitles it. I look forward to you becoming leading citizens of Launceston. (1959)
This letter, declaring both my parents ‘leading citizens’ in Heyfield, was written just a few days after my first birthday. It makes clear that it wasn’t (or wasn’t only) that my Dad was a good person—intelligent, hard-working, civic-minded, that made him a leading citizen. This was part of a larger plan for a big company in the timber industry.

In Heyfield, a small part of a big national picture, my parents represented a local managerial class. Mr Alstergren’s sense of entitlement for his managers speaks of a class politics but it is also a racial politics. Aileen Moreton-Robinson has argued that the concern expressed by Keith Windschuttle and other conservative warriors in ‘the history wars’ of the late 1990s and early 2000s was about shoring up this entitlement. She argues that the desire that white men be regarded as “the instigators of history, responsible for making the decisions establishing our political, economic, legal and cultural systems” (2004b, p. 225) motivated Windschuttle’s position. My parents’ capacity to become leading citizens was an effect of their classed and raced position. The regard in which they were held then leaves its social and psychic mark on them and their family—on me. I grew up as the daughter of a ‘leading citizen’ in a small timber-milling community, then in a bigger regional city. Amongst other things I inherited a confident belief in my parents’ goodness—indeed of being ‘leading citizen’ material myself. But, like my repetition of ‘I do not now’, this confidence now also wears thin.

I have focused on my father’s historical place as a white man in Gippsland where he arrived on an upward career trajectory. His departure for Launceston at the end of the 1950s continued his/our economic and social advancement. As for me—I was born there but did not grow up there. Heyfield is a name in my story of myself but not a place marked by personal memories. But then there do not have to be personal memories to signify my debt to Heyfield. This became clear when well into my thirties I unearthed a Spirax scrapbook from the back of the top shelf of the linen press at my parents’ home. It contained eighty mostly pink cards that were sent to my parents when I was born—cards titled ‘A Baby Girl! How Wonderful’, ‘A Royal Welcome to the New Baby’—that sort of thing. I was not simply born in Heyfield but Heyfield names the place where my birth was celebrated by a whole community. As Greta Bird writes “to be born into whiteness ... is to have your birth celebrated by the nation and your death mourned” (Bird, 2008, p. 2). Quoting Judith Butler she goes on “in contrast, to be born Aboriginal is to be constituted as ‘less than human, without entitlement to rights, as humanly unrecognisable’” (Butler, as cited in Bird, 2008, p. 2).

But this is not only a story of Heyfield or even of Australia. Neither mine nor my father’s place, materially or in its imagined entitlements, has been constrained by the borders of the Australian nation state. Goldie Osuri and Bobby Bannerjee coin the term ‘white diaspora’ to describe those people in Australia more commonly referred to as ‘settlers’. The idea of a white diaspora “provides a space for the analysis of the diasporic relationships that are drawn on in times of crisis” (Osuri & Bannerjee, 2004, p. 159). Osuri and Bannerjee discuss the crisis prompted by the attacks on the world trade centre towers in New York in 2001 and the subsequent localised Australian responses to this ‘global media event’. I want to place my father, and our family, in this white diaspora at a time of a previous historically small but, for my mother, father and I, significant moment of crisis. In July 1966 my father resigned from his position as General Manager...
of Kilndried Timber Industries Limited in Launceston terminating a sixteen year association with Alstergren Pty Ltd. I think this was because of disagreements with the Board of Directors of the company. The upshot was that Mum and Dad and I moved from Launceston back to the mainland. When he resigned he must have sent letters to various men with whom he had done business over his seven years in Launceston because I have several letters sent to him in reply. Two came from London. One letter starts:

I am dreadfully sorry to read that you resigned from the Company at the end of last month. This, as you will appreciate, has come as a great surprise and I read it with the greatest regret because I enjoyed the business we were able to do together and I also set great store by your personal friendship during this Association which, after all, is so frightfully important when one is sitting at opposite ends of the world trying to run a business. I shall be going out to Australia early next year and I sincerely hope that I shall have the opportunity of seeing you when I am in Launceston. (Fuglesang, 1966, emphasis added)

I can only imagine that at the time they were read by him these letters from men in London may have provided my father some comfort. As significantly, through several interstate moves, for a period of thirty-five years, my father kept them and several other letters sent to him at this time, some of them solicited references that testify to his honesty and integrity. The letters document not only my father’s location in the transnational economic relations of empire but also in its homo-social affective economies of recognition and praise among peers, relations which in turn underpin significant economic benefit.

**Possession**

The existence of this small collection of papers which offer some kind of insight into what was important to my father is an artefact of the privilege associated with the material capacity to keep things, and then to know things because of those possessions. By contrast, Phillip Pepper’s stories of Indigenous people living in Gippsland until the 1980s are full of people being turfed off the mission or living in inadequate housing, not circumstances conducive to keeping personal treasures. And more generally, as Pauline Mullett told the Drouin crowd in 2000, Indigenous people’s cultural artefacts were deliberately withheld from them (Landon, 2006, p. 07.1).

In her book *Finding Ullagundahi Island* Fabienne Bayet-Charlton writes about the difficulty she had in accessing resources to assist in the tracing of her Indigenous family history (the book is not an autobiography, or a family history—Bayet-Charlton writes “it’s a story of dispossession if anything” [Bayet-Charlton, 2002, unpaginated front page]). The scene in the library at the Aboriginal and Islander Studies Institute in Canberra where the librarian explains why she cannot have access to a 1959 PhD about her grandfather’s Bandjalang people is told like a farce. Explaining that it is “institute policy not to release personal and/or potentially sensitive material to the general public without the author’s permission” the librarian enacts the cruelty of colonial relations of knowledge that have governed Australia, in all their absurdity. Fabienne replies “but I’m not the general public! That’s my grandfather’s community there! It’s information about my immediate family”. The librarian replies “that’s exactly why you can’t have it” (Bayet-Charlton, 2002, pp. 155-56, original emphasis). Because this is a
farce, as well as a tragedy, the story ends with Fabienne’s “pale-face” (Bayet-
Charlton, 2002, p. 157) boyfriend doing some illicit photocopying as well as with
her tears of frustration at the overwhelming task of confronting dispossession,
again and again, just so she can write her family history.

My final story concerns generosity. An abiding image of my parents is that they
were both kind and generous people who helped out others, including those less
fortunate than themselves, as the phrase goes. While there is much in my
father’s, and my mother’s, long history of voluntary work in community
organisations, for example, that justifies this view, I now write this memory alert
to what it may occlude as well as affirm. When my nephew and I and our
respective partners cleared out my father’s home when it was finally sold in mid-
2001 we found a letter from the new owners, recently arrived refugees from
Kosovo, left for us on the kitchen bench. It was hand written, in pencil, in poor
but readable English, asking that we leave anything behind in the house that we
did not want because they had nothing. It began “Dear Owner” and concluded
politely, perhaps optimistically, “Thank You”. My nephew and I would have left
everything but my father was unmoved by this request. Where was the
compassion and generosity I had always imagined my parents to embody? I
pondered for some time whether I had imagined my father to be much more
generous than he really was; whether it was only my mother who had been the
kind and generous good neighbour; whether old age, ill health, grief over the
loss of my mother and the diminished social circumstances of being semi-
institutionalised in an aged care hostel had worn away at my father’s generosity;
perhaps he was just stubbornly annoyed at my nephew and I telling him what to
do.

My idea of him demanded that he should give his possessions to a refugee
family. But I was not confronted with any anxiety about money that may have
played on his mind. And perhaps never really cognisant of the realities of the
second hand furniture market, he was ignorant of the fact that the lifetime
household possessions of even a middle class family home are, in the end, worth
very little if, indeed, you can find anyone to buy them. In any case, I no longer
feel so confident or qualified to rely on my idea of my father’s generosity as a
guarantee of my own goodness. My confidence that my father was generous to
me and to other family members still holds but I had thought that his paternal
care and protection was not limited only to us.

Or was it that I had thought that his white paternalism should be extended to
all? Because it was my sense of self that was at stake here. Even in his last years
when he was negotiating a significant loss of the personal power that had been
his to wield through most of his adult life I wanted him to be the Good White
Father. It is pertinent of course that those household possessions were not mine
to give, nor his life mine to direct. In insisting on my investment in him as the
White Father I was reproducing the cultural habit—of thinking I could take from
others in order to bolster myself, that founds our nation. And take not just their
possessions but their self-determination too.

**Conclusion—turning towards others**
I have considered a key relationship, and an intimate one at that, which provides some of the sticky glue that holds together and reproduces patriarchal white sovereignty in Australia. In taking it upon myself to tell my father’s story, and so my own, contrary to the way such stories are imagined in dominant narratives, I have tried to intervene in dominant discourses of race and gender to bring unstuck some of this holding together. The point is to disengage from the colonial history that mandates a lack of knowledge, lack of memory, defence of the white Father and the performance of the dutiful white daughter. I have pondered what my father knew, and what I know, about ourselves and our history, and about Indigenous people. Turning towards others is to put this knowledge and ignorance in relation to what ‘they’ know about ‘us’ and about this country. What, for example, would the Kurnai people have thought of us—a white family passing through and living on their country in the 1950s? What would they have thought of our sense of entitlement to virtue?

Given that I have located my father’s story in Heyfield, and that this is my place of birth, it seems apt to conclude with news from Gippsland. In 2010, ten years since first making their claim, “Gippsland’s Gunaikurnai Aboriginal people have been granted native title over land stretching from Warragul to the Snowy River” (Rood, 2010, p. 10). They will “jointly manage 10 parks in Gippsland in a traditional-owner management board” (Rood, 2010, p. 10). Notwithstanding the importance here of access to white man’s justice, there is a truth that preexists this ruling, whether or not my father or I grasp it. This truth will exist after the native title ruling too. “The Kurnai are people who, unlike many others, have never been moved off Country” (Landon, 2006, p. 09.6). The Age news item, from where I draw this information, quotes elder Albert Mullett saying “we share our joy and relief for the justice that this ruling gives to our people with many Gunaikurnai elders who have passed away during our long struggle” (Rood, 2010).

As Albert Mullett turns to his Gunaikurnai elders, so can I, albeit from a different position. My father’s time has passed but in taking it upon myself to tell his story, and so mine, in a way that turns to Kurnai and other Indigenous people, I can change the nature of his story, how he is remembered, and his legacy. Setting out on her psychoanalytic exploration of fathers and daughters Adrienne Harris states “no fathers without daughters, no daughters without fathers, provided”, she explains, “we let these terms float and move” (2009, p. 190). Telling my father’s story in relation to Indigenous sovereignty sets the conventional gendered and raced moorings of the white father-daughter pairing scarily adrift but turning to others in this telling of the story of my white father and I is a necessary move towards justice.

**Author Note**

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References


Stuart Hall: Reflections on a Legacy

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Following the death of Stuart Hall in February 2014, this paper looks back at the development of his thinking on race and ethnicity and his contribution to the field of critical race studies. Drawing on material from the author’s wider project on the history of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), it examines the emergence of race as a subject of inquiry at the Birmingham Centre and shows how this prepared the ground for Hall’s influential work on identity in the 1980s and 1990s.

Keywords: Stuart Hall, race, cultural studies

In March 2014, a month after the death of Stuart Hall, I chaired a screening at the University of Birmingham of The Stuart Hall Project (2014), John Akomfrah’s documentary exploring Hall’s early experiences and development into one of Britain’s foremost public intellectuals. The news of Hall’s death had given the film an extra sense of poignancy and, in the discussion that followed the screening, an argument broke out over the nature of Hall’s legacy. Wilfried van der Will, a retired Professor of German Studies at Birmingham who had known Hall in the 1970s, wondered whether the film’s portrayal of Hall as an outsider downplayed the extent to which he had actually become part of the establishment—after all, Hall had been employed in the academy for more than three decades, was the face of numerous BBC television programmes and in 2000 had even appeared on that exemplar of British cultural respectability, Desert Island Disks. But to Marcel Skully, a middle-aged man who had immigrated to Birmingham from Jamaica in the late-1950s, such a portrayal of Hall was wildly inaccurate. Skully recalled how in the 1970s Hall would visit Handsworth, one of the most ethnically diverse areas of the city, to talk with local black political groups about civil rights and the Black Power Movement. He argued that in spite of his public visibility, Hall’s politics, ethnicity and status as one of the ‘Windrush’ generation of immigrants to the United Kingdom made him a perennial outsider to the British establishment—and his achievements were all the more remarkable because of this fact.

Following the news of Hall’s death, Skully had, along with others in Handsworth,
established a new political grouping under the banner of the 'Stuart Hall Alliance', the aim of which was to reflect on the ongoing significance of Hall’s work for black politics in Britain.

The disagreement was a reminder of just how many Stuart Halls there are, something further illustrated by the range of figures who paid tribute to Hall following his death. This included Tariq Ali, the veteran political activist and contemporary of Hall’s on the British New Left in the 1950s; Suzanne Moore, the feminist columnist who worked with Hall in the 1980s on the political magazine, *Marxism Today*; Owen Jones, part of a new generation of British socialists and the author of *Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class* (2012); and the black British Labour MPs Diane Abbott and David Lammy, for whom Hall’s critiques of ‘Thatcherism’ (a term that he himself coined) during the 1980s were a foundational influence. Throughout his career Hall was particularly inspired by Gramsci’s notion of the “organic intellectual” (1971, p. 5), an engaged thinker who attempts to retain a firm connection to the world beyond the academic ivory tower. The number of tributes paid to Hall’s life and work in recent months is an illustration of just how far his influence reached.

Most recently my own Hall has been the Hall who was a pivotal driver behind the early moves to establish cultural studies as a field of academic inquiry in Britain. I have been working on a project that marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) by Richard Hoggart, who conceived of the Centre as a way of expanding on the analysis into popular culture he had begun in *The Uses of Literacy* (1957). One of Hoggart’s first decisions was to appoint Hall as his deputy at the Centre, and within five years Hall had succeeded him as CCCS director. The move helped initiate a self-conscious attempt to embrace the democratic principles of the 1968 student protest movement, in which Hall and many of his collaborators at CCCS were active players. The CCCS subsequently embarked on a politicised experiment into alternative, collective ways of doing academic research. Hall attempted to renounce his position as leader and open up decisions about the curriculum and running of CCCS to the students. The aim, he reflected at the time, was “nothing less than the creation … of a collective—an intellectual foco: a sort of advanced base” (1971, p. 9).

This emphasis on collectivity ultimately helped to make race an increasingly central topic of study, for both Hall and the CCCS. Speaking at a conference on cultural studies in 1990, Hall described the identity politics of race and gender has having ‘interrupted’ the cultural studies project. As is widely known, Hall’s relationship to feminism was often highly fraught, but Hall also characterised the emergence of questions of race in the Centre as a “struggle” to find the “necessary theoretical and political space … in which to work” (1992, p. 283). Race was confronted late in the day at the CCCS, particularly given the civil rights movement in the United States, the political mobilisation of black communities in Britain following the disturbances of the late-1950s and the intervention of Enoch Powell ten years later.1 It was first explored in the in the

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1 In 1968 the Conservative MP Enoch Powell delivered what became known as his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech at a hotel in Birmingham. Powell warned that the presence of black immigrants in Britain would lead to violence on the streets, and advocated a policy of voluntary repatriation. Powell was subsequently sacked from the Conservative Shadow
shape of Critcher et al.’s *Race in the Provincial Press* (1975) and the much more widely-known *Policing the Crisis* (1978), co-authored by Hall and four postgraduate students at the Centre. If the former was a straightforward analysis into the ways in which local newspapers ‘framed’ black and Asian communities in Britain, the latter expanded on it significantly to show how the growing ‘moral panic’ over black criminality and violence was as a result of a much more fundamental ‘crisis in hegemony’ in Britain following the break-up of the post-war, social-democratic consensus. Race, Hall and his fellow authors argued, became the prism through which this ‘crisis’ was viewed. Anxieties about permissiveness, economic decline and youth were transposed onto the figure of black ‘mugger’ who prowled the inner-city’s ‘mean streets’.

This turn to race was the product of the Centre’s political commitment to grassroots community politics in areas like Handsworth, but it would not be until a later generation began studying at the Centre that race began to be articulated as a form of identity politics. It is significant, for example, that aside from Hall, *Policing the Crisis* was written by white authors, a fact that was not flagged as a possible problem in the original text. This was indeed a generational issue. As Hall recently reflected in an interview, the Centre had a problem recruiting “black students in higher education, doing our kind of work ... who had got good enough results in their undergraduate degrees, to get money to study as an undergraduate or at a postgraduate level” (22 August, 2013).² It was not until the late-1970s, when figures such as Hazel Carby, Paul Gilroy and Errol Lawrence enrolled as postgraduates at the Centre, that such a cohort became available and would go on to produce key works such as the collectively-authored *The Empire Strikes Back* (1982) and Gilroy’s own *There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack* (1987). This generation sought to move beyond a literature on race in Britain that was dominated by white sociologists who were seen to pathologise black subjects to the point of stigmatisation—something that would lead to a public falling out with John Rex, one of Britain’s most prominent white sociologist of ‘race relations’ (see Lawrence, 1982).

As with the feminist group of researchers active in the Centre at this time, the relationship between Gilroy’s generation and Hall was sometimes ambivalent. Hall found it increasingly difficult to respond to the demands of each new cohort of students, and the emergence of what became known as the ‘race and politics’ research group coincided with Hall’s eventual decision to leave Birmingham to take up the position of Professor of Sociology at the Open University in 1979. But Hall later reflected on the Centre’s developing work on race as marking a “decisive turn in my own theoretical and intellectual work” (1992, p. 283). There were, of course, concurrences. The analyses of Thatcherism Hall undertook in the 1980s alongside Martin Jacques and others associated with *Marxism Today* certainly developed many of the themes that were articulated in *Policing the Crisis*. But his work began to move away from the issues of representation and ideology and towards the subject of identity. An important marker was Hall’s ‘New Ethnicities’ essay (1989), in which Hall attempted to articulate the key features of what he identified as a “new phase” of black politics and cultural

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² The interview was conducted by the author in summer 2013 as part of a wider project on the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies.
identities in Britain, based on “the end of the innocent notion of the essential black subject” (1989, p. 442). In both this and later essays, Hall’s aim was to initiate a departure from Gayatri Spivak’s notion of ‘strategic essentialism’ and make room for representations of black identities—in political, cultural and artistic discourse—that allowed for ambivalence, desire and diversity. This was, in a sense, the other side to Hall’s earlier interventions on race, which focussed on how race functioned ideologically as a means of the state ‘winning consent’ in the context of the ‘crisis in hegemony’ and ‘politics of Thatcherism’. Hall was developing a conception of identity as something that was forever in process, a complex, ‘unfinished conversation’ between representation, considerations of masculinity, femininity and sexuality and what the historian Eric Hobsbawm termed the “invention of traditions” (1983, p.1).

Like almost all of Hall’s interventions over the course of his life and career, these ideas were generated in dialogue with others. If Hall’s early endeavours to develop cultural studies came as a result of dynamic, sometimes fraught collaborations with postgraduate students within the CCCS, his work on race in the 1980s and 1990s was developed in conversation with those outside the academy, particularly an emergent generation of black artists who were attempting to use their practices to articulate their diverse experiences as the British-born children of migrants. This included Akomfrah’s breakthrough film with the Black Audio Film Collective, *Handsworth Songs* (1986), Martina Attille’s *Dreaming Rivers* (1988), and Maureen Blackwood and Isaac Julien’s *Passion of Remembrance* (1986). Hall acted as an informal advisor in the making of many of these films, and the artists behind them often saw themselves as building on the cultural studies project in order to develop their own take on the subject of race in contemporary Britain. As Julien (2014) reflected, Hall’s work had “an immeasurable influence on the first films that we made; our [work] was only was really possible through the efforts which had been, as it were, initiated in CCCS.”

After the screening of *The Stuart Hall Project* in Birmingham I interviewed Skully about the influence that Hall’s work had on the community politics that Skully has been involved in since his arrival in Britain from Jamaica in 1959. Skully was keen to highlight what he described as the “interchange between us and him” in Handsworth and districts like it (2014). Those of his generation gravitated towards Hall, he recalled, because he was a “black brother”, one of the few black commentators visible in Britain at this time. This perhaps underplayed the ambivalence Hall felt about his own ethnicity, detailed in *The Stuart Hall Project* and in an interview I recently conducted with him shortly before his death. Hall grew up as part of a middle-class family in Jamaica, he recalled in Akomfrah’s film, “part Scottish, part African, part Portuguese-Jew”. His family were aspirational, and, he told me, wanted Hall to be “a good, middle class Jamaican boy” and contribute to the administration of Jamaican society once British colonialism finally came to an end. But Hall, he recalled, “could not stand it”. On the one hand he felt alienated from his family, in part as a result of being darker in skin tone than many of them. Yet on the other hand, neither was he of black, working class Jamaica. Hall’s “whole social formation”, he reflected, “had led me exactly to this unresolved point: ‘Who are you? Where are you from?’”

Hall eluded this question temporarily by leaving Jamaica for Britain, and in light of his subsequent trajectory—Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford, editorship of the *New Left Review*, Director of the CCCS, Professor of Sociology and ultimately a
guest on *Desert Island Disks*—it is easy to see why van der Will wanted to foreground Hall as an insider as well as an outsider. In a sense, both Skully and van der Will were right. Hall was an ‘insider-outsider’ and it was this positionality that propelled his intellectual work throughout his career. If his position as an outsider enabled him to see the possibilities of the unorthodox project of cultural studies at Birmingham, his reputation and increasingly prominent public standing enabled him to facilitate a collectivity that allowed the room that a new generation of black scholars needed to operate. Somewhat paradoxically, it was only after Hall left the CCCS and had become further established in the British academy that he could begin to resolve his own ambivalence over the question of “who are you?”

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The epistemology that maintains white race privilege, power and control of indigenous studies and indigenous peoples’ participation in universities

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This article represents my attempt to turn the gaze and demonstrate how Indigenous Studies is controlled in some Australian universities in ways that witness Indigenous peoples being further marginalised, denigrated and exploited. I have endeavoured to do this through sharing an experience as a case study. I have opted to write about it as a way of exposing the problematic nature of racism, systemic marginalisation, white race privilege and racialised subjectivity played out within an Australian higher education institution and because I am dissatisfied with the on-going status quo. In bringing forth analysis of this case study, I reveal the relationships between oppression, white race privilege and institutional privilege and the epistemology that maintains them. In moving from the position of being silent on this experience to speaking about it, I am able to move from the position of object to subject and to gain a form of liberated voice (hooks, 1989, p. 9). Furthermore, I am hopeful that it will encourage others to examine their own practices within universities and to challenge the domination that continues to subjugate Indigenous peoples.

Keywords: privilege, curriculum, universities, knowledge, epistemology

Introduction

Indigenous Studies in Australia and indeed the world has witnessed a growth across all levels of education over the past twenty years (Grieves, 2008; Gunstone, 2008; Moreton-Robinson, 2005a). The term Indigenous Studies within this article refers to content which encapsulates Australian Aboriginal Studies and/or Torres Strait Islander Studies (Nakata, 2006, p. 265) and studies that may include references to Indigenous peoples in other geographic localities.
Once located within anthropology and history, Indigenous Studies may now be found, taught and researched within all faculties in a university and across numerous disciplines including health, education, politics, law, geography, environmental science and business (Moreton-Robinson, 2005a). It is now a cross-disciplinary endeavour and seemingly is a site of collection and redistribution of knowledge about Indigenous people (Brady, 1997; Nakata, 2006). Andrew Gunstone in his recent discussion paper on Indigenous Studies explains that in the current climate Australian institutions are:

> urged that the teaching of Australian Indigenous Studies must involve Indigenous people in curriculum development and delivery of Australian Indigenous Studies; this involvement should not just occur for the purpose of increasing the number and diversity of the voices heard, but rather should also occur to address issues of power, governance and control of what is being studied and taught. (2008, p. xxi)

Martin Nakata, focusing on Indigenous scholarly involvement within Indigenous Studies, states that “underpinning Indigenous academic involvement in Indigenous Studies is a definite commitment to Indigenous people first and foremost, not to the intellectual or academic issues alone” (2006, p. 266). In other words, Indigenous people must be involved in Indigenous Studies and the programs must address Indigenous peoples’ issues and the systemic power inequalities and white hegemony in the academy. Indigenous people have been involved at a number of universities where there are initiatives to embed Indigenous perspectives in the curriculum (Hart, 2003; Nakata, 2004; Phillips, 2003; Phillips & Lampert, 2005). There have additionally been on-going discussions and forums, workshops and conference sessions on the colonising practices of western research methodologies and the call for Indigenous methodologies which challenge the imperial basis of western knowledge and the images of Indigenous ‘Others’ (Smith, 1999, 2005). In response to these discussions, presentations and papers, Aileen Moreton-Robinson (Queensland University of Technology) and Maggie Walter (University of Tasmania) have developed a Postgraduate Masterclass Program in Indigenous Research Methodologies that moves beyond critiques of Western research paradigms to defining and explaining Indigenous methodologies that are accountable to Indigenous communities. The Masterclass was offered in 2006, 2007 and 2008.¹ The suggestions and strategies put forward for Indigenous Studies and the on-going discussions across numerous Australian universities have also been coupled with the development of official university documents in the form of Reconciliation Statements, Welcome to Country or Acknowledgement to Country offerings, Indigenous recruitment or employment strategies and university wide anti-racism and anti-discrimination policies and procedures.

With all of this activity in universities in terms of official documents, one could be lead to believe that there has been a dramatic change in how Indigenous Studies, Indigenous epistemologies and Indigenous peoples are regarded. How is it, then, that being an Indigenous person within the academy can be explained by Jean Phillips (2003, p. 3) as an “on-going struggle against colonial domination” and described by Deborah Miranda as “a heartbreaking endeavour” (2003, p. 344)? Miranda in discussing the position of Indigenous academics in the United States of America states that some have become:

¹ For details see isrn@qut.edu.au and www.isrn.qut.edu.au
disgusted and exhausted by the constant battles; some have graduated with degrees only to find that non-Native scholars fill many of the positions in Native Studies; others have simply turned their tremendous gifts and energies in other directions, discounting the university as a place with potential to make a difference. (2003, p. 344)

Her position resonates with the words of Victor Hart an Indigenous Australian, when he states that our lectures are “about unpacking and exorcising the everyday, garden variety racisms that the majority of white Australians bring consciously and unconsciously to learning” and that we find ourselves increasingly “in ideological wars where fidelity to the struggle is being tested by mostly neo-conservative non-Aboriginal notions of liberation” (2003, pp. 13-14). Others such as Phillips (2003) also see universities as sites of growth and change for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. Personally, even though I know that our experiences as Indigenous people within universities often reflect the experiences we have as Indigenous people in broader society, I still get surprised and angry when it is other academics who espouse notions of justice and equity with whom we experience tension and conflict in asserting our rights and cultural values.

In this article I demonstrate how the racism and the devaluing of Indigenous people is less bloody than in earlier Australian history but is still perpetuated by non-Indigenous people with privilege and power, including academics who have control of Indigenous Studies and who can demonstrate an understanding of what hooks terms “book knowledge” (1994, p. 16). In particular, I explore how social control and cultural dominance operate, and are deployed in interracial relations and subject positions within universities which continue to marginalise and oppress Indigenous peoples. This will be done through presenting an experience as a case study and analysing it utilising critical race theory and whiteness studies. I wish to name my experience and raise objection to the practices as described in this paper in an attempt to move from the position of being silent to speaking about it in an attempt to interrupt white privilege and to reject the paradigm of control and certainty (White & Sakiestewa, 2003). I seek to move from the position of object to subject and to gain a form of liberated voice (hooks, 1989). I encourage others to examine their own practices within universities because as Devon Mihesuah asks: “if we do not take charge and create strategies for empowerment, who will?” (2003, p. 326).

**Setting the scene for ‘inclusion’**

In September 2005 I was invited to join an academic panel that would review an Australian university’s courses in the field of Indigenous Studies. Initially I said yes to the invitation thinking that it was a respectful recognition of what I could bring to the review and that it was a genuine gesture of inclusion. The following week I received a letter (dated 26 September 2005) thanking me for accepting the invitation and providing information relating to the membership of the review panel; a schedule for the two day face-to-face meeting (October 17-18, 2005); copies of the course study guides and all the resource material; a copy of the university’s graduate attributes guidelines; and a copy of the university’s generic skills guidelines. Based on the materials and the terms of reference, I anticipated
that it would take two to three days of preparation work if I was going to be actively engaged with the curriculum materials. This coupled with the two-day workshop equalled approximately five days of work.

Pamela Croft then contacted me and made me aware that she was also invited to be a member of the review panel. Pamela is another Aboriginal woman and holds a Professional Doctorate in Visual Arts (DVA, see Croft, 2003). Pamela advised me that the university was not offering any payment for our work nor was it prepared to offer any other benefits that they may have been able to offer. At that time I was not employed and was a registered recipient of unemployment benefits. I was living on $220 a week. Pamela was self-employed. We could therefore not participate without personally incurring costs. The costs included declining other work that may have come up for me that week and travelling to and from that university. I made contact with the university-based academic who originally rang me and discussed the matter. I was told that no payment would be offered. However, lunch, morning tea and afternoon tea would be provided each day as well as dinner on the first evening. I was made to feel like I was “money hungry” despite gifting my time freely in the past to a number of universities for educational activities and events. I believed what was being asked of me in this instance was too great without attributing a remunerative value or any form of reciprocity. That is, the gift that I was asked to provide was too great to ask for considering that there was no developed relationship of hospitality or reciprocity (Kuokkanen, 2003). From Kuokkanen’s (2007) perspective it is also the continued taking for granted that limits the development of hospitality between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. In this case, I believe I was being taken for granted.

Turning now to the other people listed as members of the review team. Of the ten names on the review team, seven belonged to people working for the university conducting the review. From this, six were non-Indigenous people. This included two women, one with qualifications in education and the other with qualifications in nursing and education. There were four men who collectively had qualifications in humanities, psychology and sociology. Among this seven, there was one Indigenous man who was working in the Indigenous centre of that university. He was also formally enrolled in a research higher degree program in that university and one of the non-Indigenous men on the review panel was one of his research supervisors. There was one Indigenous man from a university in another part of Australia also listed as a member of the review panel. He had qualifications in education and also worked within an Indigenous centre. There were additionally two Indigenous women’s names on the list, Pamela’s and mine.

In relation to the Indigenous Studies content, three of the non-Indigenous men had mixed responsibilities for the Indigenous courses/subjects/modules, that is, coordinating the major and individual courses or being a contact person. Two of these have received grant monies, researched and written in the field of Indigenous Studies. The Indigenous man on the review panel who was employed in that university does not have any responsibility for the Indigenous Studies courses and as already stated is based in the Indigenous centre of that university where Indigenous student support and Indigenous tertiary preparation programs are provided. This university is not, as explained by Nakata, a place where Indigenous Studies programs are “Indigenous run, managed and taught” or “increasingly under the nominal authority or management of Indigenous
academics” (2004, p. 5). It is, as Hart asserts, “within the domain of mostly non-Aboriginal academics” and where they can be in a “whole series of relationships with Aboriginality without ever losing the relative upper hand” (2003, pp. 14-15). In this regard, this university has failed to do what Gunstone explains they need to do, which is “address issues of power, governance and control of what is being studied and taught” (2008, p. xxi). Lastly, as seven of the people were employed and based within that university and their wages were covered by that university they were remunerated while they participated in the review. Some in this group were also tenured employees.

**Beginning to dissect ‘inclusion’**

Within this university, non-Indigenous people are remunerated to talk about Indigenous peoples, cultures, knowledges and histories and to gauge how much knowledge and understanding others will gain about Indigenous people. As such they hold what is considered “legitimate knowledge” that underpins and maintains their power within the university (Alfred, 2004; Henderson, 2000; Martin, 2003; Smith, 1999). The people that clearly owned Indigenous Studies within this university were non-Indigenous people. As will be demonstrated, the processes of the review and the terms in which Pamela and I were invited to participate excluded us from holding any form of ownership, even temporarily, and would lead to what Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2005b) would describe as a further investment in the white possession of Indigenous Studies in that university. Had I participated in the review under the conditions set down for me, it would have maintained the discrepancies of power and control between the paid non-Indigenous employees on the panel who talk about, write about and who are given authority to control information within the university about Indigenous people, and the authentic Indigenous voices of Indigenous women who were offered no value other than what Marcelle Gareau (2003, p. 197) calls a “targeted resource” and Shahnaz Khan (2005, p. 2025) terms a “native informant”. We would be undertaking this position in order to legitimate the academic processes of non-Indigenous people. This amounts to a recycling of the colonial power gained through colonisation and a distinct difference between those with institutional privilege and those without. Indigenous Studies and Indigenous people are objectified and reproduced as objects within this context and are what Moreton-Robinson (2008) would term ‘epistemological possessions’ of the non-Indigenous people involved in the review and by this university. I also noted that what was spoken of, as a form of gift or thanks by the contact person, was food, which in fact resonated as a reminder of the past as if food rations were being offered from the coloniser to the colonised (Rintoul, 1993). In short, my participation without payment would have affirmed “white domination and economic success at the cost of racial and economic oppression” (Moreton-Robinson, 2005b, p. 26).

Through my telephone discussion with the university-based academic who had originally contacted me, and on critical reflection, I knew that Pamela and I were being expected to give our knowledge, skills and abilities in Indigenous Studies for ‘our people’ based on ‘goodwill’, ‘community service’ and for ‘white people who wanted to learn about us’. The university staff involved had based our possible participation on their epistemological framework of us as Indigenous women with doctoral postgraduate qualifications (Croft, 2003; Fredericks, 2003).
Our possible participation was constructed through our Indigenous embodiment as racial and gendered objects and based on their desire for us to be the Indigenous ‘Other’, albeit with doctoral qualifications: the symbols of attainment and credentials of the academy. We were defined as both subject and object through our Aboriginality and offered a positioning of subjugation and subordination. From the review team’s perspective this is what would add value to the review and provide legitimacy and advantage to the university and the non-Indigenous people. The non-Indigenous people were positioned as the experts and knowers and offered the on-going positioning of authority, legitimacy, domination and control. We were being asked to perform the role of female Indigenous academics who would be used to service the non-Indigenous academics in the same way that Indigenous people were required to service non-Indigenous people in colonial history (Huggins, 1989; Rintoul, 1993). As explained by Moreton-Robinson, placing us in such a service relationship also positions our Aboriginality “as an epistemological possession to service what it is not” and to “obscure the more complex way that white possession functions socio-discursively through subjectivity and knowledge production” (2008, p. 86). It also diverts our attention from our own and community priorities to the priorities of the dominant society. The situation represented a form of identity politics that is rooted in Australian colonial history and that has contributed to the ongoing historical, legal and political racialisation and marginalisation of Indigenous peoples.

If it was only our “authentic” Aboriginality that the university wanted, then other Aboriginal women would have been asked—for example, Elders, Traditional Owner representatives, leaders in specific fields or community members from the community in which that university is physically located. If it was our qualifications in terms of our disciplines then we would also not have been included because, in other circumstances, staff in that university have explained that I could not work within the field of Indigenous Studies because I did not have an “academic pedigree” (Deloria, 2004, p. 25) in Indigenous Studies. That is, I had not undertaken an Indigenous Studies major in my undergraduate or postgraduate studies. This is despite undertaking scholarly work in the field within health and education and being recognised in the field by being granted a National and Medical Research Council (NH&MRC) Post-Doctoral Research Award in Indigenous Health (2006); a Visiting Fellow position in Indigenous Studies in another university (2007); and membership of the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS, 2008).

**Saying no**

What I have been told in the past, and the evidence associated with the review, is riddled with contradictions considering that not all the people currently responsible for Indigenous Studies in that university have qualifications in the field of Indigenous Studies. Somehow in this instance and in others, non-Indigenous people are able to undertake a process of metamorphosis, which allows them to teach within the Indigenous Studies domain and maintain the artificial barriers that continue the racism in academia (Galvan, 2003). All the while they are able to develop and grow their academic curriculum vitae to prove their worthiness to teach Indigenous Studies. Moreover, the whole argument that ‘you don’t have to be one to teach Indigenous Studies’ is negated when the issue
of needing an Indigenous person arises for the purposes of equity, cultural diversity, representation, to sit on a committee, be a resource to assist in connecting students to community groups, or, in this case, to be a member of a review panel (Deloria, 2004; Mihesuah, 2004). In this there is a difference between authority and authenticity and legitimate and illegitimate knowledge.

If Pamela and I had agreed to do what was asked of us, what would have resulted is that we as the only two Indigenous women would have given our time, skills, abilities and specific knowledge in Indigenous content for free while all the other members of the review panel, including the non-Indigenous ‘Indigenous experts’, would have been paid for their time, skills, abilities and specific knowledge in Indigenous content. It is also laden with all the other complexities that accompany messages of devaluation and disregard. Had we participated given the situation then maybe we might have found ourselves deeper within the system that marginalised us and that seeks to constantly use and take possession of us. In this we share the experience that so many other Indigenous women experience, that of being deprecated (Moreton-Robinson, 2000). The Indigenous man from that institution who participated in the review colluded in this deprecation, whether unwittingly or not, by participating in the playing out of the scenario that witnessed the reproduction of racialised and institutionalised power and privilege. I wanted to resist co-option into a position of intellectual servitude to members of the dominant society and believed that if I did participate that I would be expected to do little more than play the role that Vine Deloria terms a “house pet” (2004, p. 29).

I sought counsel from an Elder who explained that just because non-Indigenous people might know a lot about Indigenous affairs and Indigenous politics does not mean that they will support Indigenous people, our worldviews and our values over their own, and it doesn’t mean that they will not put Indigenous people down in the process. In essence they might protect and maintain their own interests in Indigenous issues by the denial and exclusion of Indigenous people and our sovereignty (Moreton-Robinson, 2004a). Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s (2004b) theoretical understandings are important to draw upon at this point. She explains that the protection and investment in white values and interests is rooted in the possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty, and that there might be anxiety about dispossession which is “harnessed to instil hope through possessive investments in patriarchal white sovereignty” (2008, p. 102). As a result of their possessive investments in patriarchal white sovereignty, non-Indigenous people can act against Indigenous sovereignty claims about our being, our knowledge, our culture and our land and show no concern for our rights or empowerment. They can act in ways that insulate themselves, their disciplines and institutions in order to protect their privileges (Smith, 1999) and can instate gatekeepers to guard their entitlements, creating a comfort zone and marginalising dissenting Indigenous voices (Rigney, 1998; Stanfield, 1993). I also came to the conclusion through my discussions with the Elder that I did not wish to reflect the image of me that was epistemologically defined by non-Indigenous people (Moreton-Robinson, 2007) and enacted in the invitation.

I then wrote a formal letter detailing my concerns to the chairperson of the review panel and stated that I would not participate in the review. I asked for my letter to be circulated amongst the review team. I also sent my letter as an
attachment to an email. I did not receive an acknowledgement of my communication or a reply via email or in a letter. Nor did I receive a telephone call from the chairperson of the review panel, or from anyone else on the review panel or from that institution. In not hearing anything or receiving a letter back from anyone associated with the review I came to understand that the review had nothing to do with engaging us with scholarly respect. By not telephoning and not responding to my letter or email I was further deauthorised, discarded and deprecated. I was again bluntly reminded that the invitation was on the university’s terms and just how easy it is for institutions such as universities to dispossess and exclude us and for them to maintain power, and control. In not communicating with Pamela or me, the university and those within it connected to the review, endorsed their positioning, privilege, advantage and their rationalising of ownership. They didn’t have to verbally say ‘this is mine’ or ‘this is ours’ because their actions and non-actions demonstrated the possessive logic of white sovereignty (Moreton-Robinson, 2004b).

I experienced intense frustration at the lack of response from anyone on the review panel or the university and while I struggled with trying to understand the atmosphere of silence, the academics involved in the review benefited from their “silenced position by proxy” (Lampert, 2003, p. 23). I wondered why did they not engage with us? Why didn’t anyone contact Pamela or me? Was the Indigenous man a willing accomplice to these activities? Was it about their unwillingness to engage and to give up their privilege and power and their resistance to changing the status quo? Vicki Grieves (2008) in her recent work writes of the recognisable stress that Indigenous scholars experience within environments such as universities. She draws on the work of Williams, Thorpe and Chapman (2003, pp. 68-91), who explain how the relationship between whiteness and knowledge often creates stress on many levels for Indigenous workers. This was an experience of such stress. I was reminded of the arrogance of white privilege in that they would assume that we would be members of the review panel without payment and that we would perform the type of Aborigine that they wanted (Smith, 1999). Moreover, they also assumed that perhaps we would be happy to be placed in the position of ‘other’ and maybe even, in some way, that we might have been grateful for their benevolence. This is in opposition to non-Indigenous academics from that university and others who repeatedly, confidently and comfortably ask for monies for consulting with community groups, including Indigenous groups, when applying for research funds to undertake research in specific Indigenous areas. In addition to this, non-Indigenous people are awarded kudos, creditability and seen as honourable (Lampert, 2003) for their work within Indigenous Studies. Pamela and I were asking for no more than non-Indigenous academics would ask for in the same situation and for which they think they are entitled. We were asking for the same form of personal and institutional legitimisation and respect that they think they deserve.

Had I undertaken the role of panel member I would have fully engaged within the review panel process. I would have critically read the materials, contributed to the discussion and ensured that my participation was not ‘token’, and that I was not positioned as ‘native informant’. I would have been in a position to offer valuable critique, put forward suggestions for change and raised issues relevant to the content. I knew if Pamela and I didn’t participate then we couldn’t do any of this and that the people handling the review panel might say that they had
asked Indigenous people, and that the Indigenous women they had asked didn’t take up the offer to participate. It would be said as I have heard before, ‘Indigenous people didn’t participate’, rather than ‘the terms of the review made it difficult for Indigenous people to participate’. To talk in these terms maintains the comfort of the white people in their belonging within Indigenous Studies because they were, or are, ‘only trying to …’. This type of statement and others of ‘goodwill’ and ‘benevolence’ also assist in masking the power differentials (Hage, 1998; Riggs, 2004) and deny the truth of Indigenous poverty and dispossession and non-Indigenous privilege. It seemed that even having been through the higher education system and earning our respective pieces of paper, we were not being valued in the same way as the other people on the panel. I have no doubts that the non-Indigenous people on the panel were all supported and congratulated for participating in and undertaking the review of the Indigenous Studies curriculum. The university and that particular faculty could tick off that job from its task list for the year and move on. We knew we risked being seen as making trouble and being too political, too critical and maybe even too personal (White & Sakiestewa, 2003). Since this time we have both heard information about ourselves and the review from people within that university who had nothing to do with the review and who should not have known anything about it at all. None of the information has been flattering. We heard that we were presented as complainers and the problem, just as Indigenous people are generally presented as the problem, rather than the social or structural issues and the power and hierarchy associated with the academy (Smith, 1999). Lampert, in discussing her experiences as a non-Indigenous academic working in Indigenous education, argues that Indigenous Studies is generally regarded as a "Black issue rather than a White issue; about ‘them’ rather than ‘us’. It’s often taken for granted that I am the good guy, or that it is even good guys and bad guys” (2003, p. 24). In this case, we were positioned as the ‘bad Indigenous women’.

Conclusion

Audre Lorde states that “it is not difference that immobilises us, but silence. And there are so many silences to be broken” (1984, p. 44). In breaking the silence on my experience I have attempted to highlight racism, social and cultural domination, control and white privilege as they intersect and are enacted within an Australian university. I have demonstrated how hard it can be to engage with the Academy when those within it are reproducing imperial attitudes and processes which marginalise and exclude us whilst proclaiming they want to include and involve us. In the Academy, this can be a common occurrence. Universities are not the safe places we would like to think they are (Mihesuah & Wilson, 2004; Monture-Angus, 1995; Walker, 2003). Taiaiake Alfred states that “they are not even so special or different in any meaningful way from other institutions; they are microcosms of the larger societal struggle” (2004, p. 88). As an Indigenous woman and academic I know I need to face the difficult questions around obligations and responsibilities to other Indigenous peoples and our struggle for freedom from oppression and exploitation at every point of academic engagement. I also know that it takes a lot of energy to challenge and fight the status quo and sometimes it is a lot easier to just accept it because of the level of emotional, physical and spiritual damage we may incur. In this article I have shown how we can reaffirm and act from our Indigenous epistemological
and ontological foundations and how we can challenge and offer resistance to the colonial forces that consistently try to silence us or make us with what Mihesuah calls “window dressing” (2004, p. 44). That is, they want us but not our opinions. In the process of working through this article and articulating the practices within this particular tertiary education institution, I have moved from the position of object to subject. I have been able to gain a form of liberated voice (hooks, 1989, p. 9) and demonstrated the multi-faceted forms of domination and control that continue to subjugate Indigenous peoples within universities. Furthermore, I have shown how ‘goodwill’ invitations can be underpinned by racism, white race privilege and racialised subjectivity which results in Indigenous peoples being further marginalised, denigrated and exploited. I have sought to challenge the possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty (Moreton-Robinson, 2004b) that continues to subjugate Indigenous peoples. I encourage others to do the same.

Postscript
The situation as explained in this case study had now changed. The Indigenous Studies pgm is now taught by Indigenous and non-Indigenous academics and managed by an Indigenous Centre.

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References


I think you’re the smartest race I’ve ever met: Racialised economies of queer male desire

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This paper explores how queer white men become both the desiring subjects and desirable objects of the queer male gaze. By analysing the personal experiences of queer Asian men, this paper argues that queer white men claim possession of desire as capital through racialised economies of queer male desire. These economies privilege queer white men by racialising queer Asian men and other non-white queer men, and ascribes them desirability according to the queer white male gaze. By racialising non-white queer men, queer white men’s whiteness is unracialised, and so, conceals their possession of desire as a white possession. I argue that it is only by exploring how queer white men claim possession of desire as capital within these racialised economies of queer male desire, that we can consider how they dominate the queer male gaze.

Introduction

The title of this paper is a pick-up line used on me by a queer white man. The fact that this pick-up line was used on me, a queer Asian Australian man, somewhat belies the presumption that we desire our partners based upon a variety of factors such as charm, height, hair-colour, class, and education, whilst excluding our desires for race and whiteness as one of these factors. Given that the body is always raced, how then can we exclude our desires for race and whiteness as one of these factors. Of course we apportion varying degrees of importance to these factors according to our individual preferences; however this does not mean that we can exclude race and whiteness as elementary as any other of these factors in our embodied desires for our partners. If admitting that we desire someone because they are racialised as black or white for instance, makes us feel uncomfortable, then we ought to seek to understand why this is so. In this paper I seek to understand why queer white men are desirable for queer Asian men. By analysing the personal experiences of queer Asian men, I
explore how queer white men are privileged as both the desiring subjects and desirable objects of the queer male gaze. I will unpack queer white male privileges and the systems through which they come to dominate the queer male gaze by developing a concept of desire as capital. Just as any other form of capital with value, I will show that queer white men claim possession of their desirability within racialised economies of queer male desire, in which non-white queer men are racialised and queer white men are unracialised. I will illustrate how queer white men benefit from these economies as unracialised white subjects, so that the invisibility of their whiteness conceals their possession of desire as a white possession.

**Speaking back to whiteness**

My story behind writing this paper is one which, I believe, is worth elaborating for the purposes of my argument. I started writing this paper as a way of speaking back to the queer white men who are racist towards me. This attempt at speaking back to whiteness is only possible with the support of critical whiteness theorists like Aileen Moreton-Robinson and Fiona Nicoll, whose work I greatly admire for the empowerment it provides me in recognising that these experiences of racism are not a problem which I have caused, but rather a reflection of the possessive investments in whiteness made by queer white men. In this paper, I am not attempting to speak on behalf of all queer Asian men. What I am doing in this paper is speaking back to whiteness by speaking with other queer Asian men, so the potential queer white male reader of this paper is entering into our conversation. In speaking about my experiences of racism, I do not intend to suggest that I do not benefit from Asian Australian privileges; rather, my intention is to think through these experiences of racism as an attempt to engage with the effects of a white/Asian binary, which I experience all the time in the Australian queer scene. The effects of this binary are also evident in the American and Canadian contexts, demonstrated by my use of queer Asian American and queer Asian Canadian male authors, who discuss similar experiences of queer white male dominance in America and Canada respectively (Fung, 1991; Leong, 2002; Manalansan IV, 1996; Mangaoang, 1996; Wat, 1996; Roy, 1998; Sanitioso, 1999).

Before I began engaging with critical race and whiteness theory, I had always considered queer white men’s racism directed towards me as due to my actions, which had caused them to be offended. However, when I researched this paper and began reading about other queer Asian men’s experiences of being racialised in the queer scene, I instantly recognised the same experiences in my own life. This paper is my preliminary attempt at theorising the reasons behind the uniformity of these queer Asian men’s experiences of queer white male racism. What is common in all of these experiences is the acknowledgement that we as queer Asian men are undesirable in the eyes of most queer white men. What continues to haunt me, even after writing this paper, is that these narratives also illustrate our acknowledgement that we are undesirable to each other (see Leong 2002). In this paper, I seek to understand why queer white men are desirable and how whiteness benefits them in a system that maintains their desirability. This paper then, focuses explicitly on queer white men. By conceiving of desire as capital, I will propose that desire circulates within racialised economies of queer male desire. Through these economies, whiteness claims possession of the
standards by which we measure queer male desirability, and so, we as queer Asian men are always racialised as non-white queer men who both desire queer white men and are undesirable for queer white men. I begin my argument with a theoretically important detour into a survey of critical race and whiteness theory, by considering how whiteness operates more broadly as possession and is itself inalienable property inherited only by white people.

**Overview of critical race & whiteness theory: Whiteness as capital**

Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies has consistently drawn attention to the power of whiteness in claiming possession of Indigenous peoples’ lands. Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2005) incisively points out that the celebrated values of Australian national identity serve the white project of denying Indigenous sovereignty to claim Australia as a white possession. Values such as egalitarianism, mate-ship, and a ‘fair’ go are embedded in the narratives of convicts, diggers and British settlers. These values mask the heterogeneity of Australia as a British possession consisting of Anglo-Saxons, Anglo-Celts, Scottish and Welsh. This masking of the heterogeneity within British whiteness denies the conflicts between these ethnic groups so that Australia’s national values of egalitarianism, for instance, can be celebrated as a white possession. Thus, it is by celebrating these values, and masking these conflicts, that Australia can be claimed as a white possession. When the land is constructed as the oppressor, evident in Australia’s historical mythology of survival against the harsh landscape, white possession is valorised and Indigenous dispossession is erased. The celebration of white Australian national values, therefore, simultaneously claims possession of Indigenous peoples’ lands by denying Indigenous dispossession. As Moreton-Robinson argues, “property rights are derived from the Crown which in the form of the nationstate holds possession. Possession and nationhood are thus constituted symbiotically” (2005, p. 21).

This suggests that, since white values are celebrated and privileged within regimes of white Australian nationalism, values are themselves part of the property claimed by white Australians. Following Bourdieu, Ghassan Hage (1998) argues that white control over Australia’s national spaces is part of the cultural capital inherited by white people. In his influential book *White Nation*, Hage illustrates how white people control Australia’s national spaces through a fantasy of white supremacy. It is through this fantasy that white Australians inherit the cultural capital of whiteness and so have the power to control Australia’s national spaces, evident, for example, in the dominance of white Australian icons celebrated in the stadium space of the Sydney Olympics Opening Night Ceremony (Hage, 1998). Thus the possession of whiteness operates within a system; a fantasy of white supremacy that endows upon those deemed to be white Australians the privileges through which Australia is claimed as a white possession. Inheriting whiteness, therefore, means inheriting a system of privileges, and so whiteness itself has a capital value.

This value accorded to the possession of whiteness also follows from Cheryl Harris’ (1993) persuasive argument that whiteness, as the inheritance of epidermically inscribed white skin, and other visible attributes of whiteness, has itself become valuable and inalienable property. In the United States, white Americans controlled Black African Slaves as property, and claimed the lands of
Native Americans as their own. Through this history of exploitation of the racialised Other, whiteness came to be defined as "the characteristic, the attribute, the property of free human beings" (Harris, 1993, p. 1721). In a system where the legal definition of property rights was alienable, white privileges were considered inalienable, something only white people inherited. As Harris argues, "the inalienability of whiteness should not preclude the consideration of whiteness as property. Paradoxically, its inalienability may be more indicative of its perceived enhanced value, rather than its disqualification as property" (1993, p. 1734). A history of exploitation through which white people claimed the property of racialised non-white Others had the effect that the inheritance of white skin meant not only the inheritance of white privileges, but also the possession of the valuable and inalienable property of whiteness. Thus, whiteness itself has come to attain a capital value, an anomalous class of property inherited only by white people.

This brief outline of specific aspects of the field of critical race and whiteness studies has highlighted how whiteness claims possession of the property of Indigenous peoples (Moreton-Robinson, 2005), inherits white power in the form of cultural capital (Hage, 1998), and is itself conceptualised as an inalienable property (Harris, 1993). The questions that I pose are: what configurations of privileges do queer white men inherit, and how do these privileges make queer white men desirable for the queer male gaze? What forms of unearned white privilege do queer white men inherit from this broader system of whiteness? My intention is to not suggest that queer Asian men are duped into desiring queer white men, and so maintain queer white male racism unintentionally; rather I focus on how the circulation of desire largely works irrespective of the intentions of agents, by considering how desire circulates as capital claimed by queer white men. Following Hage’s (1998) argument that white people inherit whiteness as cultural capital, I consider how desire for queer white men is itself a form of capital, and I explore how queer white men claim possession of desire as capital within racialised economies of queer male desire. Desire for queer white men then, is not simply inherited as a white possession, rather it is inherited in a system—a racialised economy through which non-white queer men are racialised and queer white men are unracialised. This economy constructs desire for queer white men as a form of capital. As Damien Riggs writes:

white (queer) identities are neither solely social nor individual in nature—they are in and of themselves social artefacts that are simultaneously produced through social contexts, whilst being productive of social contexts, in that their ongoing reiteration serves to further enshrine the normative status of whiteness. (2006, p. 105)

By focusing on the construction and circulation of desire in producing the desirability of queer white men, I will show how racialised economies of desire work to privilege queer white men as both desiring subjects and desirable objects of the queer male gaze. I begin my analysis of queer white male desire by problematising one of my experiences of being desired by a queer white man.

Desiring a smart race
It was at first year university parties that I met most of my former queer white male partners. At one of these parties, another first year student—a queer white man—approached me and we started speaking about what high school we attended, what courses we were studying at university, and what pub crawls we had already joined. Whilst the topic of our conversation remained on university life generally, it suddenly took a sharp turn towards ‘my race’. This change in topics occurred when this queer white man said to me, “I think you’re the smartest race I’ve ever met”. When he commented on my intelligence as a product of my race, I was confused. Although confronted by this comment, I was unsure about my emotions and how to respond. Was his comment a compliment, or an insult?

It is at university that I first began to celebrate the fact that I am queer. After officially ‘coming out’ to my friends in high school, I anticipated that university would be a time when I would meet many queer friends and queer lovers. However, after being involved in the queer scene for a few years, I began to notice that all of my queer white friends had a greater turnover of partners than I had. I noticed that all of them had met their partners from each other’s networks of queer friends. This exclusion from my queer white friends’ networks made me ask myself: ‘Am I ugly, or boring?’ Towards the end of my undergraduate degree, I made a conscious decision to focus on my study and to realise the racial construction of Asian as a ‘smart race’. Since I was excluded from my white friends’ queer networks, I decided to further pursue a queer agenda through queer activism. I was elected male sexuality officer and was actively involved in student politics. However, whilst campaigning for queer rights, I realised that the rights I was fighting for were those of queer white men. It was in my final Honours year of study when I realised that, unlike my queer white friends, I was not white, I was Asian.

After being quietly excluded from my queer white friends’ networks, to be desired by a queer white man at the party was my ultimate revenge. It was a statement of my desirability. It was confirmation that my friends were wrong. I was desirable because a queer white man desired me. Kent Chuang describes the same experience when he asks, “in my desperate search for approval from Anglo men, had I become so selfish, helpless and angry that I would turn against my own kind?” (1999, p. 35) In my recounting of these painful personal experiences, we witness a circulation of desire within racialised economies of the queer male gaze. What interests me about this experience is how this queer white man desired me as a member of a ‘smart Asian race’. Just as whiteness claims Australia as a white possession by denying Indigenous sovereignties (Moreton-Robinson, 2004, 2005), this queer white man claimed possession of the right to be the arbiter of my race’s intelligence through which he considered me desirable.

In desiring me as a member of a ‘smart Asian race’, this queer white man made me turn towards my experience of racialisation. This highlights how effectively whiteness deflects attention away from its own privileges towards the racialised other. Frantz Fanon describes the pain of this experience of being racialised as “an amputation, an excision, a haemorrhage that splattered my whole body with black blood” (1967, p. 112). Like Fanon, I am silenced by the racially subjectifying compliment, in which “I am given no chance. I am overdetermined from without. I am of the slave not of the ‘idea’ that others have of me but of my
own appearance” (1967, p. 116). Tony Ayres describes this experience incisively when he recalls how he

eventually realised that when most Caucasian men in the gay scene look at Asian men, they don’t see a tall or short man, attractive or unattractive man. They don’t see a Chinese, a Filipino, or a Cambodian, they see a category, which absolutely describes us but which defines nothing. (1997a)

Like Ayres, I became racialised as a member of the category of a smart Asian race for the gaze of the queer white man who desired me. These examples challenge conventional representations of queer male desire as a capital that circulates within and between queer male bodies, implying that all queer men have access to desire and so can become desirable. Although it could be argued that I desired this queer white man for his whiteness and he desired me for my Asianness, and therefore desire circulated between our bodies in an equivalent exchange, it will be shown that queer white men are rendered more desirable than queer Asian men because whiteness claims possession of the standards by which we measure all racialised non-white queer men’s desirability.

**Queer white men as desiring subjects and desirable objects of the queer male gaze**

Let us continue exploring how queer white men become desiring subjects and desirable objects for the queer male gaze. The queer white man who desired me at the party was the desiring subject of my queer Asianness, and also the desirable object of my queer Asian male gaze. However, unlike his overt racialisation of me as a member of a category of smart Asians, my experience of being racialised silenced me from overtly racialising him. One queer Asian man describes this experience of being racialised when he says, “every time I look at a man I’m interested in, I have to think first, ‘Does he like Asians?’ not ‘Does he like me?’” (Ayres, 2000b, p. 162). In contrast, as queer white men inherit the desirability of whiteness, when they see other queer white men, they do not need to ask ‘will this man like whites?’ Queer male desire thus circulates in a system of racialised economies of desire through which non-white queer men are racialised and queer white men are unracialised. As this queer Asian man’s question demonstrates, queer white men benefit from their invisible whiteness through the presumption that whiteness is desirable for all queer men. It follows then that although non-white queer men can gain certain forms of desire as aesthetic capital such as a muscular body or fancy clothing, unlike queer white men, they do not inherit the unracialised subject position of desirable whiteness. This invisibility of whiteness has the effect that racialised non-white queer men turn inwards towards their experience of racialisation in a search for confirmation that they are desirable.

Chuang recalls how he “searched desperately for evidence that an Asian could be a sexually desirable object, but neither Calvin Klein advertisements, *Days of Our Lives*, nor stories of Rose Hancock on the 6 o’clock news showed [him] that it was possible” (1999, p. 31). Richard Fung (1991) also searches for evidence that Asian men are desirable, only to be confronted with the dominance of images of white men in gay pornography. This overrepresentation of queer white men in queer media is the result of what Ayres describes as a “culture where Tom of
Finland is the pinnacle of what is considered desirable” (2000b, p. 161). This search by queer Asian men for confirmation of their desirability highlights how whiteness draws attention towards what it perceives as the lack of the non-white racialised other. Instead of focusing on the dominance of images of whiteness as a privilege claimed by queer white men, these queer Asian men focus on how they lack desirability as racialised non-white queer men. Our desire for queer white men, however, is not simply the result of the dominance of the images of white men in the media. Instead, this dominance highlights a broader system of whiteness which claims “prepossession” (Moreton-Robinson, 2005) of the standards by which we measure male beauty for queer white men. In other words, queer white men are made more desirable than non-white queer men because there are already systems in place, in the queer media for instance, which prepossess the capital of desire for queer white men. This prepossession of the standards of queer male beauty is not taken-for-granted, but needs to be constantly re-claimed as a white possession.

In a Letter to the Editor of the gay magazine Campaign, we witness how this prepossession of queer white men’s desirability was re-claimed as a white possession when it was challenged with the image of an Asian man on the cover. In a response to this image of the first Asian male model on the cover in the magazine’s 20 year history, the white author of the letter, David Phillips wrote:

> there are only a few white men interested in the small Asian dick. You can show me a small dick and a big black one and it is more important to go off with the big black one than the small Asian one. (Leong, 2002, p. 84)

Ayres describes this categorisation of racialised non-white queer men’s desirability according to penis size, as a racial hierarchy in which “Asians were behind Black and Latino men in the scale of things” and “of course, white men were at the top” (2000b, p. 160). Although Phillips’ mentions ‘white men’, his whiteness becomes invisible at the point at which he racialises the penises of non-white queer men. Phillips’ as a white man, therefore, is not racialised according to this hierarchy. What will be more evident throughout this paper, is that the white man’s penis becomes the invisible standard by which we measure racialised non-white queer men’s penises, and hence, their non-white queer male desirability. There are several effects of this invisibility of whiteness: first, given that the white man’s penis is absent on this hierarchy, it is presumed to be desirable. Secondly, racialised non-white queer Asian and black men are ascribed desirability by the queer white male gaze. Thus, the very absence of queer white men on this hierarchy presumes that the white man’s penis is desirable, and so claims possession of desire as capital for queer white men, through which they can then occupy the positions of desiring subject of the racialised penis, and the desirable object of the queer male gaze. This presumption of queer white men’s desirability, then, installs Phillips’ and other queer white men, as the desiring subjects of the big black penis, and the desirable objects of the queer male gaze, in which their white penis is a priori desirable.

### Queer Asian men as subjects and objects of desire

Queer white men’s possession of desire as capital is also illustrated in one of my personal experiences in which my former best friend, a queer white man, was
overtly racist towards me. In one conversation we had together, we discussed the American television series *Queer as Folk*. In one episode of the series, one of the characters, Emmett, dates a queer Japanese man (the only representation of an Asian man in the entire series), who never says a single English word in the episode, but is seen smiling and holding hands with Emmett. Despite the fact that we were not explicitly discussing the fact that this man was Asian, my friend felt entirely comfortable in telling me that he found the Asian man in the episode “repulsive” and that he would never find Asian men attractive—“they’re just disgusting” he reminded me. What offends me about this conversation was the fact that I didn’t challenge this overt racism, but instead agreed with my friend, as he knew that I only desired and had only ever dated queer white men. In being the addressee of his racism towards Asian men, I experienced the self-epistemic violence of being racialised as non-white. It was simply my racialised queer Asian male presence and that of the Japanese character on *Queer as Folk* that was sufficient to deprive my ex-friend of his desirability as a queer white man. In order to re-claim this standard as a white possession, both my ex-friend and Phillips project their insecurities surrounding their queer white male desirability onto queer Asian men, who are racialised as queer Asian men and so lack desirability for the queer male gaze. This projection is achieved by racialising non-white others, in this case queer Asian men, as having small dicks and therefore, “just disgusting” for the queer white male gaze.

There are also some similarities and differences between my former friend’s racialisation of me as an undesirable queer Asian man and the queer white man at the party who desired me as a member of a smart Asian race. In both cases, these two queer white men are the desiring subjects of the queer male gaze, illustrated by the fact that as unracialised queer white men, they have the power to racialise me as either ‘disgusting’ or desirable for the queer male gaze. Secondly, in racialising me, these two queer white men focus upon my race, which has the effect that their white privileges and possession of desire as capital is obscured. This concealment of queer white men’s possession of desire is evidenced in both scenarios in which I was silenced by the experience of being racialised. As my desire for the queer white man at the party was premised on my exclusion from my queer white friends’ networks, I accepted this experience of being racialised as a member of a smart Asian race, without challenging his whiteness. Similarly, as my former friend knew that I had only ever dated and desired queer white men, his knowledge of this fact, gained through our friendship, silenced me from challenging his overt racism directed towards queer Asian men. The difference in both scenarios is that one queer white man desired me, whilst the other found me ‘repulsive’. The dominant similarity is that both queer white men are installed as the desirable objects of the queer male gaze, achieved by silencing me from challenging their white possession of desire as capital.

Similar to Phillips and my former friend, queer white men’s reclamation of desire as capital is also evident in the terms used to describe, and thereby racialise, queer white men’s desire for queer Asian men. Chuang defines these terms in his ‘Aussie Glossary for the Linguistically Challenged’ in which ‘rice queen’ is defined as a “Caucasian man who is predominantly sexually interested in Asian men” and a ‘potato queen’ is an “Asian man who is predominantly interested in Caucasian men” (1999, p. 41). Chuang recalls how he, “heard stories about an infamous Sydney gay bar where rice queens hang out, [which] used to be nicknamed
'Asian Take Way’” (1999, p. 32). These terms serve to belittle queer white men who desire queer Asian men, and so reclaim queer white men’s desirability and spaces of desire as a white possession. Peter Jackson argues that the “rice queen [occupies] a stigmatised and marginal position, [and is] stereotyped as a sexually unattractive man who is unable to find a Caucasian partner. The rice queen is mocked as a man whom ‘only Asians find attractive’” (2000, pp. 183-184). In contrast to the terms ‘rice queens’ and ‘potato queens’, there are no terms used to describe queer white men who desire each other. Although there are fetishised descriptions of queer male desire like S&M, Bear, or Leather, these are not racialised descriptions like rice queens and potato queens. Queer white male desire, therefore, is the standard by which we measure racialised non-white queer male desire. As Jackson (2000) highlights, ‘potato queens’ and ‘rice queens’ are terms of deprecation used by queer white men against other queer white men who desire queer Asian men. By belittling ‘rice queens’, whiteness repossesses queer white men’s desirability by expelling, as an undesirable white other, the queer white men who desire queer Asian men. As they desire queer Asian men, rice queens reject the imposition of queer white men as the desirable of the queer male gaze. Rice queens, therefore, stray from the norm of white desiring queer men, and so are denigrated as undesirable by queer white men.

However, even queer Asian men who desire queer white men—potato queens—see rice queens as undesirable. Chuang describes the majority of rice queens he dated as undesirable old white men: ”I believed that I was trapped in a circle of old men and leeches in their forties, fifties and sometimes older, unfit or fat, unattractive bordering on repulsive” (1999, p. 32). “The only reason they want us is because they can't get a white boy”, one Asian friend told me. Another queer Asian man describes how he “went to a party and it was full of middle-age Caucasian men and young Asian boys” (Ayres, 1997a). From these experiences of queer Asian men, we can identify how the requirement that all queer men desire queer white men operates by excluding the undesirables—older queer white men (often rice queens) and queer Asian men. Desire as capital functions as a white possession and is reclaimed as a white possession by preventing non-white desiring rice queens and white desiring queer Asian men from claiming that they are desirable for the queer male gaze. Queer white men claim possession of desire as capital by positioning rice queens and potato queens as undesirable within racialised economies of queer male desire because they either refuse to desire queer white men, like rice queens, or they are racialised as undesirable queer Asian men. Rice queens and potato queens are therefore rendered undesirable for either refusing the installation of queer white men as the objects of the queer male gaze, or by being racialised as queer Asian men.

However, although rice queens are excluded along with queer Asian men from claiming queer male desirability, this does not mean that they stop racialising queer Asian men. Many queer Asian men describe how rice queens expect them to perform the role of submissive Asian. This is illustrated in one experience described by a queer Asian American man who writes:

when a friend of mine finally convinced a drunken white man who had been forcing himself on him that he did not like playing the submissive role, the white man became disgusted and said, ‘You have completely turned Americanized. Go back to Asia and learn how to be an Asian’. This white man and others like him,
sober or inebriated, have no way of relating to my Asian brothers except from atop. (Leong, 1996, p. 73)

Even though rice queens are belittled by queer white men as undesirable, they continue to exercise their queer white male privilege by racialising and effeminising queer Asian men. Ayres writes that “because the majority of gay Asian men in Australia are slimmer and smaller than their Caucasian counterparts, they are also stereotyped as feminine or ‘boyish’... The same racial stereotype that makes Asian women desirable makes Asian men marginal” (2000b, p. 161). By racialising queer Asian men, these rice queens demonstrate their inalienable (Harris, 1993) queer white male privileges. In other words, despite the fact that rice queens are excluded from claiming desire as capital because they do not desire queer white men, their inalienable whiteness guarantees them the power to racialise queer Asian men. In racialising their queer Asian male partners, by demanding that they 'learn how to be a submissive Asian', these rice queens feminise queer Asian men, and so maintain racialised economies of queer male desire in which queer Asian men are undesirable.

**Feminising and castrating queer Asian men**

In Fung’s (1991) famous article “Looking for my penis: The eroticized Asian in gay video porn”, he uses the visible lack of Asian penises in queer media to claim that queer Asian men are feminised for the queer white male gaze. Repeating the same racialised hierarchy that Ayres discusses, Fung writes:

> so, whereas Fanon tells us, 'the Negro is eclipsed. He is turned into a penis. He is a penis,' the Asian man is defined by a striking absence down there. And if Asian men have no sexuality, how can we have homosexuality? (1991, p. 148)

Ayres echoes Fung’s claim when he writes: "in gay media photos of Caucasian men the focus of attention is often the man’s erect penis, the most aggressive symbol of masculinity. In contrast, the focus in photos of Asian men is the curve of the body, a typically feminine emphasis. This representation shows the Asian male as passive and subservient" (1999c, p. 94). How does this feminisation of queer Asian men demonstrate queer white men’s possession of desire as capital? In answering this question, we might recall Phillips, the white author of a Letter to the Editor of *Campaign* discussed earlier, in which he declared that queer Asian men are undesirable because they lack big penises (see Leong 2002). In his letter, we witnessed how queer white men’s penises become invisible in their absence on the racialised hierarchy of penis size. Fung and Ayres’ description of how queer Asian men are feminised, thereby making them undesirable within racialised economies of queer male desire, illustrates how desire as capital is claimed as a white possession by queer white men. This possession of desire by queer white men occurs by making queer Asian men undesirable, an argument made by Jackson when he writes: “the dominant de-eroticisation of Asian men within White gay cultures occurs by an effeminisation of Asian men’s bodies and the privileging of a model of masculinity based on the idealised attributes of a Caucasian male” (2000, p. 183). In contrast to black men who possess more desire as capital than queer Asian men because of their supposedly big penises, queer Asian men lack desire due to their supposedly small penises. Feminising
queer Asian men literally dispossesses them of even more desire as capital by removing their penises altogether, and so literally makes them ‘women’, a process in which “Asian and anus are conflated” (Fung, 1991, p. 153). By apportioning desire according to penis size within these racialised economies of queer male desire, queer white men, like Phillips, make their whiteness invisible. In other words, queer white men claim possession of desire as capital through their very absence within racialised economies of queer male desire. It is only through this absence, the invisibility of their whiteness, that queer white men can conceal their possession of desire as a white possession. This racialised hierarchy installs queer white men as both the subjects of the queer male gaze and the objects of queer male desire. It follows, then, that the racialisation of queer Asian men as having small undesirable penises and feminised bodies serves the project of making whiteness invisible, and therefore a priori desirable.

The feminisation of Asian men is not an isolated representation in racialised queer male economies of desire, but is part of a dominant trope, evident in the West’s fantasies of Asia. David Eng’s (2001) book Racial Castration uses psychoanalytic theory to analyse David Henry Hwang’s film M. Butterfly (Cronenberg, 1993). This film problematises the West’s feminisation of Asia in Puccini’s original opera Madame Butterfly and replaces the Japanese woman Cio Cio San, with a Chinese transvestite, Song Liling. In the beginning of Hwang’s film, Song says: “I am an Oriental. And being an Oriental, I could never be completely a man … The West thinks of itself as masculine—big guns, big industry, big money—so the East is feminine, weak, delicate and poor” (emphasis added). Song ‘tricks’ the Frenchman—Rene Gallimard—into believing that she is a ‘woman’, as she is really a spy working for the Chinese government. Eng (2001, p. 150) argues that the logic of fetishism as defined by Freud, functions through a compensatory logic that facilitates a normative heterosexual relationship. The black penis threatens the unity of the white male ego by positioning white men as less masculine than black men, thus threatening the structural stability between him and the white woman. In M. Butterfly the opposite occurs, in which Gallimard denies the existence of the Asian man’s penis, he castrates the Asian man so that he can sustain the fantasy of his white heterosexuality (Eng, 2001, p. 151). In one scene when Song’s penis is finally revealed to Gallimard he says to her: “tonight I’ve finally learned to tell fantasy from reality, and knowing the difference, I choose fantasy” (Eng & Hom, 1998, p. 337). Gallimard’s fantasy of his ‘superior’ white heterosexual masculinity can only exist by castrating Song, thereby feminising her through the Orientalist fantasy of feminine Asia which is ultimately achieved by having ‘heterosexual’ sex with her through her anus. Thus, feminising queer Asian men literally castrates them within racialised economies of queer male desire. Without penises, queer Asian men lose the capital of queer male desire in a process which racialises non-white queer men and masks queer white men’s desirability as a white possession. The invisibility of whiteness then, makes the desirability of whiteness taken-for-granted and so guarantees the possession of desire as capital for queer white men. As feminising queer Asian men means castrating them, without penises, queer Asian men literally become undesirable for the queer male gaze.

Given the historical dominance of the West’s fantasies of feminised Asia, parodied in Hwang’s film, it is not surprising that queer white men subscribe to the same fantasies and so find queer Asian men undesirable. However, as Hage
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(1998) argues, white Australian fantasies do not just exist, but rather they require practices that sustain and perpetuate the inheritance of white power for white people. As queer Asian men then, we ought not to seek reasons as to why we are undesirable, but rather we need to explore how queer white men become desirable by perpetuating these fantasies of feminised and undesirable queer Asian men. This is a sentiment echoed by Fung) when he writes: “it is not the representation of the fantasy that offends, or even the fantasy itself, rather it is the uniformity with which these narratives reappear and the uncomfortable relationship they have to real social conditions” (1991, p. 157).

To understand the dominance of these fantasies in which queer Asian men are made undesirable for the queer male gaze, we need to examine how whiteness operates as possession. However, given that it is the invisibility of whiteness which claims possession of desire as capital for queer white men, this project of researching queer white men’s possession of desire is difficult. These challenges are expressed by Ayres when he says:

but you cannot point a finger and say, ‘This man is racist because he doesn’t sleep with me’. I don’t think people consciously choose their desires. But, the very fact of this separation of desire into racial categories indicates a kind of institutionalized racism. (1999c, p. 92)

In this quote, Ayres astutely points out the difficulty of challenging the possession of desire by queer white men and how non-white queer men are racialised by queer white men. I would caution, however, that we ought to resist the temptation to identify queer white men as racist merely on the basis that they refuse to desire queer Asian men. This is not to say that queer Asian men are misguided when they claim to experience queer white male racism—indeed, this paper is my attempt at speaking back at queer white male racism. Instead, my argument is that rather than focusing on our experiences of queer white male racism, we ought to shift our attention towards queer white men by asking the question: ‘what do queer white men gain from refusing to desire queer Asian men?’ Furthermore, we need to ask: ‘what do queer white men gain from desiring us as racialised non-white queer Asian men?’ Following Fanon (1967), we ought not to focus on constructions of the black man, but rather we need to explore how the white man constructs his whiteness through his constructions of the black man.

Conclusions

This paper has been my preliminary attempt at seeking to understand how queer white men become desirable through their racialised constructions of queer Asian men as undesirable. Borrowing from Hage (1998), who used Bourdieu to argue that white power is inherited by white people as cultural capital, and Moreton-Robinson’s (2003, 2004, 2005) work on whiteness as possession, I have shown how queer white men claim possession of desire as capital in order to install queer white men as desiring subjects and desirable objects of the queer male gaze. However, desire can only be claimed as a white possession in a process that makes whiteness the invisible standard by which we measure the desirability of racialised non-white queer men. The invisibility of queer white men’s whiteness has the effect that racialised non-white queer men, like the
queer Asian male voices in this paper, turn inwards towards their experience of racialisation and undesirability. This experience of being racialised as queer Asian men is an epistemic violence, which highlights how effectively whiteness deflects attention away from its own privileges towards the racialised non-white Other, who is encouraged to experience a lack, in this case, a lack of desirability for the queer male gaze. As queer white men’s desirability must be obscured as a white possession, desire is made to appear to circulate within racialised economies of queer male desire, through which it can then be assumed that all queer men can become desirable, thereby concealing the very queer white male privileges that install queer white men as desirable in the first place.

In conclusion, we ought to return to the queer white man who desired me as a member of a 'smart Asian race’. Not only does his categorisation of me as an intelligent race serve to racialise me, his comment also secured his desirability as an unracialised queer white male subject. As my desire for him was itself premised on my exclusion from my queer white friends’ networks, I was silenced by his ‘compliment’—a racialising and exclusionary white practice, which had the effect that I was encouraged to appreciate the fact that I was desirable as a queer Asian man, because a queer white man desired me. He claimed his desirability as a queer white man therefore, by desiring me not as another queer man, but as a racialised queer Asian man, who is ‘predominantly interested in Caucasian men’.

The final queer white man whom I would like to speak back to is my ex-friend. In speaking back to him, I follow the advice of our queer Asian sister who said:

‘don’t worry, once a bitch called me an ugly chink’ ... It’s our duty to assimilate our beautiful selves into the Australian culture. Think of the younger generation. We are pioneers for our young up and coming Asian sisters. Just go for it. (Chuang, 1999, p. 33)

Following the advice from this queer Asian man, by being present in the queer scene, queer Asian men may stand up against whiteness. When we speak about queer white male desire, we refuse the silencing of whiteness that encourages us to experience a lack of desirability. So, when faced with a call to experience the epistemic violence of being racialised by queer white men, we as queer Asian men might stand together and say in unison to these queer white men, “I think you’re the most desirable race I’ve ever met”.

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References


The taxonomic gaze: Looking at whiteness from east to west

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In this article I consider representations of whiteness which emanate from outside the Euro-American centres. I argue that it is necessary to understand how whiteness has been seen by non-white observers, and that we need to be sensitive to local taxonomies of difference which are not always reducible to the white/non-white distinction which is hegemonic in the Euro-American centres. I consider the works of some artists and writers from early twentieth century Japan who are sensitive to their positioning in international hierarchies and who attempt to place themselves in a position of power in these gendered, classed, ethnicised and racialised hierarchies through their deployment of what I call the 'taxonomic gaze'. I argue that the concept of whiteness needs to be historicised and provincialised, and that the field of whiteness studies itself also needs to be historicised.

Keywords: whiteness, racialisation, Japan, taxonomic gaze

Introduction

In 1921, I left Japan and headed for France. The ship had hardly docked in Shanghai before my fellow passengers, from curiosity to know a Western woman, went to visit the white-walled western building with the red light. There they were taken by the golden hair of the Polish Jewish women and the Russian refugee women, enchanted by the charm of blue eyes, and returned to the ship singing paans. I was the only one who celebrated the beauty of the slender bamboo-like figures of the Chinese women, and did not listen to their stories. It was the same when we docked in Hong Kong. To them, the Malay and Indian women just seemed like sauvages. For me, however, they gave me a sense of aesthetiquement beauté. (Fujita, 1984, p. 57)¹

¹ Translations my own unless indicated otherwise. In this passage, the italicised words appear in the original passage in Sino-Japanese characters, with a French reading provided alongside. I have tried to convey this in the translation with the use of French
This account comes from Fujita [Foujita] Tsuguharu’s essay on the “Women of the World”, and provides a relatively rare example of a man from outside the Euro-American centres exercising a powerful gaze on the peoples of the world. Foujita is an artist who travelled from Japan to Paris in the 1920s, where he was also able to exercise the powerful gaze of a painter. The passage above reflects a taxonomic attitude which places all of the peoples in the world in hierarchies of value, in this case in gendered hierarchies of beauty. In this article I will explore manifestations of this attitude in the writings of selected cultural producers from Japan in the 1920s. However, in order to situate this particular taxonomic gaze, we first need to locate this study within recent developments in the field of whiteness studies.

**Provincialising whiteness**

In his pioneering book, *White*, Richard Dyer commented that the study of “race” had hitherto meant the study of “any racial imagery other than that of white people” (1997, p. 1). Dyer conceptualised his own project as being about

the racial imagery of white people—not the images of other races in white cultural production, but the latter’s imagery of white people themselves. This is not done merely to fill a gap in the analytic literature, but because there is something at stake in looking at, or continuing to ignore, white racial imagery. As long as race is something only applied to non-white peoples, as long as white people are not racially seen and named, they/we function as a human norm. Other people are raced, we are just people. (p. 1)

Over a decade later, Dyer’s comments about the racialisation of white people probably seem quite self-evident. Dyer first commented on representations of racialised others by those who spoke from a dominant and unmarked position. He then extended this discussion to consider how these ‘white’ people had represented themselves, and produced their own ‘whiteness’ in opposition to a series of racialised others. It is also, however, necessary to consider how those positioned outside that sphere have critiqued the self-representations of those positioned as ‘white’ (Fujikawa, 2005; Gates, 1981; hooks, 1981; Lake, 2007). A further development might involve readings of how ‘whiteness’ has appeared in the texts of those who have been positioned as ‘non-white’. We need to historicise whiteness and to provincialise it: that is, to demonstrate that the concept of whiteness has a specific history in particular localised cultural and social contexts, and that the concept cannot easily be generalised beyond those contexts. Similarly, the field of whiteness studies itself needs to be historicised

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2 Foujita’s family name was variously spelt as “Fujita” or “Foujita”, and his given name was sometimes read as “Tsuguharu” and sometimes “Tsugujî”. He also adopted the name “Léonard”. As he is most well-known in European languages as “Foujita”, I will use this spelling hereafter, except where citing Japanese language sources. On Foujita’s life, see Birnbaum (2006).

3 Here, I am drawing on Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (2000) discussion of ‘provincialising’ Europe.
and placed in its specific academic and intellectual context in the (mainly) Anglophone Euro-American academy at the turn of the twenty-first century.

In reading texts which have been produced outside the Euro-American sphere where whiteness acts as a privileged signifier of difference, we can not assume that the concepts, discourses and debates around racialisation can simply be translated into another sphere. The dynamics of difference will be expressed in very specific terms in particular local contexts. For example, in South Asia, there has apparently been a valuing of paler skin which was quite independent of the encounter with Europe (Robb, 1995, pp. 1-76). Or, in Japan, there is a form of white facial make-up which is associated with specific professions or theatrical performances, with nothing to do with racialisation (Kazami, 1997).

In specific contexts, racialised meanings may be attributed according to the shape of facial features, the relative presence or absence of body hair, specific bodily odours, or the proportions of the body, rather than just skin colour. These features interact with dress, adornment, deportment, the dressing of hair, and the modification of bodies through such practices as shaving, piercing, or tattooing. Similarly, the semantic field encompassed by the signifier ‘white’ cannot be expected to translate neatly across languages. In each language, the local equivalent of the colour ‘white’ will have specific associations and connotations.

In this article, I consider some representations of whiteness from the early decades of the twentieth century in Japan. By this time, intellectuals in Japan had been exposed to the ideologies of racial hierarchy which emanated from Europe and the United States. These had particular relevance in Japan, which had faced the threat of colonisation by Europe and the United States. By the 1920s, the Japanese government had managed to renegotiate the unequal treaties with the United States, Britain and other European powers; had forged an alliance with Britain; and had acquired its own colonies in East Asia. In the First World War, Japan had been allied with the Anglophone powers, but nevertheless was unsuccessful in its campaign for a racial equality clause in the Charter of the newly-formed League of Nations. Japanese national identity was always, then, defined with reference to both the Euro-American powers and other Asian countries. These international geopolitical hierarchies were naturalised according to the discourses of racialisation, and ideologies of racial hierarchy were given local inflections in Japan (Morris-Suzuki, 1998; Oguma, 2002). As Dyer has commented, with respect to more recent manifestations of hierarchical thought, race was “never not a factor, never not in play” (Dyer, 1997, p. 1).

In early twentieth century East Asia, cultural representations were integrated into international circuits which referenced the circulation of signs, products, practices, finance and capital which have been associated with the condition of ‘colonial modernity’. Tani Barlow has emphasised the “interrelatedness of colonizing powers and colonial regimes” and has drawn our attention to the “colonial commodities (e.g. opium, tea, labour), reordered styles of governmentality, juridical norms (e.g. international laws and treaties), administrative innovations (e.g. customs, extraterritoriality, treaty ports), and colonial trade in ideas that characterize colonizers … as well as colonial regimes” (2004, p. 7; see also 1997, pp. 1-20).
In this article I explore some cultural representations whereby artists and writers trained in early-twentieth century Japan gazed on whiteness and thereby constituted their own gendered, classed, sexualised, racialised, and ethnicised positionings in the taxonomies of difference in East Asia and beyond. The three case studies involve male artists whose work ranged across the literary and the visual: Tanizaki Jun’ichirô (1886–1965), a novelist with an intense interest in visuality (see Lamarre, 2005); Koide Narashige (1887–1931), an artist and essayist who collaborated with Tanizaki; and Fujita Tsuguharu (1886–1968), another painter who used the essay form to reflect on his artistic practice. In the works of these artists, the themes of gender, visuality and racialisation intersect. Their works are characterised by what I call a ‘taxonomic gaze’, a gaze which classifies, categorises, and produces hierarchies.

Naomi, the modern girl

Novelist Tanizaki Jun’ichirô published an essay some time after the Great Kantô Earthquake of 1923. In this essay Tanizaki set out his hopes for the renewal of Tokyo, which included the rebuilding of the physical infrastructure of the city, and a vision for the wholesale renovation of Japanese culture, with a particular focus on the figure of the Japanese woman.

The change will be so great it will be almost as if they belonged to a different race. Their figures, the color of their skin and of their eyes will become like those of Western people, and even the Japanese they speak will have the ring of a European language. (Tanizaki, 1934; trans. in Keene, 1984, p. 751)

This faith in the power of culture to transform the very bodies of the people seems surprising to modern readers. Notwithstanding the scientific and sociological debunking of the category of ‘race’, we are used to thinking of ‘race’ as a property of bodies, something which cannot easily be modified by culture. It is implicitly assumed that the meanings attached to bodies are infinitely malleable, albeit within specific regimes of power, but that the bodies themselves cannot so easily be transformed. Tanizaki’s statement, is, of course, the rhetorical flourish of a novelist-turned-essayist, and does not stand up to excessive scrutiny. Nevertheless, when read in conjunction with his novel, Chijin no Ai (A Fool’s Love, 1925/1985) it does suggest an engagement with some more fluid and unstable discourses of racialisation.

A Fool’s Love focuses on a white-collar salaried worker, Jôji, and his relationship with the café waitress Naomi. Jôji marries Naomi in the expectation that she can be trained as a suitable companion, and he provides her with lessons, in English conversation, singing and social dancing. They live together in the former studio of an artist and his model. Naomi has been described as the archetypal example of the moga, or ‘modern girl’. The moga, in turn, has been seen as one of the symbols of artistic modernism and of early twentieth century Japanese modernity (Mackie, 2007, 2012; Sato, 2003, passim). In the first half of the twentieth century in disparate places around the world, attention was focused on modern girls like ‘Naomi’. They challenged mainstream representations of domesticity and femininity; were characterised by distinctive dress and commodities; experimented with alternative romantic relationships outside the sphere of the
marital home and the nuclear family; and ventured into the public spaces of the city, where they could be seen by others and return the gaze (Conor, 2002, pp. 53–54; Conor, 2004; see also Barlow, 2006, pp. 26–28).

Naomi wears a bricolage of Japanese *kimono*, western dress and Indian fabrics. Her style is reminiscent of the women described by the Modern Girl Around the World Research Group, women who “occupied the liminal space conjoining the indigenous and the imperial, the national and the international”, and who “combined and reconfigured aesthetic elements drawn from disparate national, colonial and racial regimes to create a ‘cosmopolitan look’” (2005, p. 246). In a similar vein, Thomas Lamarre has described such women in Tanizaki’s novels as “an overdetermined image of transgressive intercourse ... a site where so many different tensions or contradictions are condensed and materialized ... a literal place of intercourse between different races, cultures and nations” (2005, p. 135).

One of the attractions of Naomi is that she cannot be placed comfortably either inside or outside the category of Japanese. This starts with her very name. Although the name ‘Naomi’ is well-formed as a given name for a Japanese woman, particularly when written in Sino-Japanese characters, it is also a common-enough name in the English-speaking world. This suggestion of indeterminate linguistic genealogy is emphasised in the narrator’s choice to write Naomi’s name in the *katakana* script reserved for foreign words rather than any of the other choices available (Tanizaki, 1925/1984, p. 8).

**Vernacular taxonomies**

Naomi is placed in a shifting hierarchy shaped by class, gender and racialisation. There is a taxonomy of different types of women in the novel, from the most refined of middle-class Japanese women, to the Russian countess and dance teacher, Madame Shlemskaya. There is also a more localised taxonomy of women in the theatres and dance halls of urban Tokyo. Naomi is a long way from the refined middle-class ladies and the ‘white countess’ Madame Shlemskaya, but may be placed precisely in a hierarchical relationship with the other women in the dance halls. The actress, Kirako, for example, seems a charismatic and refined figure in the world of the dance hall, but as an actress, she would be beyond the pale for respectable middle-class families. Kirako’s beauty references elite consumer products, appropriate for a woman who is herself a commodity, a spectacle to be consumed by the patrons of the theatre.

*Kirako ... gave the impression of a precious object that’s been scrupulously polished with the highest art ... when she sat down at the table and picked up her cocktail glass, her hand, from the palm to the wrist, looked wonderfully slender, so light it could barely support the weight of her softly draping sleeve ... If they’d been flowers, Naomi would have bloomed in a field, and Kirako indoors. How thin, almost transparent was that little nose on her firm, round face! Not even a baby – only a doll made by the greatest master – could have such a delicate nose! Last of all, I noticed her teeth; Naomi had always been proud of hers but Kirako’s were rows of pearls. (Tanizaki, 1986, p. 92)*
Naomi can, however, look down on another woman, Mâ-chan, who presents the spectacle of an unsuccessful racialised masquerade, a monstrous and carnivalesque image of mismatched colours.

Her cheeks were red, her eyes large, and her lips thick, but the oval outline of her face, with its long, thin nose, was in the pure Japanese style of the ukiyoe prints. I pay close attention to women’s faces, and I’d never seen such an ill-assorted face as this. It occurred to me that the woman was probably distressed by her Japanese face and had worked overtime to look like a Westerner [Seiyô-kusaku]. She’d whitened [o-shiroi ga nutte ari] every bit of exposed skin until she looked like she’d been dusted with rice flour, and applied shiny, blue-green pigment around her eyes. The bright red on her cheeks was obviously rouge. Unfortunately, with that ribbon twisted around her head, she looked like a monster. (Tanizaki, 1986, pp. 83-84)

Naomi suffers, however, in comparison with Madame Shlemskaya, who is associated with the whiteness of fabrics such as georgette and precious stones such as diamonds.

She had the grave dignity and firm features of a born aristocrat; and her dignity was enhanced by her pale, limpid complexion – so white [sôhaku o obita] it was a little frightening. Seeing her authoritative expression, her tasteful clothes, and the jewels glittering on her breast and fingers, I found it hard to believe she was as poor as I had been told. (Tanizaki, 1986, pp. 60-61)

A meeting between Madame Shlemskaya and Naomi allows for further comparisons and further refinement of the taxonomy.

Naomi flushed bright red and shook hands furtively without saying a word. I was even worse when my turn came. To tell the truth, I couldn't look at the countess’s pale [aojirō], sculptured face. Her hand glittered with countless tiny diamonds as I touched it silently. I didn't raise my eyes. (Tanizaki, 1986, p. 66)

The narrator’s comments on Madame Shlemskaya’s body odour reflect commonly-held views of racialisation at this time. Non-Japanese bodies were thought to have a distinctive smell, due to the consumption of animal products, such as milk, butter and meat. Indeed, one epithet used to describe Europeans and Americans was batâ-kusai, ‘smelling of butter’. In addition, the application of perfume directly to the body, rather than the use of incense to perfume clothing, was a cultural practice which distinguished Japanese and non-Japanese (Adachi, 2006, pp. 19-38). We can also see the closely linked attitudes of anxiety and fascination, fear and desire, which are evoked by whiteness in the novel.⁴

What's more, [the countess's] body had a certain sweet fragrance ... I'm told that Westerners do have strong body odor, but to me, the faint, sweet-sour combination of perfume and perspiration was not at all displeasing—to the contrary, I found it deeply alluring. It made me think of lands across the sea I’d never seen, of exquisite, exotic flower gardens.

"This is the fragrance exuded by the countess's white body [shiroi karada]!" I told myself, enraptured, as I inhaled the aroma greedily. (Tanizaki, 1986, p. 69)

⁴ Hamilton has characterized this structure of feeling, when faced with racialised difference, as “fear and desire” (1990, pp. 14-35).
The most interesting feature of the novel, however, is the shifting racialisation of Naomi herself. She is said to look like someone of ‘mixed blood’, although there is no specific question raised in the novel about her parentage (Tanizaki, 1986, p. 10). Rather, her body shifts in categorisation through her skilled manipulation of dress, deportment, demeanour, gesture and cosmetics. After a trip to the beach, the narrator watches the progress of sunburn, suntan, peeling and finally once again the paling of the skin as the effects of the sun wear off. Naomi’s appearance on the beach in her swimsuit causes a lyrical reflection on the beauty of her body. The narrator expresses delight at the physical proportions of her body, the straightness of her limbs, the deportment which she has learned from watching Hollywood movies, and the added aura of the Hollywood-style swimsuit, purchased on the Ginza, the place most closely associated with the gendered and commodified modernity of the modern girl:

my heart cried out, “Naomi, Naomi, my Mary Pickford! What a fine, well-proportioned body you have. Your graceful arms! Your legs, straight and streamlined like a boy’s!” And I couldn’t help thinking of Mack Sennett’s lively “bathing beauties”, whom I’d seen in the movies. (Tanizaki, 1986, p. 28)

The following passage not only suggests the importance of deportment in racialised categorisations, but also a process of training to achieve specific forms of deportment.

Apparently she studied the actresses’ movements when we went to the movies, because she was very good at imitating them. In an instant she could capture the mood and idiosyncrasies of an actress. Pickford laughs like this, she’d say; Pina Menicheli moves her eyes like this; Geraldine Farrar does her hair up this way. Loosening her hair, she’d push it into this shape and that. (Tanizaki, 1986, p. 37)

At times, Naomi wears Japanese dress—kimono—with the particular form of white make-up which was applied at that time by women. This make-up (oshiroi, or ‘white’) is sometimes translated as ‘powder’, but is, in fact, a paste. Furthermore, the meaning of this white make-up shifts according to context. When Mâ-chan, above, wore such make-up with western dress, it was seen as an unsuccessful attempt to masquerade as ‘white’. When Naomi wears this make-up with her kimono, it takes on different connotations, for this white make-up is perfectly appropriate with Japanese dress.

“Well? A good choice don’t you think?” Dissolving white powder [o-shiroi] in her hands, [Naomi] patted it vigorously on her steaming shoulders and nape as she spoke.

To tell the truth, the soft flowing material [of the kimono] wasn’t very becoming on her full shoulders, large hips, and prominent bust. Muslin or common silk cloth gave her the exotic beauty of a Eurasian girl [ainoko], but a more formal kimono, like this one, only made her look vulgar. And when she wore a bold pattern, she looked like a chophouse woman in one of those places in Yokohama that cater to foreign sailors. (Tanizaki, 1986, pp. 80–81)

5 Tanizaki uses the word, ‘Ainoko’, which refers to someone of mixed parentage, and in the novel is written with Sino-Japanese characters which specifically mean ‘mixedblood-child’.
It is rather Naomi’s classed positioning which is the source of incongruity. For a vulgar woman like Naomi to wear the *kimono* of a respectable woman results in a dissonance which, nevertheless, has racialised connotations. Here, racialised anxiety is a matter of contagion rather than an essential property of the body. There is an anxiety about Japanese women who provide sexual services to non-Japanese customers in former treaty ports like Yokohama. Naomi can also be connected with the former treaty port of Yokohama through her consumption of imported goods. At home, she dresses her body in exotic imported fabrics, and their house is decorated in bohemian style with cheap Indian cotton and calico.

**White nights**

Most fascinating and challenging, however, is that Naomi’s very body is transformed in the course of the novel. The narrator keeps a diary where he records the transformations of her body from adolescence to adulthood, as they share their life in the ‘culture house’. The diary and photographs seem like a parody, or perhaps a vernacularisation, of the scientific and medical discourses whereby the truth of racial difference is thought to be something that can be defined and captured through testing, measuring and documentation (Anderson, 2002, *passim*). However, the very transmutability of Naomi’s body provides a challenge to these discourses of racialisation.

At 8 p.m. I bathed her in the washtub. She still has her tan from the beach. She’s very dark, except under the bathing suit. I’m dark, too, but Naomi has such a light complexion, the contrast is sharper. Even when she has nothing on, you’d think she was wearing a suit. “You look like a Zebra,” I said. She laughed.

About a month later, on October 17, I wrote:

*Her tan is fading and her skin doesn’t peel any more. It’s even smoother and lovelier than before.* (Tanizaki, 1986, p. 33)

In a pivotal scene, the narrator contemplates Naomi’s sleeping body. This is no longer the suntanned body of the bathing beauty, but a wholly new vision of whiteness.

Taking care not to waken her, I sat by her sleeping pillow, and stealthily gazed at her sleeping form … A book lay open at her nose … My eyes moved back and forth between the pure white Western paper [*junpaku na seiyōshi*] in the book and the whiteness [*shirosa*] of her breast. (Tanizaki, 1986, p. 120)

The reference to the whiteness of paper is perhaps unsurprising for a literary figure who grew up in a household of printers. The association with paper might also suggest, however, the literary reference points for Tanizaki’s explorations of whiteness. The chimerical and chameleonic nature of Naomi’s body reaches its ultimate expression in this scene. Naomi’s skin shifts from yellow (*kiiroi*) to white

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6 On the ‘culture house’ (*bunka jūtaku*), see Sand (2005). The artist’s studio figures as a particularly sexualised space in the popular culture of the time, and performs a similar function as a sexualised space in Tanizaki’s novel, *Manji* (1926-8/1947)

7 In another work, *Ningyo no Nageki* (A Mermaid’s Lament) for example, Tanizaki tells the fantastical story of a white mermaid figure which clearly draws on European mythology and fairy tales. See Tanizaki (1917), trans. in Lamarre (2005), pp. 45-46.
(shiroi), but this whiteness has a distinctive quality. Naomi’s whiteness is displaced from discourses of racialisation, but also problematises the association of whiteness with purity. Her whiteness is ‘wrapped in tatters, amid soiled, dusty quilts’, a necrophiliac whiteness associated with death and melancholy, a paradoxical whiteness which is associated with the darkness of night-time rather than the light of day.

Naomi’s skin looked yellow [kiiroku] one day and white [shiroku] another; but it was extraordinary limpid when she was fast asleep, or had just awakened, as though all the fat in her body had melted away. Night is usually associated with darkness; but to me, night always brought thoughts of the whiteness [shirosa] of Naomi’s skin. Unlike the bright, shadowless whiteness of noon, it was a whiteness wrapped in tatters, amid soiled, dusty quilts; and that drew it to me all the more ... her face, too, radiant and kaleidoscopic by day, now wore a mysterious cast, a melancholy frown, like that of one who’s just swallowed bitter medicine, or of one who’s been strangled. I loved her sleeping face … “Her death-face would be beautiful, too”, I often told myself. (Tanizaki, 1986, pp. 120-121)

**Under Western eyes**

Thus far I have explored the shifting, chimerical and chameleonic properties of the body of Naomi in the eyes of the narrator. The narrator’s view of the shifting racial categorisation of Naomi’s body suggests a fluid, non-essentialist view of racialisation. There is, however, a limit to this fluidity. In the end, Naomi is a Japanese woman. The narrator’s relationship with Naomi is a way of managing his fascination with and fear of whiteness.

Though I had no sense for such things, my tastes ran to the chic and up-to-date, and I imitated the Western style in everything. My readers already know so much. If I’d had enough money to do whatever I pleased, I might have gone to live in the West and married a Western woman, but my circumstances wouldn’t permit that, and I married Naomi, a Japanese woman with a Western flavour. Even if I had been rich, I would have had no confidence in my looks. I’m only five feet two inches tall; I have a dark complexion, and my teeth are snaggly. I’d be forgetting my place if I hoped for a wife with the majestic physique of a Westerner. A Japanese should marry a Japanese, I concluded, and Naomi came closest to meeting my needs. I was satisfied. (Tanizaki, 1986, p. 67).

For most of the novel, the narrator and protagonist, Jôji, has been the bearer of the gaze, casting his powerful taxonomic eye over a series of women, and placing them in a strict hierarchy according to racialised standards of beauty. In a scene reminiscent of John Berger’s (1977) discussion of women who constantly imagine themselves under the gaze of a man, Jôji imagines himself under the gaze of a Western woman. In the taxonomy of difference, his masculine gaze

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8 See also Tanizaki’s (1917) story, Ningyo no Nageki (A Mermaid’s Lament), where the mermaid’s skin “was of such whiteness that it recalled the glow of moonlight” (trans., in Lamarre, 2005, pp. 45-46). Readers of Kawabata Yasunari’s (1952/1972) novel Yukiguni (Snow Country) may also think back to the white nights of Tanizaki’s novel. The opening sentence of Snow Country is: “The train emerged from the long tunnel into Snow Country. The depth of the night turned white” (1972, p. 5, my translation).
cannot quite meet the European gaze on equal terms. He is conscious of his height, his skin colour, and his teeth.

The taxonomic gaze

The character of Jôji in *A Fool’s Love* is constantly classifying women into categories according to class, according to racialised gradations and according to physical beauty (Tanizaki, 1925/1984, p. 92, 102, 105-106, 127-128, 142). In his essays, too, Tanizaki repeatedly reflected on the different kinds of beauty to be found in women of different countries. Tanizaki’s close contemporary, the artist Koide Narashige, also reflected on different kinds of beauty in his essay “Rafu Mandan” (“Idle Thoughts on the Nude Woman”, 1926/1987, pp. 9-14). Koide, like Tanizaki, has a taxonomic gaze, and constantly makes connections between the act of painting a woman, and taking such a woman as a lover.

Japanese women do not have beautiful bodies, and no matter what you say, everyone agrees that only a Western woman will do for a nude; moreover, when you look at the shape of the women who appear in Japanese oil paintings, you just want to laugh at their lack of shape. But if you were to ask the one laughing whether he had made love to a Western woman, the answer would be no. They would, after all, be walking out with a broad-faced Japanese woman. (Koide, 1926/1987, p. 9)

Koide’s essay is populated by waitresses, models, and inaccessible European women. He also reflects on the spaces which are the most suitable settings for the depiction of the nude. In a similar fashion to Tanizaki’s fictional musings, Koide finds Western-style rooms to be superior to Japanese-style rooms for this purpose:

in Western art, there are paintings of women connected with various natural scenes from everyday life: bathing scenes, seated women, scenes of women at their toilette, and so on. In Japan, however, even if one attempts to find motifs of nudity in everyday life, it’s rather difficult. Even if one were to find such a scene, it would be the site of things which one would hesitate to introduce. For example, if one were to paint a scene of a woman standing by a bed and translate it into a Japanese context, it would not be a very pleasing composition ... Beds look right in Western-style rooms. There’s nothing uncomfortable about the sight. Often, beds are more of a decorative element in such rooms. In Japan, there is something suggestive about seeing a bed in broad daylight. (Koide, 1926/1987, pp. 8-9)

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9 See also the anxiety about comparisons between Japanese men and European men expressed in Tanizaki’s essay “On Love and Sexual Desire”: “Questioning the prostitutes in the ports open to foreigners in the Yokohama and Kobe areas supports this fact; according to these women, relatively few Japanese have such appetites, in comparison with Westerners” (Tanizaki, 1931; trans., in Lamarre, 2005, p. 333).


11 Koide provided illustrations and book design for one of Tanizaki’s novels (see Koide Ryûtarô, 2006).
Koide’s essay is symptomatic of some prevalent attitudes in the art world of early twentieth century Japan. He clearly makes connections between ‘Westernised’ spaces, artistic spaces, and sexualised spaces, in a manner similar to the logic of Tanizaki’s novels. He goes on to describe the ‘dressing’ of artist’s studios with Indian cloth and Western furniture, in a manner similar to Tanizaki’s novel. These scenes suggest the international dissemination of the bohemian style (Koide, 1926/1987, p. 9; Tanizaki, 1925/1984, p. 30; Nicholson, 2003, passim).

Koide can be placed in a lineage of artists who engaged with European styles of painting. By the time Koide was writing, the art world in Japan was polarised into two styles known as ‘Nihonga’ (Japanese-style painting) and ‘Yôga’ (Western style painting). From the 1890s, artists in Japan travelled to Paris to experience the art schools of Montmartre and Montparnasse (Bryson, 2003, pp. 101–118). Those who could not travel to Paris studied with college art teachers who had returned from Europe. They learned the practices of drawing and painting from live models, the practices which are referred to in Tanizaki’s novelistic references to studios and art schools. They also learned a series of gendered, classed and racialised power relations.

Tanizaki’s novel suggests that the constitution of racialised difference is not an inherent property of bodies. Rather, racialisation involves the reading of bodies for evidence provided by dress, deportment, gesture, cosmetics, adornment and a whole range of embodied practices. Racialised positionings are constituted through a series of gazes between actors in the modern scene, embedded in complex relations of power amid the circulation of signs, symbols, bodies, commodities, finance and capital.

**Gazing on whiteness in the metropolis**

While Tanizaki and Koide were gazing on and classifying various types of women in the urban areas of Japan, Fujita [Foujita] Tsuguharu took his brush, paints and inks to the centre of the visual arts—Paris. Foujita lived in the Paris of Hemingway and Gertrude Stein, Amedeo Modigliani and Chaim Soutine, Man Ray and Jean Cocteau, Colette and Kiki de Montparnasse. It was the town of bohemians, writers, artists and models, new women, modern girls and garçonnès.12

Foujita has become known for a particular technique for rendering white skin. Although using oil paints, he adapted techniques from Japanese brush painting to achieve a profound, milky whiteness in his paintings. He first covered the canvas in a special white paint of his own recipe, then produced outlines with a fine, dark brush, before finally filling in with paint (Birnbaum, 2006, pp. 5–6, pp. 96–98). While drawing on the techniques of Japanese brush painting, Foujita also achieved effects which had not been attempted by his forebears in Japan.

> I suddenly realised one day that there are very few paintings of nudes in Japan. In the paintings of Harunobu or Utamaro, there are merely glimpses of part of an...

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12 See Foujita’s ink and watercolour drawing of a woman doing the Charleston, from the album “Le Journal de Youki”, reproduced in Selz (1981, p. 19).
arm or a small area around the knee. I realized that they conveyed the sensation of skin only in those places. For the first time I decided to try and represent that most beautiful of materials—human skin. (Fujita, 1984, trans., Birnbaum, 2006, p. 6)

As an artist in Paris, Foujita could literally gaze on the women of the world, and, through his paintings, make the spectacle of these women available to other viewers. His paintings have come to be hung in major international galleries, and thus could be said to express a gaze of power, contributing to the artistic culture of Paris and the world. In focusing on the beauty of ‘human skin’, however, he was touching on one of the privileged signifiers of racialised difference. It is also, of course, important to note that it was the skin of the woman’s body which most interested him, thus placing him in the position of powerful masculine observer. A similar positioning has been described with reference to Foujita’s predecessors.

It is through a focus on the bodies of women rather than men that proximity to and intimacy with the West are evoked. Such a high degree of assimilation into European visuality cannot have been easy for any of the Meiji artists to achieve. Yet in a sense there was always a place carved out for them in advance, by virtue of the fact that the European visual regime they were embarked on entering was centered squarely on the masculine subject of vision—one had only, so to speak, to step into his shoes. (Bryson, 2003, p. 108)

One of Foujita’s celebrated paintings of whiteness is “Nude with Jouy Fabric” from 1922, a portrait of Kiki de Montparnasse reclining on a pale brocade fabric.¹³ Foujita’s third wife, and one of his models, was Lucie Badoud. He called her “Youki” (Snow) in honour of her milky white skin. In this act of naming, he demonstrates a fascination with whiteness, but also assimilates whiteness into his own cultural sphere by giving her a Japanese name. Foujita and Youki were photographed lounging in his studio, both wearing Japanese kimono. His painting, “Youki, Goddess of the Snow” was exhibited at the Salon d’Automne in 1924 (Birnbaum, 2006, pp. 118-126; Klüver & Martin, 1989, pp. 100-101).

Skin colour also took on gendered meanings in Foujita’s paintings. In the 1920s, Foujita completed two massive and rather fanciful murals. They have only recently been restored and put on public display (Satô et al., 2008, pp. 70-89). One is called Lutteurs (Fighters, 1928) and the other takes the form of two Compositions: Composition au lion (Composition with Lion) and Composition au chien (Composition with Dog, 1928). Both wall-sized paintings are composed of a series of carefully arranged naked male and female bodies, some in repose, some embracing, and some in combat. In the Compositions, the human bodies are interspersed with animals. What is interesting about the male and female bodies is the gradation of colour. Generally, the female bodies are paler than the male bodies, unless they are specifically racialised as Indian or African. The figures in the murals are largely divorced from a specific place and time, and thus the use of colour to delineate gendered and racialised differences is all the more striking.

¹³ Kiki de Montparnasse was one of the names by which Alice Prin (1901-1953) was known. She was a painter, actor and artist’s model, who appears in many of Man Ray’s photographs, and is featured in the surrealist film, Ballet Mécanique (see Klüver & Martin, 1996).
In Foujita’s essays, the impulse to classify and categorise appears, just as strongly as in the writings of Tanizaki and Koide. In one essay, on “Women and Cats”, he describes the experience of having been a judge at a cat show in Paris. In fact, the essay has little mention of women at all, but the title prompts the reader to wonder what analogies are being drawn between cats and women. He explains at the end of the essay that when he did not have access to a woman as model, he would draw and paint cats. Indeed, Foujita became famous for paintings which feature cats, which finally became equivalent to the artist’s signature (Fujita, 2005, pp. 54-56).

In the above-mentioned essay on the “Women of the World”, Foujita recounts his experiences with women from various countries. Travel, it seems, provided Foujita and other tourists with an excuse to purchase the sexual services of women from all over the world. Let us take another look at Foujita’s account.

In 1921, I left Japan and headed for France. The ship had hardly docked in Shanghai before my fellow passengers, from curiosity to know a Western woman, went to visit the white-walled western building with the red light. There they were taken by the golden hair of the Polish Jewish women and the Russian refugee women, enchanted by the charm of blue eyes, and returned to the ship singing paens. I was the only one who celebrated the beauty of the slender bamboo-like figures of the Chinese women, and did not listen to their stories. It was the same when we docked in Hong Kong. To them, the Malay and Indian women just seemed like sauvages. For me, however, they gave me a sense of aethetiquement beauté. (Fujita, 1984, p. 57)

Foujita displays none of the anxiety about European women which we can discern in the writings of Tanizaki and Koide. He places himself in a position of power which allows him to categorise the women of the world. He appears to privilege women from Asia, his own part of the world. However, he displays his access to European cultural capital through the sprinkling of French words through his text. He goes on in other essays to provide anecdotes of the various women he came to know in the bohemian circles of Paris. While in Paris, Foujita was able to access the privileges of the male artist, and exercise a gaze of power on the women who posed as models for himself and other artists.

Nevertheless, Foujita himself was also subject to the taxonomic gaze, and could not always transcend his positioning as an exotic ‘oriental’. In English language accounts of the artistic world of early twentieth century Paris, he comes across as something of a curiosity. He provided judo demonstrations; performed Japanese folk songs and dances; and dressed in idiosyncratic costumes of his own design and fabrication (Birnbaum, 2006, pp. 63-71, 95, 128-129). Phyllis Birnbaum has commented on the popular view of Foujita, that “he was simply seen as a Japanese artist without nuances, reaching toward caricature, always effervescent and sociable, with endless silly costumes at the ready” (2006, p. x). While it is true that Foujita often played on this exoticism and was a tireless self-promoter and manipulator of his own image, a somewhat more sophisticated picture emerges from his writings (Fujita, 1984). His essays reveal someone who

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was disciplined in his work habits, thoughtful about his art, and able to conjure a picture in words just as skilfully as he does with his brush on canvas or silk.

**Conclusion**

All of these case studies demonstrate that those who grew up in the cultural milieu of early twentieth century Japan had been exposed to hierarchical notions of ‘race’. European racial taxonomies interacted with local taxonomies which depended on much more than just skin colour. Bodies were ‘read’, not only for physical differences (skin colour, hair colour, body size and proportion, body hair, bodily odours) but also for clues based on deportment, dress, gestures, posture and voice which could be used to make judgments about class, gender, ethnicity, racialised positioning and sexuality. Local taxonomies interacted with, but were not identical to, Eurocentric categorisations. Writers and artists explored these racialised taxonomies and at times were able to subvert them. These racialised hierarchies also interacted with gender in interesting ways. These male artists could exercise a dominating, masculine gaze on the women of their own and other countries. However, in the racialising gazes which emanated from Europe, the Japanese male was often positioned as exotic ‘other’, an otherness which sometimes trumped his ability to exercise a powerful gendered gaze.

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Introduction

The formation of specifically white subject positions has in fact been [the] key, at times as cause and at times as effect, to the socio-political processes inherent in taking land and making nations. (Frankenberg, 1997, p. 2)

‘I do not believe that the real life of this nation is to be found either in the great luxury hotels and the petty gossip of so called fashionable suburbs, or in the officialdom of organised masses. It is to be found in the homes of people who are nameless and unadvertised and who, whatever their individual religious conviction or dogma, see in their children their greatest contribution to the immortality of their race’. Those words are in substance as true today as they were then. (John Howard, quoting Robert Menzies, 1997a)

The Prime Minister is touring the battlefields of France where his father and grandfather fought, carrying with him one of their wartime diaries. Is such wallowing in the past healthy? Sounds like black armband travel to me. (Lucashenko, 2000)

The British imperial project was predicated on taking possession of other peoples’ lands and resources for the benefit of Empire. Britain took possession in a number of ways: in Canada, the United States and New Zealand it was through negotiated settlements and treaties with Indigenous peoples that lands became appropriated by the Crown. The right to take possession was embedded in British and international common law and rationalised through a discourse of civilisation that supported war, physical occupation and the will and desire to possess. Underpinning property rights, possession entails values, beliefs, norms and social conventions, as well as legal protection, as it operates ideologically, discursively and materially. Property rights are derived from the Crown which in the form of the nation-state holds possession. Possession and nationhood are thus constituted symbiotically. This leads me to ask whether the form of Britishness and national identity that developed in Australia is “free of, uninformed, and unshaped by” (Morrison, 2002, p. 266) Indigenous sovereignty. In this article I
explore how the core values of Australian national identity are located within the
house that Jack built; a nation that in its denial of Indigenous sovereignty is
perceived to be a white possession.

**The perceived loss of dominance**

Despite the dominance of whiteness culturally, politically and economically, since
Australia’s bicentenary there has been a concerted effort to write about and
reiterate the relationship between Britishness and Australian national identity
through a discourse of loss and recuperation. The emergence of this literature
coincided with Australia’s bicentenary, evoking a new sense of nationalism, which
celebrated and promoted the idea of a unified nation, born in part as a response
to more than a decade of multiculturalism. Keating’s policies in particular were
thought to undermine the idea that the nation was a unified white possession.
The push to see Australia as part of Asia did not sit well with members of a
growing conservative electorate who perceived themselves as a country with
more in common with Britain, Europe and America than our neighbours to the
north. A discourse of loss emerged, tied to the ideas that there were too many
non-British migrants, mainly Asian, entering Australia and the granting of native
title to Indigenous people after the *Mabo* decision. Both, the fear of Asian
‘invasion’ and of ‘dispossession’ by Indigenous people, were orchestrated to
recentre white possession of the nation. The conservative reaction to the Keating
government resulted in the election of John Howard and the emergence of
Pauline Hanson, representing the One Nation party, onto the political scene. Both
Howard and Hanson espoused a return to ‘core values’ of the mainstream and
the reduction of fiscal and policy support for multiculturalism and Indigenous
affairs. The Office of Multicultural Affairs closed and Howard appointed a National
Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC) in 1997 to provide policy direction and
strategies for implementation over the next ten years. The NMAC’s report
*Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: Towards Inclusiveness*, was
launched on 5 May 1999.

In response, the government presented its multicultural policy in parliament in
December of the same year ‘highlighting the need for Australian multicultural
policy to be a unifying force and relevant to *all* Australians’ (Department of
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, n.d., p. 1). The Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Commission’s budget was decreased and its policy
direction changed from one of rights-based advocacy to practical reconciliation.
The native title legislation was amended to reduce the degree and amount of
rights enshrined in the original Act. By selectively demonising migrants,
Indigenous people and later refugees, Howard effectively recuperated national
identity and white possession, which he constructed as threatened by the
‘political correctness’ of the Hawke and Keating governments.

Another way that Howard strategically deployed the discourse of loss and
recuperation was by reifying the digger whose embodiment in Weary Dunlop, a
white heterosexual male, represents the core national values of mateship,
egalitarianism and a fair go (Howard, 1997b). Such an embodiment implicitly
excludes non-white migrants and Indigenous people from holding such core
values. As Ghassan Hage argues “it means making the ludicrous claim that other
people in the world are less committed to them or actually committed to
opposing values” (2003, p. 73). Howard’s assertion of such nationally-held core values paradoxically excludes the power relations which support and nurture white dominance while simultaneously exalting its seemingly invisible existence. The core values which were displayed by diggers on the battle fields are never linked to their colonial origins and the part they played in claiming the nation as a white possession.

Like Howard, Paul Keating also deployed the digger in nationalist rhetoric but he did so in a different way. As Fiona Nicoll argues in her book *From Diggers to Drag Queens*, Keating’s eulogy to the unknown soldier “presented ... a figure capable of drawing the diverse threads comprising contemporary Australian society together in tolerance” (2001, p. 29). In his attempt to reorient Australia’s core values towards a postcolonial future, Keating walked the Kokoda trail in the ex-colony of Papua New Guinea, relocating the digger in the Pacific and away from Europe, also signifying Australia’s role as a colonising nation. Though Keating was willing to acknowledge past injustices and presented an Australian national identity that did not privilege Britishness, he did not alter the perception that the nation is a white possession (Johnson, 2002).

Prime Minister Howard has visited the majority of overseas Australian war memorials where his attendance and conveyance of respect were televised to the nation. In particular, his visit to French battlefields signified to the nation that he had been touched by war through carrying to the site a diary belonging to a member of his family. Promoting his family’s wartime contribution assists in legitimating his authority as an Australian leader of the nation and vicariously links him to the digger tradition. Howard strategically deploys the digger, connecting the First World War to East Timor and then Iraq to substantiate our involvement in war; it is no coincidence that all our soldiers are now referred to as diggers. He will be at ANZAC Cove, Gallipoli, when Australia’s latest contingent of armed forces, who will be under the command of the British, arrives in Muthanna province, Southern Iraq on the 25 April (*The Weekend Australian*, 26–7 February 2005: 19). The icon of the digger defending all that his country represents, in the guise of protecting other people’s land and sovereignty, reaffirms in the national imaginary that the nation is a white possession. Similarly, the link between the digger and his British roots will be performed through Prince Charles presiding over the Gallipoli ceremonies this year.

Ghassan Hage argues that this apparent sense of loss and affirmation of white Australian heritage is tied to the perception that there was an assault on Australo-Britishness and its importance to the way in which people perceive their sense of belonging. He argues that white Australia’s sense of loss is directly connected to what he terms ‘governmental belonging’. This involves the belief that one has a right over the nation ... the belief in one’s possession of the right to contribute (even if only by having a legitimate opinion with regards to the internal and external politics of the nation) to its management such that it remains ‘one’s home’. (Hage, 1998, p. 46, my emphasis)

The right to possess is inextricably tied to perceiving the nation as a white possession. As Hage illustrates, during the years when multiculturalism was policy-driven, a white middle-class exerted their governmental belonging to give
voice to their aspirations and ideals on being cosmo-multicultural. The ‘cosmo-multiculturalist’ could be distant from the material reality of multiculturalism but appreciate and enjoy the aesthetic interaction and food (1998, pp. 118-146). Extending Hage’s argument, the cosmo-multiculturalist could support the granting of native title because the law and government limited the material reality for Indigenous people and Indigenous sovereignty rights were not granted. White possession was understood as not being threatened by these concessions. The discourse of loss and recuperation was in response to a split and crisis within whiteness producing a sense of declension and melancholy that gave impetus to recentring white possession.

That such a sense of loss of governmental belonging is underpinned by the belief that the nation is a white possession is evident in the recent High Court decision in the native title claim of the Yorta Yorta people (Moreton-Robinson, 2005). The High Court consolidated its legal and political resistance to native title by creating judicial and legal impediments that were presented as though they were race blind. Yet, the origin and assertion of property law in Australia continues to be based on racial domination and white possession. The denial of the Yorta Yorta’s native title was based on a regime of statutory interpretation that usurped the common law property rights of Indigenous people. On the basis of the fact of occupation, under Australian common law, the Yorta Yorta proved their native title. In effect, the High Court’s decision assumed “only white possession and occupation of land was validated and therefore privileged as a basis for property rights” (Harris, 1995, pp. 277–278). The High Court refuses the continuity of Indigenous sovereignty as the precondition and genesis of all concomitant rights, interests, entitlements, responsibilities, obligations, customs and law. In doing so, the High Court imputed reified white social standards to the Yorta Yorta which “not only denied their right to historical change but also the reality of their paradoxical continued existence” in white Australia (Torres & Mulin, 1995, p. 186). The perception that the nation is a white possession was visible in this decision.

The return to Britishness

Since assuming power in 1996, Howard has given numerous speeches outlining the Australian core values of ‘fairness’, ‘tolerance’, ‘equality’, ‘mateship’, ‘down-to-earth common-sense’, ‘decency’ and ‘a commitment to democracy’ (Hage, 2003, pp. 70–73). These values in one form or another are echoed in the literature on Britishness and Australian national identity. There is consensus that they are the core white values of the nation. For Howard, and writers such as Miriam Dixson, these values ‘hold’ the nation and they need to be reaffirmed and their social capital enhanced.

A common thread woven through the literature is that Australian national identity has been shaped by British values shared by convicts, explorers and pioneers, the nation’s founding ancestors. Their ethnic origins are acknowledged as being English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh, but collectively they constitute the British. It is often argued that the form of Britishness that developed in Australia was homogenous due to the lack of overt class barriers, the shared experience of immigration or transportation and the struggle to survive in a harsh and difficult landscape. This distinctly Australian and homogeneous form of Britishness is
racialised as being Anglo-Saxon (English), Anglo-Celtic (English and Irish) or the British patriotic race (English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh). Deploying these racial categories in this way suggests that there were a number of different races operating in Australia which in effect conflates ethnicity with race and masks the homogeneity of whiteness that developed through the spread of Empire (Allen, 1994). So while whiteness masked the ethnic heterogeneity of British immigrants in the service of the egalitarian myth up to the latter years of the twentieth century, today the egalitarian myth that Australia is a ‘tolerant society’ is deployed to mask the persistently privileged position of whiteness and its possession of the nation which simultaneously disavows Indigenous sovereignty.

Representations of Britishness take a number of forms in historical narratives written since the late 1990s. In their respective articles in an issue of the Journal of Historical Studies, Neville Meaney and Stuart Ward illustrate that Australia has a British inheritance consisting of economic, cultural and political affiliation with Britain until the late 1960s. Australians share with the British kinship and familial ties and this is why they supported Britain in the two world wars, why they continued to trade with the motherland even when it was not in their best interests and why they thought Britain’s protection would continue. It was only after Britain decided to invest its trading future in Europe that Australia sought trade and security in the arms of the United States (Meaney, 2001, p. 89; Ward, 2001, p. 104). Meaney and Ward both fail to acknowledge Australia’s British inheritance resulting from the spoils of colonialism and British law which provided the context for the assumption of white possession of the nation and the denial of Indigenous sovereignty. The separation of Australia’s institutional affiliations with Britain may have been born of necessity in the 1960s, but that did not result in the same affiliations being established with Asia; instead they were forged with another imperialist white nation.

According to Tara Brabazon in Tracking the Jack, threads of British culture have woven the fabric of the Australian nation. Australia’s British inheritance manifested in our form of government, education, legal and industrial systems and is signified through the incorporation of the Union Jack in both the flags of New Zealand and Australia. Brabazon’s excellent book traces the various forms Britishness took in its colonies, acknowledging the role of colonisation in shaping their content. However, she does not extend the implications to engage with white possession and Indigenous sovereignty. In Scatterlings of Empire, an issue of the Journal of Australian Studies, Amanda Nettelbeck illustrates how British migrants who came to Australia in the 1880s envisaged their task as being the establishment of a new colony for Britain. She presents them as ‘pioneers’ who, through hard work and determination, contributed to the development of the nation, making it their own (a similar portrayal is being represented in the current series The Colony on SBS television). What is clear in Nettelbeck’s work, though not argued, is how these attributes instilled a sense of possession that was connected to, but separated from Indigenous dispossession.

In his recent essay Made in England: Australia’s British Inheritance, David Malouf argues that, essentially, the values Australians inherited from Britain involve

[a] low church puritanism and fear of the body and its pleasures, British drunkenness; British pragmatism and distrust of theory; British philistinism and
dislike of anything showy, theatrical, arty or ‘too serious’; British good sense and the British sense of humour. (Malouf, 2003, p. 39)

According to Malouf, these attributes are tied to a habit of mind that is essentially Anglo-Saxon.

One that prefers to argue from example and practice rather than principle; that is happy, in a pragmatic way, to be in doubt as to why something works so long as it does work; is flexible, experimental, adaptive, and scornful of all those traps it sees in habit and rule. (2003, p. 43)

Malouf simultaneously disaggregates Anglo-Saxons into being British but does not explain why this conceptual shift is made. A racialised category (Anglo-Saxon) is constituted as a nationalist category (British). So Malouf understands that there is a relationship between race and nation but does not extend his analysis to engage with how Australia’s inherited values were racialised, that is whitened, in the process of becoming a nation. Instead he argues that a racialised habit of mind informed these values, one which is tolerant and finds expression in the form of English used by Australians. Malouf argues further that Australian English is derived from late-Enlightenment English and as such it is ‘purged of all those forms of violent expression that had led men to violent action’ (Malouf, 2003, pp. 47–48). It is moderate language grounded in reason, negotiation and compromise that created a form of social interaction in Australia, which tempered extremism and kept ‘the worst sorts of violence at bay’. It is the language of Australian literature, courts and the education system. What Malouf does not acknowledge is that this language is also tied epistemologically to a possessive investment in whiteness. Binary oppositions and metaphors had, by the eighteenth century, represented blackness within the structure of the English language as a symbol of negation and lack. Indigenous people were categorised as nomads as opposed to owners of land, uncivilised as opposed to being civilised, relegated to nature as opposed to culture. In Australian history books, the violence continued in written expression by denying Indigenous sovereignty through portrayals of peaceful settlement, not invasion and war. Yet Australian nationalism is now heavily invested in the tradition and memories of war and the defending and taking of possession, albeit in other countries (Nicoll, 2001).

Miriam Dixson, in *The Imaginary Australian: Anglo-Celts and Identity—1788 to the Present*, argues that Australia’s British inheritance manifested in a core Anglo-Celtic culture primarily derived from the English and Irish free immigrants and convicts. This core culture was “shaped to a disproportionate extent not just by the politics but by the entire folkways of founding generations” (Dixson, 1999, p. 24). She notes that it was the ideas and practices associated with authority, work, freedom, liberty, individualism, community, equality and gender that formed this core identity. She argues that whether the narrative is about bush pioneers, battlers and farmers or the ‘noble’ proletariats, they share common values. They involve “decency, a dedicated practicability and sense of finitude and a commitment to fairness which, as in all cultures where it appears, is a commitment within limits” (Dixson, 1999, p. 30). Dixson’s preoccupation with core Anglo-Celtic values that ‘hold’ and affirm the nation has the effect of reducing Indigenous dispossession to a mere blemish on the historical record. For Dixson, whiteness does not appear to be one of the limits to making commitments which are fair and equitable through its possession of the nation.
Dixson and Malouf, among others, espouse it was the founding ancestors’ conquering of the landscape that shaped these values, for they had to battle flood, fire, disease, famine and drought in contributing to the spread of Empire. There is also agreement among scholars of Britishness that the Australian nation in the latter part of the twentieth century was changed by the introduction of multiculturalism. Some perceive this as a positive thing, though they give little explanation as to why this is so. Others perceive it in terms of loss associated with the core values of the nation but the specificities of what has been lost is not addressed—leaving the sense that white people feel this way because there are too many racialised ‘others’ here who are ‘taking over’. Regardless of whether multiculturalism is perceived as a threat or promise, however, the nation must first be believed to be a white possession.

The discourse of loss and recuperation implicitly underpins studies of Britishness in contemporary Australia derived from the testimonials of British migrants who arrived after the 1940s. These studies identify similar values to those contained in historical narratives. Perseverance, struggle, self-reliance and adaptability are encapsulated in the icon of the battler and echoed in the respective work of A James Hammerton, Catharine Coleborne and Alistair Thomson. Hammerton and Coleborne reveal British migrants have a sense of being ‘left out’ of the migration experience of multicultural Australia. Alistair Thomson concurs that ‘though the British continued to be the most numerically significant migrant group, the British migrant experience was not central’ to Australia’s migration story (2001, p. 106). They agree that the apparent cultural and political similarity of British migrants to the mainstream has worked against their inclusiveness in the story of migration. Hammerton and Coleborne argue that while the testimonies disclosed that there were two competing narratives: one of ‘misery and failure’, the other of ‘vindicated struggle and success’, on the whole the dominant tale is one of ‘successful struggle’. Similarly, Thomson’s work illustrates how British migrants were successful in coming to terms with “a new physical and cultural environment” (2001, p. 114).

Jon Stratton (2000, p. 47) argues that British migrants’ sense of being overlooked in the migration story is directly linked to feelings of loss and a perceived decline in their ideological status as non-migrants and thus more authentically Australian. These feelings are connected to the Hawke and Keating governments’ attempt to shift

the thinking about Australia itself from the idea that it is some sort of offshoot of British society in the southern Pacific to seeing Australia as being, and always having been, engaged in, and to some extent moulded by, the South Asian region. (2000, p. 23)

Stratton argues that British migrants’ response to being overlooked is tied to the new self-ethnicisation being expressed in the form of associations, festivals and pubs. Sara Wills and Kate Darian-Smith take issue with Stratton arguing that these performative and symbolic displays of Britishness are not so much a form of empowerment through ethnicisation but

rather they can be seen as the attempted remobilisation by an uneasy but socially empowered group of a heightened public presence for their conception of history,
culture and nationhood ... in this process, British ethnicity is positioned as ‘other’—although certainly not as ‘alien’—to the mainstream. (Wills & Darian-Smith, 2003, p. 67)

Susanne Schech and Jane Haggis’s study of British migrants in South Australia extend the findings of Wills and Darian-Smith. They agree that British migrants do not perceive themselves as ‘foreign or strange’ but argue that they perceive migrants and Indigenous people as continuing foreigners or strangers who do not belong to the nation. It is British migrants’ whiteness that enables a sense of being part of the core of the nation. Schech and Haggis further argue that the British migrant’s expectation of fitting in was predicated on their knowledge of Australia as an extension of British whiteness. The presence of family members already in Australia tended to reinforce the idea of Australia as a member of the white Commonwealth family. Despite the long journey, moving to Australia felt to many like moving next door. None of our respondents who were adults at the time of migration recall fear or trepidation commonly associated with migration to an unknown place, even though few had detailed information on Australian life and environment. They just knew it was a place they could go. (2004, p. 6)

The discourse of loss and recuperation is expressed in contemporary British migrants’ narratives as an exclusion from the migration story, a change in their dominant ideological status as non-migrants and a remobilisation around their ethnicity as a recuperative strategy to claim a unique space within Australia’s migration history. Simultaneously they understand that they are part of the core or mainstream because of their race. However, the mobilisation around British ethnicity signifies a split within Australian whiteness because British migrants’ inclusion in the narrative of Australian migration history works to separate them from the history of Indigenous dispossession. This is in spite of the fact that their migration is one of the benefits they accrue from that history. They feel included in the nation because prepossession has been claimed on their behalf, hence their implicit understanding that the nation is a white possession.

**Whiteness and Indigenous dispossession: Beyond Britain**

Anne Curthoys argues that “Australian popular historical mythology stresses struggle, courage and survival, amidst pain, tragedy and loss”. It is “a history of suffering, sacrifice and defiance in defeat” (1999, pp. 2–3) which unfolds as narratives of victimisation. Similarly, the literature on colonial Britishness expressed through the bush battler, the pioneer, the explorer and the convict place these founding ancestors as struggling against the landscape. Thus, the landscape stands in as the oppressor in these narratives of victimisation and a displacement occurs; the violence committed against Indigenous people is disavowed. It is the landscape which must be conquered, claimed and named not Indigenous people, who, at the level of the subconscious are perceived to be part of the landscape and thus not human. By creating the landscape as oppressor, the values and virtues of achieving white possession can be valorised and Indigenous dispossession can be erased; the mythology of peaceful settlement perpetuated and sustained. As Ken Inglis illustrates in his book *Sacred Places*, despite the landscape holding memories of colonial land wars, conflicts between black and white are seldom commemorated (1998, p. 21). The values and virtues associated with overcoming an oppressive landscape are not easily
When there is evidence of white inhumanity. As they became part of Australian national identity these values and virtues are underpinned by the denial of violent invasion. Therefore the shaping of national identity cannot be detached from white possession of the nation and the denial of Indigenous sovereignty wars. This is why in the ‘history wars’ the virtue of white possession and denial of Indigenous sovereignty are inextricably woven into these debates about the nation’s history.

As I have argued elsewhere, during the years of frontier wars and subsequent occupation, it was the intersection between race and property that played a definitive role in constructing and affirming white domination and economic success at the cost of Indigenous racial and economic oppression (Moreton-Robinson, 2005). The incarceration, removal and extermination of Indigenous people were validated by regimes of common law based on the assumption that terra nullius gave rise to white sovereignty. “Only white possession and occupation of land was validated and therefore privileged as a basis for property rights” (Harris, 1995, pp. 277–278) and national identity. The white nation cannot exist as such without land and clearly defined borders; it is the legally defined and asserted territorial sovereignty that provides the context for national identifications. In this way terra nullius indelibly marks configurations of national identity. This is evident in Australian films ranging from The Sentimental Bloke through to Walkabout, and including Picnic at Hanging Rock, The Last Wave, Crocodile Dundee, The Man from Snowy River, Mad Max 2, The Adventures of Priscilla Queen of the Desert and The Castle, where myths of national belonging and identity are clearly tied to land, disconnected from the continuity of Indigenous sovereignty. Representations of Indigenous people in these films are through ghostly images or nomadic props appearing and then disappearing within the landscape. Although The Castle purported to offer something else, it lampooned the Mabo decision in the common law, and proceeded to reinscribe white possession. Refracted in this fantasy of film are representations of whiteness taking centre stage in the narrative of adversity, through virtue, intelligence, resilience, loss and hard work, effectively disavowing Indigenous sovereignty.

The assumption that the nation is a white possession is evident in the relationship between whiteness, property and the law which manifested itself in the latter part of the nineteenth century in the form of comprehensive discriminatory legislation tied to national citizenship (Markus, 1995, p. 238). Colonial and subsequent governments legitimised the appropriation of Indigenous lands, racialised incarceration and enslavement and limited naturalised citizenship to white immigrants (Lipsitz, 1998). While blackness was congruent with Indigenous subjugation and subordination, whiteness was perceived as being synonymous with freedom and citizenship. The right to determine who was allowed into the country and therefore who could belong was exercised by a white male British constituency at the heart of the nation. It was whiteness not Anglo-Celticity or Anglo-Saxoness that served to unify the nation.

The social reproduction of whiteness was legalised through the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 and the white Australia policy, which, until the 1940s, gave preference to white British, Canadian, American or New Zealand migrants (Markus, 1995). As Harris points out: “According whiteness actual legal status converted an aspect of identity into an external object of property, moving
whiteness from privileged identity to a vested interest” (1998, p. 104). The Australian definition of ‘white’ was expanded to include a variety of Eastern and Central European refugee groups by 1949. Stratton argues that the Australian usage of white covered all the people in Europe who “were technically thought of as white ... the geographical definition of European had come ... to equate with the racial classification of white” (1999, p. 177). The integration of various Europeans into a white Australian identity, coalesced around Anglo norms, was enabled by a worldview that defined Indigenous people up until the 1960s as non-citizens. Despite being revoked in 1973, the white Australia policy continued in immigration practice for many years. “The courts played an active role in enforcing this right to exclude ... in that sense the courts protected whiteness as they did any other form of property” (Harris 1995, p. 283).

Conclusion

Contemporary and historical narratives of Britishness and Australian national identity reveal that the values required to establish the nation as a white possession are those that were also required to dispossess Indigenous people of their lands. That these values can be linked across generations of those who trace their ancestry through Britishness is evidence of the perseverance of a white national identity and its possessiveness. Through the law, politics and culture the nation has been created as a white possession. “White [Australians] are encouraged to invest in whiteness, to remain true to an identity that provides them with resources, power and opportunity” (Lipsitz, 1998, p. vii) and to adhere to narratives that valorise their past and their present. Not all white Australians benefit from whiteness in the same way and some resist profiteering, but Australian national identity is predicated on retaining the benefits of colonial theft on the one hand, while exalting a sense of tolerance and fair play on the other. Britishness has metamorphosed into Australian national identity and culture but Indigenous sovereignty continues, through the presence of Indigenous people and their land, haunting the house that Jack built, shaking its foundations and rattling the picket fence.

Author Note

Professor Aileen Moreton-Robinson is a Geonpul woman from Quandamooka (Moreton Bay). Previous to her appointment as Australian Research Council Postdoctoral Fellow she taught Indigenous studies at Griffith University in Brisbane and Women’s Studies at Flinders University in Adelaide. She is author of Talkin’ Up to the White Woman: Indigenous Women and Feminism, University of Queensland Press and editor of Whitening Race: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism in Australia, Aboriginal Studies Press. Aileen has been involved in the struggle for Indigenous rights at local, state and national levels and has worked for a number of Indigenous organisations. Her writing in the area of native title, whiteness, race and feminism has been published in anthologies and journals here and abroad. Professor Moreton-Robinson is President of the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association.
References


This article undertakes two related tasks. Firstly, it provides one account of the origins of the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association (ACRAWSA) in 2003 and considers some of its significant events, publications and relationships. Secondly, it reflects on the survival of critical race and whiteness studies (CRWS) in the cultural space of the neo-liberal university. The arguments of three critical race and whiteness studies scholars are used to support me on this journey. To understand the challenges of thinking, speaking and writing critically about matters of race and whiteness, I draw on David Theo Goldberg’s distinction between anti-racism and anti-racialism in The Threat of Race (2009). I draw on Sara Ahmed’s study On Being Included (2012) to explain an increasing disarticulation between an anti-racist politics centred on equality—on the one hand—and ‘diversity’ talk and practice—on the other. The last part of the talk turns to the matter of Indigenous sovereignty, drawing on a key concept from the work of ACRAWSA’s founding president, Aileen Moreton-Robinson. I argue that ACRAWSA’s focus on everyday manifestations of the “possessive investment in patriarchal white sovereignty” (2011) have provided intellectual and ethical resilience in the face of the neo-liberal university’s radically individualising trajectory. I conclude with a call to scholars working within CRWS to resist the gendered temptation of white virtue as we enter the Association’s second decade.

**Keywords:** race, whiteness, virtue, everyday life, academia

**Timelines and Milestones**

In 2013 I was invited to speak at the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association (ACRAWSA) conference as the first Vice President and
member of our first executive formed after the *Critical Contexts and Crucial Conversations: Whiteness and Race* symposium convened by Aileen Moreton-Robinson in April 2002 on the Gold Coast with funding secured from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. My reflections on our first decade will necessarily be partial ones. There are as many stories of ACRAWSA's first decade as there are members. Rather than attempt to speak the truth about our organisation, I have searched for and will seek to communicate one vision of why ACRAWSA was formed, what it has achieved and what remains to be done.

The *Critical Contexts and Crucial Conversations: Whiteness and Race* symposium aimed to be a meeting of like-minded scholars committed to making visible the variegated visual register of race in a country that continued to be politically, legally and culturally shaped by the legacies of *Terra Nullius* and the White Australia policy. We decided that for these vital conversations to continue beyond the occasional symposium, we needed to establish a formal organisational presence within the academy.¹ An interim board was formed comprising Aileen, myself, Jane Haggis, Susanne Schech, Ben Wadham and Ingrid Tufvesson. In the first year we established the ACRAWSA website and e-journal with funding Aileen secured from the Queensland Department of Education and Training under their reconciliation initiatives fund. The next ACRAWSA symposium was at Flinders University in 2004 followed by a major conference in 2005 organised at Queensland University, titled *Whiteness and the Horizons of Race*, which featured David Roedigger as a keynote speaker. The following year's conference was organised by Sydney members of the executive and facilitated the participation of critical race theorists David Theo Goldberg and Cheryl Harris as international keynotes. Subsequent conferences have brought us international queer theorists of race and whiteness including Sara Ahmed, Jasbir Puar, and David Eng, as well as critical Indigenous studies scholars including Chris Anderson and Brendan Hokowhitu. Australian and New Zealand based intellectual leaders in the field who have framed our annual and biennial discussions include Moreton-Robinson, Jon Stratton, Suvendrini Perera, Irene Watson, Rebecca Stringer and Sandy O’Sullivan.

Many individuals have volunteered for executive and representative roles since ACRAWSA’s formation. In addition to the founding executive members named above they include: Damien Riggs, Angela Pratt, Adrian Carton, Angela Leitch, Toula Nicolacopoulos, Margaret Allen, Anna Szorenzy, Catherine Koerner, Mehal Krayem, Anne Barton, Jane Haggis, Goldie Osuri, Tracy Bunda, Peter Gale, Lara Palombo, Wendy Brady, Maryrose Casey, Alia Imtuoal, Suvendrini Perera, Emma Kowal, Steve Larkin, Alan Han, Kathleen Connellan, Holly Randell-Moon, Rose Carnes, Sharon Meagher, Sarah Cefai, Dona Cayetana, and Sharlene Leroy-Dyer.

I have named just some of the people who have identified themselves with and worked to advance the project of critical race and whiteness studies in Australia. Now I want to pause for a moment to consider what this naming might or might not mean. I see ACRAWSA as a unique intellectual space which has the potential to reorient our relationship to individuality itself. Outside ACRAWSA I can be Dr. Fiona Nicoll, Fiona or "Fi" as a colleague, a teacher, a daughter, a niece and a friend. In contrast, ACRAWSA invites and requires me to situate myself within historical and continuing structures of privilege and possession. So I write this article conscious that I am a white woman whose *habitus* is shaped by the

¹ Correspondence with Aileen Moreton-Robinson.
middle-class profession of teaching and the Christian missionary values of my family which have been in Australia since the mid nineteenth century through migration from Scotland, Ireland, Wales and Cornwall.

In spite of my strong commitment to secular values and critical race pedagogy I can nevertheless embody and perpetuate racist cultural practices forged during settler colonialism and refined as Australia emerged into the twentieth century as a white racial state. My research begins with the recognition that we are all embedded in this history and social context in different ways—as older and newer migrants to this country of Aboriginal countries—and that this embeddedness limits what it is possible for us to see and to know. While it is easy to write this in the relative solitude of my home office, it is harder to live and to work with this recognition in everyday life.

Paradoxically our ability to be effective intellectuals serving the socially transformative agenda of critical race and whiteness studies can be limited by our position as professional academics with expertise in cultural and social criticism. It is in this context that Ahmed (2012) suggests:

> When criticality becomes an ego ideal, it can participate in not seeing complicity. Perhaps criticality as an ego ideal offers a fantasy of being seeing ... critical whiteness might operate as a way of not seeing in the fantasy of being seeing: the critical white subjects, by seeing their whiteness, might not see themselves as participating in whiteness in the same way. (p. 179)

In a similar vein, George Yancy (2012) explains that embedded racism is often opaque to white people. Anti-racism for white people in everyday life is simplistically conceived as an ethical decision not to cross a moral line that separates good (non-racist) and bad (racist) individuals. In contrast, CRWS demands that we become better at seeing and dealing with racism that is at once inside and outside of us. To encapsulate the argument to come in a nutshell: my journey with CRWS has become one in which being good and well-intentioned are less important than doing better at anti-racist work to unsettle possessive claims to white sovereignty in this place.

ACRAWSA was always going to be a challenging inter-subjective space but never a boring one. Our association was formed against prevailing tides of history which would bring a barbaric approach to asylum seekers and a retreat from public engagement with Indigenous rights together with a revival of paternalistic discourses and policies. To work with critical race and whiteness studies in universities during the Howard years was to be perceived by colleagues and students as being on the wrong side of history. The Rudd Labour government provided a momentary reprieve from this hostility towards matters involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous relationships. One of the most vivid indicators of the power of publicly recognising Indigenous grievances was in my lecture theatres. To speak about the ‘stolen generations’ of Indigenous children prior to Kevin Rudd’s apology in 2007 was to experience a significant number of students walking out of the room in protest. After the apology the walk outs stopped. Now that Tony Abbott has taken Indigenous Affairs under his portfolio, our classroom dynamics have changed once again. Fun times!

As I step back from the teaching coalface to reflect on the inter-subjective dynamics of ACRAWSA’s first decade, there are three issues that seem endemic to a project like ours. I believe that our continual acknowledgement of and
working through these issues will ensure ACRAWSA’s survival in the face of criticisms that our work is no longer necessary, that our work is too hard or too dangerous, or that our work is misguided, simplistic or naive.

The first issue is: who does most of the really heavy lifting? Often in the life of ACRAWSA the work of gaining funding for our websites, conferences and journals has fallen to our Indigenous members, most notably Aileen Moreton-Robinson. As non-Indigenous members of ACRAWSA we need to keep developing creative ways to bring financial resources and institutional support for our work. It is also vital that we share successful strategies of generating institutional and external support with one another and develop persuasive and seductive strategies of representing our participation in ACRAWSA to our academic colleagues and supervisors.

The second issue that arises within ACRAWSA is a tendency to see and to represent our expertise in CRWS as project of credentialisation that, once accomplished, can be moved on from. This tendency is so pronounced that it feels instinctive. Of course, after working in this area for more than 10 years, I want to be able to say “OK. I get it!”, provide some footnotes from international critical race theorists as evidence of my savviness and move onto areas of research that are less politically fraught and personally challenging. It is true that continuing to work in CRWS after an initial process of credentialisation is not a great academic career move. I recently found myself defending my work in CRWS to a promotions committee:

I started working in CRWS to understand a set of problems related to race and Indigenous sovereignty in the late 1990s and thought that I would be finished with this work by now. Unfortunately the problems that CRWS studies addresses have remained so I will continue to work in this area until such time as they are no longer relevant.

I think the unspoken view of several committee members was ‘Sure. Go for it! In your own time.’ My everyday experience of CRWS work is one of rubbing up against an institution which doesn’t see why it should be paying for this kind of research and teaching and against a significant minority of students who are angry because they didn’t sign up to learn about this kind of thing when they enrolled in courses about media, communication and culture. Not on our clock. Not in my degree. I was extremely lucky on this occasion that a powerful member of the promotion committee valued the very work in CRWS that my managers had urged me to downplay when I made my case.

While some publications may count towards your academic track record, most of the time CRWS will feel like—and in many respects be—a ‘second job’. So approaching CRWS as credentialisation would seem to be the only rational thing to do. But it is not the most effective thing to do if we are in the business of socially transformative scholarship. If we are going to have CRWS as our second job, we better find ways to enjoy this work and to communicate this enjoyment to our students and colleagues. My own enjoyment comes from the new ways of seeing and being in the world that CRWS enables. This kind of scholarship brings hope to staff and students otherwise debilitated by the punitive environment of everyday life within the neo-liberal university.

The third issue that ACRAWSA may be unique in posing is managing desires for a form of cultural capital acquired through proximity to a value that Aileen and I
describe as ‘Professorial blackness’. As a long-term colleague of Aileen’s, I have sometimes felt like a human vending machine when I am approached by people who hope I can dispense a ticket to a private audience with her. News flash: I can’t. While I understand this desire for proximity to Professorial blackness, it is important to interrogate the drives behind it. Do we desire proximity to Professorial blackness to provide a guarantee of our credentials in CRWS? If so, what does this say about the kind of racial state we find ourselves in? And what does it say about the racial disciplines that are specific to the neo-liberal university? More specifically: how might proximity to the figure of the black female professor work ideologically to secure patriarchal white sovereignty’s possessive claim to virtue?

To illustrate the material stakes at the heart of my argument about CRWS work I will briefly consider two videos about the ‘Basics Card’. The first one is produced by Centrelink, the social security arm of the Australian Federal government, and the second one is a parodic mashup of the former. The Basics Card is a policy tool for administering welfare payments in Australia. It was introduced as a way to govern the everyday expenditure of residents in remote Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory as part of a Federal ‘Intervention’ in 2007 intended to protect vulnerable women and children from the effects of unhealthy consumption choices. Quarantining a portion of payments that might have otherwise been spent on alcohol, cigarettes and pornography, the card provides credits for redemption at designated retail outlets. The extension of the Basics Card to encompass certain categories of non-Indigenous citizens several years after its introduction provides the appearance of a race-blind policy. However, while this change avoids charges of formal discrimination levelled at the Intervention, the Basics Card continues to facilitate racialised welfare administration since the urban and regional areas chosen for its extension are also home to significant populations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.

The official Centrelink video depicts a Basics Card user as a well-dressed and apparently white Australian woman compliantly availing herself of its ‘protections’ against dangerous or excessive consumptions. She is shown purchasing groceries at the supermarket and making inquiries on the telephone. Centrelink’s construction of what Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2010) calls ‘colour blind racism’ is underscored by the use of the terms ‘John Citizen’/‘Jane Citizen’ on the cards shown and the voiceover of an apparently Australian male with British modulations to his accent.

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2 The ‘Intervention’ refers to the Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 passed by the Howard Coalition government, which imposed the following ‘special measures’ on 73 prescribed communities: quarantining of 50 per cent of welfare money to be spent on ‘basics’; compulsory acquisition of five-year leases on community land; alcohol restrictions; licensing of community stores; establishing ‘government business managers’ in each community; restricting pornography; and controlling publicly funded computers. These measures could to be applied to Indigenous communities because of the ‘race power’ section in the Constitution (51[xxvi]), which overrode the Racial Discrimination Act 1975.

3 A variation of this video can be viewed here: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2nA1wEzT6u8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2nA1wEzT6u8)
The Basics Card Parody mashup (2013) attributed to ‘John Public’ features clips from the Centrelink video edited with other material to make explicit three aspects of racial discrimination disavowed by the government video:4

- That underneath the government’s rhetorical commitment to integrating Indigenous Australians into the ‘real economy’ and providing people with ‘real jobs’, a population of primarily Indigenous people has been created whose access to the marketplace is largely mediated through government control;
- That this process is inherently and seriously social stigmatising for people who must use the Basics Card in everyday processes of consumption;
- That an implicit—but unspeakable—social distinction between ‘fucked’ and ‘non-fucked’ categories of individuals is an important vehicle through which racist policies and practices are rendered invisible and able to escape public critique.

This humorous intervention highlights the serious issue that— notwithstanding the suspension of anti-racial discrimination law to devise and apply the tool in the first instance—the majority of Basics Card recipients can still be presented by the government as ‘just happening to be Aboriginal’. How is it possible for Centrelink to get away with a representation of a product so tenuously connected to its primary audience? To answer this question, the video needs to be understood in the context of broader scopic regimes that have and continue to shape Australia as a white state. There are very specific ways that we expect Indigenous people to appear within the network of institutional discourses that construct the meaning of Aboriginality in Australia. A representation that explicitly depicted Indigenous welfare recipients as excluded from ordinary market transactions and as precluded from indulging in legal vices available to other adult Australians would be more vulnerable to critical international and domestic scrutiny.

It is through the figure of an apparently middle-class white woman that the Centrelink video appears to speak to a subject imagined as an individual, rather than to a subject classified as part of a specific racial population. The Basics Card Parody shows how whitening the race of Basics Card recipients makes the Australian government look good. The face of a small Aboriginal girl featured on the Centrelink homepage (http://www.humanservices.gov.au) reinforces this communication of virtue since it was with recourse to the protection of Indigenous women and children that the Howard government justified its Intervention in 2007. This tension between racial appeal—on one hand—and racial ex-nomination—on the other—lies at the heart of neo-liberal subject formation in settler colonial nations. The remainder of this article will address the question of how it plays out in the institutional context of the university.

At first glance the discourses and scopic regimes of Centrelink may seem a long way from the academy but it is part of my aim to explore their shared basis in an ideological disposition Moreton-Robinson describes as the possessive investment in ‘patriarchal white sovereignty’ (2004). For the moment I ask you to note that Centrelink is likely to be a familiar institution to two of the largest populations in our universities: students and the casual academic staff who do well over half of our teaching and many of whom earn less than $25,000 per year.

4 The parody video can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tCdGv4KbD4
The Neo-liberal University as a Disciplinary Site of Subject Formation

In her essay ‘Breaking the Silence: The Hidden Injuries of Neo-liberal Academia’ (2009), feminist academic Rosalind Gill notes the limits of research reflexivity when it comes to our most immediate and familiar environment of work. She asks:

How might we make links between macro-organisation and institutional practices on the one hand, and experiences and affective states on the other, and open up an exploration of the ways in which these may be gendered, racialized and classed? (p. 4)

She identifies:

... the endlessly self-monitoring, planning, prioritizing, ‘responsibilised’ subject required by the contemporary University. She requires little management, but can be accorded the ‘autonomy’ to manage herself, in a manner that is a far more effective exercise of power than any imposed from above by employers. (p. 6)

And she highlights the reluctance of academics to speak publically about the terms and conditions of our work, arguing that a sense of ‘toxic shame’ about not being good enough and ‘a sacrificial ethos’ often prevent us from talking about personal costs of insecure and precarious work within universities.

Gill acknowledges that individual experiences of the neo-liberal university are "(of course) deeply gendered, racialized and classed, connected to biographies that produce very different degrees of ‘entitlement’ (or not)” (2009, p. 15). But she doesn’t connect the experiences of toxic shame and a sacrificial ethos to the specific subject position ‘middle-class white woman’ scrutinised in Moreton-Robinson’s book Talkin’ Up to the White Woman (2000). This is where I think critical race and whiteness studies can extend existing examinations of the neo-liberal university. Towards the end of this article I will return to Gill’s analysis and consider the problem of white virtue in light of Moreton-Robinson’s recent work on virtuous states. In the next section I am guided by Goldberg as I consider some specific challenges of doing critical race and whiteness studies in the neo-liberal university.

Critical Race and Whiteness Studies

In The Threat of Race (2009) Goldberg seeks to explain:

the relation between racial evaporation and erasure as explicit conception across a broad swath of societies and the increasing difficulty as a consequence of considering racisms critically, of resisting them. (p. 30)

He argues that a broad consensus about the end of racism has been practically achieved through the displacement of anti-racist with anti-racialist discourses: "Anti-racialism is fundamentally concerned with ‘decategorization’” (p. 22). It insists on the non-mattering of race as a category. Anti-racism by contrast "seeks to remove the condition not indirectly through removal of the category in the name of which the repression is enacted. Rather it seeks to remove the structure of the condition itself” (p. 22).
Moreover, Goldberg argues, “Antiracism requires historical memory, recalling the conditions of racial degradation and relating contemporary to historical and local to global conditions” (p. 21). This is in stark contrast to anti-racialism, which “seeks to wipe out the terms of reference, to wipe away the very vocabulary necessary to recall and recollect, to make a case to make a claim” (p. 21). Rather than disappearing race, anti-racialism displaces the sites of race from “broadly institutional [contexts], from which it is at least explicitly excised to the micro-relational of everyday interactions, on the one hand, and the macro-political strategizing of geo-global interests, on the other” (pp. 24-25). In this context, he notes the irony that “the call of antiracism, while representing the triumph of the global, is always a local call ... There is no global antiracial movement ... Where antiracisms [were/are] truly global movements, antiracism is never more than a local call” (p. 22). Goldberg highlights here the significant challenge for anti-racist scholarship in institutional contexts which are proudly anti-racist. Specifically, he helps us to understand the ideological process through which the university and its disciplines have increasingly been placed off-limits to self-reflexive forms of critical inquiry.

While racism might be recognised as a problem for other nations or for a small minority of misfits in our own nation, it goes without saying that racism is not a problem for us or for our institution. It is only a problem when we are seen to make local issues appear to be about race. Bringing anti-racism home to institutions from which it is believed to have been formally banished is profoundly disruptive to what Moreton-Robinson calls ‘the politeness of whiteness’. The next section will draw on recent work by Sara Ahmed to consider how the story of the university’s successful journey to ‘becoming diverse’ produces a fiction of institutional happiness which acts as a wall against critical engagement with racism and whiteness.

‘Overying’ Anti-racism: Diversity and/as the Maintenance of [white] Institutional Happiness

Ahmed’s book On Being Included (2012) explores how explicitly valuing different forms of cultural, religious and racial diversity can work as a mechanism of social exclusion in universities. Her important study is grounded in qualitative research with diversity practitioners in universities and participant observation based on her own experience with anti-racist work in universities. She argues that “To recognize the institutionality of whiteness remains an important goal of antiracist work, as does the recognition of institutional racism” (p. 44).

She presents numerous examples of how:

Organizations manage their relation to external others by managing their image ... Diversity work becomes about generating the ‘right image’ and correcting the wrong one ... Diversity becomes about changing perceptions of whiteness rather than changing the whiteness of organisations. One of the way in which organisational whiteness is maintained is through the use of ‘community’ as a euphemism for ‘race’ ... The implication is that the institution does not reach such communities—it does not include them—because they perceive the institution as excluding them. The problem of whiteness is thus redescribed here not as an institutional problem but as a problem with those who are not included by it. (p. 34-5)
And she makes an important move that allows us to think institutional whiteness and institutional racism as part of the same problem. Rather than seeing institutional racism as a bad habit that requires institutional good will and commitment to break, she suggests a new way of understanding the relationship between habit and will, such that:

an institutional habit could be understood as a continuation of will ... A habit is a *continuation of willing what no longer needs to be willed*. I think this formulation is especially useful for rethinking the category of ‘institutional will’. A habit is how an institution keeps willing something without having to make something an object of will. (p. 129)

This institutional will is evident in the way that “statements such as ‘we don’t have a problem with racism’ make those who report racism into the problem” (p. 145).

She argues that the claim to being a happy and diverse institution works as a method of protecting whiteness whereby “to speak about racism would hurt not just the organisation, reimagined as a subject with feelings, but also those subjects who identity with the organisation” (p. 146-7). Embodying this institutional problem is an experience that Ahmed and the diversity practitioners she interviewed described as ‘hitting a wall’. I imagine many of us working with/in critical race and whiteness studies have experienced the scenario she describes:

[They say] ... Why are you always bringing up racism? Is that all you can see? Are you obsessed? Racism becomes your paranoia. Of course, it’s a way of saying that racism doesn’t really exist in the way you say it does. It is as if we had to invent racism to explain our own feeling of exclusion, as if racism was our way of not being responsible for the places we do not or cannot go ... To preserve the possibility of getting on and moving on, we are asked to put racism behind us ... Indeed, diversity enters institutional discourse as a language of reparation; as a way of imagining that those who are divided can work together; as a way of assuming that ‘to get along’ is to right a wrong ... The promise of diversity is the promise of ‘happiness’ as if in becoming happy, or in wanting ‘just happiness’ we can put racism behind us. (p. 155-165)

This deployment of diversity against anti-racism is—as Goldberg notes—predicated on the legalistic elimination of obvious or formal codes of discrimination against those who don’t quite inhabit the institutional norms. The claim that racism is past deprives non-white individuals of the terms of reference needed to legitimate claims of being excluded—being excluded is rendered a problem of subjective perception rather than an experience the institution engenders.

Ahmed argues that in the disorienting house of mirrors that Goldberg describes as ‘racial neoliberalism’:

Only the practical labor of ‘coming up against’ the institution allows *[the wall which is the continuation of institutional will] to become apparent*. To those who do not come up against it, the wall does not appear—the institution is lived and experienced as being open, committed, and diverse ... When you don’t quite inhabit the norms, or you aim to transform them, you notice them as you come up against them. The wall is what we come up against: the sedimentation of history into a barrier that is solid and tangible in the present, a barrier to change as well as to
the mobility of some, a barrier that remains invisible to those who can flow into the spaces created by institutions. (p. 175)

In this context she provides a welcome critique of “the hope invested in new terms [including] (mobilities, becomings, assemblages, capacities)” (p. 180). She observes how these terms are presented “as a way of overcoming, as if these terms allow us to get over the categories themselves” (p. 180). And she points to how:

the hope invested in new terms can mean turning away from social restrictions and blockages by identifying restriction and blockages with the old terms [such as feminism and anti-racism] that we need to move beyond. Indeed, we need to note that the narrowing of the descriptive or analytic potential of the old terms is part of this narrative of becoming; a caricature of the work done by these terms allows the terms to be, as it were, ‘given up’. (p. 180-1)

It is the work of critical race and whiteness studies in the neo-liberal university to witness to the wall that is the continuation of institutional will in our everyday practices and values of work. Those of us in possession of white privilege need to acknowledge the limits of our capacity to know what our institutions are for those without it and to take every opportunity to listen and learn from what our colleagues and students tell us about their experiences. And having listened, we need to take responsibility for doing what we can about specific problems. To quote Ahmed one more time:

Things might appear fluid if you are going the way things are flowing. If you are not going that way, you experience a flow as solidity, as which you come up against. In turn, those who are not going the way things are flowing are experienced as obstructing the flow. We might need to be the cause of obstruction. We might need to get in the way if we are to get anywhere. We might need to become the blockage points by pointing out the blockage points. (p. 186-7)

Having worked with Ahmed’s figure of the wall that is the continuation of institutional white will, I want to briefly return to Goldberg’s discussion of anti-racialism. He concludes his argument in The Threat of Race (2009) as follows:

Far from losing all analyticality, race has continued, silently as much as explicitly, to empower modes of embrace and enclosure, in renewed and indeed sometimes novel ways, as much shaping the contours and geographies of neoliberal political economy globally as modulated by them. As embrace, race constitutes a bringing in, an engulfing, elevating, consuming, and suffocating hold on populations. It is a holding up and a holding out, a tying and restricting. As enclosure acts, it continues to encircle, closing in and out, to fence off. Perhaps the symbolic sign (post) of race in our (neo-)neoliberal present reads ‘DO NOT TRESPASS’. (p. 373)

This figure of an informal and de-categorised racism that promises an inclusive embrace while practicing macro and micro exclusions resonates with my experiences working in a large, prestigious Australian university on projects related to the recognition of Indigenous knowledge over the past decade. Like many similar universities, mine has consistently failed to meet targets for Indigenous student and staff recruitment in spite of advocating the importance of closing the education gap.

I sometimes wonder if this failure to recruit and retain Indigenous staff and students can be attributed to white institutional fantasies of the perfect
Aboriginal academic/colleague and the perfect Aboriginal student. Certainly I have come across utopian education strategies that see the Indigenous student as a blank slate ready to be filled with our institutional vision of what knowledge and success look like. Elsewhere in the education sector I have witnessed disturbing conversations about the inherent difference of Indigenous people and suggestions that we need to accommodate cultural proclivities—like excitability and restlessness—based on stereotypes derived from Myers-Briggs personality types. Certainly the fantasised Indigenous colleague is one who fits seamlessly into the existing organisational culture, and contributes to its happiness. What is feared most in a context where we feel like we are already working 24/7 is allowing entry to a person who could turn out to be ‘hard work’. From a psycho-social viewpoint this fear can be read as a projection of the challenges the Australian state is yet to address to deliver justice to Indigenous people onto the body of prospective Indigenous colleagues.

Absent and (more or less eagerly) anticipated Indigenous colleagues and students are rendered through white institutional will as happy objects that we want to have in our university. The university participates in this way in a possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty (Moreton-Robinson, 2004) which constructs Indigenous nations, communities and individuals as ‘our Indigenous culture, community, heritage or expert.’ Being attentive to these white fantasies helps us to imagine the invisible wall that an Indigenous student or staff member might encounter when they are recruited as part of universities’ inclusive agendas.

**Virtue, Sovereignty and Race**

In The Threat of Race (2009) Goldberg observes that:

> Once formal equality was guaranteed through state-mandated non-racialism, racism was born again as ‘racism without race’, racism gone private, racism without the categories to name it as such ... In short, born again racism is an unrecognized racism for there are no terms by which it could be recognised: no precedent, no intent, no pattern, no institutional explication. (p. 23)

This ‘racism without race’ is exemplified in the rhetoric of Australia’s current Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, in a recent speech about ‘closing the gap’ of health, employment, housing and education outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people:

> A fair go for Aboriginal people is far too important to be put off to the judgment of history. We have to provide it now—or as soon as we reasonably can. I am confident of this: amidst all the mistakes, disappointment and uncertain starts, the one failure that has mostly been avoided is lack of goodwill. Australians are now as proud of our indigenous heritage as we are of all our other traditions. The challenge is to turn good intentions into better outcomes. (2014)

Note that racism has been excised as the historical source of the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians and that the problem is reframed as one of a gap between goodwill and intentions—one on hand—and mistakes, disappointment and suboptimal outcomes—on the other. The white subject of
racial neo-liberalism that emerges here is substantially defined through his possession of virtue.

It is in this context that Aileen Moreton-Robinson considers the corporate behaviour of white-settler states of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. Her analysis of these states’ initial objections to provisions within the draft of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) and their eventual but vocally qualified acceptance of it hinges on an argument about the relationship between race, sovereignty and virtue.

She elaborates ‘patriarchal white sovereignty’ as a part of a national formation that is “underpinned by an excessive desire to invest in reproducing and reaffirming the state’s ownership, control and domination” (2011, p. 647). And she argues that “virtue functions through reason within sets of meanings about patriarchal white ownership of the nation within the law, as part of commonsense knowledge, decision-making and socially produced conventions by which societies live and govern behaviour” (p. 647).

This possessive relationship to virtue enabled the four white-settler colonial states to continually claim the moral high ground in their negotiations with other parties even as they adopted apparently contradictory positions throughout the process. Her detailed reading of these States’ arguments against this non-legally binding document shows how UNDRIP:

ontologically disturbed patriarchal white sovereignty, which retaliated through political, legal and moral force to disavow the virtue of Indigenous rights. The Declaration was treated as an outside intervention that required the containment of the enemy within its borders: Indigenous peoples whose existence threatens the self-realization of patriarchal white sovereignty’s interior truth. (p. 657)

She demonstrates the centrality of virtue to sovereignty. Being well-meaning becomes an un-contestable quality self-attributed to these white states:

virtue functions within the ontology of possession, which occurs through the imposition of sovereign will-to-be on Indigenous lands and peoples that are perceived to lack will, thus they are open to being possessed. (p. 646)

Moreton-Robinson’s account of the inherent connection between virtue and Indigenous dispossession is a valuable contribution to the literature on whiteness which is yet to come to grips fully with why our good intentions so routinely fail to produce social justice outcomes (see Trepagnier, 2010, p. 155). Moreton-Robinson prefaces her argument about virtuous racial states as follows: “It would be a mistake … to place total responsibility with individual white subjects for their attitudes and behaviours when relations of force shape and produce the conditions under which racism flourishes” (p. 641). This raises the question of how our need to embody and perform virtue as individuals sustains broader relations of force within white racial states.

As Barbara Trepagnier’s (2010) research on white women in the US found: “The role of well-meaning whites in the production of institutional racism is hidden by the way white Americans think about racism. The oppositional categories of racism obscure how institutional racism is produced because they effectively imply that ‘racists’ are the problem and ‘nonracists’ have nothing to do with racism. Nothing could be further from the truth … the not racist category itself produces a latent effect—passivity, which reinforces institutional racism” (p. 155).
The final part of this article will approach white virtue as a blockage to ACRAWSA’s traction within the neo-liberal university. I will not be advocating performative inversions or assuming the self-styled identity of a race-traitor. I’ve addressed issues with such attempts to ‘transcend’ white subjective interpellation elsewhere (Nicoll 2006). Instead I’ll consider how virtue functions as a blockage to those who “are not going the way things are flowing” (Ahmed, 2012, p. 186-7).

How does virtue support the continuation of institutional will that is encountered as a wall by those lacking the privileges to flow easily through the increasingly dispersed spaces of the neo-liberal university? I’ll argue that a focus on being good and meaning well blocks our individual capacity for virtuosity—the art of resourcing, doing and disseminating CRWS. It keeps us stuck in what Ahmed (2006) describes as the ‘non-performativity’ of anti-racist commitment and encourages a credentialising approach to CRWS which is also evident in the desire for proximity to Professorial blackness as a ground of moral and intellectual authority. The questions this final section will pose are difficult ones for white people and they are questions also posed to myself:

- To whom or to what are we ultimately responsive and answerable?
- Who gets the very best of our work?
- Does our ‘good’ research performance reinforce institutional constructions of ‘others’ as the problem?
- Is our support of Indigenous sovereignty struggles active and intellectually engaged?
- Are our jobs in the neo-liberal university the main stake at play?
- Can a useful distinction be drawn between virtue and virtuosity and, if so, what would this mean for our understanding of the racial subject of the neo-liberal university?

Over many years of working I have observed that the gendered ‘burden’ of white virtue in settler colonial university contexts is often distributed between male colleagues’ need to ‘be right’ and female colleagues’ need to ‘be good’. Ahmed recounts her experience of “the most defensive reactions [to her work] ... from white male academics who think of themselves as ‘critical’” (2012, p. 179), while Gill’s examples and analyses speak to white women’s attachments to a fantasy of ourselves as being ‘good’ people.

Gill describes how working within ‘fast academia’ and having to be ‘always on in academia without walls’ creates “an overheated competitive atmosphere in which acts of kindness, generosity and solidarity often seem to continue only in spite of, rather than because of, the governance of universities” (2009, p. 10). And she worries about “so much energy invested in navigating a course between being a good ethical ‘citizen’ of academia, and surviving—that is, not going under, getting sick or giving up one’s work entirely.” Using the example of the PhD examination she recounts: “When I say ‘no, sorry, I can’t do it’ ... I am immediately flooded with guilt, I feel a little bit less than the human being I want to be” (p. 11).

This worry about losing our ethical compass amidst demands to be more and more productive within systems that measure, calibrate and rank our efforts is telling. Post-feminist inducements to conduct ourselves as disciplined individual subjects in a ‘gender blind’ academy reinforce the possessive prerogatives of patriarchal white sovereignty by discouraging challenges to the terms by which it
defines what counts as excellence. Feminised virtue in the neo-liberal academy is a falling stock. This is evident in the relative weight accorded to teaching—where the feminised value of *being good*—by modelling ethical relationships to knowledge—is at the fore and the more prestigious work of research—where the masculinised value of *being right*—is the focus and ethics can become a formality of box-ticking.

White institutionalised virtue is sustained by the focus on and deep ideological commitment to the *individual* as the site through which power flows. Projects of solidarity organised around gender, anti-racism, Islamophobia and homophobia are anathema in our moment of post-feminism and anti-racialisation. We are *simply* being asked by our inclusive institutions to ‘just’ fit in and contribute—as *individuals*—to a collective happiness by performing what Ahmed calls the ‘overing’ of the injuries caused by social markers of difference. If we play our cards right, we might just be rewarded by a rare and valuable gift: that elusive form of economic security we attach to as ‘my job’. A desire for and attachment to ‘my job’ is one of the hardest things to give up both psychologically and materially. But I think it is necessary if critical race and whiteness studies are to have a sustainable second decade within the neo-liberal university. Whether we are casual, contract or continuing staff, the only way to dismantle the white wall we present by being good and/or being right is to detach ourselves from a possessive relationship to an academic career path as currently defined.

This detachment is not reconcilable with an image of a positive, proud, and attractive white anti-racist subject who is ‘over guilt and shame’, critically scrutinised by Ahmed. The detachment from ‘my job’ that anti-racist work actively engaged with Indigenous sovereignty struggles requires is much more risky than a performance of proud anti-racism. It is—frankly—fucking terrifying. It forces us to contemplate Centrelink—not simply as an object of academic critique but as a government institution that may play a role in our individual futures. As frightening as the prospect of ‘being fucked’ might be to those of us who are used to flowing through spaces of privilege, I think we need to imagine a future where our jobs don’t have to be possessed at all costs. For the capacity to imagine this future changes our relationship to the neo-liberal university in ways that have implications for how well we do CRWS.

The title of this article signals a focus on working *in* the neo-liberal university. I want to end it by considering what it means to do CRWS as a way of working *on* the neo-liberal university and *between* sites of the neo-liberal university.

Gill (2009) encourages us to consider how:

some of the pleasures of academic work (or at least a deep love for the ‘myth’ of what we thought being an intellectual would be like, but often seems at far remove from it) bind us more tightly into a neoliberal regime with ever-growing costs, not least to ourselves. (p. 15)

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6 She notes how "adjectives [like] (positive, proud, attractive, antiracist) [make] antiracism just another white attribute or even a quality of whiteness (this rather likable whiteness would be one in which antiracism can be assumed)." And most disturbingly, she points to how this rebranded form of "Antiracism even becomes a discourse of white pride" (2012, pp. 169-170).
The costs of attachment to my job in the neo-liberal university will continue to accumulate as long as the individual subject of patriarchal white sovereignty is taken as a given. Working within white institutions encourages and authorises us to produce knowledge about, to practice virtuous orientations towards and to speak for others as individual teachers and researchers. In contrast, working on and between sites of the neo-liberal university through CRWS is predicated on and productive of different forms of solidarity. It involves taking a stand and declaring our investment in a specific kind of social future. Ahmed argues in The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004) that:

speaking for something, rather than someone, often involves living with the uncertainty of what is possible in the world that we inhabit. Solidarity does not assume that our struggles are the same struggles, or that our pain is the same pain, or that our hope is for the same future. Solidarity involves commitment and work, as well as the recognition that even if we do not have the same feelings, or the same lives, or the same bodies, we do live on common ground. (p. 189)

This recognition returns us to the ground of Indigenous sovereignty which will remain unrecognised as long as patriarchal white sovereignty possessively claims the virtue of its state of being and its being as State.

What does it mean to see CRWS not as my research, not as problematically linked to my job and as unrelated to my self-perceptions of being right or being good? Our everyday compliance or resistance within the neo-liberal academy is the thread which connects us as individual subjects to the possessive demands of the patriarchal white state. In this sense, virtue is an inherent rather than contingent way that our state of being and knowing as white people is circumscribed in settler colonial contexts. But giving up on virtue is absolutely not to give up on doing better, it is a necessary prerequisite for doing better.

Conclusion

Whenever we yield to the temptation of virtue we disarticulate the ontological state of ‘being good’ and ‘meaning well’ from specific terms of reference—or what might be called the Key Performance Indicators—of anti-racist work that spur us to ‘do better’ and to ‘do our best’. When being good or being right or meaning well are detached from doing our best and doing better they become alibis for failing to confront the habits that support the continuation of white institutional will. Our ontological sense of being a good white person deflects criticism of our institutional passivity while our moral claim to being well-intentioned refuses responsibility for unintended consequences of this passivity. I want to return to Ahmed’s point about how solidarity requires us to live with “the uncertainty of what is possible in the world we inhabit” (2004, p. 189). As long as our identities are bound up with being good and performing our good intentions, we will fail to test and realise what is possible when we offer our best to CRWS. By allowing the neo-liberal academy to define our best work and its often nutty strategic visions to define what doing better means, we are depriving ourselves, our colleagues and our students of the opportunity to learn what might be possible in the world we inhabit.

Possibilities for CRWS work on and between sites of the neo-liberal university are immanent rather than based on utopian visions of a different and better world.
And they return us to Centrelink. For many students and casual and contract academic staff, Centrelink is already a familiar social institution.

Margaret Mayhew is an early career researcher and contract lecturer who reflects on the experience of living and working between universities as a ‘para-academic’ in order:

- to encourage a mental shift away from haunting images of being fixed, or trapped or bound into a precarious and marginalised relationship to academia, into a reimagining of our position as being porous elements of institutions; as leaky portals between academia and other sectors; as positive contaminants of universities and creators of new forms of knowledge and society. (2014, p. 149)

Rather than subscribing to the neo-liberal university’s interpellation of casual and contract employees not being ‘good enough’ for tenured positions, she has developed new ways of doing critical queer and anti-racist work through performance and volunteering between different sites of employment. She cites her rewarding work at the Melbourne Free University and the work of casual academics and artists from Sydney University conducting art classes in a high security refugee detention centre as concrete examples of “what critical inquiry and knowledge creation and action can become” (2014, p. 288) when the neo-liberal university is not assumed to be the centre of epistemological value.

In closing I want to return to the value of virtuosity. We can let Indigenous people do the heavy lifting, we can credentialise ourselves and we can cultivate proximity to Professorial blackness while possessively clinging to a state of white virtue and to our jobs within the neo-liberal university. Or we can cultivate virtuosity as workers on and between the visible and invisible walls of these white institutions. I am not positing an existential choice between assuming one kind of identity or another. In this moment of racial neo-liberalism, anti-racism is not a simple matter of buying into or out of opposing ideological regimes. What I’m suggesting is that we accept the responsibility in everyday life of refusing the easy choices that white virtue enables and that we try to do CRSW with all the intelligence, passion and courage we can muster in solidarity with one another. We need to become virtuosos—expert players of and with the neo-liberal university. I’ve learned some things about productive trouble-making over the last ten years as I’m sure many of us have. I hope we can use ACRAWSA as a forum of solidarity to share strategies to improve our performance.

**Author Note**

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References


Whiteness and anti-discrimination law—it’s in the design

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Although anti-discrimination laws have supported much social change, they have been subjected to sustained critique by legal scholars. A significant concern is that the formal 'same treatment' standard promoted by the design of anti-discrimination law is inherently problematic (Graycar & Morgan, 2004) because it gives "apparent legitimacy to outcomes which ... in effect embed inequality" (Kerruish & Purdy, 1998, p. 150). In this article, I critique the laws’ standard of formal equality, first to demonstrate the capacity of its ‘neutral’ response to reproduce and stabilise dominant privilege. Next, using the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) as an example, I argue that the Act’s ‘race-neutral’ and ‘colour-blind’ practice of formal equality holds capacity to stabilise and reproduce whiteness. I then argue that substantive equality—advocated by most legal critics as promoting ‘better’ forms of equality—also holds the capacity to reiterate whiteness as it can be defined through terms and conditions 'designed for and skewed' in favour of 'the white majority' (Davies, 2008, p. 317). I conclude that this holds great implications for legal scholarship that remains selectively ‘colour-blind’ to the significance of racial ‘difference’, and call on mainstream legal scholars to open spaces to interrogate the implications of our raced position as whites (Moreton-Robinson, 2007, p. 85).

Keywords: race discrimination, racial non-discrimination, equality—formal, substantive, whiteness, difference

Introduction

Australian common law recognises the fundamental right to equality before the law, but has never protected citizens from discrimination in their day-to-day affairs; instead, this protection is made available in Anglo-Australian law only through federal anti-discrimination Acts and those enacted in each state and territory jurisdiction (Rees et al., 2008, pp. 16- 19). These Acts are based upon international covenants to which Australia has become signatory, providing a
constitutional basis for the federal laws, and arguably at least, the inspiration for state and territory enactments. For instance, all of these laws prohibit race discrimination, which corresponds to the principle of racial non-discrimination established in Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (1969).

Despite their achievements, these laws have attracted sustained criticism (Pace, 2003; Partlett, 1977; Thornton, 1990) and are desperately in “need of renewal” (Rees et al., 2008, p. 3). However, much of this critical attention has been directed to rights associated with gender, sexuality and disability, so that—with notable exceptions (de Plevitz, 2000; Gaze, 2005; Moreton-Robinson, 2007; Thornton, 1995)—discrimination and equality rights associated with race have attracted less sustained analysis. I make this point because, despite parallels, there are important differences between these points of analysis.

Moreton-Robinson (2007, p. 85) is, however, more particular in her concern about the (general) lack of attention by mainstream Australian legal scholars to issues related to race: it is, she says, indicative of their ‘agency’ in the ‘reproduction and maintenance of racial hierarchies’. This demands that white legal scholars, like me, pay more attention to race, but by doing more than simply ‘dropping’ race into our analyses. Instead, it demands that we interrogate the implications of our own raced position as whites who benefit from the racial hierarchies reproduced and maintained by our (white) law.

This same point became apparent in my doctoral research on discrimination law, in a statement made to me by an Aboriginal man I consulted. When I asked him why he thought discrimination laws do not work, he replied:

*the laws are designed for them [white people]. It’s not for us ... It’s not. It’s just taking things away.* (Uncle N, as cited in Nielsen, 2007, p. 123)

While obviously ‘white’ refers to colour and biological identity, like any ‘racial identity’, whiteness is connected to the social meanings attributed to ‘race’ by virtue of processes of “affiliation and external ascription” (Doane, 2003, p. 9). But as Frankenberg has pointed out, this process of social construction operates to produce very different meanings for whites than for those constructed within non-white races, as whiteness “signals the production and reproduction of dominance rather than subordination, normativity rather than marginality, and privilege rather then disadvantage” (1993, pp. 236–237). This is not to say that all whites gain full access to the privileges of whiteness, but that all whites can more readily claim its privileges than can those constructed as ‘other’ and ‘non-white’. Indeed, Uncle pointed out the great significance of whiteness in that white people might expect to experience law differently to those constructed as ‘non-white’. However, this runs counter to the pervasive Western liberal philosophy that Anglo-Australian law produces justice through its commitment to the formally equal treatment of all who come before it (Thornton, 1990, p. 9);

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1 I use the term ‘mainstream’ to direct attention to the dominant group amongst the legal academy, that is, those of us who are white.

2 Referring to the First Nations Peoples of Australia—‘Indigenous’ is used to signify First Nations peoples, irrespective of geographic origin.

3 I use ‘white’ generally to refer to peoples with Anglo-and European-Australian racial identities.
that is, in racial terms, law practices equality through being ‘colour-blind’ to racial difference (Davies, 2008, p. 317). However, instead of this ‘colour-blind’ practice, Uncle’s lived knowledge of white law is of a practice ‘skewed towards the white majority’ because it offers a ‘protected and exclusive place of privilege’, to which non-whites gain entry only on white terms and conditions (Davies, 2008, p. 315). And fundamentally, the whiteness of Anglo-Australian law relates to “a colonial cultural condition” (Anderson, 1996, p. 35) that involves a claim of the right to ‘settle’ territory and to receive the privileges attendant upon occupation—including the expectation of laws’ protection—a claim based upon the violence of invasion and the falsehood of white sovereignty (Watson, 1997).

The purpose of this article is to follow Uncle’s concern about the function of whiteness in anti-discrimination law as indicated in its response to race discrimination against Aboriginal peoples. ‘Whiteness’ is applied throughout as its prime point of analysis to signify it as a ‘colonial cultural condition’ that founds and reinforces the ‘cumulative privilege’ that has been “quietly loaded up on whites” (Fine et al., 1997, p. 57). My central argument is that the ‘neutrality’ in the design of anti-discrimination law is actually a practice of racial differentiation achieved through a selective ‘colour-blindness’ that presents whiteness and white privilege as normative (Moreton-Robinson, 2007, p. 84). First, I explain the capacity of the prevailing formal standard of equality promoted by Australian anti-discrimination law to stabilise, endorse and reproduce dominant privilege. Next, using the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) as an example, I argue that the specific effect of formal equality is to entrench—rather than challenge—the dominance of whiteness and white privilege. In the third part, I analyse substantive equality measures to suggest that they retain the potential to reiterate whiteness and white privilege. To conclude, I call on mainstream legal scholars to open spaces in which we interrogate the implications and benefits of our raced position as whites, because otherwise—as Moreton-Robinson warns us—we will only sustain the racial hierarchies reproduced and maintained by our law.

A ‘formal’ model of equality

There are 13 separate pieces of anti-discrimination legislation in Australia, four enacted by federal parliament, and one in each state and territory jurisdiction. These Acts “follow a similar pattern and operate, legally, in the same way” (Rees et al., 2008, pp. 3-4) and share a lack of clarity in their policy goals. Although none of them specifically defines ‘equality’, each Act requires non-discrimination to be achieved through treatment that is ‘comparable to’, thereby instilling ‘a struggle for equality’ into anti-discrimination law mechanisms. However, the

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point of this struggle remains unclear until we ask: “equal to what?” (Watson, 1998, p. 38).

In international law, the answer to this question is founded in the theory of substantive equality. This involves ‘relative’—rather than ‘absolute’—equality that treats "equally what are equal and unequally what are unequal": it holds that treating “unequal matters differently according to their inequality is not only permitted but required” (Judge Tanaka in South West Africa Case, as cited in Pritchard, 1997, p. 44). In relation to the right of racial non-discrimination, Recommendation XIV of the United Nation’s CERD Committee stated that the Convention’s reference to ‘discrimination’ relates “to invidious acts of discrimination, not acts which are aimed at achieving an equal enjoyment of rights” (Jonas & Donaldson, 2001, p. 16). Consequently, in international law, the principle of racial non-discrimination does not demand “identical treatment without regard to concrete circumstances” (Pritchard, 1997, pp. 45–46) because ‘positive’ forms of differentiation are integral to it, provided they are designed objectively and reasonably to achieve ‘a legitimate aim’ or they support the ‘distinct’ rights of Indigenous peoples. Indeed, Pritchard argues this principle is so fundamental to the achievement of human dignity that it is one of the “least controversial examples” of an international legal peremptory norm, that is, an ‘overriding’ principle of international law notable for its “indelibility and non-derogability” (1997, pp. 42–43). Therefore, one might expect CERD signatories—like Australia—to promote the standard of racial equality that international jurists espouse.

However, a fundamental concern shared by critics of Australian anti-discrimination legislation is that it has been consistently interpreted by the courts as promoting formal equality as the primary standard (eg. Gerhardy v Brown [1985]; Purvis v New South Wales [2003]). Unlike substantive equality, formal equality is concerned only with form—not outcome—so that all types of differentiation are completely impermissible (Thornton, 1990, p. 9). For example, in Gerhardy v Brown (1985), the High Court examined the type of equality protected by the prohibition of direct race discrimination in s 9(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RDA). It concluded that the Pitjantjatjara Lands Rights Act 1981 (SA) contravened s 9(1) because it enabled non-Pitjantjatjara people to be treated differently because of their race (by having to apply for entry permits to Pitjantjatjara lands). But how else could the Pitjantjatjara peoples manage their country? Don’t other landowners have a legal right to limit entry? As these questions suggest, the Court’s conclusion indicates why formal equality’s environment of ‘sameness’ is inherently problematic (Graycar & Morgan, 2004) and defeats “the underlying philosophy of non-discrimination” because it gives “apparent legitimacy to outcomes which ... in effect embed inequality” (Kerruish & Purdy, 1998, p. 150).

In Gerhardy, the Court did, however, go on to conclude that the Land Rights Act was valid on the basis that it was a ‘special measure’ permitted by s 8(1) of the RDA. Section 8(1) endorses ‘special measures’ as defined by CERD:

[Measures taken] for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial
discrimination, provided, ... [these measures do not] ... lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved. (1969, Art 4(1))

That is, the Land Rights Act’s different treatment of rights on the basis of race was valid at law because this treatment was applied in order to redress ‘historical disadvantage’. But, as Sadurski argued at the time, the Act’s legitimacy could have been founded in the principle of racial non-discrimination itself, in that the effect of the Act on non-Pitjantjatjara people:

did not amount to the impairment of their dignity by exhibiting racial prejudice against them, by stigmatising them as inferior, [or] by perpetuating the existing patterns of disadvantages. (1986a, p. 136)

Likewise, most Australian critics advocate substantive equality as the ‘better’ legal standard because it fosters an environment that responds to difference when justice requires—to prohibit ‘invidious’ discrimination—while simultaneously enabling a response to historical disadvantage and to the contexts in which inequality operates (Graycar & Morgan, 2004). Therefore, making ‘appropriate’ differentiations is an implicit—not a separate—process within the substantive equality standard.

However, the Court refused to apply this standard of racial equality in Gerhardy because it viewed Pitjantjatjara land rights as valid only on account of ‘historical disadvantage’, rather than on account of the Pitjantjatjara peoples’ distinct rights based upon their enduring connection and relationship to their law and country—rights that could not be claimed by any other group. As Sadurski lamented shortly afterwards, the Court wasted an opportunity to establish “standards for future legitimate ‘positive discrimination’”, and ignored its “duty to examine the substantial issues of the limits of legitimate racial distinctions and the indicia of discrimination” because it was unwilling:

to engage in a morally serious discussion that potentially could have serious consequences and carry a threat to the stability of dominant community values and dominant patterns of privileges. (1986b, pp. 6-8)

Indeed, Sadurski exposes what the Court really ignored, namely the capacity of formal equality to stabilise, endorse and reproduce dominant privilege. In the next section, I investigate the implications of this capacity. Using the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) as an example. I argue that the ‘neutrality’ claimed as the effect of the Act’s formal equality design is instead a practice of selective racial differentiation that renders whiteness and its attendant privilege the Act’s normative standard.

**Formal equality entrenches whiteness and white privilege**

The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (ADA) does not explicitly state its purpose (or objects), although its long title describes it as an Act to make various grounds of discrimination unlawful “in certain circumstances” to promote
“equality of opportunity between all persons” (s 1). It defines two separate forms of racial discrimination—direct race discrimination, the most commonly litigated form, which prohibits less favourable treatment of people because of their race (s 7(1)(a)), and indirect discrimination, which prohibits unreasonable conditions or requirements that have a disproportionately negative effect upon those of a particular racial group (s 7(1)(c)). Like the RDA, it also enables special measures to be taken in favour of certain groups, including Aboriginal peoples (ss 126 & 126A). It establishes the Anti-Discrimination Board (the Board) (s 71 & Part 8) as the statutory body with authority to handle discrimination complaints and perform a range of educative functions to promote the elimination of discrimination and develop human rights policy for the state (s 119). Essentially, the ADA creates a jurisdiction that is “about education”, as it was founded in a “general consensus that criminal sanctions are ineffective in carrying out” its purpose (Partlett, 1977, p. 153). However, I argue that three main features of the Act’s design demonstrate that it is not race-neutral but instead is structured to support whiteness and its attendant privilege.

First, the Act supports whiteness by placing the privileges it produces outside the scope of the definitions of what is race discrimination: the Act fails to prohibit class-based discrimination (Thornton, 1990, p. 14), the definitions of direct and indirect race discrimination focus only upon ‘disadvantage’, and neither direct nor indirect race discrimination are unlawful per se as they are actionable only when they occur in specific areas of public life. Not only does the Act’s definition of race discrimination deflect attention from the ‘ordinary’ social ‘advantages’ enjoyed by whites (see Davies, 2008, pp. 312-316; McIntosh, 1992), it also remains “artificially and permanently” separated from the system of white privilege founded by and inherent within the prevailing capitalist system (Thornton, 1990, pp. 14-15).

The Act’s definitional scope is further reduced because all forms of discrimination are defined as events that occur as a result of separable characteristics: race, gender, sexuality, and so on. Thornton has long argued that the ‘benchmark’ for these characteristics is the “white, Anglo-Celtic, heterosexual male who falls within acceptable parameters of physical and intellectual normalcy, who supports, at least nominally, mainstream Christian beliefs, and who fits within the middle-to-the-right of the political spectrum” (1990, p. 1). Although

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7 The grounds are: race, sex, marital status, pregnancy, family responsibilities, sexuality, transexuality, disability, age and sexual harassment.
8 It also prohibits racial vilification, that is, public acts that incite hatred, serious contempt, or severe ridicule towards those of a particular racial group (s 20C), while those that involve or incite threats of personal harm or harm to property are made a criminal offence (s 20D).
9 The Act creates few offences: e.g. serious racial vilification, publishing discriminatory advertisements (s 51), and (since 2005) a number related to involvement in conciliation proceedings.
10 Compare this with s 9(1) RDA, which creates a cause of action in relation to “any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference” (see Baird v State of Queensland [2006]).
11 Paid work relationships (ss 8-13), education (s 17), the provision of goods, services, and facilities (s 19), housing/ accommodation (s 20), registered clubs (s 20A), and in the activities of certain public bodies and government (ss 119-121; though each is qualified by ‘exceptions’ which permit racial differentiation (ss 8(3), 14-16, 54 & 56).
complaints can be based on multiple grounds, each ground must be pleaded and proved separately, so that complainants are forced to ‘pluck out’ singular aspects of themselves by reference to the benchmark person and present it as “the meaningful whole” that eclipses other parts of their being (Lorde, as cited in Harris, 1990, p. 586). Yet this ‘meaningful whole’ remains inherently limited in scope, because the definition of race discrimination is framed in ‘race-neutral’ language that conflates ‘race’ to a ‘universal’ experience. For instance, in the High Court’s decision in Purvis v New South Wales (2003), Justices McHugh and Kirby commented that:

[d]isability discrimination is ... different from sex and race discrimination [because] ... its forms are various and personal to the individual while sex and race are attributes which do not vary. (at (86); my emphasis)

This ‘universal’ approach indicates that the Act is designed to respond most effectively to what Duclos describes as a “paradigmatic victim” who “conforms” to and is “part of the ‘centre’ except for his race” (1993, p. 42). For example, an Aboriginal woman complaining about sex discrimination would typically need to “establish that she is just like” a white woman, even though “it is very possible that the discrimination [she experienced] occurred precisely because she was not” a white woman (Duclos, 1993, pp. 43-44). Thus, Duclos suggests that non-white experience will naturally be distorted by the Act’s ‘universally’ defined racial scope and definitions, because it must be conveyed in accordance with the Act’s white centre. Clearly, this ‘universal’ scope cannot acknowledge that disparities exist in the social, political and economic experience of different racial groups (Parashar, 1994, pp. 84-85), nor account for the variation in the social, political and economic impact of race discrimination upon Aboriginal peoples as compared to those of other ‘non-white’ heritages (Gaze, 2005, pp. 174-175). And significantly, it gives no account to the different—and privileged—experience of race by whites. Rather, the Act founds whiteness as the invisible standard by which it measures the way raced ‘others’ ‘should’ be treated. The consequence is that complaints of racial discrimination by Aboriginal peoples may enable them to ‘achieve’ the ‘same treatment’ as white people, but cannot involve any challenge to the systemic privileges already enjoyed by whites (Nielsen, 2007, pp. 12-129).

The second aspect of the Act’s design that reinforces whiteness is its focus on the ‘individual’, which confines complaints to forms of race discrimination involving ‘discrete’ experiences. This is because complaints are limited to acts of discrimination that occur within the 12 months proceeding the date a complaint is lodged (s 89B(2)(b)), which confines the legislation’s attention to racialised acts occurring in the ‘present’, not the ‘past’. For example, an Aboriginal person may experience systemic race discrimination in the labour market, resulting in a résumé that implies a ‘broken’ and ‘poor’ work history. Any employer who refuses to employ them as a result remains immune from a complaint of race discrimination because the person’s work history is placed outside of the employer’s ‘individual’ responsibility—even though that employer’s denial of employment perpetuates systemic racism (Nielsen, 2007, pp. 161-191).

12 See also Moreton-Robinson (2007).
13 See further, de Plevitz (2000).
Moreover, the Act fails to empower the Board to intervene, investigate, prosecute or punish acts of race discrimination or to investigate systemic racism (Partlett, 1977, pp. 156-158, 171-173). Although these are longstanding concerns, the Board remains empowered to act only when an affected individual lodges a complaint (ss 90-91A). This is significant, as the following example demonstrates, because the law struggles to respond even to ‘individual’ acts that compound to create a racist system overall. As part of the consultations for my doctoral thesis, the Board’s complaints staff told me about the difficulty they faced when contacted about a recruitment agency that was “discriminating against [Aboriginal] people constantly” because:

all we can do is act on individual complaints, then in theory, every single person in this area who is discriminated against by [this agency] has to make a complaint, and we deal with each of them individually, without recognising that it might be coming from this one source … It would be much easier to just be able to address the source of the discrimination. (as cited in Nielsen, 2007, p. 134)

The combined effect of the Act’s temporal scope and the Board’s inability to initiate action without a complaint is that systemic racism is structurally defined as an ‘Aboriginal’ problem—that is, one that does not implicate white people. Consequently, Aboriginal people not only bear full responsibility for challenging the effects of systemic racism, but may only challenge narrowly defined versions of problems that occur in the ‘present’. This reiterates the normativity of the accumulated privileges of whiteness, as these privileges are immunised from challenge by being “buried deep within the social psyche” where their ‘longevity’ accords them “the status of a self-serving ‘truth’” (Thornton, 1995, p. 84).

Finally, the Act’s support of whiteness is firmly entrenched through the design of the complaint system. Initially this is because the choice to pursue a complaint is a significant one: the law requires those who do so to be “sufficiently informed, motivated … empowered” and resourced to use its “complex legal machinery” (Bertone & Leahy, 2003, p. 113). Although this inevitably involves ‘great personal cost’ to Aboriginal people (Moreton-Robinson, 2007, p. 93) as well as legal costs, the Act’s formal equality makes them equally entitled to pursue their complaints as those people who enjoy the privileges of whiteness.

Whiteness is also supported as a result of the Act’s emphasis on ‘education’ and ‘persuasion’, because conciliation—a process that rests primarily on mutual agreement—is the primary dispute resolution process used to resolve complaints (Nielsen, 2007b, pp. 129-132). Even though the complexities of litigation might suggest that the focus on conciliation is a good thing, a successful conciliation does not ‘prove’ that the discrimination alleged occurred. Instead, it might result in an explanation, an apology, action to restore a person’s rights, monetary or other forms of compensation or development and/or improvement of equal employment opportunity policies (NSW Anti-Discrimination Board, 2008, p. 15). However, there are no guarantees because the Act is designed to use ‘gentle persuasion’ to convince respondents to change their practices or policies rather than penalties that would cause them ‘pain’ and thus deter them from

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14 Section 7 requires an individual to be affected before any contravention of the Act can be alleged.
15 Race discrimination is criticised as extremely difficult to prove (Gaze, 2005; Thornton, 1995), and about two thirds of litigated complaints will fail (Nielsen, 2007b, p. 138).
repeating acts of race discrimination (Distaff, 1994, p. 5, p. 9). Moreover, the Act does not define what action should—or at least could—constitute a ‘successful’ conciliation, and does not establish any criteria to vet the outcomes achieved at conciliation (Distaff Associates, 1994, p. 41). Instead, all that is required is that the complainant accepts the respondent’s proposals for resolution (if any and whatever their form) and/or agrees to ‘discontinue’ the complaint.

Clearly, this ignores the likelihood of a ‘structural inequality’ between the complainant and respondent (Thornton, 1995, p. 88), and that this inequality can be used to apply pressure on complainants to reduce their “demands on the respondent wherever possible” (Distaff, 1994, p. 39). What this grants to white respondents, then, is a structurally superior position in conciliation because nothing can happen without their consent. For instance, some Aboriginal people have reported using the complaint system as a way of educating white people about racism (Distaff Associates, 1994, p. 74); but they can only achieve this if white people want to learn. According to the discrimination law practitioners I interviewed, this rarely happens. As one commented: “I’ve never seen ... the lights go on and somebody go ‘oh yeah I’m a racist’”, because more typically, respondents “settle it on a ‘commercial’ basis to get rid of it, on the basis of no admission of liability and confidentiality” (as cited in Nielsen, 2007, pp. 136-138). Yet, again, the system’s standard of formal equality positions Aboriginal complainants as formally equal to white respondents, all the while according those respondents a structural advantage that protects and reproduces their whiteness and their privilege. This suggests that the ‘best’ the Act can offer an Aboriginal person is the ‘opportunity’ to persuade white people to release their grip upon privilege through a process that actually supports white privilege because it imposes no demand that it must change.

Collectively, these features in the ADA’s design reveal that, while formal equality dictates a ‘neutral’ response that ignores racial difference—that is, colourblindness—the Act is only truly blind to the racialised difference founded in the system of white privilege. Indeed, whiteness is the Act’s (unstated) normative standard because ultimately, all that the Act requires is that Aboriginal people be treated like white people (Nielsen, 2007, pp. 192-210). However, I think it unlikely that Aboriginal peoples would recognise this as a form of equality. Instead, I think it more likely that, like Watson (2005), they would recognise this standard as a form of more assimilation.

**Does substantive equality ‘undo’ whiteness and privilege?**

The question unexplored so far is whether the formal standard inherent in anti-discrimination law is moderated by the inclusion of indirect discrimination and special measures provisions, because these types of provisions can promote substantive forms of equality.

As indicated above, indirect discrimination provisions prohibit conditions or policies that cause disproportionate disadvantage to members of a particular group. Thus, they may promote substantive equality because they enable scrutiny to be applied to the effect of facially neutral standards. However, the reach of the indirect discrimination provisions is inherently limited because a
condition or requirement, despite causing disadvantage, is not unlawful if it is also reasonable.

In Anglo-Australian law, reasonableness is an ‘objective’ criterion, by which the courts “weigh the nature and extent of the discriminatory effect” of the “policy, requirement or condition against the reasons advanced” in its favour (Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade v Styles [1989], p. 624). Not surprisingly, this criterion attracts significant criticism. For instance, Pace argues it involves a “questionable claim to universal objectivity”:

The reasonable person standard applied by judicial decision-makers is assumed to provide a code of conduct that is commonly understood. The reasonable person is said to be neutral: devoid of gender, class, race, sexuality or other immutable characteristics. What this approach fails to recognise, however, is that there is in fact no self-evident, commonsense, consensus view about what is reasonable. The judgment as to what is reasonable is clearly going to depend upon the position and perspective from which the question is viewed. (2003, p. 3)

Pace highlights where the fundamental difficulty in proving indirect discrimination complaints lies, in that what is reasonable tends to be viewed from the respondent’s perspective. For example, Thornton (1993, p. 99) points out that the anti-discrimination tribunals’ approach to judging whether or not employment decisions are ‘reasonable’ involves ‘a presumption in favour’ of an employers’ ‘prerogative’ to manage and make decisions in their workplace. As I have argued elsewhere (Nielsen, 2007, p. 252), mainstream workplace culture and practice is infused with white cultural values and assumptions, even though this white racial content is obscured by courts most often interpreting it as the ‘ordinary’, ‘standard’ way things are done—so much so that Aboriginal workers are simply expected to reconcile themselves to white workplace culture. Consequently, when employment conditions or decisions are scrutinised in an indirect race discrimination complaint, they are most likely to be blanched of their racial content through being read as ‘ordinary’ and/or ‘commonsense’, which judges consistently interpret as reasonable. Therefore, I doubt that complaints of indirect race discrimination achieve the ‘better’ equality outcome asserted through substantive equality because the concept of ‘reasonableness’ represents a ‘universalized order’ (Watson, 2007, p. 96) infused with white cultural values.

However, as noted above, ‘special measures’ work in another way in that they give legitimacy to different treatment where it is applied to (favour) a particular group so as to redress historical or other disadvantage. That is, they could promote substantive equality as they are said to be designed to achieve ‘equal’ outcomes. But even though this focus on outcome can promote substantive equality, the more important question is whether the outcomes it enables offer enough. Because the inherent difficulty in ‘reasonableness’ also lingers in special measures: who decides what form they take and what ‘disadvantage’ makes them necessary and legitimate? Monture highlights this by explaining that describing Indigenous peoples as ‘disadvantaged’ is:

a nice, soft, comfortable word to describe dispossession, to describe a situation of force whereby our very existence, our histories, are erased continuously right before our eyes. Words like disadvantage conceal racism ...
[Because Indigenous Peoples] are only disadvantaged if you are using a White middle class yardstick. I quite frequently find that White middle class yardstick is a yardstick of materialism ... [For us it] is not what you are that counts, it is who you are. So when the world of the dominant culture hurts me and I cannot take it anymore, I have a place to go where things are different. I simply do not understand how that is disadvantaged. (1986, pp. 161-162)

Monture’s point is exemplified by examining a feature of the Federal Government’s ‘emergency response’ to violence and child abuse within certain Northern Territory Aboriginal communities—the 'Intervention' (see Martiniello, 2007). The legislation underpinning the Intervention specifically reduces and/or negates Aboriginal rights, including by permitting the compulsory acquisition of and other reduction of certain land tenure rights. The irony in this approach is that the rights being taken are 'special measures': like Pitjantjatjara land rights, the rights affected are founded (in Anglo-Australian law) in Northern Territory land rights legislation.

Nonetheless, the legislation would have us believe that the Intervention itself functions as a 'special' measure because it redresses ‘Aboriginal disadvantage’. Apparently, those who drafted this legislation were undeterred by its absurd logic: that is, the Intervention has the effect of securing for those within these Aboriginal communities “equal enjoyment or exercise of [their] human rights and fundamental freedoms” (CERD 1969, art 1(4), my emphasis) by reducing Aboriginal property rights. And though it did not specifically interrogate the Intervention’s status as a ‘special measure’, the High Court recently endorsed the logic that supports it, by deciding that there is nothing so ‘distinct’ or unique about these Aboriginal land tenure rights that precludes them from being compulsorily acquired by the Crown—just like white property rights. Therefore, just as it reasoned in Gerhardy, the High Court refused to measure the property rights of these Aboriginal communities through their enduring connection and relationship to their law and country—the claim no other group can make—because it refused to understand Aboriginal property rights as superior to or more ‘special’ than ‘normal’ property rights, that is, those rights defined by the white ‘yardstick’ of white sovereignty (Watson, 1997). And the current government has also endorsed this logic by announcing its commitment to extending the Intervention; therefore, like its predecessor, this government is committed to measures defined through 'comfortable' words concealing normative white standards that perpetrate assimilation (Watson, 2005). This is the exact problem Monture identifies.

What this discussion indicates is that, while both indirect discrimination and special measures can support a substantive model of equality, each retains the capacity to reiterate whiteness. This is because the outcomes produced by both

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16 Part 4, Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth).
18 Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth), s 132(1). The Act also immunises the Intervention from challenge under the RDA, s 132(2).
19 Wurridjal v The Commonwealth of Australia [2009] HCA 2; but see Justice Kirby’s discussion which gives an expanded notion of Aboriginal property rights, though he also contains them within the paradigm of white sovereignty ([307]–[308]).
20 See Karvelas (2007).
are typically measured through a ‘comfortable’—yet selectively colour-blind—standard that conceals the yardsticks of whiteness and racism. This suggests that the inclusion of substantive equality provisions does not automatically absent whiteness from laws’ equality, but may instead further entrench it as laws’ (unstated) normative standard.

The ‘agency’ of legal scholarship

I have argued that the formal equality that underscores Australian anti-discrimination law functions as a form of ‘race-blindness’ that views all forms of racial differentiation as inherently discriminatory. But as indicated by my analysis of the ADA, the effect is neither colour-blind nor race-neutral, because the Act fixes ‘equality’ as something "symbiotic with the prevailing [racial] order of social relations, and the interests of those who are dominant within it” (Bakan, 1991, p. 454). As a result, the design of the Act is only truly blind to the racialised difference founded in the systemic privileges accrued through whiteness. Accordingly, the ‘colonial cultural condition’ of whiteness is not only the ADA’s invisible measure, but its protection appears to be the Act’s central concern. Moreover, as suggested by my analysis of indirect discrimination and special measures, whiteness is not necessarily absented from or even moderated within laws’ ‘equality’ simply by including provisions designed to promote substantive equality. Both of these provisions may reiterate whiteness because the terms and conditions that define what is ‘substantive’ can be “designed for and skewed’ in favour of ‘the white majority” (Davies, 2008, p. 317).

But rather than giving the ‘answers’, I think my analysis opens other questions: who is our law designed for and do our mainstream legal analyses of equality work to reveal that? Uncle was very clear to me about who the law is designed for, and Moreton-Robinson is very clear that typically our work does not reveal that (2007, p. 85). Indeed, each time we omit ‘race’ from our discourse, we retain our agency with laws’ “reproduction and maintenance of racial hierarchies” (p. 85) by remaining selectively ‘colour-blind’ to the significance of racial ‘difference’ and skewed in our understanding of the context of inequality consequent upon ‘historical disadvantage’. Therefore, we (whether unwittingly or not) continue to re-assert and stake white claims through upholding the ‘invisibility’ and supposed ‘neutrality’ of the whiteness of law. Consequently it is important how we ‘know’ when and why and whose racial difference matters; while I agree that substantive equality theory offers a more capable model to enable responses to equality, to apply it accurately, we need to ‘know’ when justice requires a response to racial difference, and we need to ‘know’ the full context both of racial inequality and of ‘historical disadvantage’. None of these things are just about ‘others’.

And, given the commitment of legal scholars to issues of justice and equality, why are mainstream legal analyses failing to engage with the implications of our whiteness? In part, I think this is the result of the voices to which we are and are not willing to give attention. As Watson says:

The exclusion of other narratives works to silence other possibilities, one being the role of the grandmothers. When the frame remains limited, so too does our search for solutions. (2007, p. 107)
For instance, many Indigenous scholars articulate theories of difference rather than ones simply of ‘equality’. As I understand it, they do so because Aboriginal peoples “have never wanted to be the same” because it is “difference, and the right to be different, that is central to the idea of an Indigenous struggle, the sameness is killing” (Watson, 2001, p. 35). This struggle cannot be achieved through sameness with white people, whether in form or outcome, because instead, it is a struggle to hold onto the core of Aboriginal difference—the “freedom to be myself, to honour the mother, to honour the traditions and culture that we have carried since time immemorial … without fear of recriminations” (Watson, 1996, p. 108)—Aboriginal sovereignty and self-determination.

Clearly this is not a dialogue about formal equality—but neither is it a dialogue based simply in a theory of substantive equality. Instead, it is a conversation based on the premise that “equality is better measured against ourselves” as Aboriginal peoples (Watson, 1998, p. 38). But more particularly here, this conversation is not heard often within mainstream legal discourse even though, as Moreton-Robinson (2007) warns, by remaining closed to ‘other’ conversations, we continue an agency that contradicts our calls for ‘justice’.

What this should suggest to those of us who are members of the mainstream legal academy, is the need for us to develop greater reflexivity in our practice, to open ourselves to spaces in which different epistemologies can meet and disrupt our own (Moreton-Robinson, 2000, p. xxv). But our purpose in opening these spaces must not simply be to enable us to understand ‘others’. Instead, our purpose should be to better understand and interrogate our own race consciousness—that is, ourselves and the implications of our raced position as whites:

not to strengthen the concept of the white race, but rather to call it into question—to demystify white power, and to remove the certainty of the comfortable place white people occupy in the world [and in our law]. (Davies, 2008, p. 318)

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‘Aussie luck’: The border politics of citizenship post-Cronulla Beach

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The essay situates the watershed event, ‘Cronulla Beach’, in terms of its effects: its ramifying political consequences as well as its circulation at the level of popular culture and the everyday and its reinflections of racist imaginaries and identities. It argues that these heterogenous effects contribute to resignifications of citizenship deployed as forms of internal border control across multiple sociocultural and sociospatial sites. Across a series of discontinuous sites and contexts, the essay explores how Cronulla Beach plays a key role in enabling and legitimising a resurgent border policing of Australian citizenship.

Keywords: Cronulla Beach, Australian race relations, Citizenship test, territorialisation, Redfern

Introduction

In the summer of 2004, a seventeen year-old Aboriginal youth died, horrifically impaled on the railings of a local park, while being chased through the streets of Redfern by police. The awful circumstances of his death, one in a long sequence for which police bear responsibility, sparked furious community protests and rioting that night (Funnell, 2004). After initially struggling for control, police responded with a violent crackdown through Redfern. In the aftermath, Ray Minnecon, Director of Redfern’s Aboriginal Crossroads Ministries, wrote of the fraught process of “rebuilding … Aboriginal identity, integrity and community from the ashes of our burnt-out histories in this place we call Redfern”:

For me as an Aboriginal person Redfern is a place where one can interact with a powerful collective will to struggle against the imperial forces that continue to interfere with … our history … For almost 200 years we were locked away from the new Australia that was built on our lands … We are not happy with many of the results of that nation-building process … We are not happy at our forced
exclusion in the building process ... And we are still picking through the rubble of that terrible history, not made with our own hands, to rediscover ourselves, our identity and our place in the new nation ... Redfern is all of these things and more to me ... I live with this hope that my Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people will find our place and our space in the most alien and inhospitable place of all to Aboriginal culture and people—the city of Sydney. (Minnecon, 2004)

Minnecon’s analysis of the complex meanings encapsulated in Redfern powerfully substantiates Achille Mbembe’s formulation that “space was the raw material of colonial sovereignty” (2003, p. 26). The site of a “nation-building” project premised on the exclusion of Indigenous people, Redfern and its environs are the ground, as Mbembe puts it, upon which colonial occupation “writ[es]...new social and spatial relations” (p. 26). This process of writing new spatial relations that Mbembe names “territorialisation” was “ultimately, tantamount to the production of boundaries and hierarchies, zones and enclaves; the subversion of existing property arrangements; the classification of people according to different categories; resource extraction; and, finally, the manufacturing of a large reservoir of cultural imaginaries” (pp. 25-26).

Here Mbembe itemises the processes of colonial boundary-making, the production of intermeshing spatial, epistemological and ontological borders that undergird and organise colonised societies. Through this constellation of processes space is written as race. It is a writing both enacted and continually reproduced through violence. As Ray Jackson, the opening speaker at the Borderpolitics of Communities forum, meticulously documents through the work of the Indigenous Social Justice Association, violence against Aboriginal bodies is one of the constitutive ways in which the boundaries of race and space are reproduced and policed in contemporary Australia (Jackson, 2001). The punishment, incarceration and killing of Indigenous bodies reinforces colonial ‘hierarchies, zones and enclaves’ that continue to produce racially marked sites such as Redfern. And they do so even as, in Minnecon’s words, its inhabitants determinedly take on the collective task of “rebuilding ... Aboriginal identity, integrity and community from the ashes of our burntout histories in this place we call Redfern” (2004).

I begin this essay, written for a forum to mark the anniversary of the 2005 pogrom on Cronulla Beach, on the streets of Redfern in order to underline that Cronulla Beach cannot be understood in isolation. A hidden but nonetheless inexorable logic of territorialisation binds Redfern to Cronulla Beach. Both must be situated within the city of Sydney, as a space written by ethnoracial hierarchies, zones and enclaves: that is, by the production of borders. Borders operate not only spatially, but also conceptually and analytically. To understand the violence on Cronulla Beach as an aberration or as the outcome of a set of local circumstances alone is itself a form of border policing: it denies the sociospatial linkages that sustain Sydney as a city constituted by racialised and ethnicised borders within a neoliberal regime that both recodes and reinscribes colonial demarcations, scales and categories. The marketing of Sydney’s cosmopolitan charms should not obscure that it is a city marked at every level by the racialised differentiation of space, from the location of most of its mosques and Hindu and Buddhist temples in industrial areas, next to waste dumps or in the middle of highways (Sandercock, 2000), to the saturation of the airwaves by broadcasters such as Alan Jones.
In the introductory section of the essay I attempt briefly to map some key operations of borders in the city. The rest of the essay situates the watershed event, 'Cronulla Beach', in terms of its effects: its ramifying political consequences as well as its circulation at the level of popular culture and the everyday and its reinflections of racist imaginaries and identities. In turn these heterogenous effects contribute to resignifications of citizenship that are deployed as forms of internal border control across multiple sociocultural and sociospatial sites in the aftermath of 'Cronulla Beach'.

From Redfern to Cronulla Beach: Effaced geographies of violence

Sydney, described above by Minnecon as “the most alien and inhospitable place of all to Aboriginal culture and people” (2004) is inscribed, perhaps more than other major Australian cities, by a racialised and ethnicised topography. In this marked landscape names such as Redfern, Auburn and Cabramatta signify on a national scale. As the preserve of the native and the alien they are the locus of fear and abjection. Simultaneously, they are structured by a continuing colonial logic that veers between poles of exclusion and assimilation. Even as they function as ghetto precincts that operate to encircle, separate, control and police racially othered populations, these spaces are subject to the demand to reflect the dominant culture back to itself. In this sense they correspond to the imaginative geographies of empire identified by Edward Said, as spaces of otherness irretrievably marked by difference and lack even as colonial activity violently strives to convert them into the same (1978, pp. 54-55).

Spaces of lack and difference in the urban landscape are continually subjected to the colonial demand to assimilate. The assimilationist demand takes varied forms, from the seemingly benevolent desire to promote ‘renewal’ and ‘development’ (such as on the Block in Redfern) to the drive to eliminate spaces of difference perceived as threats to ‘law and order’, ‘social cohesion’ and, increasingly, ‘national security’. To this end the opaque, unknowable and shadowy spaces of the city must be rendered open, orderly and secure. Even before the war on terror, selected suburbs became subject to new forms of criminalisation and surveillance as escalating rates of Aboriginal imprisonment, the introduction of racial profiling and the mandatory incarceration of asylum seekers combined with the neoliberalist drive to privatise the prison/detention system. It was in this context, as private security guards began patrolling the streets of Redfern and Chippendale, that the Redfern elder, Auntie Ali Golding, commented in early 2001, “it’s as if we’re living in a detention centre” (as cited in Perera, 2001).

Since Australia’s entry into the war on terror these moves have gathered force to redraw ever more narrowly the limits of belonging within the nation and police with increasing violence the frontiers of citizenship. The overarching imperative of national security now combines with neoliberal logic on the one hand and assimilationist pressures on the other to train the searchlights on new spaces of racial fear and danger. The suburbs of Lakemba and Auburn are cast as landscapes that mirror the war zones of Lebanon and Iraq (Kremmer & Pryor, 2006), with their residents subjected to levels of unrelenting suspicion and surveillance.
In the late 1990s Pauline Hanson identified Bankstown and Cabramatta as suburbs that threatened the social fabric of the nation by their linguistic and visual heterogeneity. Following the mobilisation of ‘culture’ and ‘values’ as surrogate terms for race in the war on terror, the demand for bodies in these spaces to be intelligible, transparent and knowable to the dominant has amplified. Dress and speech are registered as acts of aggression not only against the ‘values’, but also against the security, of the nation. The demand to be open, available and transparent to the dominant is enforced in differential ways upon gendered and racialised sectors of the population, as in the attacks, led by senior politicians, on Muslim women’s veiling practices. Women wearing hijab or burqa are subjected to a spectrum of violence from physical assault to the suspicion of concealing bombs under their burqas and accusations of ‘confronting’ the sensibilities of Anglo-Australia by their mere presence in public spaces (Perera, 2010).

Territorialised inscriptions of threat and embedded histories of exclusion also structure the relations between Cronulla Beach, Sutherland Shire and Western Sydney. In the days immediately after the racist attacks in Cronulla Beach the Sydney Morning Herald reported: “the shire is a white, Anglo-Celtic, Christian heartland. But, ominously, this white sanctuary is hemmed in by the great Middle Eastern melting pots of Sydney” (Overington & Warne-Smith, 2005). The shire’s status as a “white sanctuary” is reinforced by the information that the area is “fast becoming a celebrity haven” as the home to Australia’s former cricket captain, Steve Waugh, and the Olympic champion, Ian Thorpe (Overington & Warne-Smith, 2005). As household names, these local heroes anchor Cronulla Beach in national space. In pointed contrast are the faceless figures who inhabit “the great Middle Eastern melting pots of Sydney” that “ominously hem ... in” (Overington & Warne-Smith, 2005) this haven of whiteness, and who weekly encroach on its hallowed beaches. The shire’s status as a ‘white sanctuary’ also possesses an even deeper purchase on the national imaginary. Its official website proclaims that: Sutherland Shire is known as the ‘Birthplace of modern Australia’, as Kurnell (now a suburb of the Shire) was the first landing site on the east coast of Australia by James Cook. He went ashore on 29 April, 1770 at a spot now within the Captain Cook's Landing Place, part of the Botany Bay National Park. For eight days he and his scientists, seamen and marines explored and mapped the area (Sutherland Shire Council). Faithfully represented here are the processes of territorialisation enacted at the ‘Birthplace of Modern Australia’. The first space to be mapped, explored and rendered intelligible by colonial violence, the shire is also the originary scene of Aboriginal dispossession. The presence of a succession of imperial pioneers—Cook, Philip, La Perouse—is scored into the terrain that now bears the seemingly innocuous name, Botany Bay National Park. This ground, subsumed into the sanitising regime of the “National Park” (Perera & Pugliese, 1998), is the land of the Dharawal people, previously effaced under the sign of ‘Botany’, whose effacement is reenacted in the website’s description of Cook’s exploration and mapping of ‘the area’.

The Dharawal, invisible in the extract from the shire website, were “among the first Aboriginal people to resist the invasion of their land, the first to be struck down by smallpox and other introduced diseases and the first to become decimated by random killings and massacres” (Welsh, 2005). Rob Welsh, Chairman of the Metropolitan Aboriginal Land Council, recalled this history in May
2005 as people from Redfern and La Perouse came together to complete the burial ceremonies for six Dharawal people whose remains had been salvaged from museums as far away as Edinburgh in Scotland. As Welsh notes, Aboriginal bodies, as much as land, were objects of theft. They too formed the ground on which colonial sovereignty mapped out its demarcations and carved the frontiers of what would constitute the limits of the human and the citizen (Pugliese, 2007) within the new nation.

The line that connects Redfern and Cronulla Beach runs through Botany Bay. Bringing back into view the violence that inscribes the site of Botany Bay National Park is one way of reframing representations of the shire as a ‘white sanctuary’ threatened by ‘Middle Eastern melting pots’. Rather than being ‘a white haven’ under siege, the ongoing presence of Dharawl bodies locates the white sanctuary of the shire as itself a site of violence. As Maria Giannacopoulos argues in her essay *Terror Australis*, instead of being a place threatened by “ethnic violence”, the shire is exposed as a place predicated on and “having been constituted by a form of white sovereign violence that continues to be retrospectively legalised” (Giannacopoulos, 2006, p. 4). This invisiblised ‘white sovereign violence’ continues to produce and patrol the limits of the nation in the form of the unquestioned and unquestionable law of the land.

**Citizenship, Territory and Nation: The View from Cronulla Beach**

In *Race Terror, Sydney, December* 2005 I discuss in detail how geopolitical insecurities about the “homeland” and the racialised fears and anxieties that characterise Sydney are layered onto Cronulla Beach as a sacred site of Anglo-Australia (Perera, 2006). These layered spatial relations correspond to what Arjun Appadurai describes as “geographies of anger”: “the volatile relationship between the maps of national and global politics … and the maps of sacred national space” (2006, p. 100). Appadurai suggests that geographies of anger, “the spatial outcome of complex interactions between far away events and proximate fears”, manifest “uncertainty about the enemy within and the anxiety about the always incomplete project of national purity” (2006, p. 100). Read as a staging of Appadurai’s ‘geographies of anger’ Cronulla Beach reveals how anxieties about the ‘great Middle Eastern melting pots of Sydney’ combine with the project of preserving the purity of the ‘Birthplace of modern Australia’ and securing its borders against the enemies within.

Building on Appadurai’s formulation, I want to propose that the category of citizenship, authorised by the law of the land, also constitutes a ‘sacred national space’ where geographies of anger are enacted. At the intersection of law, territory and nation, symbolic checkpoints and border posts are installed. Criteria for belonging are recast as the emphasis shifts from the fortification of external borders against the ‘illegal’ and the ‘unlawful noncitizen’ to new types of differentiation aimed at searching out the enemy within. The category of citizenship is repoliticised or, more precisely, resignified in ways that make citizenship visible anew as a site where the (racialised and gendered) limits of the national are tested and enforced.

These new formations of citizenship are produced across a number of levels from the biopolitical and necropolitical operations of state institutions (Mbembe, 2003).
to locations of popular culture and everyday life. In what follows I explore, across a series of discontinuous sites and contexts, how Cronulla Beach plays a key role in enabling and legitimising a resurgent border policing of Australian citizenship.

The deployment of citizenship and border control as mechanisms for differentiating spatially and racially among the population is not new; indeed, it is constitutive of the Australian state. Brian Galligan and John Chesterman note:

> The elaborate legislative and administrative regimes constructed around citizenship rights and entitlements by successive colonial, Commonwealth and state governments ... have been mainly exclusionary. Their overwhelming purpose was to bar any ‘aboriginal native of Australia, Asia, Africa, or the Islands of the Pacific’ from rights and benefits, with quite extraordinary and ingenious efforts being applied to this negative cause. (1999, pp. 73-74)

The ‘negative cause’ of excluding nonwhite ‘aboriginal [sic] natives’ was complemented by a series of other forms of border control. Henry Reynolds argues that in the absence of substantive independence from Britain, the government of the newly federated Australia was able to assert its independence not by hauling down the Union Jack but by closely controlling what and who could enter the country by means of tariffs, immigration controls, customs and quarantine regulations. These forms of control, rigorously exercised, came to be the surrogate assertion of independence by an impaired nation state. (2007, p. 66)

In the impaired Australian state created post 1901, border control over bodies and goods operated in tandem with the continued definition of nationhood in racial terms and through subjection to Britain. Galligan and Chesterman argue that the Australian constitution was "deliberately couched in [British] ‘subject’ rather than [Australian] ‘citizen’ terms” (1999, p. 73), a status that was reemphasised rather than amended by the 1948 Citizenship Act. Introducing the Act in parliament in 1947, Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell assured his audience that it was “not designed to make an Australian any less a British subject” and promised that it would “in no way lessen the advantages and privileges which British subjects who may not be Australian citizens enjoy in Australia” (as cited in Galligan & Chesterman, 1999, pp. 76-77). Galligan and Chesterman succinctly gloss this as follows: “the only way British subjects who were not Australian citizens could maintain the same rights was if Australian citizenship was meaningless. And it was” (1999, p. 74).

Galligan and Chesterman go on to identify the “deliberate eschewing of citizenship in favour of subjecthood” and the exclusion of “non-white ‘aboriginal natives’ ” as “evidence of Australia’s non-citizenship tradition”, concluding that as a consequence “contemporary Australians have no core notion of positive citizenship upon which to draw”:

> Reinventing citizenship is not an option since there is no noble past to refurbish. Nor is reviving civic education enough, since the old civics was premised on subjecthood [to Britain] and racial exclusion. Moreover, reconciliation with Aboriginal people, which is a prerequisite for national dignity, does require coming to grips with their past exclusion. (1999, p. 74)
Galligan and Chesterman’s contention in 1999 that “Australians have no core notion of positive citizenship upon which to draw” (pp. 76-77) may provide one explanation for the increasing recourse to the term ‘unAustralian’ as way of defining the nation in the second century of federation. Their argument also contextualises the proposed revision in 2007 of the 1948 Citizenship Act. Although the content of the amended legislation was yet to be finalised, on 11 December 2006, that is, on the first anniversary of Cronulla Beach, the Prime Minister announced that a citizenship test requiring “a basic level of English language skills, as well as knowledge of the Australian way of life and our shared values” (DIMA, 2006) would be required of all future citizens.

The decision to introduce a citizenship test suggests both an extension and a reworking of what Galligan and Chesterman characterise as “Australia’s non-citizenship tradition” (1999). Historically the measure recalls the implementation of the White Australia Policy through the technology of the dictation test with the aim of reducing the number of aliens both outside and within Australian borders (Reynolds, 2006, p. 67). As such it foreshadows a covert re-racialisation of the category of citizenship through cultural and linguistic, rather than overtly racial, exclusion. In terms of contemporary geopolitical imperatives, the new legislation replicates moves to limit citizenship by the USA and UK, Australia’s senior partners in the coalition of the willing, while also paralleling successive Border Protection Acts adopted since 2001.

In contrast to these previous pieces of legislation, the notion of a citizenship test based on “knowledge of the Australian way of life and our shared values” initially seems to gesture towards the definition of a positive, rather than “non” or negative, content for Australian citizenship, discussed by Galligan and Chesterman above. From the beginning, however, the stated aim of the new test in Prime Minister Howard’s speech to identify “the Australian way of life and our shared values” (DIMA, 2006), is belied by its contextualisation. As already mentioned, the announcement of the move was clearly timed to connect the restructuring of citizenship with the anniversary of Cronulla Beach. Rather than putting forward a “core notion of positive citizenship” (Galligan & Chesterman, pp. 66-67), the images of a seething mass of bodies, flags and riot police that accompanied the announcement could only have been calculated to create the opposite effect. Juxtaposed with replays of scenes of mob violence, the announcement of the citizenship test reinforces an understanding of Australian citizenship as at once beleaguered, belligerent and exclusionary. Here the promise of a new citizenship that would articulate ‘the Australian way of life’ is anchored not by reference to shared futures or common ends, but by an unspoken but nonetheless unmistakable threat: the spectre of Cronulla Beach.

The stated aim of the citizenship test is "to ensure that migrants to Australia integrate successfully and contribute to our national progress” (DIMA, 2006). The repeated use of the term ‘integrate’, harking back to an earlier stage of immigration policy, is in pointed contrast to the absence of any reference to the principle of multiculturalism or even its clumsy official substitute, ‘Cultural and Linguistic Diversity’ (CALD). Instead, the category of citizenship is resituated in the terms of neoliberalist discourse as “an important extension of the government’s broader philosophy of mutual obligation” (DIMA, 2006).
Again, this rearticulation of citizenship within a neoliberalist framework might be seen as one way of potentially providing a new, positive, content for Australian citizenship. Understood as ‘mutual obligation’, the relations between state and citizen are seemingly privatised, cast as matters to be negotiated at the level of the individual, remote from the bloodied battlegrounds of history and culture. However, as Aihwa Ong points out, “neoliberalism as a technology of governing relies on calculative choices and techniques in the domains of citizenship and of governing” (Ong, 2006, p. 4). Significant (if submerged) links tie the project of neoliberalism to the formation of citizenship as a racialised category. Both are predicated on forms of demarcation and differentiation—‘calculative choices’—between subjects that reward some and penalise others on the basis of assumed traits and attributes. Racial and economic regimes coincide as these discriminations are produced through remarkably similar sets of binaries, for example those working to distinguish self-sufficient, flexible, enterprising and disciplined subjects from groups classified as hide-bound, recalcitrant, ill disciplined and lazy.

The contracting of the cultural and linguistic borders of citizenship in the interests of national security and cohesion thus intersects in complex ways with the shrinking of the state demanded by neo-liberal logic (Ong, 2006). Both work to exclude, punish or render expendable their target populations, who often (if not always) coincide in the same racialised and gendered bodies: for example, remote Aboriginal communities deemed ‘unviable’ for survival or those unwilling or unable to enter into ‘mutual obligation’ arrangements with the state. Similarly, within the racialised landscape of Sydney in the period leading up to Cronulla Beach, a campaign was mounted against particular migrant communities in the city as unfit to adapt to life in contemporary western society (Perera, 2006).

As neoliberal technologies of governing reorganise sociopolitical space and the relations among sectors of the population (Ong, 2006, pp. 13-14), new demarcations and differentiations do not replace, but are mapped on to preexisting racial regimes. Neo-liberal logic redeployrs these regimes of race and ethnicity while simultaneously transcoding them into the terms of its own, seemingly racially unmarked, economies of morality and value. Brought into play as the backdrop to the reorientation of Australian citizenship in neo-liberal terms, Cronulla Beach testifies to the unspoken nexus between the two and points to a key paradox in the official campaign to redesign citizenship: the dependence of a neoliberal incarnation of Australian citizenship that is meritocratic, inclusive and positive on the silent shadow presence of its fearsome and intractable racial other.

**Cronulla country**

On the first anniversary of December 11, 2005 the news cameras were assiduously trained on Sydney’s ocean suburbs in the expectation of more racist violence. But it is elsewhere that the exclusionary violence of Cronulla Beach was being most clearly reenacted. A few days later, the Tamworth Regional Council voted to refuse five Sudanese refugee families the opportunity to resettle in this
The reason, according to Mayor James Treolar, was that Tamworth residents feared having to face a “Cronulla riots-type situation”. In interviews with the media Treolar stated: “the community has expressed enormous concerns of mistrust against the Sudanese people, and I think this is largely based on previous events like the Cronulla riots” (Stapleton & Madden, 2006). He went on to attack the record of Sudanese-Australians already living in Tamworth, clinching his remarks with: “ask the people at Cronulla if they want more refugees” (Norrie, 2006).

Treolar’s words suggest how Cronulla Beach circulates in popular understandings one year later. While many accounts of the violence focus on a narrowly local microanalysis of events—alleged attacks on two lifeguards; the fraught relations between Anglo- and Lebanese-Australians; the availability of alcohol on the day—Treolar invokes Cronulla Beach as both an enactment and a vindication of Anglo-Australia’s accumulated hostilities towards nonwhite migrants and refugees in general. At the same time his rhetorical injunction to “ask the people at Cronulla if they want more refugees” (Norrie, 2006) confers on the mob violence at Cronulla Beach the status of a national referendum on questions of race and refugees. Treolar’s statements recall the tendency in much of the commentary on Cronulla Beach to understand racist violence as an unfortunate, but understandable, reaction to the ‘provocations’ of young Lebanese-Australian men. In Tamworth, Treolar suggests, Sudanese refugees must carry the burden of the Cronulla riots and implicitly bear responsibility for the racism of Tamworth residents.

In the Tamworth decision, multiculturalism, crime, misogyny, disease and race signify through a single term that enfolds them in a coherent narrative and renders them culturally meaningful: Cronulla Beach. Old racist phobias such as fears of nonwhite migrants spreading “TB and Polio” (Norrie, 2006) intersect with more recent concerns over security and law and order to position Sudanese refugees as unfit subjects for citizenship and as threats to ‘our way of life’. Kevin Tongue, one of the Tamworth councillors who voted to exclude the Sudanese, cited the “community’s concerns … for our future generations” as his primary motivation. “Is this the lifestyle that we want to leave to our future generations”, he challenges in an interview on TV, “a multicultural lifestyle?” (Lockyer, 2007).

In Tamworth, as at Cronulla Beach, ‘values’ and ‘culture’ were endowed with the kind of fixity that attaches to ‘race’ in order to enforce boundaries between ‘communities’ seen as irretrievably different. In both instances the protection of women, that indispensable thematic of colonial and racist discourse, was singled out as the primary concern. Mayor Treolar explained to Sydney Morning Herald journalist Damien Murphy, “you see, in the culture they come from, women are treated abysmally. I mean, we’ve given women the vote here” (Murphy, 2006).

1 Following the negative publicity, the council agreed on 16 January 2007 to reconsider its previous decision and negotiate a “pilot resettlement program” (Overington, 2007) for Tamworth with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. However, at the time of writing it is not yet clear whether this pilot program will indeed proceed. One counsellor who voted against the original decision to exclude the refugees has suggested that the ‘pilot program’ was a window dressing exercise aimed at minimising embarrassment during the Tamworth music festival.

2 These were among the explanations offered by some of the participants at the Borderpolitics of Communities Forum in Sydney on 11/12/2006.
For Treolar, ‘giving women the vote’ is both the ultimate indicator of Australian (men’s) benevolence towards ‘women’, and the measure of their distance from the Sudanese (men).

To further buttress claims of a biologised difference of ‘culture’, Treolar originally claimed that eight out of the twelve Sudanese-Australians currently living in Tamworth had been “before the courts for everything from dangerous driving to rape” (Norrie, 2006). In his article, however, Murphy challenges Treolar’s claims, citing a statement by local police:

> While Treloar keeps running off at the mouth about resident Sudanese, the Oxley Local Area commander, Superintendent Tony Jefferson, gives the lie to the Mayor’s words. He says some have been charged with assault, traffic and domestic matters - but ‘they do not stand out over any other ethnic group in the community’. Unrepentant, Treloar says: ‘If this is racist, well so be it. Call me a racist then’. (Murphy, 2006)

Confronted with evidence that contradicts his claims, Treolar is quick to change tactics: he defiantly owns the title of racist. I read this again as a response enabled by the precedent of Cronulla Beach, a site where racism was camouflaged through its proxy terms as it was also defiantly staged as public display. At Cronulla Beach the line that distinguished between a “community picnic” where “thousands of Australians gathered to defend their way of life”, in the words of the Australia First Party (Gosch, 2006), and exclusionary violence as a display of “100% Aussie Pride” was not only blurred, it was indistinguishable. Cronulla Beach thus signifies on a national scale as a name that absorbs white racial fear and resentment and presents them anew, defiantly wrapped in the colours of national pride.

In detailing the ways in which Cronulla Beach provided an enabling environment for the events at Tamworth, I want to call into question an often reproduced binary distinction in political commentary between a regressive and redneck rural Australia and its cosmopolitan urban centres. This self-serving distinction between centre and periphery effectively marginalises racism in the Australian landscape. Rather, the connectivities between Cronulla Beach and Tamworth suggest the deep implication of these sites alike in racist hierarchies and demarcations that are, as I have already shown, constitutive of Australia as a nation-state. In the following section of the essay I explore further the enabling role of Cronulla Beach in renewing racist imaginaries through new circuits of identification and consumption at a national scale.

**Reworked repertoires of Australian racism**

One context in which I locate the Tamworth Mayor’s comments is a highly publicised artefact that emerged as a tribute to Cronulla Beach, the Cronulla 2230 Board Game. Treolar's responses reproduce in a number of ways the unabashed racism of the Cronulla 2230 game, dedicated “to all those who stood up for the freedoms of fair dinkum Aussies” (Sydney beach riot game condemned, 2006). The game, freely available on the internet despite the NSW government’s attempts to restrict it, overtly solicits support for the white
supremacist Australia First Party (although the party itself has denied any involvement with the game).

Structured as a Monopoly-type board game, the objective of Cronulla 2230 is for the winning player “to become the wealthiest person in the Cronulla area through buying, renting and selling property [in order to] … fund patriotic organisations like Australia First and the Patriotic Youth League, so they can get into parliament and Win Back Australia” (Gosch, 2006; Moses, 2006). An uneasy mix of racism and real estate, the game reproduces the racial polarisation and divisiveness that is also reflected elsewhere in the landscape of Australia’s wealthiest city. At the same time, the aim of ‘Winning Back Australia’ interpellates publics at different levels, appealing to the aspirations of ‘ordinary Australians’, carefully fostered over the last decade, to amass real estate, while also playing on underlying anxieties about globalisation in the form of foreign investment and competition.

Cronulla 2230 is accompanied by a series of “Aussie Luck” cards that alternatively reward or penalise players. The term ‘Aussie Luck’ references the title of Donald Horne’s 1964 classic, The Lucky Country. Although Horne (1964/1988) intended the title as a warning and an indictment, the term has long since acquired a self-congratulatory nationalist gloss. Among other things, it is used to invoke a promised land of plenty into which nonwhite migrants should be grateful for receiving admission and, simultaneously, to suggest a golden age before the advent of multiculturalism. Elsewhere I have suggested that Horne’s text betrays more ambivalence about multiculturalism and the coming Asian century than is often realised (Perera, 1995, pp. 4-7). The return of the “Aussie Luck Cards” in the Cronulla 2230 game can be seen as exploiting the buried ambivalences in Horne’s brand of reformist nationalism.

The messages on the cards refer not only to events immediately relating to Cronulla Beach but reproduce the full repertoire of white racism. Messages such as “Health inspectors find dogs & cats in fridges in Asian restaurants, Pay $15” appear side by side with “Lebos spoil Cronulla Beach for families, Pay $5”. Reward cards proclaim: “Rally for compulsory vaccinations for Asians, Collect $20”; “More and more Aussies fly the Australian flag from their cars and utes, Collect $30” and “Locals rally to stop the Captain Cook memorial from being moved, Collect $40”.

On the board itself images and slogans from 11 December 2005 (We grew here, you flew here; Freedom for Aussies) are surrounded by the street names and landmarks of Cronulla Beach. Also marked are places labelled as ‘rallying points’ for various white supremacist groups such as the Patriotic Youth League and Australia First. Chillingly, selected sites such as “Captain Cook’s Landing Place Park”, Beach Street and the Cronulla train station (where the mob hunted for ‘lebs and wogs’ to assault) are designated as points of “Aussie Luck”. The board therefore maps a localised itinerary of racist violence from the arrival of Captain Cook to the pogrom on the beach. Players re-enact this racist itinerary as they progress through the game.

On one level Cronulla 2230 is a product of the normalisation of racism in Australian life. The “Aussie Luck” cards recycle the banal racisms of the radio talk show and the internet conspiracy theory, and reproduce the xenoracism that
characterises mainstream Australian politics in the Howard era. What is new in this mix, however, is the triumphalist declaration of “Aussie Pride”, materialised in photographs of bared white bodies and massed displays of the Australian flag reprinted on the game board. These images suggest the ways in which Cronulla Beach has reenergised and reactivated racist imaginaries, enabling their address to a range of new publics and their ability to engage new circuits of consumption and specularity. While the Cronulla 2230 game itself is one instance of these new sites of display and consumption, the reanimation of racist imaginaries is also reproduced at more mundane levels.

As spectacle Cronulla Beach references a visual archive that includes white supremacist iconographies of bared Aryan bodies and of the Australian beach as a site of white privilege, as well as images of fascist mass rallies and ANZAC day parades (Perera, 2006). As such this capacious visual archive addresses a range of viewers, presenting an ‘innocent’ and ‘patriotic’ as well as a ‘sinister’ and ‘extremist’ aspect. These two-faced or double-coded images of Cronulla Beach, distributed through conventional as well as alternative media sources such as YouTube, have provided the impetus for what I want to name a reworked aesthetics of white Australian racism. This aesthetic can be deployed in contexts that range from the mainstream consumer culture of the suburban shopping mall to the staging of underground or sub-cultural white supremacist identities.

The reworked repertoire of white Australian racism I have identified is sometimes referenced through (ambiguous) gestures of self-reflexivity, as with the ‘Sam Kekovich’ character’s TV commercials endorsing red meat as a remedy for unAustralianism in the lead up to Australia Day 2007. More insidiously, it works through the production of a set of submerged associations. At my neighbourhood supermarket, part of a major national chain, even before the Christmas specials were retired, a red, white and blue display enjoined: “Wear with Pride” as an array of products manufactured mostly in China—water bottles, towels, thongs, sandals, plates, socks, mugs, backpacks—suggested that in the lucky country there was only one place for the patriotic to celebrate the national day.

The display, one I don’t remember from previous years, inescapably recalled the mass mobilisation at Cronulla Beach, and the spectacle of swarming, flag-bedecked bodies. What brought me to a standstill before this menacing display, in the everyday space of an inner city supermarket, was precisely its two-faced ability simultaneously to camouflage and to stage racist violence. Post-Cronulla Beach, the flag, recoded through the aesthetics of white Australian racism, has emerged as the season’s essential beach accessory.

A convergence of forces enables the circulation of these mass-produced mementos and souvenirs of Cronulla Beach. The production and national distribution of these artefacts by a large supermarket chain within a relatively short space of time; the public and acceptable face of patriotic display in the context of the war on terror; the Commonwealth government’s campaign to increase the visibility of the flag in schools and offices: all these factors collude with heightened emotions called forth by the aesthetics of white Australian racism post-Cronulla Beach.

Flying the Flag: A beer in one hand and a baseball bat in the other
In an interview on December 12, 2005, Channel 9 journalist Ellen Fanning interviewed Prime Minister Howard about the previous day’s scenes of terror on Cronulla Beach.

ELLEN FANNING: Prime Minister, part of what was chilling yesterday was seeing a lot of people in between the violence doing things that you’d see at the cricket, singing ‘Aussie, Aussie, Aussie, Oi, Oi, Oi’, wrapping themselves in the Australian flag. What do you say to people who use the Australian flag in that way?
PRIME MINISTER: Look, I would never condemn people for being proud of the Australian flag. I don't care — I would never condemn people for being proud—
ELLEN FANNING: What if they've got a beer in their hand and a baseball bat in the other? (Howard, 2005)

Despite the Prime Minister’s emphatic refusal to entertain Fanning’s argument, the question of the role played by the Australian flag as an emblem of racial particularism and aggression erupted again a year later in the lead-up to Australia Day in January 2007. The organisers of the Big Day Out concert in Sydney held the day before Australia Day asked audiences to leave their flags at home, citing instances of concertgoers the previous year being forced to kiss the flag to prove their patriotism (Mulvey 2007). The concert organisers were immediately denounced for a ham-fisted move that could only provoke a backlash from ‘ordinary Australians’ who would now feel impelled to defend the flag (Birmingham 2007).

The ensuing debate, however, returned to the question Fanning had attempted to raise a year earlier when she described the racist violence on Cronulla Beach as interspersed with ‘things you’d see at the cricket’: the distinction between deploying the flag as a celebration of ‘harmless’ nationalist sentiment and deploying it as an emblem of exclusionary violence. The Prime Minister’s response was that both alike were demonstrations of national pride. A year later he elaborated on these comments by saying, in words that inevitably recall the infamous “guns don’t kill people” argument of the US gun lobby: “flags don't have legs and arms, if anyone was breaking the law at Cronulla, or breaks the law at any time in the future, they should be dealt with by the authorities” (Mulvey, 2007).

In contrast, Harold Scrooby, the executive director of Ausflag, a group campaigning for a new Australian flag, called attention to the exclusionary racial meanings indelibly inscribed on and reproduced by the flag: “I’ve no doubt that in the Cronulla riots, those waving it at the opposition were saying ‘I’m Australian and you’re not because I’m of British descent’ and it would be similar [at the Big Day Out]” (Mulvey, 2007). Scrooby’s comments return me to Galligan and Chesterman’s argument that the subjection to Britain that founds Australian citizenship has resulted in a ‘tradition of non-citizenship’ for Australia (1999). Consequently, racial identification with Britain provides the basis for Australian national identity and continues to privilege it over other, potentially more inclusive, identities. Here the ambiguities of the term ‘subject’, as able to simultaneously encompass both subjection and subjecthood come into play: Australian citizenship continues to reproduce subjection to an imagined white homeland that includes Britain (and its successor, the United States) while also deploying this white British subjectivity to exclude and devalue other identities in Australia.
Simultaneously, the meanings of the flag ramify within a transnational network of significations. "Is it a gang to be a western democracy?" an interviewee demanded in response to the charge that the flag was deployed in the manner of "gang colours" on Cronulla Beach (Mulvey, 2007). Here Cronulla Beach is resituated as a front in the war on terror, linking it to what Goldie Osuri and Bobby Banerjee describe as the "ideoscapes of democracy and freedom ... particularised as the identity of 'white' Western countries" (2004, p. 167). Osuri and Banerjee argue that in these spaces "whiteness [is] expressed as transnational loyalty" (2004, p. 151) that at the same time represents itself as transcending ethnoracial categories by "proclaiming democracy and freedom ... as universal values" (2004, p. 167).

These responses suggest that displays of the Australian flag carry a range of inflections in which imagined local, national and transnational spaces are layered on to one another, producing new maps of identification and exclusion. While in the Prime Minister’s understanding, ‘being proud of the flag’ is a practice that has a singular and static meaning, since Cronulla Beach new articulations of the flag have emerged that overlie and reinflect its previous uses. It was in this context that the Big Day Out organisers, although themselves enmeshed in the wider nationalist project of Australia Day, called attention to what had become, post-Cronulla Beach, almost a naturalised relationship between the flag, Anglo-Australian identitarianism and racist violence. While this nexus had been remarked on in different contexts (eg. by columnist Lisa Pryor’s call to fly the flag upside down ‘as a sign of distress’) the Big Day Out intervention was publicised on a national scale that, potentially, short-circuited the process of naturalisation.

In the (different) context of the ubiquitous displays of the Stars and Stripes after 9/11, Inderpal Grewal notes that "nationalism ... does not emerge out of one imaginary community but rather is produced through the changing specularity of consumer culture and contingent community affiliations created by new and historical hierarchies of race and gender" (Grewal, 2003, p. 2). Grewal’s formulation allows us to think of nationalism itself as a contested space, where the meanings of national symbols such as the flag are continually rearticulated and renegotiated by subjects differentially positioned within intersecting hierarchies. Whereas the Prime Minister’s refusal to distinguish between different uses of the flag contributes to a normalisation of its association with racist displays, Big Day Out’s intervention opens up room for further public debate over the meanings of the flag, styles of whiteness and possible countermobilisations. As such it is a rare expression of dissent against the exclusionary and violent forms of nationalism unleashed on Cronulla Beach.

**January 27, 2007**

On the national day at the ‘Birthplace of modern Australia’, the Dharawal people remember the arrival of Cook, Philip and La Perouse on their land, marking the day of invasion even as they celebrate their own survival. As Maria Nugent

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3 I thank Kristen Phillips for her research on this event and for discussing her insights about the Big Day Out with me.
discusses, a powerful tradition of protest on this site from the 1939 Day of Mourning to the demonstrations of 1970 and 1988 unsettles the triumphalism of the nationalist anniversary (Nugent, 2005, pp. 174-175). The government chose Australia Day 2007 to announce that the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), previously known as the Department of Multiculturalism, Ethnic and Aboriginal Affairs (DIMEA) will henceforth be renamed the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC). This series of name changes in recent years is one indication of the succession of administrative and classificatory regimes brought to bear on racialised and ethnicised others. It also indicates the making and remaking of borders between Indigenous and other racialised/ethnicised bodies within the space of the nation.

At the same time, the new focus on citizenship, a category from which both Aboriginal and nonwhite migrants were excluded in 1901, reinforces the shift already suggested above, to a new policing of the cultural and linguistic, as well as the territorial, limits of the nation. As a technology that aims to search out the enemy within, the new emphasis on citizenship extends at an official level the project of national purification undertaken at Cronulla Beach and the resurgent border politics of Australian citizenship that I have mapped in the course of this essay.

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References


16


Vanishing at the border

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Literature on Canadian nationalism suggests that living in Canada is living the border, a frustratingly self-conscious place to be. The border divides Canada from the U.S., but this is secondary to its colonial function. In parcelling out land between the two settler nations, it acts as a colonial border, a marker of settler power and entitlement on Native lands. First Nations are both at home on their lands and profoundly alienated from them within the settler state. Nowhere could this be more apparent than at Niagara Falls, where the image of a dying Native woman, known as the Maid of the Mist, helped to form the tourist industry. In 1996 the myth of the maid was abandoned by its chief promoter, the Maid of the Mist Steamboat Corporation. This abandonment sparks questions of visibility and representation, community and responsibility. What does the Maid of the Mist’s presence obscure or render invisible? What does her absence make visible? These questions contribute to the interrogation of the settler nation, and in acknowledging them, the settler nation is challenged to become the decolonial nation.

Introduction

Vanishing is no metaphor. (Chrystos, 1988, p. 40)

In September 1996 the Maid of the Mist Steamboat Corporation finally heeded the protests of First Nations leaders, activists, scholars and community members and stopped using the myth of the maid to sell their tour. Prior to this, tourists were treated to the tragic story of the sacrificial Indian woman which was prerecorded and played on the tour boat and featured in promotional materials. The steamboat corporation is not alone in its use of this tourist industry myth; in fact, it is ubiquitous at Niagara Falls. The Maid of the Mist has graced everything from comic books to key chains since the development of this tourist industry, and in her many mundane appearances her origins in Native culture is simply assumed. In fact, she is a fabrication of the tourist industry, designed to give context and meaning to tourist experience at the cataract. Lelawala, another
name for the maid, is a marker of authenticity in a place that is known for its theme park atmosphere. She is the mythical *Indian* princess who paddles her canoe over the brink of the waterfalls, thereby willingly sacrificing herself to appease angry gods and save her community. As authentically inauthentic as she is—she is, to borrow again from Chrystos, “such an old old story” (1988, p. 41).

*Indian* images have always been rigorously confronted and yet remain stubbornly persistent with debatably little affective purchase in dominant culture. Lelawala is the invention of the tourist industry made possible by colonial and eventually late capitalist conceptions of land, consumption and experience, to be sold to the global tourist audience. In spite of the important move to distance the image from Native cultures, she remains the shorthand for Nativeness at Niagara Falls. Here the tenacity of the *Indian* image cordons off political action in the context of contemporary colonialism. Lelawala gives us pause to look again at the process of visibility in colonial culture, at what and who her ubiquitous and unremarkable presence obscures or renders invisible. If Lelawala—or any contemporary image of the Indian—is to be meaningfully taken up at all it must be with full knowledge that while the image is all surface and no depth, it is a part of a community of superficial images which articulate a politics of colonisation.

The settler cultural landscape is where we find Lelawala and other *Indian* images that simplify the complex colonial histories of First Nations at Niagara Falls. *Indian* images reduce the genocide of the Neutral or Attawandaronk Nation—a nation that inhabited the Niagara region until contact (Revie, 2003; Wright, 1963)—to the myth of a simple and childlike people who fell prey to the allegedly warmongering neighbouring Five Nations Confederacy. These images also blot out the history of forced removal of the Tuscarora Nation from what we now call the Carolinas, and how Tuscarora communities were attacked by white settlers there and many eventually fled northward in the 1720s (Dubinsky, 1999). These communities of dispossessed peoples appealed to the then Five Nations Confederacy for refuge in the Niagara area, a region they were permitted to share with the Seneca Nation (of the Five Nations Confederacy). The Confederacy eventually adopted the Tuscarora Nation, making it the Six Nations Confederacy which we know today. In these narratives the complexities of colonial history are reduced to the image of the tragic *Indian* who cannot exercise individual or national sovereignty, but can only vanish. This contingent visibility is the operation of colonialism in cultural, historical and manifestly political ways. This article is about the grounds for making people, sovereignty and responsibility visible or invisible. These contingent visibilities constitute a border separating representation and lived experience that are just as concrete as, in fact coproduce, national borders. The Canadian-U.S. border is a relatively recent imposition that bisects Indigenous communities. While the Tuscarora Nation at Niagara Falls resides on the U.S. side of the border, the nation’s access to traditional lands and neighbouring communities north of the border is ensured to them by the Jay Treaty of 1794 and the Treaty of Ghent of 1814. But the recognition of this right has been hard fought (see Rickard, 1973) and the increased emphasis on securing the border today has violated First People’s sovereignty.

Investigating settler culture, as Sherene Razack says, is a matter of “unmapping” (2002) the ways in which dominance is socially and spatially organised, of
throwing into doubt the presumed normalcy of the settler’s organisation of space and society by means of the nation. A necessary part of this project is questioning the way *us* and *them* structure social realities (Razack, 1999). In Canada (and other settler societies) *we* is not clearly organised along racial lines, but implicates the racialised in a process of disavowal of Indigenous sovereignties. Any analysis of settler society must work to uncover the complicated positions of the racialised in the settler state and the ways dominance is confronted or submitted to. The settler state is dependent on myths of a shared origin and a palpable desire to mimic the imperial centre (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). The settler society, Stasiulis and Jhappan maintain (1995, p. 98), is a deficient notion for the purposes of structuring the nation. First People’s to the development of Canada and against colonisation are rendered invisible. To this end, it is fundamentally unhelpful to leave the notion of the ‘settler’ society or culture unexamined (1995, p. 98).

*Terra nullius*, the socio-legal concept that stated that First Peoples were stateless wanderers, in part patches over the conflict that First Nations’ presence poses to the settler state’s legitimacy. If they are wanderers, they have no rightful claim to land. If they are stateless they are without organisation and governance. But this patching over is only partial because colonial myths run up against the facts of First Peoples’ social and legal organisation independent of, in conflict or cooperation with, settler states. The idea of an ‘Indian Problem’ attempts to make First Nations strange to the settler state by asking what *we* are to do with the *Indian*.

The settler cultural landscape is also where *we* are located, it is the home where *we* build meaning and community. My use of *we* signals a troubling of the assumption that there is a positivist *we*, a coherent community of critics and committed scholars. The U.S. Third World Women’s Movement continues, decades later, to challenge us to acknowledge *we* as a corruptible collective where pristine beginnings and collaborations are pure fantasy. Within whiteness studies *we* come up against the problems of location, politics and scholarly work. These problems come from the nature of our subject: the illusiveness of power and politics, material and abstract that is whiteness.

We, as whiteness studies scholars, are haunted with the knowledge that our subject comes into existence through fundamental injustices against First Peoples; the profound dislodging of people from rights, communities from history, nations from land. Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2003) explains how disposessions mean that Indigenous people come to find refuge on other First Nation’s lands, as settler states interfere with and undermine First Nations’ sovereignties and force First Peoples to move. She points out that Indigenous ontologies and practices remain centred within Indigenous nations but seldom cross over settler borders in meaningful ways (2003, p. 53). This makes Indigenous ways of knowing and doing strange in the settler state, and this, coupled with forced migrancies of First Peoples, produces an at-home homelessness. The unhoming of Indigenous protocols and ontologies is perpetual colonialism. The matter at hand is the centrality of Indigenous ontologies and the unhoming of settler ontologies. We are then compelled to rethink belonging, responsibility and complicity in creative ways and this begins with confronting the ways in which *we* come into existence.
Colonial history warns us to be cautious of conflating the unspoken with the natural. We, in the name of national dreams and global security, can pass from active criticism to passive acceptance. As we do, those of us who stand to be counted as us obscure those on the periphery, who are not permitted to move into visibility. We today, in the context of this article and the climate in which I write, is an altogether mystified construct. We can refer to scholars, settlers, nationals, activists, but the critical point is the way we (both the concept and the group) are mobilised.

We can be mobilised in two ways. The first is homogenising, the ideological hail that compels us to twist ourselves to match the 'hey you', and respond as a coherent group. Such a we means that the focus of our concern is the centre of power and how we relate to and within it. This we is deeply raced, classed and gendered and those of us on the periphery of this we can gain admission at the cost of our ways of knowing and doing. The Third World Women’s Movement strongly criticised second wave feminists for reproducing modes of oppression and exclusivity which decades earlier they had condemned as patriarchal (Amos & Parmar, 1984; Anzaldúa, 1990; Lorde, 1981; Trinh, 1986-87). Once at the centre of localised politics, the second wave feminists who are the subject of Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar’s critique (1984), argued that Third World women’s cultures were inherently oppressive and that the specific concerns of Third World women would be attended to after other, allegedly more pressing priorities. The reduction of Third World women’s ways of knowing and doing, and prioritisation in the name of progressive politics is not merely the aping of oppressive politics. This grafts the vocabulary and grammar of political struggle onto oppressive politics.

The second mobilisation of we is less stable though potentially more creative and this is what I hope this article calls upon. Returning to the Third World Women’s Movement, Trinh Minh-ha writes of the “inappropriate/d other” (1986-87). Trinh imagines the inappropriate/d Other as a Third World feminist who, by virtue of her Third Worldness and gender registers as Other, and by virtue of her politics is inappropriate. She is alienated, but in her alienation is the source of potential creativity and productivity. Being peripheral she is inappropriateable and her difference moves from her damnation to her strength. Audre Lorde writes that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” (1981, p. 99, original emphasis). The inappropriate/d Other begins as peripheral to power and comes to work within new centres of power; hers is a political move. Ian Angus writes that Canadian philosophers experience a “radical homelessness” (1997, p. 126). Located between empires and myths of place, we are at the hinterland and so drawing a border means we have answered Northrop Frye’s riddle: “Canadians are bedeviled not by the question Who am I? but by the riddle Where is here?” (Frye, 1971, p. 220). Here is where we are, at the border that we have drawn and here becomes more about politics and less about place. Radical homelessness necessitates this border and through this kind of border, productive difference is revealed. The Other is not abject, but internal to us. This we is not about the closing down of difference, it is about an articulation of politics that is constant and so always productively incomplete.

Vanishing Indians
Daily, First Peoples are confronted with vanishing. Not as a disembodied metaphor, but as a lived experience. The myth of the vanishing Indian declared that the Indian was tragically out of step with the inevitable march of progress (Francis, 1992; McKinsey, 1985). Unable to adapt to white ways, the myth confidently predicted that the Indian would die out altogether or become so polluted by white influence as to be utterly unrecognisable. This myth, Daniel Francis (1992) reminds us, has not vanished but remains the structuring principle of settler imagined relations with First Peoples. Gerald Visenor’s work on the Indian helps us to tease apart the representation and its associated logics from the lived experience of First Peoples:

The word Indian ... is a colonial enactment, not a loan [lone?] word, and the dominance is sustained by the simulation that has superseded the real tribal names. (1999, p. 11, original emphasis)

Colonial representation is the process of transforming First Nations into Indians. First Nations all become Indian and with one word the specificities, histories, locatedness and agency of these distinct and sovereign nations are discursively steamrollered. Visenor helps us to understand how colonial power permeates visibility and perception. The appearance or absence of Indianness in the visual terrain are not colonialism’s destination, but are signposts in the mapping of colonial power.¹

Lelawala is a colonial cultural product who is marked by her Indianness, femininity, stoicism and remarkable ability to die with each new telling. But taken on her own she means very little and does nothing new. This image² in the context of other images indicates colonial power and clutters the visual landscape with images we simply take for granted. The absence of the image is just as important as its presence. Today, the figure of the woman in her canoe is present, in comparatively discreet forms on tourist paraphernalia but beyond this, she takes up very little space in the public tourist arena. The steamboat’s now abandoned pre-recorded retelling of the myth turns out to be a very public broadcast which today is unparalleled. On the Canadian side, the Maid of the Mist Marketplace (see Figure 1) houses the tourist industry’s wares but there are no images of the woman to be found. In spite of the popularity of the name, there is an abundance of mist and a conspicuous absence of the maid. Lelawala is, briefly stated, the cultural side of colonial violence, the abstracted end of oppression’s materiality.

The works of decolonial scholars teach us that colonialism is violence and this violence is performed in many spaces—the physical, cultural, and psychological (Alcoff, 2001; Fanon, 1967a, pp. 141-209). Outwardly privileging the visual but ultimately relying on the mind, what rests just beyond our field of vision is just as, if not, more important than on what our eyes apparently focus. Because race is always the operation of colonialism, the racial subject is alienated, locked in the colonial encounter where race materialises. Once spotted, once made visible

¹ I adopt Visenor’s use of the word Indian to indicate the colonial construction, not First Nations people.
² Please see Figure 1, Maid of the Mist Marketplace, in the original publication of this text (Sehdev, 2007, p. 5).
according to the parameters of race, the racialised subject becomes invisible to herself.

The apparent ease with which one passes into and out of visibility obscures the violence that is the structuring principle of visibility in colonialism. But the ‘fact of blackness’ is not the ‘fact of Indianness’. Blood quantum, or the notion that one drop of black blood would make a person black and so the property or potential property of a white, finds its strange sibling in the colonial definition of Indianness where one drop of white blood was grounds for assimilation, the denial of sovereignty, the abrogation of rights, the annexation of resources and lands. We see the visceral intersection of the myth of the vanishing Indian with the lived experience of First Peoples dressed in the discourse of civic engagement in Canada today just as we can trace it historically in the arena of Indian policy (to be discussed below). Put simply, visibility has market value, political power, and cultural pull.

Niagara Falls comes into colonial visibility by means of ‘exploration’ literature in which the land and the people who inhabit it are routinely described as ‘savage’. Letters, journals and books written by Europeans during the time of contact with First Peoples constitute this ‘exploration literature’, which tells us less about First Peoples than it does about the fixations and mores of the authors. As with other colonial sites, Niagara Falls’ ‘exploration’ literature contributed to new cultural and political economies of colonial expansion. European monetary and imaginative investments were critical to the development of ‘exploration’ literature, which became increasingly competitive as European presence in the area became more established.

The Falls were first represented to Europeans by the Recollet priest, Father Louis Hennepin, who arrived there with the considerable assistance of Iroquois guides on December 6, 1678. The priest’s account exaggerated the dimensions of the Falls, making them three times their actual height and appreciably narrower than they are (Berton, 1993; McKinsey, 1985; Revie, 2003). Unable to accept what he saw—a waterfall sourced from a lake, rather than a mountain as is typical of Europe—Hennepin added an upstream mountain range to his written and visual representations. The size and ferocity of the snakes in the region add to the priest’s description of Niagara Falls as a classical Christian hell on earth. This narrative of terror twinned with wonder characterises the early treatment of Niagara Falls in the ‘exploration’ literature.

The history of early habitation of the area is murky. By failing to accurately represent the yawning gaps in colonial history-production, and to challenge what exists of the historical record, popular historians have bolstered the myth of the all-seeing and omnipotent recorder of history. According to colonial history, Niagara Falls was inhabited by the Neutrals, a small nation settled between two competing and often warring confederacies: the Huron and Five Nations Confederacies. As history goes, the Neutrals allowed both confederacies to cross their lands, and this, according to the writers of this history, demonstrated their lack of political savvy (Coyne, 1895). One historian writes, ‘life was so good for the early Indians that they grew ‘soft’. They were large and affable. As it turned out, they were easy prey for other Indians” (Rennie, 1967, p. 7). Eventually, the story goes, the savage Five Nations slaughtered all the Huron and when they were done they did the same to the Neutrals.
More recently, upon announcing the corporation’s decision to not use or retell the story of the Maid of the Mist, the steamboat corporation’s president, James V. Glenn stated, “since the legend is not important to the existing experience we provide our visitors to the Falls, it will no longer be described” (Ricciuto, 1996). He added that the myth would be stricken from all of the corporation’s literature and promotional materials. Today, tourists will hear trivia and information of a geological and historical nature when they take the tour boat (the capacity of the Falls, rock formations, the history of daredevilry and accidents, for example). They will not hear about the tourist industry’s legend from the steamboat corporation. Likewise, the history of its reliance on Lelawala and the myth of the savage Indian, along with the company’s initial refusal to abandon her, are also rendered invisible.

A good deal of the ‘exploration’ literature of Niagara Falls and the area includes stories of various forms of brutality (specifically torture and cannibalism) committed by the Six Nations and Huron Confederacies, although human sacrifice was never practiced by member nations of the Six Nation’s Confederacy. “We’re portrayed as savages. This has to stop” (Fairbanks, 1996) said Bill ‘Grandpa Bear’ Swanson, Executive Director of the American Indian Movement’s New York chapter. Some went further, explaining that the persistence of the tourist industry’s myth obscured history, and damaged the esteem and integrity of First Nations. This was the position of Allen Jameson, the director of the Native American arts and cultural group, Nanto. He argued that the myth was “racist propaganda” (Fairbanks, 1996). The corporation’s vice president, Christopher M. Glynn objected, “to accuse us of racism is outrageous … And we are not real anxious to change what we’ve been doing for 100 years” (Fairbanks 1996). When the daytime talk show Live with Regis and Kathy Lee was scheduled to film on location at Niagara Falls in September, Nanto, AIM and others planned to stage a public demonstration near the filming to bring attention to their cause. Because of this, by 5 September, 1996, the corporation backed away from the tourist legend, stating that the story was best left to historians and Native Americans to retell and explain (Stephens, 1996).

Throughout this confrontation with First Nations, the corporation maintained the position that it had not started the maid’s myth, but was only one among many who used it. The fact that the company named itself and its fleet of steamboats after the myth in order to market its tour casts considerable light on the corporation’s agency and its decision to tap an image rich in tourist industry symbolism. As Glynn stated, “we’re not in the business of offending people” (Fairbanks, 1996). The corporation’s refusal to abandon the myth and ultimate decision to cleanse its records of all reference to the myth under threat of public scrutiny indicates something more than the desire to avoid offence. The Niagara Falls tourist industry, like all other tourist places, relies on public opinion, and in this debate the steamboat company had nothing to gain by appearing stubborn and insensitive. Erasing Lelawala does not ‘set the record straight’; it demonstrates how Indian images are viscerally connected to the practice of erasure and how casually they are called upon or cast away.

Lelawala first appeared in a guidebook to Niagara Falls by Andrew Burke (1851). She surfaced in a chapter that chronicled Indian savagery against white settlers and soldiers, tourist industry enhancements to the area, and several gruesome stories of fatal or near-fatal accidents. Burke then described “An Indian Legend”,
where the maid of the mist appears as a beautiful—the “fairest”—young maiden, who, according to tribal custom, must sacrifice herself to the waterfall to ensure her people’s survival into another year (p. 103). She is the daughter of the ruthless chief who must compel her to be sacrificed lest he “show his weakness” (p. 103). Dutifully, Lelawala fulfils her obligations to her father and community, being “the only offering fitting the occasion” (p. 103).

As Niagara Falls became a popular honeymoon destination in the mid 1800s, Lelawala blossomed into the sexualised figure that remains with us today (Dubinsky, 1999, pp. 67-71). The story still described Lelawala as virtuous and dutiful but images which accompany it typically showed her naked, with bubbles or spray strategically placed to preserve the viewer’s scruples. The portrait, The Maid of the Mist of Indian Legend by James Francis Brown (1891) depicts Lelawala naked as her white canoe tips over the brink, her father attempting and failing to intercept her before her fall. This image was reproduced on several postcard series from the early 1900s (see Figure 2), retitled, The Legend of the White Canoe, and was widely circulated.3

In the 1901 Pan-American Exposition, an exposition to promote tourism and trade in the Niagara region, the Maid of the Mist serves as the reference point for Evelyn Rumsey Cary’s promotional poster, “Spirit of Niagara” (Aichele, 1984, p. 47).4 Rather than an Indian woman, this one is unambiguously white and wears what looks to be laurel leaves around her head; a cityscape complete with industrial smoke stacks can be seen behind her (see figure 3). The image produced a minor scandal because this woman was portrayed naked above the waist, her lower half obscured by broad brush strokes. Ultimately the Spirit was abandoned (Aichele, 1984). While the Spirit was met with scandal, Lelawala in the nude, who had been in wide circulation years longer than the Spirit, was not met with the same reaction. It is unlikely that industry carrying these images were concerned that pictures of naked women would alienate business people and tourists (both images were used in comparable ways). We are then left to speculate what this sliding scale of acceptability serves.5

More recently, the 1953 Hollywood movie Niagara, which casts Marilyn Monroe as a sexually charged adulteress who plots her husband’s murder, borrows from both the Spirit of Niagara and The Legend of the White Canoe. The movie’s promotional poster depicts Marilyn as the edge over which the torrent of water flows (see figure 4).6 The poster illustrates the movie’s theme that some dangerous women are the cataracts over which daring or foolish (perhaps both) men will cast themselves, framed in the kitsch aesthetic that is now characteristic of Niagara Falls and postwar Hollywood.

3 Please see Figure 2, The Legend of the White Canoe, in the original publication of this text (Sehdev, 2007, p. 8). [http://www.acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/71RobinderKaurSehdev.pdf]
4 Please see Figure 3, “Spirit of Niagara”, in the original publication of this text (Sehdev, 2007, p. 9). [http://www.acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/71RobinderKaurSehdev.pdf]
5 Indigenous women are highly sexualised in colonial societies and cultures and a pointed argument concerning the connections between the abundance of sexualised images of Lelawala and colonial violence absolutely needs to be made. While the scope of this article does not permit such an analysis here, I directly engage this in my dissertation.6 Please see Figure 4 in the original publication of this text (Sehdev, 2007, p. 9). [http://www.acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/71RobinderKaurSehdev.pdf]
Looking through Lelawala’s surface to the related images of women at the Falls and the associated myth of vanishing, I am confronted with the material limitations of representation. The representations obscure the materiality of colonialism, the necessities of Indigenous labour as well as the labour of people of colour in the construction of an apparently apolitical tourist site. They obscure the flows of capital emanating from the tourist site which structure the labour and movements of First People.

Niagara Falls is a space where the tourist encounter with First Peoples is mediated, serving to disappear First Nations’ sovereignty. Jolene Rickard (A&E, 1998) speaks of the myth of the imperilled Indian as a grafting of Indian onto landscape at a time when the tourist, power, and manufacturing industries of Niagara Falls were significantly altering the local environment and engendering romantic ideals of landscape. What then amounted to a nostalgic gesture to save the beleaguered Indian and his natural environment (because the Indian is often depicted as a man), is localised on Indigenous women and their work. Rickard reminds us that Niagara Falls, as part of the Grand Tour—or European and American bourgeois travel circuit—relied heavily on Tuscarora women to produce beadwork, which, in the early to mid-1800s, served as proof of having made the trek to the famous cataract and as a curiosity or artefact which permitted the tourist to own something that was surely the last of its kind (A&E 1998). The women who produced the beadwork thus became, in the minds of the tourists consuming their goods, spectral bodies whose only impact on the physical world was affected through bead and leather. They disappear, leaving the souvenir behind.

Tuscarora women’s labour and the tourist dollar figure significantly when in the 1830s the U.S. federal government declared that it would deport the Tuscarora from their lands in the Niagara region to Oklahoma unless they could demonstrate that they could be economically self-sustaining (A&E, 1998). A rich prospector named Augustus Porter bought Goat Island (A&E, 1998). He charged tourists admission to enter the island and permitted Tuscarora women to sell their beadwork there (Low, 2002). If not for the productivity of Tuscarora women, Porter’s capital and entrepreneurial spirit, and the tourists’ impulse to authenticity, the Tuscarora Nation would likely have faced a second dispossession.

The settler border appears remarkably pliable as tourists and their money routinely crossed from one side to the other. Both the United States and Canada were using Indian images, Lelawala in particular, to market tourism, but Canada’s Dominion status in comparison to the U.S. revolution created a space that was amenable to the European tourist. The tourism related amenities on the Canadian side of the border reveal a conspicuous reorganisation of land, resources and people for the tourist who bitterly complained about the growing commercialism of the town. Elizabeth McKinsey (1985) points out that the construction of Niagara Falls as an appropriate tourist destination for the European and American elite of the 1800s marks the production of the venerable sublime and the crassly commercial. The desire to ‘master’ the Falls as promised

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7 The Tuscarora have a reserve on the U.S. side of the border at Niagara Falls and so were subject to U.S. Indian policies.
8 Goat Island divides the American from the Horseshoe Falls.
to tourists in guidebooks like Holley’s (1883), the construction of tourist infrastructure, coupled with the rise of the working class holiday, threatened to make Niagara Falls a victim of the “low brow” on many levels (McKinsey, 1985, p. 131).

The unflinching use of Lelawala as iconic of unadulterated authenticity in the context of obvious commercialism and claims of cultural vulgarity by the upper classes, who before the rise of the working-class holiday had near exclusive access to the Falls, come together at the border. Sourced from the colonial visual lexicon, referencing myths of a defeated and disappearing people, the exchange of souvenir for capital in the context of threatened dispossession embodies the troubling relationship between image and action, cultural and material capital. This slip between the representation and the action is routine, and this is the lived experience of colonialism.

“How does it feel to be a problem?”

As ‘the veil’ of race was cast over him, du Bois was met with this question, “How does it feel to be a problem?”, and the knowledge that he was two-ed, confronted with the notion of Americaanness that actively excluded him (1986, p. 363). As du Bois wrote this, black people had achieved emancipation approximately decades earlier in 1863. However, Jim Crow laws ensured that while black people were no longer considered property, they were most certainly not on par with the white American. Indeed, Jim Crow ensured that ‘white’ and ‘American’ were redundant and exclusive. The American nation depended on the labour of slaves and indentured workers, and this reliance conflicts with the national myth of the American spirit of liberty, hard work and fair play. “How does it feel to be a problem?” is a question of nation and a clear expression of national anxiety. du Bois never hears this question posed as such, as posing the question in an unambiguous way would threaten to expose the fundamental contradiction of the American national dream: liberty and justice for all but those who need it most. The discourse of the Indian Problem operates in similar ways, suggesting that the Indian is a problem for national cohesion. Bearing in mind the active role that colonial myths and images play in the construction of settler cultures, this is plainly true: the pre-existence of First Peoples, even the caricature Indian, poses a question of place that unsettles the settler claim to nation. Taiaiake Alfred says “the Indian problem is the Indian” (2005a), meaning that colonial politics reduce Indigenous sovereignties to a matter of civic engagement, rights and entitlements based on a racialised idea of who First Peoples are and should be.

The ‘Indian Problem’ emerged in North American settler culture as the grounds for nationalism were laid and the borders of nation-states formed. Indian policies in the United States and Canada hinged on the tallying of Indian bodies to catalogue an allegedly ‘vanishing race’. This tally was used to calculate the amount of land to which they would be granted access. The United States operated according to the principle of aggressive assimilation and relocation to lands west of the republic.

North of the border, Canada’s approach to the ‘Indian Problem’ was to procedurally enforce vanishing. Canadian policies concerning First Peoples were
based on the idea that it was impossible to be an Indian in the face of ‘civilisation’. The crown took it as its duty to introduce and enforce its brand of civilisation and, to this end, the franchise was used as a technology of vanishing. First Peoples were granted the franchise unconditionally in 1960. Before this, they had the right to vote provided they renounce their Indian Status, which would mean they had elected to release the federal government of its Treaty responsibilities to them. The renunciation of Treaty carries with it very material consequences. Treaty ensures that First Peoples have access to reserves, health care, education, among other things. Perhaps the most significant consequence to the lives of enfranchised First Peoples was that they could no longer live on reserves and so would be physically alienated from their communities. Further, First Peoples could have the franchise imposed upon them by a jury whose decision could not be appealed (Surtees, 1988). This leads Francis to say, “when Canadians said ‘Indian’, they meant doomed” (1992, p. 57). The question that rests just under the surface of Frances’s statement is one that needs to be explored: who are they, and are we them?

Ian Angus maintains that Canadianness is crisscrossed by borders, both physical and abstract—necessary, not natural. English and French Canada erect a border between; Canada erects a border against the U.S.; before this, it erected a border against England (1997, pp. 105-134). This constant and shifting need for an Other means that Canadian national identity is not static; we are shifting. Angus is arguing for a negotiation of Canadianness between the English, French and First Nations but the normative status of English and by implication, white Canada endangers any honest dialogue between these parties. The ‘Indian Problem’ polices the border that continues to be drawn around First Peoples, that opens on the condition of Indianness but remains tightly shut against sovereign First Nations. “How does it feel to be a problem?” is posed to First Nations, making sovereignty strange while indigenising the Indian. In the meantime, the we who pose the question remain normative, rightful and reasonable.

When multiculturalism emerged as official policy in 1971 and was recognised in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1985, the matter of racism became more and more urgent as it became less and less visible in the Canadian public sphere (Bannerji, 2000). The basis of multiculturalism as we know it today was the ‘Just Society’, which was meant to temper English-French antagonisms and in addition to entrenching bilingualism, granted ‘founding nations’ status to the English and French; a nod to the roles of these linguistic, and by extension, settler communities in forming Canada. The creation of the ‘just society’—through the recognition of the linguistic and cultural significance of the francophone, decriminalisation of homosexuality, opening the borders to people from nations beyond Britain and the United States—advanced rights discourse and was the defining feature of Trudeau liberalism in the 1970s. As part of the Just Society package, then Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean Chrétien, proposed to undo the federal government’s Treaty responsibilities. The implications of the notorious and ironically named White Paper were enormous. It would mean that First Peoples would completely lose all rights ensured to them by Treaties, the contracts that allowed the crown to establish colonies on Indigenous territories,

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9 Chrétien would later serve as Prime Minister from 1993 to 2003.
10 All proposed bills enter debate as ‘white papers’ but the procedural designation used in this case poetically exposes the intersections of white supremacy and Canadian law.
which made the Canadian nation a possibility in the first place. In short, there would be no legal difference between First Peoples and other visible minorities in the nation.

The borders between representation and experience are made concrete and we indicates the indifference to Indigenous sovereignties that binds the settler nation. This means that we ignore the fact that we live on lands leased to us, that we all are (First Nations and settlers) implicated in Treaty and therefore have responsibilities to ensure that they are attended to as living documents, not as historical relics, drained of significance. Treaties are agreements between sovereign nations and they must be read as declarations of sovereignty, not as the surrender to colonial powers (Rickard, 1973). The White Paper officially died but we see it re-emerge in land claim disputes, roadblocks, government policies and proposed bills routinely. Even when First Nations were later included in the list of founding nations, their status in the confederacy was discursively sealed in the past by the implication that Indigenous sovereignty is trumped by the Canadian nation-state.

The desire to create a just society at the expense of justice to First Nations also hints at the insufficiencies of recognising difference through official multiculturalism. Official multiculturalism identified the existence of diversity but provided no framework through which racism could be meaningfully criticised (Bannerji, 2000; Miki, 1998; Philip, 1992). Scholars began to question the placement of multiculturalism at a time when the effects of systemic racism were most keenly felt, and while the rights of First Peoples continued to be eroded. “Multiculty” (see Bannerji, 1997) as some called it, dominated public discourse and pushed serious talk about systemic racism out of the public sphere, while it further distanced us Canadians and our elected representatives from the very pressing subject of Indigenous sovereignty. So effective was multiculturalism in ensuring the status quo that one scholar declared “multiculturalism is anti-anti-racism” (Bannerji, 1997). It is little wonder why we is considered a disingenuous claim to collectivity.

The inability to dismantle the border between unqualified Canadians and racialised Others within Canada is exactly where dominant articulations of Canadianness fail, says Angus (2005). The impulse to insist on difference from the U.S. and the threat of empire is internal to Canadian identity and yet, in its dominant form, it would colonise within the nation’s borders (Angus, 2005). Access to the nation under multiculturalism means little if racism is swept under the nation’s carpet, and the franchise means colonisation if it is imposed or not met with the ability to confront, refocus and change the terms of inclusion, Angus says. Yet, even as the borders fluctuate and the we who determine and are determined by these borders constantly shifts, the primary claim to the nation remains unspoken and deeply problematic. I do not argue that the settler nation be dismantled, after all, where would we go? I am instead underlining the problems and ambiguities inherent to the settler state. Further, Angus is not suggesting that inclusion for First Peoples should come at the expense of sovereignty, or that this primary nation claim is somehow normative. But as we question the production of the settler state we must also question the ways in which even the most radical articulation of inclusion is buttressed against a history and culture of assimilation and genocide.
Unhoming settler states

Colonisation is continued through the operation of this contingent visibility in the form of conditional inclusion of a people in exchange for their sovereignty. This renders us incapable of recognising how colonialism is experiential as well as representational. Indifference to colonialism’s violence as well as to the sovereignties of First Nations surfaces here and is stunningly difficult, though not impossible, to confront.

To be blind to our political realities means we are blind to our agency within them. Taiake Alfred identifies the disavowal of the responsibility to recognise this colonial reality as an injustice at the level of the relationship between Natives and non-Natives. Similarly Fanon (1967b) wrote to French people during the Algerian war of independence saying that they had responsibilities to Algerians. This responsibility is not analogous to the idea that we are all one another’s keepers. That characterisation of responsibility is fundamentally unhelpful because it depoliticises the responsibility to acknowledge the violence of colonisation by framing it as a general and apolitical state of existence. The responsibility Fanon and Alfred are referring to is deeply political and needs to be carried collectively and individually. Without a recognition of a fundamental wrong and the undeniable need to confront the injustice in order to recognise the ways that colonisation organises our relations with others, our efforts to develop an inclusive, diverse and just society can only result in failure and frustration.

The relationship between the representational and the material exposes contradictions that are inherent to any we in the settler state. Colonial representations, read through their histories and the context that surrounds them today, illustrate the process of making and normalising the settler state. Taken together, the inherent contradictions of the profoundly unstable and conspicuously unqualified settler nation begin to emerge. Demystifying the settler state commits us to factoring the unstable and indifferent into our analyses. The term settler society presents an opportunity to unsettle this presumed collective, to look at the coercive potential of collectivities within colonialism and the ways whiteness continues to structure our experience either through confrontations with it or by adopting dominant standards of success and inclusion; by accepting the reduction of justice to a matter of visibility and invisibility. The term settler society indicates struggle, which in the context of progressive politics and committed scholarship means constantly confronting how power in the abstracted sense and the lived experience becomes localised in this group claim.

Rinku Sen recently wrote that “white progressives don’t get it” (2007). She argues that white progressives in the U.S. surface periodically to blame allegedly politically immature progressives of colour for the lack of cohesion in progressive politics. These white progressives, according to Sen, argue that the immobilisation of progressive politics happens because of racialised progressives’ apparently unthinking devotion to ensuring that there are the requisite number of people of colour in any given organisation. Here the movement for racial justice is reduced to a wildly simplistic version of identity politics that is about inclusion without reflexivity. The question of racial justice is sidestepped as progressives of colour are cast as the politically damaging Other on the inside.
We see similar arguments surface in the context of multiculturalism and national security in Canada. After the arrests of 18 members of an alleged terrorist cell in the Greater Toronto Area in the summer of 2006, debates emerged concerning whether we had compromised our national fabric and the collective endeavour of making Canada a socially responsible and diverse nation by opening our borders too widely, by being too welcoming (for a particularly caustic example see Wente [2006]). Had we, in the quest to realise the national dream of the cultural mosaic gone too far? Were we too multicultural? The response to both Sen’s example and the case of the now famed “Toronto 18” is the same: shut down equity to protect what we have worked toward, be it a loose idea of progressive politics or a national myth. The terms of engagement are then set and reinforced by the impulse to sameness, the superficial inclusion of difference and the apparently justifiable right to include or exclude. It is this illogic that collapses Muslim into terrorist, First Nation into Indian, racial justice into political decay, the radical us into the constricting we. This illogic reduces the politics of representation to visibility and invisibility, and in framing progressive politics this way, deflects meaningful critique of the terms of the argument.

Whiteness studies have helped us to develop an understanding of the ways whiteness responds to its political environment. It helps us to understand glib reductions of identity politics as a way of alienating agency from the white subject. While on the surface there appears to be little binding a white person who claims to be colour-blind and blameless to the very material benefits that whiteness accrues, given an understanding of structural racism and the normativity of whiteness, we are able to identify the currents of power that run through the act of disavowing one’s blame. Similarly, disappearing Lelawala from the steamboat company’s public records needs to be understood in more nuanced ways than a desire to ‘make good’, given that this disappearance has not been met with an apology or even an acknowledgement of a wrong done and given the community of similar images that create the appearance of settler home-ness at Niagara Falls. Whiteness studies enables us to take this long view and ask difficult questions about power, location, agency and responsibility.

The responsibility to decolonise confronts every we. The we of the settler state and whiteness, if left undifferentiated and unexamined, is not bound to a recognition of agency and responsibility. The settler state produced Lelawala, her changing context shaped her over time, and she is deeply colonial. Whiteness studies can help us in the radical repositioning of the question: “how does it feel to be a problem?” to where it rightly belongs: on whiteness itself. As we ask this question we need to continue to question our treatment of whiteness as an agent and how this impacts or obscures the location of our personal and collective responsibilities. This personal and collective location is an opportunity, an act of hope, where we might begin to think through agency and responsibility in ways that are not bound up with dominant articulations of race and location. We, rethought as agency, compels us to do this difficult work. To do otherwise is to create a discipline that is indifferent to politics and to create a politics by means of disavowal.

**Author Note**
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References


The white fireman and the American heartland in the memory of 9/11

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Memorial efforts commemorating the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) frequently pay tribute to the fireman and his courageous actions on that day and in its aftermath. This article is interested in the pairing of the fireman (and his associated iconography) with the sentimental signifier of the American heartland in 9/11 memorial culture. It argues that this combination is a potent reaffirmation of the goodness of the United States that effectively does away with the need to interrogate possible reasons as to why the 9/11 attacks occurred. Through an analysis of heartland imagery, I explore the co-articulation of whiteness and American innocence that characterises the memorial culture of 9/11. First, the article explores how the American heartland is used to signify goodness and innocence, and how such qualities are linked with whiteness. It then explores how the heroism, decency, and integrity of the (white) fireman is used as a cipher for national goodness and wholesomeness in two memorials: the St. Paul’s Chapel exhibition Unwavering Spirit: Hope and Healing at Ground Zero, and Mural with Silos, a photograph by Jonathan Hyman. Finally, the article tracks how the pairing of the fireman with the heartland rejuvenates white exceptionalist narratives by producing both the American nation, and its protector-heroes, as white.

Introduction

Jonathan Hyman’s photograph T.C.’s back (Figure 1) depicts a memorial tattoo that commemorates the sacrifice of fire fighters who died in the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Written on the body of New York City (NYC) fire fighter T.C. Cassidy, the tattoo is an elaborate, graphic, highly saturated depiction of the burning World Trade Centre (WTC) towers. A banner, held above the orange torch of the Statue of Liberty by two angels and (presumably)
bearing the names of fallen comrades, turns T.C.’s skin into a living memorial upon which to commemorate the dead. The tattoo embodies the injunction to ‘Never Forget’—a slogan that frequently accompanies memorials to 9/11. While unspecific, given that is often paired with tributes honouring members of the fire and police departments, and is a post-9/11 addition to the sides of ambulances and fire trucks in New York City, the slogan is likely in reference to the heroic efforts of fire fighters and police officers during 9/11 and in its aftermath. T.C. stands with his back to the camera, bowing to uniformed images on the wall in front of him—perhaps the portraits of the individuals listed on his back. We see nothing of T.C.’s face, just his muscular build and short, cropped hair. He is an anonymous figure of grief whose body anchors themes and values key to the memorialisation of 9/11: heroism, sacrifice, patriotism, masculinity, and whiteness.

The first two themes of heroism and sacrifice are plainly seen, and recur across a range of 9/11 memorials—from the 56-foot-long bronze relief memorial wall at Engine 10 (a fire station opposite Ground Zero), to Fire Department of New York (FDNY) trinkets and souvenirs available for purchase at the Ground Zero site, to those discussed in this paper. It is nothing less than an honourable, courageous act when emergency personnel run into burning, unstable, and/or toppling buildings in order to rescue others, and T.C.’s memorial tattoo embodies the heroism and sacrifice often associated with the dangerous work of fire-fighting.

I will discuss patriotism and masculinity in further detail soon, but here I want to draw attention to whiteness because it plays a critical role in efforts at national healing in the aftermath of the traumatic 9/11 attacks. In this article I discuss two examples of 9/11 memory: Jonathan Hyman’s photograph Mural with Silos and Unwavering Spirit: Hope and Healing at Ground Zero, the commemorative exhibition at St. Paul’s Chapel in NYC. Their pairing of the 9/11 firemen with heartland imagery suggests that firemen not only protect and rescue people from burning buildings, but also safeguard a way of life that is encapsulated in the American heartland. Focusing on the deployment of the white fireman in the memorialisation of the 9/11 attacks, I explore how his individual virtue, borne out through his sacrificial heroism, is used to confirm the integrity of the nation-at-large. In other words, the white fireman is used as a cipher for national goodness and wholesomeness. My interest lies in how such use of the fireman mobilises white narratives of American exceptionalism that characterise the cultural memory of 9/11. In each example, race, gender, nation, and patriotism intersect with foundational American narratives to produce the American nation, and its protector-heroes, as white.
The heartland in American culture

However, before I discuss my examples, a word about my use of ‘white’. Joseph Pugliese has argued that treating whiteness as an ahistorical and homogeneous category without reference to the “specificities of ethnicity and geo-politically situated subjects” (2002, p. 150) reproduces the universalising effects of whiteness that are supposedly under critique. As such, this section contextualises whiteness as it has been articulated through the American heartland, linking the signifier to the nation’s Puritan beginnings and its doctrine of exceptionalism.

As a term, ‘heartland’ is often used in reference to the territorial Midwest—the geographic middle of America comprising the states North and South Dakota, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, Ohio, Kansas, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Missouri. At the same time as referring to these states, ‘heartland’ is also used metaphorically to represent the ‘real’ America. James R. Shortridge calls the heartland the “most American part of America”, locating in it small town America, rural farmland, Main Street, and the home of the average American (1984, pp. 213-214, 1985, 1989). As a symbol of authentic American-ness, the heartland evokes the emotional and spiritual core of American identity, which is why thinking about the heartland in relation to 9/11 helps us understand how this signifier is used to represent the nation to itself, particularly in times of national crisis (Knepper & Lawrence, 2006).

An Anheuser-Busch advertisement for Budweiser Beer that aired during the 2002 Super Bowl, not six months after the 9/11 attacks, alerts us to how the heartland may be used in such a context.1 In its depiction of an essentially wholesome American nature, the Budweiser advertisement captures the spirit of 9/11 memorials that employ heartland imagery—of which, more in my next section. The Anheuser-Busch commercial showed eight Clydesdale horses being hitched to a Budweiser wagon in a wintry, rural landscape before depicting their journey to Lower Manhattan through small town America. Upon confronting the absence of the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in the skyline, the Clydesdales genuflect, the trumpet—a key instrument of the funeral march—sounds out in tribute, and the Budweiser logo appears on screen. Anheuser-Busch used the advertisement to honour the victims of 9/11 while at the same portraying itself as a grieving corporate citizen—chiefly through heartland imagery.2

In its depiction of a barn, frolicking horses in a pastoral landscape, Main Street of small town America, a barber wearing an old-fashioned smock gazing out at the passing Clydesdales, the advertisement presented images of rural and small town America that harked back to an earlier time in the nation’s history. An earlier time in which life moved at a slower pace, where things were done the ‘old way’, where life, it seems, was more innocent. Anheuser-Busch mobilised this set of images to portray (and identify with) the ‘real’ America that was attacked on 9/11, and the ‘real’ America that would provide solace in the attacks’ traumatic aftermath. In so doing, the advertisement de-emphasised the attacks as a military, political, and economic event; instead portraying them as an

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1 This advertisement can be viewed at youtube.com/watch?v=3zXZX2sXHYI
2 See Christopher Campbell (2003) for a thorough deconstruction of the advertisement’s politics.
assault upon American identity and the values with which the heartland is typically associated: humility, tradition, ordinariness, decency, innocence and simplicity (Shortridge, 1984, p. 215). Such values characterise the American heartland and its inhabitants as essentially good, which constitutes the 9/11 attacks as a desecration of American wholesomeness and innocence.

Whiteness is critical to the heartland, as both a racial marker and a collection of shared values and beliefs that reinforces the assumption of essential American goodness. Although the Budweiser advertisement features no one save the white barber, we can turn to the work of celebrated American artist Norman Rockwell, whose paintings exemplify this dual sense of whiteness. His depictions of the lives of ‘everyday’ Americans are deeply nostalgic, featuring happy (white) families, apple-cheeked, cherub-like children, the local milk bar, small town existence—representations of wholesomeness that implicitly shore up white, heterosexual, anti-urban, politically conservative values that are identified as and with the ‘real’ America. And if Rockwell’s mid-twentieth century art seems passé, consider how in the aftermath of 9/11 The New York Times chose to advertise itself as a trusted news source through which traumatised Americans could “make sense of [the] times”: by publishing a series of photo-shopped Rockwell paintings whose all-white, familial subjects stood in for the threatened American public—of which more later (Frascina, 2005).

Rockwell’s vision of American life—its ethnic and racial homogeneity, its domesticity, its sentimentality and, above all, its ordinariness—provide clues to its appeal. According to one critic, “to enjoy [Rockwell’s] unique genius, all you have to do is relax”—comments that suggest that Rockwell’s work is familiar and reassuring (Rosenblum, 1999, as cited in Frascina, 2005, p. 83). That Rockwell’s art is pleasurable to consume because of its comforting depiction of ordinary American life should give us pause, because Rockwell’s art shares with the heartland features that are also a source of comfort, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11: belief in the goodness and wholesomeness of the American people. The reassuring nature of Rockwell’s work suggests that both his art and representations of the heartland provide comfort because they both summarise and provide direct access to the soul of the nation and its people—who are overwhelmingly white. Recent Hollywood and television portrayals of the heartland also configure it as a comforting, nostalgic space populated by (mostly) white people. Saving Private Ryan (1998), A History of Violence (2005), the Iowan origins of Superman in Superman Returns (2006) and James T. Spock in J. J. Abrams’ Star Trek (2009), the U.S. version of the reality-TV show The Farmer Wants a Wife (2008): all portray a rural, small town existence where virtually everyone is white, humble, and leading an earthy, wholesome existence.

In these examples, whiteness is indelibly paired with moral purity and goodness—though such an equation is deconstructed in A History of Violence.4

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3 See Marita Sturken (2007) for an account of the comfort culture of 9/11 concerning the consumerism of kitsch souvenirs of the event, and how such consumerism enacts a “tourism of history” that substitutes feelings of sympathy for the innocent victims of the event for critical engagement with the social and political context of the attacks.

4 David Cronenberg’s A History of Violence (2005), a film about a killer who starts his life anew in a small town and with a new identity, demonstrates the impossibility of escaping
Indeed Ruth Frankenberg notes that in “the national origin narratives” of the U.S., the nation “is always self-styled as innocent” and that “whiteness, American style (and for that matter Americanness, white style) is inherently connected, in its own view, with narratives of innocence, goodness, Godliness and strength” (2005, p. 559). Frankenberg identifies the powerful co-articulation of whiteness and innocence that is a staple of American identity, and that is derived from the nation’s Puritan history as well as the doctrine of American exceptionalism—the “national origin narratives” to which Frankenberg refers. And so given this context, my use of ‘white’ refers not only to a racial category but also to the Puritan (Judeo-Christian) values and assumptions that, together with the discourse of American exceptionalism, characterise the United States (and by extension, its people) as fundamentally good and innocent.5

Though Frankenberg does not specifically mention the role of the heartland in her analysis, the addition of the heartland to this co-articulation of whiteness and innocence forms a formidable trio from which proceed deeply held beliefs and values about American identity and purpose. Puritan values and assumptions positioned the colonists as good, humble and innocent—virtues that courted divine favour and uniquely qualified them to establish a “city on a hill” (Winthrop, 1630/1996) that would provide an education to the rest of the world. And even if the heartland’s rural associations disqualified it as a “city on a hill”, Roderick Nash notes that in the Puritan effort to found an ideal community, these early settlers “hardly needed reminding that Eden had been a garden” (1967, p. 31) and that consequently the pastoral condition provided the route to paradise. In turn, this sense of Puritan election, of chosen-ness for a special destiny, also resonates with exceptionalist discourse that locates in the U.S. an exceptional model of liberty worth emulation—given its successful establishment of republican government in contrast to failed attempts in Europe (de Tocqueville, 1848).

The idealisation of the heartland also emerges from assumptions of exceptionalism, most notably in Thomas Jefferson, principal author of the Declaration of Independence, champion of exceptionalist rhetoric, and third President of the newly established nation. Jefferson was instrumental in articulating agrarian activity as fundamentally virtuous, writing in his “Notes on the State of Virginia”:

Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. (Jefferson, 1781-5/1943, p. 678)

Jefferson goes on to say that the nature of agricultural toil would produce good, moral, citizens that would form the basis of the new American republic. So very early on in the nation’s formation, Jefferson established a link between goodness and wholesomeness, agrarian activity, and the authentic American citizen, which explains why these three notions are treated as virtually interchangeable in representations of the heartland. And Jefferson’s example demonstrates how the

a violent past. The film also comments upon the violence underwriting the supposedly peaceful and wholesome existence of small town America.  
5 For more on American origin narratives of exceptionalism and their connections to white racial history see Bush (2010) this issue. 
cultural narrative of the heartland (innocence and goodness) overlaps and is interwoven with the territorial heartland (the site of primarily rural activity, the geographic Midwest).

Whiteness, the heartland, and the assumption of innocence and wholesomeness: this cluster of associations finds unique expression in the cultural memory of 9/11. In particular, it is the heartland as the romantic construction of the (white) American experience in which I am most interested, and Jonathan Hyman’s photograph *Mural with Silos* (Figure 2) shows how this sentimental imagination of the heartland is deployed, in the context of 9/11, to reaffirm the goodness and innocence of the United States.

![Figure 2 “Mural with Silos, Warwick, New York.” Photograph © 2001 Jonathan Hyman.](image)

**Mural with Silos and Thomas Franklin’s photograph**

The photograph in Figure 2 was chosen as the cover of the catalogue for *9/11 and the American Landscape*, the first exhibition of the National September 11 Memorial and Museum. In the foreword to the exhibition catalogue, Memorial Museum director Alice Greenwald wrote that Jonathan Hyman had “journeyed into the heartland of American grief” (2006, p. 4, my emphasis) to document public art after September 11. Hyman travelled into the territorial heartland, the Midwest, to photograph some 15,000 memorial responses to 9/11, but also covered states not conventionally thought part of that heartland—the Mid-Atlantic states and New England. Greenwald’s language indicates that the experience of personal and national grief brought on by 9/11, expressed in the unofficial (and privately funded) memorials scattered over diverse areas, creates a figurative heartland that transcends the territorial heartland. And so in referring to a metaphorical ‘heartland of grief’, Greenwald suggests that the attacks of 9/11 struck at the spiritual core of American identity. While Hyman’s archive includes numerous photographs of urban environments, Greenwald’s language emphasises the rural articulations of 9/11 memory.

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6 The official premises of the National September 11 Memorial & Museum are currently under construction at the Ground Zero site, with the institution due to open in 2011.
Mural with Silos is one such example. It depicts a pastoral scene: green grass, two silos, trees in the background, and a shed featuring a mural of Thomas E. Franklin’s Pulitzer prize-winning photograph of three firemen raising an American flag on the rubble of Ground Zero (Figure 3). Hyman (2007) found that this iconic image was frequently used in the memorials he documented. Franklin’s photograph was widely reproduced on postcards, stamps, posters and key rings; popular for its depiction of hope and resilience in the face of national tragedy, and for its canonisation of firemen, who emerged as key heroes during 9/11 and in its aftermath. And, undoubtedly, due to its iconographic similarity to Joe Rosenthal’s image of U.S. marines raising a flag upon Iwo Jima during World War II, a photograph that also won Rosenthal a Pulitzer Prize. Franklin’s photograph, then, through its intertextual connection to Rosenthal’s earlier photograph, effectively nationalises firemen, articulating them as civil soldiers united against a common enemy—terror—and standing strong in the midst of disaster as they raise the American flag. The patriotic and soldierly meanings evident in the Rosenthal photograph are taken up and applied to firemen in Franklin’s photograph, casting them as the first line of national defence, and transforming the destroyed WTC site into a battlefield.

I deliberately gender the fire fighter since none of the 343 fire fighters who died on 9/11 were female. Male fire fighters vastly outnumber female fire fighters, and there is such a preponderance of masculine meanings around fire fighting that terms like “brotherhood” and its variants—like FDNY “brothers”—are virtually universal when referring to the culture of fire fighting. The apparent ubiquity of male fire fighters, together with their association with the American flag in 9/11 memorial culture, encourages the view that firemen are supreme models of patriotic masculinity. Yet there is more to these images than identifying and praising the standout individual members of the national body. Rebecca Adelman notes that “as we look at soldiering masculinities, masculinity is soldered back together” (2009, p. 279). She argues that as the 9/11 attacks were experienced as a national wounding and castration, viewing photographs of manly men—particularly those of the U.S. Coalition’s male soldiers—helps to “remember, reconstitute, and reaffirm” (2009, p. 263) American masculinity, and consequently that of the nation.

The reaffirmation of American masculinity is key to Franklin’s photograph; however, also significant is the whiteness of these male heroes. Indeed, their whiteness is non-negotiable—revealed when a sculptor proposed to build a commemorative statue of the figures in Franklin’s photograph, but to change the ethnicity of the firemen so that one was white, another was African-American, and the last Hispanic. This offer was made in the spirit of unity, and meant to honour all those who had died, regardless of race; however it was rejected, as fire fighting is very much the preserve of white, Irish-Catholic, working-class men in New York City (Flynn, 2002, p. 21). Though a clumsy attempt at political

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7 For copyright reasons this photograph is unable to be published in this article, but it can be viewed at: http://www.september11news.com/AAAfirefighters-flag-2-320.jpg
8 This is not to say that there were no female fire fighters (or policewomen or female EMTs) active on 9/11 and during its aftermath. But female fire fighters make up less than 0.3 percent of New York’s fire fighting brigades, compared to a national fire fighter percentage of roughly two percent (Crary, 2002). Also see Faludi for a discussion of how the contribution of female first responders was sidelined during 9/11 (2007, pp. 79-88).
correctness (that in its attempt at inclusivity, excluded women and people of other ethnicities), the incident acknowledged that portraying only white men risked narrowly defining heroism (and the at-risk nation) in the context of 9/11.9

Returning to Mural with Silos, given the presence of the Franklin mural, the two identical grain silos intertextually evoke the twin towers of the WTC. The memorial’s agrarian versions of the twin towers suggest that though the nation has moved away from a predominantly agricultural economy, the soul of the United States, its essential identity, is still found in that rural existence. As such, the way of life symbolised by that pastoral lifestyle, the heartland, can comfort people in mourning after the attacks. In the mural, the three firemen stand atop the rubble of Ground Zero, looking up toward the American flag they have just raised. The addition of a physical American flag to the shed depicted in Mural with Silos symbolically transforms the rubble upon which the firemen stand into the landscape depicted in the photograph. Effectively, the rubble of the World Trade Centre and the grass of this rural landscape are made equivalent, suggesting that the 9/11 attacks not only assaulted the WTC but American values, identity, and the landscape itself. The correspondence established here between the rubble and the rural de-emphasises the attacks as assaults upon U.S. economic practices (as the attacks otherwise suggest, given their choice of target) and articulates the attacks as an unconscionable violation of American innocence and goodness—a practice also evident in the Budweiser advertisement to which I earlier referred.

The heartland is not the only signifier of innocence in Mural with Silos. The White firemen depicted in the mural (as in the original Franklin photograph) are also called upon to signify moral virtue. Robyn Cooper (1995) argues that in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain the fireman was the exemplar of “immaculate manhood” (p. 155-6), celebrated for his physical strength, virility, and acts of everyday heroism that were popularly represented as involving the rescue of women and children. Such acts of heroism not only emphasised the manliness of firemen but the weakness and dependence of women and infants on men. This chivalric dimension of firefighting is invested with gendered discourses of protection where men are protectors and women are the protected—more on this soon in my discussion of St. Paul’s Chapel.

In the case of Mural with Silos, however, the white firemen of the mural enact what John Shelton Lawrence refers to as a “transfusion of innocence” (Lawrence, 2005, p. 37) where those who suffer or die on behalf of the nation transfer the innocence of their suffering/death to the nation that will have to respond to their loss. Such figures, whether the prisoner of war as in Lawrence’s example, or the fireman in the context of 9/11, supply “the lifeline back to America’s moral innocence” (Lawrence, 2005, p. 41) and thus the prerogative to avenge both the

9 The centrality of white heroism to the exclusion of other ethnicities is also evident in the case of Private Jessica Lynch, who was captured in Iraq in March 2003 and subsequently retrieved by American soldiers in a staged rescue. The media interest in Lynch—who went on to appear on talk shows, had a television movie made about her rescue, and received a book deal—was staggering in comparison to other female American soldiers: Shoshana Johnson, an African-American taken captive in Iraq and held for just over three weeks, and Lori Piestewa, a Hopi Indiana from Arizona who was the first Native American woman to die in combat while serving in the U.S. Military. Piestewa was also in the ambush that resulted in Lynch’s capture.
individual deaths sustained and the nation imbued with the narrative of victimhood. Effectively, the fireman’s moral courage, his self-sacrificing nature, and his individual virtue become an individual exemplar of national wholesomeness.

Yet even if the virtue of the individual firemen is beyond reproach, the assumption of national wholesomeness and innocence is problematic and unsustainable. Memorials to victims of the 9/11 attacks that use the heartland to signify (white) American innocence mourn a way of life built upon suppressed histories of violence. Though the heartland is a powerful signifier of whiteness and innocence (and, for that matter, white innocence), portrayals of the heartland frequently and ritually deny the violence and bloodshed of the early nation through which land became available for “civilisation” and, by extension, agriculture—referred to in exceptionalist rhetoric as the “manifest destiny” of the United States (O’Sullivan, 1845, p. 5). This project also extends from Puritan conceptions of their ‘errand into the wilderness’ that necessitated characterising the Native American occupants of the land as both uncivilised (which implicitly framed the white, Puritan settlers as ‘civilised’ in contrast) and hostile in order to justify territorial conquest and genocide (Miller 1956; Nash, 1967; O’Sullivan, 1845; Slotkin, 1992, 2000). Recognition of the treatment of Native Americans, as well as the practice of African slavery, is often completely elided in the nostalgic signifier—and must be if the heartland is to signify moral purity. Effectively, the use of the heartland in the memory of 9/11 scrubs the past violence of these spaces, and in place of these ghosts of history substitutes a victimised (white) American identity, under assault from new ‘savages’ in the form of Al Qaeda operatives at the behest of Osama bin Laden.

I turn now to an analysis of the commemorative exhibition Unwavering Spirit: Hope and Healing at Ground Zero at St. Paul’s Chapel in New York City. If the fireman is part of a ‘brotherhood’ whose job it is to save and protect women and children, the artefacts of this exhibition mobilise discourses that conceive the nation as a domestic space (the ‘home-nation’) that in turn articulates the fireman as the ‘brother’ who takes care of the American ‘national family’.

St. Paul’s Chapel and the articulation of the home-nation

![Figure 4 “St. Paul’s Chapel, New York City.” © Justine Toh, 2006.](image-url)
St. Paul’s Chapel (Figure 4) stands directly across the street from the WTC. Although debris from the destruction hurtled across the road on 9/11, the Chapel escaped destruction, and became a respite centre for rescue and recovery workers during the eight months it took to recover remains of victims and sort through the rubble of Ground Zero. The work exposed workers to toxins in a dangerous and unstable environment, and was frequently traumatic given the scale of the destruction and the scarcity of identifiable human remains. During that time, the spontaneous memorials that sprang up on Manhattan avenues similarly proliferated on the gates of the Chapel, banners of support draped the building, and the interior of the church was lined with cots to receive weary workers—police officers, firemen, construction workers, civil engineers—as they exited their shifts at Ground Zero.

During the recovery effort, St. Paul’s became an impromptu medical centre that treated wounded workers for various injuries sustained during their work at Ground Zero. Podiatrists treated recovery workers whose feet were scalded through the soles of their boots from the fires that burned under the rubble for a month after the towers fell. Masseuses were on hand round-the-clock to give massages to the workers. Meals were provided. St. Paul’s also doubled as a kind of bunkhouse where workers could sleep between shifts. Too tired to remove their tool belts before resting, the workers left rough scratches on the pews where they slept. At the conclusion of the recovery effort, the decision was made not to repair the pews, so these marks have become a kind of scarification of sacrifice indicating where the workers once slept (Figure 5).

As the Chapel carried out its mission of providing a place for workers to rest and recover, St. Paul’s acquired both a religious and frontier description, with recovery workers calling the Chapel an “outpost of heaven” and “an oasis in the midst of hell” (Exhibition text, St. Paul’s Chapel). These descriptions, along with the scarification of sacrifice indicated in these marked pews, acquire significance in a church setting given the Christian belief in the sacrifice and resurrection of Jesus Christ, its central figure. The “doubting Thomas” episode in John’s gospel recounts the need for Thomas to “see the nail marks in [Jesus’] hands and put my finger where the nails were, and put my hand into his side” for him (Thomas) to believe in Christ’s resurrection (John, 20:25). In that case, Thomas requires proof of resurrection; at St. Paul’s the visitor can trace their fingers along the scarred pews and see and feel evidence of the sacrifices of recovery workers. As Figure 5 “Marked pews at St. Paul’s Chapel, New York City.” © Justine Toh, 2006.
such, the recovery workers are positioned as Christ-like figures: people who suffer (read: descend repeatedly into the ‘hell’ of Ground Zero) on behalf of others (to recover victims’ remains to give back to their families) to effect restoration (return the site to normality).

This presentation appears to position rescue workers as Christ-like figures. Given the enormity of their sacrifices, and the toll these sacrifices clearly took upon these workers, this articulation is not inappropriate. However, this characterisation is problematic inasmuch as it appears to confirm dominant discourses of national innocence by providing as proof of American virtue a scarred, heroic, masculine body—and of course, associating this body with the sacrificial figure of Christ. Given the nationalisation of firemen and their articulation as soldiers in the aftermath of 9/11 (particularly in the Franklin photograph), it is practically impossible to pay tribute to the heroic efforts of these individuals without treating their work as reflective or indicative of national character. That is, the memorial culture of 9/11 cannot simply represent the fireman as merely a heroic individual, but must treat him as a figure of national goodness. The commemorative practices at St. Paul’s—that mobilise discourses of masculinity, protection, and sacrifice—are one node in a network of 9/11 memorial texts that slip between paying tribute to heroic individuals and endowing their sacrifices with national meaning. And the meanings of such practices work to reinvigorate exceptionalist assumptions about American innocence.

Another consequence of seeming to characterise the rescue workers as Christ-like, sacrificial figures is the de-emphasising of 9/11’s significance in the world of the everyday—the attacks as an event bound up with U.S. politics, conflicts in the Middle-East, and global economic practices. Instead, such positioning resituates the attacks and their recovery effort on a spiritual plane concerned with notions of absolute ‘good’ and ‘evil’. The emotive language associated with St. Paul’s recovery effort—‘heaven’ as opposed to the ‘hell’ of Ground Zero—implicitly characterises the recovery workers as sacrificial and morally pure like Christ, given their unflagging commitment to often harrowing work. Consequently, the perpetrators of the attacks are implicitly cast as villains in this exhibition, those who brought ‘hell’ to New York City on 9/11, and with whom the recovery workers are engaged in a kind of spiritual warfare.

In the St. Paul’s exhibition, the innocence and goodness that characterises the individual recovery worker is also evoked in the exhibition’s heartland imagery. To take an example: the banner from Oklahoma (Figure 6) does more than express support from one American community to another, as do most of the other banners on display. As I earlier discussed, in American culture the heartland is envisioned as the innocent, moral centre of the United States. Oklahoma may have already been considered innocent given its heartland location, but the experience of the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building reinforced this designation. As Edward T. Linenthal recounts, newspaper stories on the bombing ran with headlines like, “Myth of Midwest safety shattered” and “American innocence buried in Oklahoma” (2001, p. 16).
If the firemen and other emergency service personnel are the saviours of 9/11 and the figureheads of national character, the reference to the Oklahoma bombing inadvertently hints at the demon of this imagination—Timothy McVeigh. While the destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah building was immediately blamed on Muslim extremists, it was due to the actions of McVeigh and his lesser known accomplice Terry Nichols—two white, ‘home-grown’ Americans. McVeigh in particular was notable for his ‘boy next door’ quality and the fact that, according to a CNN report published the day of his execution, he:

spent his early years in surroundings straight out of a Norman Rockwell painting. In many ways, McVeigh had a typical middle-class American upbringing in the rural New York towns of Pendleton and Lockport, outside of Buffalo. The main pastimes were church bingo games, bowling and football. (Timothy McVeigh Profile, 2001)

The CNN article implies that before his murderous actions, McVeigh was an ordinary American with a “typical American upbringing” (Timothy McVeigh Profile, 2001) that, while not in the geographic heartland, was characterised by heartland, small town values (“the main pastimes were church bingo games, bowling and football” [Timothy McVeigh Profile, 2001]). The Norman Rockwell reference reinforces this notion that McVeigh was so insistently American.

There is a contradiction, then, between McVeigh’s orchestration of the bombing and his upbringing—that would create expectations he would become the kind of man who would honourably save women and children rather than dismissing their deaths as ‘collateral damage’. The kind of man, that is, like the fireman. McVeigh’s ghostly presence at St. Paul’s through reference to the Oklahoma bombing interrupts the pro-heartland, pro-protective masculinity otherwise displayed at the Chapel’s exhibition. His noticeable absence reveals the kinds of masculinities, both reviled and revered, produced by the American body politic. There is the fireman whose ideal masculinity is allied to notions of protection, valour and sacrifice and who becomes the guardian of cherished values encapsulated in the heartland. And then there is the firebrand, the gun-toting extremist disillusioned with his government and willing to commit murder on principle. This latter subject offends heartland values of wholesomeness and innocence, but he also stages a critique of the heartland—a signifier that typically
resists critical analysis—by revealing that the heartland does not necessarily produce the wholesome citizens of Jefferson’s agrarian vision. But even if McVeigh, as the spectre of domestic terrorism, is invoked by the heartland imagery of St. Paul’s, he is just as summarily exorcised through emphasis upon the ideal masculinity of the 9/11 fireman—whose charge it now is to protect Americans from internal (McVeigh as disavowed American masculinity) as well as external threats (Muslim extremism).

Returning to the exhibition, the banner depicted in Figure 6 represents Oklahoma City as a collective group of survivors of the 1995 bombing, reaching out in fellowship to survivors and rescue workers of the 9/11 attacks. Such a gesture from the Midwest heartland of America, from a community that has also suffered loss through terrorist violence, also has the effect of bestowing upon cosmopolitan New York the distinction of shared victimhood. In this vein, we might consider the items that adorn the cots of recovery workers (Figure 7). Hand-knitted blankets, donated pillows, stuffed animals, children’s cards: these are artefacts of domesticity, of childhood, and of craft—more traditionally associated with the humble heartland rather than cosmopolitan, upwardly mobile New York.

![Figure 7](image)

These artefacts evoke Kaplan’s discussion of the term “homeland” (1998)—in widespread use after 9/11, particularly in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The term, Kaplan argues, unites the home and nation, conceiving the nation as a domestic space “imbued with a sense of at-homeness” in implicit opposition to “an external world perceived as alien and threatening” (1998, pp. 581-582). She notes that the term “has a decidedly anti-urban and anti-cosmopolitan ring to it” in its evocation of the past, native origins, common bonds, birthplace, and ancestry (2003, pp. 84-88). These associations implicitly appeal to notions of ethnic and racial homogeneity (whiteness) that project difference (connoted as hostile, foreign) beyond the bounds of the safe (domestic) space of the nation. The culturally homogeneous nature of American life promoted by the imagery of the home-nation is inconsistent with other

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10 Racial and ethnic otherness is not the only kind of difference positioned as beyond the nation. Linenthal notes that rhetoric surrounding McVeigh and Nichols consistently positioned them as “in” but not ‘of’ America” (2001, pp. 19-21), which meant that their actions were read as aberrant and thus precluded further examination of their actions and their motives for them.
portrayals of America, most notably in the claim that the United States is a 'nation of immigrants'. As Kaplan argues:

Where is there room for immigrants in the space of the homeland as a site of native origins, ethnic homogeneity, and rootedness in common place and past? How could immigrants possibly find inclusion in the homeland? (2003, p. 87)

The rhetoric of the homeland, in its appeal to a "rootedness in common place and past" also obscures the fact that the Puritan colonisers were themselves immigrants seeking their Promised Land in the so-called 'New World'—and the fact that their new home was made possible through the dispossession of Native American peoples.

At St. Paul’s, the gendered production of the handmade artefacts—traditionally associated with female arts and crafts—articulate the home front. They establish American women as the “national allies” of American men who together produce the (white) American nation as home (Kaplan, 1998, p. 582). Through their imagery of innocence and wholesomeness, these artefacts—of the heartland, domesticity, childhood, and care—connote innocent victims who may require future protection. These symbols of heartland America are more than the paraphernalia of support, care, and comfort. They derive their symbolic power through the way they make sense of exceptionalist assumptions about American innocence—and the necessity of protecting that innocence. The artefacts can also work to rationalise in other contexts the barricading of the American community from a hostile exterior. As signifiers of the faithful wife and family waiting to welcome their weary soldier-husbands and fathers home, these artefacts connot an at-risk population along racial (white), heterosexual, and familial (the nuclear family) lines—also performed by the publication of the photo-shopped World War Two-era Rockwell paintings by The New York Times to which I earlier referred.

Such artefacts demonstrate Susan Faludi’s thesis that the post-9/11 landscape is one of “neofifties nuclear family ‘togetherness,’ redomesticated femininity, and reconstituted Cold Warrior manhood” (2007, pp. 3-4) characterised by a renewed appetite for conservative gender roles—for men as hero-protectors, and women as comforters and keepers of the hearth. As Faludi comments:

The myth of American invincibility required the mirage of womanly dependency, the illusion of a helpless family circle in need of protection from a menacing world. Without that show of feminine frailty, the culture could not sustain the other figment vital to the myth, of a nesting America shielded by the virile and vigilant guardians of its frontier. (2007, p. 144)

Faludi thus connects the conservative gender politics implicit in the memorialisation of 9/11 with foundational U.S. narratives of exceptionalism and its attendant enthusiasm for ‘errands into the wilderness’ in order to establish that innocent ‘city on a hill’ (2007). At St. Paul’s, artefacts of domesticity and childhood are imbued with heartland values of innocence and wholesomeness. They imply that the defence of the national family is at stake, and that the (male) recovery workers are the ones charged with (and capable of) protecting the helpless home-nation. This “reconstituted, reaffirmed” (Adelman, 2009, p. 263) American masculinity rebuffs claims that late-century (white) masculinity is in ‘crisis’ due to advances of minority groups and post-industrial restructuring of the labour force (Faludi, 1999; Kennedy, 1996; Schlesinger, 1958/2007), as well
as a general malaise brought on by excessive Western consumption—as portrayed in films like *Fight Club* (1999) and *American Beauty* (1999). Faludi notes that the courageous acts of both the firemen and the “white-collar men of Flight 93 … assur[ed] their brethren that the ‘feminised society’ wasn’t irreversible, after all” (2007, p. 61).

Indeed, the courageous acts of manly, white men authorises their status as protectors—the heroes of Elisabeth Anker’s “melodramatic mode” where presentations of 9/11 are characterised by dramatic polarisations of good and evil, and filled with stock characters of the ruthless villain, the suffering, innocent victim, and the heroic saviour (2005, pp. 24-25). The moral economy of melodrama, argues Anker, is unambiguous—the suffering of victims justifies heroic action against villains (2005, pp. 24-25). Deployed in the context of 9/11, the melodramatic mode empowers the U.S. (or other heroic agent) to take action against an evil villain (‘terrorists’) on behalf of the suffering victim. This melodramatic mode also implicitly assumes American innocence, which does away with the need to interrogate possible reasons why the 9/11 attacks occurred.

By focusing on the desecration of the known and familiar—the *American response* to the attacks in the recovery workers, the *American response* to the recovery workers in the volunteers, and the various comforts of banners, teddy bears, blankets and cards that flowed in from around the country and world—St. Paul’s exhibition retreats to familiar stories in the nation’s mythos through the sentimental signifier of the heartland. These stories are potentially problematic in that they proclaim the fundamental goodness and decency of the nation and its people which, in extolling a particularly American articulation of innocence, works to reinforce the perception that whatever is outside the nation, or those who are excluded from those national stories, are threats. In this way, the exhibition conforms to the melodramatic mode that Anker describes by re-circulating exceptionalist assumptions about American wholesomeness.

**Conclusion**

Both St. Paul’s chapel and *Mural with Silos* enshrine the innocence and moral purity of the assaulted American national community, using not only the signifier of the heartland but also the icon of the white fireman to underscore the nation’s virtue, and those of its individual members. In doing so, these memorial practices implicitly authorise the defence of wounded innocence—in real terms, the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both memorial expressions implicitly suggest the home front and, effectively, the values and investments of the national community. Such investments were mobilised in the justifications for the ‘War on Terror’—that include the reinvigoration of conservative gender roles where “men [wear] all the badges and women [wield] all the roasting pans” (Faludi, 2007, p. 139). St. Paul’s exhibition and *Mural with Silos* employ memorial practices that rely on the same homeland and heartland imagery presented as under threat in the ‘War on Terror’—the humble, wholesome way of life depicted in these memorials.

Remembering 9/11 in these romantic terms negates any question of U.S. culpability regarding the nation’s foreign policy, economic practices, and military
actions—activities and policies that may help explain why the attacks occurred, and that are documented in the work of Chalmers Johnson (2004), Noam Chomsky (2001, 2006), and Arundhati Roy (2001, 2004), among others. Memorial efforts offered by St. Paul’s Chapel and Mural with Silos, in other words, displace interrogation of the event in favour of its uncritical memorialisation. The co-articulation of whiteness and American innocence enacted in these memorials makes possible the emphatic resistance to critical interpretation of 9/11 and the labelling of those who engage in such debate—like the critics named above—as ‘un-American’. By representing the nation in such nostalgic terms, these memorial practices perpetuate an exceptionalist fantasy—to which whiteness and its associations of wholesomeness and innocence are vital. This fantasy is what it is crucial to ‘Never Forget’.

Author Note

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BOOK REVIEW

Colin Salter
Whiteness and Social Change: Remnant Colonialisms and White Civility in Australia and Canada
Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2013
RRP $126.95 AUD

Louise Chiodo
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In one of my Honours subjects a few years back, called Activism, Revolution and Social Change, I experienced a moment of intense discomfort and disequilibrium. With an emerging interest in critical race and whiteness studies at the time, I was becoming familiar with these moments, which psychologists term ‘cognitive dissonance,’ a potentially transformative experience in which your understanding of the world and place within it can undergo a significant shift. The week’s topic was music as a powerful form of resistance, with a focus on different Indigenous reggae artists and their fan bases forming a diaspora of diverse cultures, reaching across race, ethnicity and place-based identity, through a shared struggle for dignity. Our lecturer spoke of his personal connections to reggae as a young Indigenous man during the 1970s and ‘80s, discussing poignant lyrics from prominent artists, the symbolism of dread locks, and more. As he talked, I sat listening, at first very engaged and interested, but then a wave of emotion started to take hold of me as I remembered back to the ‘reggae phase’ of my angsty teens in the ‘90s. What I was feeling was my own whiteness in a very real and visceral way. I suddenly realised my teenage self had been culturally appropriating struggles that were not my own, and that I’d had no true sense or understanding of what the music I’d been listening to was actually about.

Colin Salter, author of Whiteness and Social Change: Remnant Colonialisms and White Civility in Australia and Canada, refers to having experiences of cognitive dissonance during his involvement with Indigenous activism, and these were a driving force for reflecting on his own complicity in perpetuating whiteness. This examination of white privilege is also the motivation for his book, in which he investigates how whiteness manifests and operates within activism through a detailed examination of three high profile and long running community campaigns in Australia and Canada. With all of them involving Indigenous
sovereignties and environmental protection in a postcolonising society, Salter is able to consider the pervasive and shifting nature of whiteness, and the nuances of its manifestations in each context. In each instance he finds the persistence of a colonial mindset amongst non-Indigenous involvement and support for Indigenous activism, despite ‘good’ intentions and genuine goals of social justice and cultural recognition. Whiteness pervades, through the privileging of white perspectives, the positioning of white ways of knowing—especially Lockean notions of property, the idea of ‘wilderness,’ and Western science—as superior, as well as the false perception that Indigenous knowledges are available to, and knowable by, Western knowledge systems, a phenomenon Aileen Moreton-Robinson terms Terra Knowlegius (p. 32).

In the first chapter Salter introduces the theme of remnant colonialisms, defined as the “assumptions and interpretations, rooted in colonial legacies that continue to shape the way in which western societies view (and construct) other cultures” (p. 2). He opens the book with the story of an arson attack on the Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy, first pointing to the prevalence of overt acts of racist violence towards Indigenous peoples in contemporary Australia, but also as an entry point to reflecting on the prevalence of less easily identified forms of racism. Pertinent to this discussion are the good/bad dualisms that tend to dominate much social discourse in relation to what constitutes racism. The simplistic notion of ‘good anti-racist’ and ‘bad racist’ is not only indicative of widespread misunderstandings of how racialised power structures operate, but actually furthers their operation by enabling a deflection of and a lack of reflexivity around racism. Here, and in greater detail throughout chapters two and three, the importance of identifying and examining the ‘invisible,’ or more insidious and structural, modes of white supremacy is highlighted, and some of the complexities associated with this ‘work’ are grappled with.

In chapters four, five and six, Salter focuses on his three case studies in more detail. The first of these is the Wave Hill Walkout, a ten year campaign beginning in 1966, when around two hundred Aboriginal stockmen, house servants, and their families, literally walked off the Wave Hill Cattle Station located in Gurindji Country, in an area now called Kalkarindji, in the Northern Territory. Media representations over-emphasised non-Indigenous involvement and initially misinterpreted worker actions to be solely about wage equality, even as the walkout was initiated by complaints about race-based oppression, living conditions and ongoing connections to country. The second case study is Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy, in an area now called Kuradji, two hundred kilometres south of Sydney in Wollongong, New South Wales. Plans for a housing development were revealed in the late 1990s on a site known to be an ancient Aboriginal burial ground. Non-Indigenous support for this campaign was strong, but problematically drew on discourses around reconciliation, which had the effect of obfuscating issues of Indigenous sovereignty. The third case study shifts our attention to Canada, specifically to First Nation’s peoples, the Haudenosaunee, and widespread opposition to the construction of a major expressway through Haudenosaunee country in the Red Hill Creek valley in Hamilton, Ontario. Non-Indigenous environmentalists involved in this campaign, which spanned over fifty years, also steered conversations away from Indigenous sovereignties.
Whiteness and Social Change presents a rigorous engagement with key conceptualisations about whiteness, resulting in a theoretical framework that draws on a wide range of sources, alongside detailed accounts of events transpiring in each place and community campaign, which explicate precisely how whiteness plays out in each case. Such an analysis is an ambitious project, and the paradox of seeking to deconstruct and even “transcend whiteness” (xiii) while simultaneously demonstrating its persistence regardless of intention is not lost on Salter. He makes note of the “fine line” he traverses in being susceptible to the same “(constructive) criticisms” contained within the arguments he explores in the book (p. 190). I did find myself looking for more personal stories, those moments of cognitive dissonance that drove this in-depth inquiry, and which Salter no doubt experienced throughout the research and writing process. Such an approach may also have made the insightful, yet very complex, content a little easier to engage with, broadening the potential audience. Nonetheless, this book is a valuable and unique contribution to critical race and whiteness studies literature in the Australian and Canadian contexts.

Author Note

Louise is currently a PhD Candidate at the University of Melbourne. Her interdisciplinary research draws on a study background in both Landscape Architecture and Cultural Studies to ask what landscapes and architecture can reveal about cultural identities in Australia, and how the design of civic, institutional and even everyday spaces might be manipulating us.
Imagine me as I am, and now imagine me with a suitcase, it is the beginning of a story. (Bakhtiari, 2013)

Stop-Over, a documentary directed by Kaveh Bakhtiari, tells the story of a group of Iranian men and an Armenian woman ‘stopping over’ in Athens en route to various European destinations. The story starts with Kaveh greeting his cousin as he is released from 4 months imprisonment for a failed border crossing attempt, and has now been served with papers to leave Greece. Iranian born director Bakhtiari, who migrated to Switzerland at age 9, spent 12 months living with this group in Amir’s informal boarding house, shooting over 500 hours of footage which has been developed into a feature length documentary (K. Bakhtiari, personal communication, June 4, 2014). The group share rent of the small flat while planning to move-on. Together they attempt to find a trustworthy border escort and identity documents that will enable them to pass into other parts of Europe without attracting the notice of police and custom officials. The documentary restricts its focus to the period of time it was shot in Greece, providing a unique and intimate insight into their life in limbo during their undocumented stay, a period of transition between country of origin to destination.

A film about the present: migrants setting their own borders

In the Q & A session after the film screening at the Antenna International Documentary Film Festival in Sydney, an audience member asked Bakhtiari about the reasons why the individuals featured in the film had left Iran. Bakhtiari reminded the audience of the central rule of Amir’s boarding house—that no one is asked about their past. This was also a condition for the filmmaker’s presence. He said that for many of those in the film he simply did not know their histories, the reasons why they left their homes and why they travelled to Greece. In this way the legitimacy of their departure is authorised simply by their decision to
leave, not by the legal normative framework of refugee law. The reasons for departure remain decidedly outside the purview of audience judgment and the documentary opens up the parameters of the debate beyond the state focused constriction of liberal refugee law.

The documentary’s implicit treatment of the legitimacy of unauthorised border crossing as determined solely by the undocumented migrants themselves provides a timely contrast to a recently introduced Australian immigration border control policy. In October 2012, the Australian government introduced a process of ‘enhanced screening’ for specified migrants arriving by boat without authorisation. Enhanced screening is designed to determine who should be permitted to lodge a formal application for protection in Australia and ‘screen out’ those who fail to meet the threshold. Although a form of border screening has operated since 1998 in Australia, it has been utilised primarily at airports when an immigration officers suspect a traveller intends to work without permission (such as on a visitor’s visa), or when a traveller arrives without a passport or visa (Evidence to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee [ESLCA], 2013, May 28a, p.45; Question taken on Notice [QoN], 2013, May 27-28a). Prior to the introduction of enhanced screening, the Immigration Department had decided to “automatically screen in most IMAs [irregular maritime arrivals] without any border screening” (ESLCA, 2013, May 28b, p.46). In effect, the action of attempting the risky and sometimes treacherous journey to Australia had been treated as enough to show that the government should rigorously consider its protection obligations through the established protection assessment process and permit the entrant’s lodgement of a protection visa application. This changed with the introduction of enhanced screening, which installs a further hurdle before boat arrivals are permitted to lodge protection applications.

Enhanced screening institutes a highly summative form of assessment that excludes the key safeguards considered important in refugee status determination. Enhanced screening interviews may involve a single question “Why did you come to Australia?” (Cooper, 2013). Though the interviewee is advised that the purpose of the interview is to inform a decision as to whether the entrant has a “valid reason to be allowed in Australia”, the interviewee is not specifically asked to disclose any refugee (or other protection claims) nor are they informed of the UN definition of a refugee (QoN, 2013, May 27-28b).¹ The interview itself is conducted without a lawyer for the entrant. Of the 3072 Sri Lankans subject to enhanced screening in the 12 months to October 2013, almost 40 per cent have been returned to Sri Lanka as a consequence of being screened out of Australia’s protection obligations (ESLCA, 2013, November 19, 2013).

¹ This is based on the enhanced screening interview transcript for persons who arrived by boat before 19 July 2013 and without immigration authorisation.
p.170). The scope of the enhanced screening enquiry is limited to verbally articulated claims in interviews, and if available and permitted, documentary evidence. As such it contrasts with the implicit narrative in *Stop-Over* that the action of departure from home itself communicates an important part of migrant claims. The documentary audience have only the depiction of the struggle, anxiety, and risks the men take during their time in Greece though which to judge the legitimacy of the men’s efforts to move on to other parts of Europe.

**Figure 2: Images from Stop-Over**

**Confinement, claustrophobia and resistance**

Much of the documentary is set inside the crowded confines of Amir’s informal boarding house. The physical and psychological claustrophobic closeness invokes that of immigration detention itself. The windows are sheeted to prevent people seeing inside. The men are hyper vigilant when outside, consciously performing to avoid police notice, the potential for apprehension ever-present. We see how illegal status reproduces national borders within the state without recourse to institutional walls. These scenes resonate with De Genova’s argument that migrant illegality is “lived through a palpable sense of deportability, which is to say, the possibility of deportation, the possibility of being removed from the space of the nation-state” (2002, p. 439). In an arresting scene (shown above) hundreds mass at the fence of the immigration office waving temporary permits for renewal, only a few being addressed, the camera capturing raw devastated emotion as migrants give up and turn away.

The film also documents the audacious action people take to evade border controls. The contemporary age of facial mapping and drone technology, biometric passports and highly policed borders generate the perception that state control is at its most acute and almost undefeatable at the border. Indeed, though not mentioned in the documentary, in December 2012 a 11km double fence line was constructed at the Greek/Turkish land border, guarded with 25 thermal imagers, supplementing the patrol of the Evros river border, with data sharing arrangements established through the Schengen Information System (Omonira-Oyekanmi, 2012). In this context, the portrayal of the bustling activity of people squeezing through fences, jumping on trucks headed to ships travelling elsewhere provides a glimpse of the surprising persistence of guerrilla border crossing possibilities. The gaps in border technology are exposed in the film: we see the men getting haircuts, shaving and assisting one another with the insertion of contact lenses, to resemble those depicted in the genuine passports of others that they eventually obtain. This intimacy shows the care and solidarity their shared struggle has engendered. Bakhtiari’s work in tracing clandestine journeys contributes to the growing literature on the counter cartographies such
journeys generate (for example Khosravi, 2010). Here the ‘people smugglers’ are recast as border (un)officials issuing passports. The border crossers, conventionally depicted as either criminals or victims, are instead portrayed as persons of courage and resourcefulness who seek to “escape their condition and take hold of their destiny” (Deriaz, 2013).

Anxiety about the indefinite time it would take to obtain passports and uncertainty about moving-on and surviving the border crossing is clearly present for the group followed in the film. Frustrated about the delay in his refugee resettlement application, Hamid ('Bruce Lee'), who had been the group’s unofficial sports instructor sets up a hunger strike protest outside the Athens office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that sustains for 38 days. His increasing weakness and despair is distressing to watch. Yet the documentary resists the temptation to focus primarily on the suffering experienced. The individuals maintain their dignity and autonomy, whilst in tears, or eruptions of anger and frustration. And there are humorous moments such as when Amir and another, preparing to visit Hamid’s hunger strike, poke at their own round bellies and joke about remedying their expanding girth. At another point, the boarding house occupants confront the filmmaker’s privilege and demand he attend the police station where one of the group has been held, and we later find out, beaten. Amir, the unofficial ‘papa’ of the boarding house is a constant source of both material assistance as well as encouragement, “Don’t let yourselves go, don’t get bogged down, or else you’ll end up staying here, like me! And there’s nothing for you here”. By the end of the film, all but three of the group have moved on to another destination. Despite the hardships, uncertainty and risks experienced by the group, the documentary nevertheless becomes a story of resistance and possibility. Yet the success of the group followed in the film was unusual. About 80% of unauthorised entries into Europe transit through Greece but many die in the crossing from Turkey to Greece before even reaching other Western countries of final destination (Weber & Pickering, 2011, p. 195).

Ultimately, Australia’s law and practice towards unauthorised migrants almost completely removes the capacity for asylum seekers and undocumented migrants to meaningfully put forward their claims for protection. Australian legal processes of ‘enhanced screening’ form part of a suite of policies which involve turning back unauthorised boats to Indonesian waters, transferring those who arrive in Australia by boat to Nauru and Papua New Guinea, and denying free legal advice on protection matters for those arriving without authorisation. These legal processes strike the stories of undocumented migrants out of the historical record. It is the generosity of the individuals who wanted their lives shown, and the commitment of the filmmakers, that attempt to disrupt such erasures from the record.

Stop-Over has been screened at a number of international documentary and film festivals over the last year, and has received numerous awards and mentions. www.escalelefilm.com

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Louise Boon-Kuo is a lecturer at the Faculty of Law at the University of Sydney. Louise’s current research is in the field of Australian border control and the implications of developing relationships between the state and non-citizens. She is also researching the impact of terrorist proscription on peacebuilding.

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Critical Race and Whiteness Studies

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Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Review Survey—
Monographs, Journals, and Theses, 2005-2014

Bibliography

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The inception of the Critical Race and Whiteness Studies journal in 2005 was a response to the need to critically challenge the ways in which racial privileges formed geopolitical, socio-economic, and socio-cultural ways of being, knowing, and becoming. At its genesis, this journal was named the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association e-journal and has since been renamed to account for the broader transnational scope of the articles and reviews in terms of critical race and whiteness studies (CRWS) scholarship. Through its ten year journey, Critical Race and Whiteness Studies offers critical snapshots of a larger picture composed of the various works that engage with CRWS. This survey aims to provide a bibliography of some of the monographs and books, journal articles and special issues as well as masters and doctoral dissertations that were produced from 2005-2014. Coinciding with the ten year anniversary of the Critical Race and Whiteness Studies journal, this bibliographic survey celebrates and reflects on the past ten years of CRWS scholarship.

Keywords: Critical race and whiteness studies, critical race theory, bibliography, survey, books, monographs, journals, dissertations
**Monographs and Edited Book Collections**

**Adoption**

**Autobiographies and Memoirs**

**Cybercultures**

**Diaspora and Transnationalism**

**Diversity and Multiculturalism**

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**Essays, Poems, and Plays**

**Fiction**

**Gender and Sexuality**

**Indigenous histories and sovereignties**

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3 This book cites ACRAWSA on page 240, and specifies that the field of critical race and whiteness studies is a useful prism through which Asian-Australian studies can be investigated.


**Nationalism/Sovereignty**


**Neoliberalism and Democracy**


**Pedagogical Institutions**


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5 This book is reviewed in the journal by Alan Han and can be found at: [http://www.acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/93AlanHanReview.pdf](http://www.acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/93AlanHanReview.pdf)

6 Peter Gale has a chapter in this edited collection entitled “The ‘Problem’, the Politics, and the National emergency in Australia.”


Popular Culture


Post 9/11 and the ‘War on Terror’


(Post)Colonialism, Empire, and Imperialism


Racial Mixes/Hybridity


Journal Articles and Special Issues

*Affect, Race, and Whiteness*

¹¹ This book is reviewed in the journal by Damien W. Riggs and can be found on at: http://www.acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/94DamienRiggsReview.pdf

¹² This book is reviewed in the journal by Barbara Baird and can be found at: http://www.acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/201Baird20132.pdf


**Borders, Crossing Borders**


**Citizenship/Honorary Citizens**


**Cybercultures**


**Detentions, Camp/s**


Empire/s and State Terror


*Geography and Place*

**Histories**  

**Indigenous Histories and Sovereignties**  

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**Indigenous Sovereignties and the Law**


*Interdisciplinary approaches to whiteness*


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**Orientalism, race and literary criticism**


**Pedagogical Institutions**


*Phenomenology and Materialism/s*


**Popular Culture**


**Post-Apartheid South Africa and Race Politics**


**Post-Racial Europe**


**Race Politics**

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White Nationalism/s


**Masters and Doctoral Theses**

**Ability Studies**

**Adoption**

**Art, Architecture, and Theatre**

**Diaspora and Transnationalism**
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**Nationalism/Sovereignty**


News media and journalism


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Popular Culture

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(Post)Colonialism, Empire, and Imperialism


Religion


