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The impact of Australia’s restrictive immigration policies during the period 1901-1970s upon the family lives of non-white non-Indigenous people in Australia have been largely ignored in the writing of Australian history. The paper explores some dimensions of the experiences of non-white non-Indigenous people and their transnational families in relation to state interference.

Introduction

In A Private Empire, Stephen Foster (2010) maps the journeys of an imperial and transnational family - the Scottish Macpherson family - beginning in Calcutta in 1781. Their story spans Britain, Australia, Guyana and India and ranges to the present day. In Australia, he maps two branches, the Macphersons and the Williams: two branches of the family – both tracing their lineage to William Macpherson (1784-1866). His sons, Allan Williams (born in 1810) - the son of ‘Countess’, a Guyanian slave woman - and Allan Macpherson (born in Scotland in 1818) were half-brothers. Allan Macpherson bore his father’s family name and was legitimate, while Allan Williams, was illegitimate and was given a different surname. William Macpherson came to Australia in 1829, bringing with him his sons, with Allan aged nineteen years at the time and Allan aged ten years (Foster: 123-196).

Until Foster did his research, the connections between the Williams and the Macphersons were almost forgotten, so successfully had they been buried, even suppressed. Indeed, when Foster met the fifth Allan Williams, the great-great grandson of the first Allan Williams and patriarch of a well-known and successful Queensland agricultural family, Williams heard Foster’s account of his ancestry, namely his descent from Countess, the slave concubine of his

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great-great-grandfather in Guyana in the early nineteenth century, with some bemusement (Foster 2010: 387). This example of the suppression of a non-white history, it could be argued, is mirrored in non-white and non-Indigenous aspects of Australian history, which have been largely suppressed and forgotten. From Foster’s important historical work, and for the purposes of the present paper, I wish to draw a number of points in relation to the histories of the family life of non-Indigenous, non-white people in Australia. The histories of such families are based here upon examples largely drawn from the migration files of the National Archives of Australia (NAA).

But to return to Foster. Much of the book traces the history of Allan Macpherson, through his squatting career and violent forays against the Indigenous peoples of the Fitzroy Downs area, up to his return to the ancestral home in Scotland where his own son went out to India in the Indian Colonial Service. Curiously, one of his descendants - Sir William Macpherson - was the British judge who inquired into the recent infamous Stephen Lawrence case, a black teenager killed as he stood at a bus stop in London. In his judgement, Sir William made important statements about the racist nature of the British police force. His most searing indictment of the police force has been seen as a defining moment in British race relations. The racism of the empire had come home and been named in the metropole.

_Private Empire_, with its discussion of Allan Williams, crucially challenges the assumed whiteness of Australian settlers. Here it relates to some other recent work showing more diverse origins for settlers than previously understood. For example, Cassandra Pybus (2006) has traced former African-American slaves and freemen who made their way from North America to Britain and later came to Australia, often as convicts. Ian Duffield (1992; 2001) has written of black convicts and also of Black Scots, sometimes like Allan Williams, children of Scottish imperialists, who were brought back to Scotland for their education and some of whom later made their way to Australia. Pybus (2011) has written recently about Gilbert Robertson, one-time editor of a Van Diemen’s Land paper, the _True Colonist_, whose mother was a coloured woman from Demerara in the West Indies. In my own work I have explored the life of John Harvey, a black Scot, whose father was described as a ‘native of St Helena’. Harvey was an early settler in the Salisbury district of South Australia, where he was virtually the local squire. He was most likely the first black member of an Australian parliament when he was elected in 1857 (Allen 2003). The field of Chinese-Australian history, so recently un-tilled, is now flourishing with the work of scholars such as Kate Bagnall, Sophie Couchman, John Fitzgerald and others (Bagnall 2006, 2011, Couchman, 2004, Fitzgerald 2007). My work on Indians in Australia has brought to light Indians who settled across Australia before the hardening of restrictive immigration in 1901 (Allen 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2011a, 2011b).

_Private Empire_ provides another clear example of this type of work, in the attention it pays to the discrimination, unequal treatment and lesser life chances of a man such as Allan Williams. His career as a colonial official
began well, but soon his advancement was blocked as he was ‘a man of colour’ (Foster 2010: 200-204). He took up farming, went to the gold diggings and acted as manager and agent for his more fortunate half-brother. On his return to government service in the NSW Surveyor General’s Office he was finally able to gain a comfortable position to support his large family. It is important that Foster represents Allan Williams as an agent, a man who made his way despite discrimination and not merely a victim. However of his eleven children, only two married, suggesting as Foster notes, “that in the late nineteenth century it paid to be white” (Foster 2010: 332).

Foster’s *Private Empire* also serves to remind us of the importance of conceptualising Australian histories in a transnational frame. Only recently have historians addressed the transnational aspects of Australian history. Most relevant here is Lake and Reynolds’ magisterial work *Drawing the Global Colour Line* (2008) which places Australia’s quest for an exclusively white nation for the white man within a transnational circulation of people, texts, ideologies about “race” and technologies to restrict mobility. Foster, with his subjects ranging over Guyana, Scotland, Australia and India brings out both the transnational and imperial aspects of this family history and of Australian history. Thus Indians, former African slaves, Chinese and indeed all settlers cannot be seen as confined by their lives and positioning here. Indeed William Macpherson, son of the glen, spent a number of years in Guyana as a planter, having three children with Countess, before coming to New South Wales with his Scottish wife, and his sons. In Sydney, he held a government post as Collector of Internal Revenue in NSW (Foster 2010: 196). His life and endeavours were mixed, he had two families, one coloured and later a white family. This family history, like all Australian family histories, is an intimate history of racialisation, always formed in a relationship to notions of whiteness through the driving force of nation building and the role of families in the reproduction of nation.

The notion of the nation as a family is a powerful metaphor in political science, and in Australian history both the nation and the family have been pervaded by the idea of whiteness, of white sameness, purity and homogeneity. The colonial politician, Henry Parkes, declared Australia’s unity as a function of its British origins, employing a familial metaphor – “we are all one family, all one blood, all one faith…in all respects we are one and the same people” (Jayasuriya 2003: 249). From 1901, the Australian people through their elected representatives drew a line around Australia and declared it a white man’s country. The basic unit of this white nation was the white family. As Fiona Probyn-Rapsey (2007) has argued, “the family has also functioned within Australian colonialism in a biopolitical form to help shape the racial composition of the nation.” Notions of the “white nation” have had violent consequences for Indigenous people. Indigenous scholars and scholars of Indigenous histories in Australia (see Morgan 1987; Haebich 2000) have written about some of the implications of this for Indigenous people. As one who is born of the settlers, to use Judith Wright’s phrase, I am deeply implicated in these violent histories. However, in this paper I focus upon some
implications for non-white and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia, always mindful nonetheless of the fact that the other battles that have played out in Australia in relation to race, family and nation have played out upon land that is illegally possessed (Moreton-Robinson 2003).

Banishing the Spectre of “A Young Chinese Race Rising in Australia”

Producing a white nation for white families meant immigration restrictions and the denial of family to non-white non-indigenous peoples. The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 built upon restrictive immigration regimes, which had developed in a number of the Australian colonies from the 1850s (Lake and Reynolds 2005). The legislation was designed to exclude keep out “aboriginal natives of Asia, Africa and the Pacific”. The device elaborated for this task was a dictation test, which could be administered in any European language to exclude such people. In addition, policy makers expressly sought to extinguish the “Asian” communities, which had developed in the country in the previous century. Jones notes that between 1901 and 1933, the Asian population, which was predominantly male, fell from 44,000 to 21,000 during a period when the total population doubled (2003: 113). As Jones points out, the Australian population thus became whiter. With the passing of the Pacific Islanders Act in 1904, the Commonwealth government proceeded with the deportation of Pacific Islanders, who had lived many years in Queensland and in northern New South Wales. However in relation to others, such as Chinese, Indian and Japanese people, a policy of attrition was adopted. Thus in the early years of the twentieth century, it was made very difficult for those who had already been resident in Australia to return to Australia if they left to visit their homeland. Although from about 1904, such people gained the right to be recognised as domiciled in Australia, their movements across national borders was closely regulated and under careful surveillance by Australian authorities (Allen 2011b).

In such an environment, it was particularly difficult for these men to form a family with a woman from their own background. The particular regimes differed for “prohibited immigrants” from India, China and Japan and also sometimes differed for merchants and businessmen. But all policies were intended to limit the growth of what were seen as alien communities. Fitzgerald notes of the Chinese

> They entered communities that valued the wholesome and self-reliant family but were not permitted to invite their own families to accompany them to Australia without suffering impossible financial penalties levied through discriminatory poll taxes. (Fitzgerald 2007: 23)

Stories of separation and deportation mark such family histories in Australia. One infamous case early in the twentieth century was that of Poon Gooey who had been a green grocer for sixteen years in Victoria. In 1910 he was allowed to bring his wife from Hong Kong to spend six months with him in
Geelong (“A Hard Case”: 10). He was able to get an extension for a further three months during which time Mrs Poon Gooey gave birth to a child and as a newspaper report described them they formed “an affectionate family group” (“A Hard Case”: 10). She was due to leave the country only a few weeks later in August 1911. Poon Gooey was well liked and respected in his community and his supporters made a deputation to meet the Acting Minister of External Affairs, Senator Findley. This case gained a lot of publicity and the young family were supported by a wide spectrum of people in their local community, “by wharf labourers, artisans, tradesmen, merchants clerks and others” (“A Hard Case”: 10). The Poon Gooey family were able to stay longer in Australia and another child was born before they finally had to leave in 1913. The crux of the matter was candidly revealed by Senator Findlay when he met the deputation in 1911:

If we allowed the wives to stay here we would have a young Chinese race rising in Australia. That would be against the White Australia policy (“A Hard Case”: 10).

The government and the community in general were determined that their would be no young Chinese race “rising” in Australia and the general implication of this was that Chinese men resident in Australia, even those such as Poon Gooey, who were British subjects, were not able to bring Chinese wives into the country.iv

In fact many Chinese men married and/or had families with non-Chinese women in Australia. Some married white women and a smaller number married or had families with Indigenous women (McGrath 2003). Interracial relationships were an important feature of Chinese experience in nineteenth and twentieth Australia. Kate Bagnall (2011) estimates that in the second half of the nineteenth century up to 1901 there were over one thousand interracial marriages in New South Wales and Victoria. However these relationships have been seen as degraded. For

white colonists constructed a narrative where intimate relationships between European women and Chinese men became irrevocably intertwined with ideas of immorality and vice, desperation and destitution, as well as with the language of race (69).

It is only very recently that Australian historians have focussed upon aspects of the Chinese experience in this country, and as Bagnall has argued, more recent work has been conceptualised from a more human beginning, in other words, the age-old story, that

white women and Chinese men came together for reasons of economics, physical security, companionship, love, comfort, sexual fulfilment and the formation of families. These interracial relationships occurred with a perhaps surprising frequency, diversity and degree of toleration, such that they formed a substantial part of nineteenth-century Chinese-Australian family life (77).
As the Poon Gooey case exemplifies, it could be very difficult for Chinese-Australians to bring in a Chinese spouse and maintain their family life in Australia. As Bagnall notes, intermarriage between the Chinese and others in Australia was quite common, but such relationships were generally represented in an unfavourable light.

The Rights of British Subjects? Indians in Australia

Even though Indians were British subjects, they were treated in a similarly discriminatory manner as were the Chinese and other prohibited immigrants. All ‘Asiatic’ communities in Australia declined steeply in the first decade of the century as the government made it impossible for them to return to Australia after a visit to their homeland. As noted above, however, from 1904-5 there was a change in the operation of the law and those who had been in Australia for five years and were deemed to be of good character could gain a Certificate Exempting the Dictation Test (CEDT), which gave them the right of domicile in Australia. When Indians resident in Australia left for a visit to India, their departure was prompted by the desire to see family and to maintain an interest in joint family property. In addition, a sojourn in Australia could be the means of amassing funds to allow for marriage in India and thus children and a family life. These men had to live as sojourners in Australia and were separated from their families by long distances and uncertain communications. Furthermore they had to negotiate their family life within the strictures of the White Australia Policy. It was possible for the CEDT to be renewed from India, a number of times. The NAA contains many letters from Indian men domiciled in Australia, but written from Indian villages, seeking renewal of CEDTs for a host of family reasons such as a child’s impending marriage, a wife’s illness or family disputes over land (Allen 2011a).

After 1919, however, Indian men were able to apply to bring wives and minor children to Australia. This concession came about as a result of British pressure, for they wanted to see more favourable treatment of Indian people, who had contributed so much to the imperial war effort. However my research has shown that of those of those who applied to bring a family member to Australia, many were refused (Allen 2008). Only a few were able to have any family with them in Australia. By bringing a son, who in time would apply for a CEDT and then go back to India to create his own family before returning alone to Australia, applicants were able to pass on their property to their family and also to allow for a continuous, even if very small, Indian presence in Australia. Yet the creation of such small fragments of family within Australia by non-white people saw the Australian officials very carefully scrutinising CEDT and other records, birth certificates, to ascertain if the child an Indian man sought to bring to Australia was in fact his son, or whether he was in fact trying to bring in another relative (Allen 2008). Here the State took it upon itself to inquire into the intimacy of a family, to appraise the domestic settings destined for an Indian family. In particular, when
permission was sought to bring in a wife, the officials were required to check as to whether the Indian applicant had a home suitable for a wife.\textsuperscript{11} Permission to introduce a wife to Australia could be refused on the grounds that the applicant did not have a suitable home nor a steady income on which to base a respectable family life (NAA, A1 1919/14322).

\textbf{The Wrestler and the Fight for Family Life in Australia}

Of course, the opportunity for Indians to apply to bring in a spouse and minor children applied only to male applicants. Men formed the overwhelming majority of “Asiatics” in the country. However with the development of the tiny second generation of such people, further difficulties in relation to family could arise. The case of Australian born Mrs Marjorie Singh of Sydney is a curious one, in that she was trying to get permission for her husband, Jaget Singh, to stay in Australia. This case, which ran from the late 1930s until early 1950s, highlights the difficulty of individuals seen as “inappropriate” for Australia could have in establishing and maintaining family life (NAA A2998, 1951/379 Jaget Singh). Although the individual circumstances of each of these cases were sometimes different, this story is fairly representative of many stories whose outlines can be found in NAA files.

In September 1937, Mrs Singh wrote to her local MP in Sydney, asking that her husband Jaget be able to live in Australia. Her husband, whom she had married in Sydney in May 1936, was Indian-born. He was “the world famous wrestler”, Jaget Singh, who had appeared in most Australian capital cities, in the United States, China and Hong Kong etc. He was cosmopolitan and said to have considerable wealth, owning property in India and US, and Mrs Singh contended that he would not be a financial burden on the Australian people or their government. She explained that she and her mother both were Australian born, while her father was born in India, having been in Australia for 48 years: “all of us are pure Indian blood.” To locate her family as part of the Australian community, she pointed out that her parents were voters and that she too was entitled to vote but had not yet done so as she had been travelling abroad with her husband and their baby daughter (NAA A2998, 1951/379).

If Marjorie had married someone resident in Australia, whether of Indian or any other background, she would have not encountered any difficulty with the authorities. Furthermore, if her husband came from outside Australia, but was deemed to be white, there would have been no problem with his coming to live with her in Australia. However by attempting to bring Jaget into Australia, she was adding to the number of non-white people in Australia and thus coming into conflict with the Immigration Restriction Act. Here was the spectre of a young Indian “race” rising in Australia. Jaget was allowed to stay for a further three months, before leaving in 1938, with Marjorie to tour, and presumably to work, in Asia. In 1941, perhaps because of the advance of the Japanese forces through Asia, he was permitted to land for six months. In
December 1941, seeking another extension of four months as his wife was sick, he pointed out. “I may state I am a British subject, my wife is an Australian born Indian I have always abided by the laws of your country” (NAA A2998, 1951/379). During the war years, with a number of “prohibited” immigrants seeking refuge in Australia from the hostilities (Tavan 2005), some aspects of the immigration administration were relaxed and his stay was thus extended until March 1942. Then his wife wrote in pursuit of a further extension, as she was “in confinement”, once more re-iterating “Jaget is a loyal British subject and I am sure that no harm can possibly exist by his present (sic) here” (NAA A2998, 1951/379).

From his arrival in 1941 until 1950, Jaget stayed in Australia on a short-term basis, often only for three months, but on a couple of occasions his permit ran for twelve months. Over these years he and Marjorie settled into family life in Australia and made significant contributions to Australian society. They had two more children, bought a house and later an orchard, he worked on the construction of the Warrangamba Dam, at Cockatoo Island Dockyard, and also as an interpreter for Indians in Sydney (NAA A2998, 1951/379).

After the war, however, Arthur Calwell, Minister for Immigration, was determined to enforce all aspects of the policy and in 1948, on granting Jaget a six-month extension, pronounced this as the final extension, declaring that he must then leave. A blank deportation form was on his file - ready to be employed. However a file note read, “This case is a snag, as wife is Australian and press publicity will undoubtedly be given in any move is taken to deport Jaget” (NAA A2998, 1951/379).

It is interesting to note this concern about “press publicity”, for in these post-war years there were a series of deportation cases, which “drew strong domestic and international criticism” (Tavan 2005: 51). The Singh family had good reason to feel afraid, for in December 1947 the government deported a number of Malayan seamen who had gained temporary residence in Australia after fleeing the Japanese invasion during the war. Many were married to Australian women, had children born in Australia and steady jobs. A case rather similar to the Singh case was the infamous case of Annie O’Keefe (formerly Jacob) and her children. This family had come from the Netherlands East Indies in 1942, after the Japanese invasion. During those years Annie had another child, but her husband Samuel Jacob was killed in 1944 (Tavan 2005: 54-57). Although in 1947, Annie married an Australian, John O’Keefe and thus became a British subject and entitled to remaining Australia, the government sough to deport her and most of her children as prohibited immigrants. Annie O’Keefe took the matter to the High Court, which upheld her right to stay. Subsequently Immigration Minister, Arthur Calwell, introduced new legislation to ensure that such people could be deported.

In the election of 1949, the Liberal party campaigned on the basis of maintaining the White Australia Policy, but “with ‘humane and commonsense administration in individual cases’” (Tavan 2005: 64). The Menzies Liberal
government allowed the O’Keefe family to stay. Similarly, in 1950, with a Liberal government in power, Jaget Singh was granted a further five years residence, subject to good health. The Singh file is closed after 1950, and I presume he was able to stay indefinitely and this family were released from the years of strain and worry to which they had been subjected (NAA A2998, 1951/379).

As well as having to petition the authorities, sometimes on a three monthly basis in order to stay together - to maintain their family intimacy - this family had also to shore up their position by enlisting support of influential people. Jaget’s application was supported by his MPs, by the local Presbyterian minister, and later by Fred Daly, the Labour MHR. Aspects of his family life, such as Marjorie’s confinement in 1942 and the fact that in November 1945, he had two children at Boronia School, were used as a lever to persuade the authorities to make decisions favourable to him and his family.

So this family lived in fear for many years of their husband and father being deported. This case is only one of thousands as Indians, Chinese, Japanese and others sought to create and maintain family life in relation to policies of restrictive immigration. Many were less successful than the Singh.

Conclusion

Foster’s study traces the life of Allan Williams, the son of a Guyanian slave woman, in a human and personal manner. His part in the Australian story is explored in a frame that accords him both agency and individual personality. He lived before the days of the White Australia policy, but nevertheless he and his children had to contend with prejudice and discrimination. The passing of the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901 consolidated the project of creating a white nation built of white families. This put great pressure on the lives of Chinese, Indian and other prohibited immigrants who were resident in Australia. The bio-political project of diminishing and even extinguishing such communities brought particular attention to family life when it involved bringing in a spouse or children from overseas. Historical researchers in Australia have finally turned their attention to the family stories and intimate histories of Australians of Asian backgrounds in the period of the White Australia Policy. Conceptualising these people as Foster has Allan Williams, as agentic and normal, rather than as victims, oddities and degenerates, they find them trying to make history and to make families albeit in difficult circumstances. Their stories are run through with notions of race, imposed upon their stories by Australian attitudes and policies.

Author Note

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whiteness. Her current research focuses upon relationships between India and Australia and Indians and Australians in the late 19th and early twentieth centuries. She is working on Australian women missionaries in India as well as exploring the ways Indian men domiciled in Australia negotiated the White Australia Policy. She is a member of the Fay Gale Centre for Research on Gender at University of Adelaide.

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**Notes**


2 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds (2008) demonstrate the transnational nature of the concept of ‘the white man’ at the end of the nineteenth century.

3 I am grateful to Kate Bagnall for bringing this important case to my attention.

4 After 1912, prosperous Chinese merchants with capital over £500 and involved in overseas trade could apply to bring their wives to Australia for certain periods. (Jones 2005: 46-7)

5 The CEDT can be seen as a type of passport for people who because of their previous residence in Australia were exempted from the requirements of the
Immigration Restriction Act viz. the dictation test. The CEDT included photographs, handprints and a description of the appearance of the holder. See Allen 2011b for further information on its development.

\[vi\] Fiona Rapsey-Probyn (2009: 96) has noted that evidence of a settled domestic life in an appropriate dwelling could be used to permit or not permit the marriage between an Indigenous woman and a white man in early twentieth century Queensland.
SPECIAL ISSUE: FUTURE STORIES/INTIMATE HISTORIES

In Relation to a White Father

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This paper sets out to explore the meaning for the author, a white woman in contemporary Australia, of having a white father. It both follows and deviates from other work by white daughters about their white fathers – not seeking to defend the father, nor needing in particular to resolve grief, but like the other work, acknowledging pride, admiration and above all a major personal and cultural debt to the father. Notwithstanding this debt it sets out to clear a space where a white daughter’s relationship to Indigenous sovereignty is not mediated or protected by a relationship with the white father. The paper moves between history, theory, family archives, memory, stories, and reflection; it is fragmented. It is both personal and particular but also I hope of wider relevance to the project of moving Australia and white Australians, including myself, towards a post-colonial future. The paper risks all the pitfalls that Sara Ahmed outlines in her article on the non-performativity of anti-racism but pins it hopes on her call to those in whiteness studies to ‘turn away from themselves and towards others’ (2004:59).

Inheritance

A couple of years ago I wrote an article about the cultural politics of the resignation in 2003 of Peter Hollingworth as Governor-General of Australia (Baird 2009). I located Hollingworth as the White Father of the nation, and following Fiona Probyn’s (2003) argument about the white nation’s need to disassociate from ‘bad white fathers’ in relation to the Stolen Generations, I made a lot of the nation’s need to remove Hollingworth from the centre stage. His presence there raised questions about national virtue that, from the white nation’s point of view, were best dealt with by his departure. It took a while to sink in that ‘the white father’ was not just a conceptual construct that I could identify in national politics: I was/am a white daughter of a white
father. That moment of recognition brought home to me a passage in the introduction to Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s book *Talking Up to the White Woman*. After discussing the work of some white feminists who have pioneered the area of whiteness studies, Moreton-Robinson qualifies:

> The work of these feminists recognises that white race privilege makes a difference to women’s life chances. Yet these authors fail to appreciate that their position as situated knowers within white race privilege is inextricably connected to the systemic racism they criticise but do not experience. (2000: xx)

This article continues thinking about my white father, as a material presence and provider and as a symbolic figure, about what it means for me to be his white daughter, and the relevance of these things to my position as an academic writer. In a response to an early version of this article a friend wrote:

> [A]s someone who grew up without a white father (or any father) being present - I have always been aware of the provision and protection that the white father provides - something that was very much absent from my life and left our family very vulnerable. (Kurtzer 2008)

I take it as an obligation to reflect on what my white father has provided for me – and to reposition myself in relation to these provisions. This is the way here that I locate myself in the contradictory time and place of white Australia, now, where, as Alison Ravenscroft has described it, there is both fear and desire in moving ‘towards another future’ (Ravenscroft 2003: 239). To do this the paper moves between history, theory, family archives, memory, stories, and reflection; it is fragmented. It is both personal and particular but also I hope of wider relevance to the project of moving Australia and white Australians, including myself, towards a post-colonial future.

It needs to be acknowledged here that having a white father is no guarantee that one inherits his legacy of white privilege. For the many members of the Stolen Generations who were the children of Indigenous mothers and white fathers it was indeed this paternity that lead to their removal from family, community and culture, all too often into situations of abuse and deprivation (National Inquiry 1997). Even for white daughters whiteness alone does not convey material security, although it usually helps. And plenty of white fathers do more emotional damage than they convey self-worth and a sense of entitlement. But that’s not my story. In my case having a white father has created more than a fair share of economic security and subjective self-possession.

Having said all that let me introduce my father, Ross Baird, because it is in relation to him that this article takes shape. He was born in 1913 in Melbourne. By my reckoning he was fourth or fifth generation Australian, descended on his maternal side from migrants who came to Victoria from
England in the first twenty years of the colony, and on the paternal side from migrants who arrived in Melbourne from Scotland in 1854. After his father left them, when my dad was six or seven years of age, he was raised by his mother, with support from her family, in particular her sister. His mother supported the two of them by working as a tailoress. They lived in ‘rooms’. My father was academically gifted and I can only assume that his mother sacrificed her own comforts so that he could continue his education well beyond his years of compulsory schooling. After qualifying from Footscray Technical College with a diploma in civil engineering in 1931 he gained employment in the newly developing kiln seasoning department in the Division of Forest Products at the CSIRO in Melbourne, and began a lifetime working in the timber industry. In 1934 he went to Adelaide to work in the kiln drying department at the Holden car factory. It was in Adelaide that he met my mother, Jean Taylor, whose people had come to South Australia from Wales and England in the 1880s and where they married in the Unitarian Church in 1936. My father’s work took the two of them and a growing family to Tasmania, back to South Australia and then to Victoria, and round again, through many small and medium sized rural timber-milling towns as well as Launceston and a short period back in Melbourne. My father did not go to war, his Unitarian faith leading him to conscientious objection (although he was in any case exempted from service because of his involvement in an essential industry). In 1950 he became manager of Glen Maggie Timber Limited, located in Heyfield in Gippsland, Victoria, a position he occupied for nine years and which developed into wider responsibilities for the company’s timber operations across Gippsland. While in Heyfield, then a town growing to well over two thousand people, my father served on the Management Committee of the Bush Nursing Hospital, for four years as Chairman, was a Justice of the Peace and a member of the Heyfield Masonic Lodge. The 1950s were the hey-day of Heyfield, and the period included the building of the Glen Maggie Weir about ten miles north of Heyfield. The weir was built with a significant migrant workforce and newly arrived migrants also worked in the timber industry. I’ll pause in this brief account here, because it was at the end of this period in Heyfield that I was born. In 1958 I arrived, after five boys, as my father’s first and only daughter.

This brief sketch of my father’s first forty-five years gestures towards many familiar aspects of Australian social history but does not, however, offer an account of the subjective dimensions of this history. And neither is an account of colonialism in twentieth century Australia apparent at face value. These are the issues that are at the heart of this article. But the point here is not only the social context of my father’s life, nor how he was able make sense of his circumstances. The issue is as much my inheritance from him, material and cultural, including my investment in a certain idea of my father, one for which he cannot be held entirely responsible. My mother’s repeated appreciative statement that my father had never been out of work for a single day in the whole time of their marriage is an example of how others’ views of my father became part of my view of him – good worker, good husband, good father. It is also a testament to the economic privilege of whiteness. Further,
daughters’ ideas about (white) fathers are bigger than can be embodied in any one single white man. This is one point to be drawn from Katrina Schlunke’s story of feeling guilty after the distant sight of her father interrupts the skinny dipping in a river pool on her family’s property at her tenth birthday party. She goes on to write that ‘it took me a long time to realise that my parents found it funny. Only I thought of possible immorality’ (2005:26).

When I first presented the conference paper from which this article has developed, I finished my presentation with a photo of me, my father and my dog, taken by my girlfriend about six months before my father died. This photo means many things but I read it then in the context of a consideration of whiteness. It sits on the desk in my study at home – where I sit at my computer to write this article. I don’t have many photos of the two of us. It was only when writing the paper that I noticed that, like the photos from my childhood, at 90 (I was 45) my father was still putting a protective arm around me, something I found comforting. A woman in the audience at the conference session suggested that even as my father was supporting me, in leaning in to him, I was also supporting my father. From his late eighties my father was reliant on the caring work of the women (and some men) employed at the modestly government-funded home where he lived and also emotionally reliant on my sister-in-law in particular. But even then, as throughout his life, my father could rely, as all white men can, on the privilege born of Indigenous dispossession. As he pulls me towards him in the photo, and as I lean I to support him, we could signify a history of the reproduction of this dispossession – first father to daughter, then daughter to father.

**Whiteness**

This article takes up the primary attention to the ongoing colonial nature of the Australian nation state and the ethical imperative for white Australia(ns) to establish a sense of accountability to Indigenous peoples that has distinguished the field of critical race and whiteness studies in Australia.

Given its first person address, consideration of intimate family relationships, and its use of family archival material, this article could be located in what Anne Brewster described in 2005 as ‘the turn to a personalized or autobiographical narrative mode’ in ‘recent writing in Australia and elsewhere on whiteness’ (2005:1). Brewster located this ‘new whiteness writing’ in part as a response to the flowering of the personalised writing of Indigenous women since the 1980s. Brewster rehearses the claims and counter-claims made for the white subject’s project of particularising itself and acknowledges the limits, even self-delusions, of such alleged anti-racist projects. Her conclusion is to argue for ‘new whiteness writing’ as *complementary to* the project that Robyn Wiegman (1999) calls for - ‘the deconstructive one of scrutinising the limits of anti-racist projects’ (Brewster 2005: 11). She works hard to elaborate this ‘complementary enterprise’ which she identifies as one
that ‘focuses on the intensity and immediacy of the relation of whiteness to its others’ (11). At the end of her essay it still seems, to me, a fragile claim. Simply marking the indebtedness of the subject to its others, and its fractured nature, does not necessarily involve any shift in power relations.

This article certainly shares some of the features that Brewster observes in the small body of work that she writes of - a focus on ‘memory’ and ‘divided and dislocated forms of subjectivity’ and use of ‘the trope of the self-addressed question’ (2005: 9, 10). But despite this I want to resist the possibility that this article, like much writing by women and racialised others, especially that using the first person, will be autobiographicalised and so denied epistemological authority and complexity (Nicoll 2000: 370). Yes, there are biographical and autobiographical elements to this article but, as Alison Ravenscroft writes of a piece of writing by Kathleen Mary Fallon, ‘to the extent that it might be “autobiographic”, it is the autobiography of all white Australians, the story of our own origins that we nevertheless disavow’ (2003: 235). I take up the prerogative to tell aspects of my father’s life not to make him into the subject of a biography, or myself into an autobiographical subject, but to show precisely how we are constructed not as individual unique subjectivities but as active place markers in the history of ‘patriarchal white sovereignty’, to use Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s term (2004a).

As Sara Ahmed writes in her article on the non-performativity of declarations of whiteness, white racism and privilege ‘may even be repeated and intensified, through declarations of whiteness, or through the recognition of privilege as privilege’ (2004: 58). This article risks every one of the features that Ahmed argues mark the ‘non-performativity’ of anti-racist whiteness studies. Somewhat reluctantly, Ahmed concludes her article by saying that ‘whiteness studies should involve at least a double turn’ (my emphasis).

The task for whiteness studies is to stay implicated in what they critique, but in turning towards their role and responsibility in these histories of racism, as histories of the present, to turn away from themselves and towards others. (59)

Ahmed states that ‘the “double turn” is not sufficient but it clears some ground, upon which the work of exposing racism might provide the conditions for another kind of work’ (2004:59). Indeed, Alison Ravenscroft writes that a new subject position for those located through white privilege ‘cannot yet be fully spoken’ (2003: 239).

In writing about my father I attempt the ‘double turn’ that Ahmed writes of. In doing this I need to say that I am not setting out to disown my father. Quite the opposite. Lisa Slater notes that ‘ethical cross-cultural relationships ... require an understanding of one’s culture and heritage’ (2010, p. 290). Understanding him is not, however, the same as defending him, but not defending him does not mean that I cannot record that I loved him. I wish to own my father and my debt to him, and understand my heritage, by turning
away from him (and myself) to histories not heretofore understood as ‘ours’. And by asking questions that I have not previously asked, answers to which I cannot necessarily give, I invoke what Judith Butler describes as the conditions for an ethical stance. She writes ‘any effort to “give an account of oneself” will have to fail in order to approach being true’ (2005:42). This failure comes from an openness to others and so to their (quite possibly) incommensurable knowledge of oneself, as well as from the constantly changing nature of oneself.

Daughters and Fathers

This article is not the first piece of Australian writing about a white father written by a white daughter. 1 Judith Drake-Brockman’s *Wongi Wongi* (2001) is a nostalgic reminiscence of the life of her family - wealthy West Australian landowners and pastoralists - in the first half of the twentieth century. The book was published as a direct response to one of the early and most widely read examples of personalized writing by Indigenous women in Australia – Sally Morgan’s *My Place* (1987) (a response different, however, to that which Anne Brewster claims for other white writers). Morgan’s ground-breaking book includes the claim that Drake-Brockman’s father, Howden, fathered a child with an Indigenous woman who worked as a domestic on his station (325, 333), and suggests that he then incestuously fathered a child with this woman, his own daughter (340). This woman and her child are Morgan’s grandmother Daisy and mother Gladys respectively. ‘Sally’s book discredits my family and casts serious aspersions on my father’, Drake-Brockman writes (2001:138). Her account rejects Morgan’s story of her father and includes stories of events that appear in Morgan’s book, told from a Drake-Brockman point of view. She concludes that ‘I have discharged my bounden duty to the memory of my parents, to Daisy, to all my Aboriginal friends and to my family’ (138).

Kim Mahood’s *Craft for a Dry Lake* (2000) is another book written by a white daughter about her white father. It is a story of the journey she took to mourn and understand her father in the wake of his death. *Craft* is about Mahood’s relationship with her father and also about her relationship with the Warlpiri people upon whose land she grew up in the 1950s and 1960s. The Warlpiri now legally own and manage the country that once legally belonged to her father as the station Mongrel Downs, in the Tanami Desert. Where Drake-Brockman wrote to defend her father, Mahood writes at one point that the book is about her struggle to tell the father in her head ‘that I no longer need him to authenticate me’ (2000: 227). *Craft* has been received quite clearly as an engagement with whiteness, white masculine authority and the

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1 I do not claim this to be a comprehensive account of Australian writing about white fathers by white daughters. Mary Ellen Jordan, for example, refers to the death of her violent father in the middle of her account of spending a year in Manigrida (Jordan 2005: 124-6). She notes that it is not only Aboriginal families who lived with violence. See Probyn (2007) for an analysis of Jordan’s book that claims she reproduces a paternalist position.
Australian colonial predicament. Lisa Slater, who includes reflections on her relationship with her own white father and other men of her childhood in her account of the book, appreciates Mahood’s narrative as one which attempts to ‘remake or rewrite her sense of belonging and identity’ in relation to ‘the colonial imaginary’ (2010, 288). On the other hand, Sonja Kurtzer, identifying as an Indigenous woman, whilst initially hopeful, is less appreciative. She notes that Mahood does not acknowledge her reliance on a white sense of entitlement in her literal journey across the country of others – specifically across ‘some of the few spaces in Australia which have been legally recognised as Indigenous space’ (n.d.: 12; see also Kurtzer 2004). Rather Mahood re-enacts ‘one of the privileges and stories of whiteness – to move into (an)other’s space in order to enlighten improve or transform the white self’ (n.d.: 5). Neither does Mahood acknowledge the white privilege in the ‘stories of the triumph of the white, feminine self’ (3) that are produced in the writing of the book. Slater acknowledges these aspects of Craft but sees success in ‘what is revealed: a tale of white belonging and of the tenacity of colonial desire’ (2010: 285). Kurtzer agrees that the book reveals this but does not cast it as success (n.d.:12).

I share with both Drake-Brockman and Mahood admiration for, pride in and a debt to, a white father - and no doubt the (past) desire for approval, too, that Mahood articulates (2000:191). This field of writing is saturated with deep emotion, including, as Slater concludes, ‘a fear that we might have to abandon those, and that which, we love’ (2010: 290). But I write as an academic, consciously taking up the tools of critical inquiry as much as I draw from personal and family archives and memories. It is not that academic writing is not partial or even emotional although its credibility and authority is usually staked on its claim to dispassionate objectivity. That I take up the first person voice is an intervention into academic writing, not an autobiographicalisation of my father or myself. In this sense I am following Greta Bird’s discussion of becoming a white legal academic. Her account is certainly ‘autobiographic’, but she explains that one purpose of her storytelling is ‘to remove the cloak of reason woven in the academy and reveal my skin of spirit and emotion’ (Bird 2008: 3).

In a brief anecdote about her father in an essay where she writes about ‘coming out as a white woman’, Fiona Nicoll manages to place herself firmly in relation to Indigenous sovereignty without apparently abandoning her father (2000: 380). In fact she seems to escape this either/or predicament. Nicoll tells of attending a high school where her father was a teacher. Two Indigenous sisters came to the school and in the same year two new white girls also arrived, both demonstrating what Nicoll describes as ‘private school behaviour’. One day the younger Indigenous girl ‘decided to sort them out’ and Nicoll, upon observing the incident in the school yard, comes to the defence of the white girls, calling ‘that’s not fair’ as she rushes into the fray. In response the Indigenous girl takes Nicoll, physically, and pushes her into a rubbish bin. As she does this someone else yells to the Indigenous girl ‘Watch it! … that’s Nicoll’s daughter’. The Indigenous girl replies ‘I don’t care whose
fucking daughter she is’. Nicoll concludes the re-telling of this incident with
the statement that that sentence ‘will always encapsulate my experience of
Indigenous sovereignty in Australia. Absolute defiance in the face of what
Moreton-Robinson describes as a national “possessive investment in
patriarchal whiteness”’ (378). The purpose of my article is to acknowledge
and promote what Nicoll remembers - a relationship to Indigenous
sovereignty from which my relationship to the white father does not protect
me.

Knowing Heyfield

I pick up my father’s story in Heyfield, the place where I was born, and look
back, and forward, from there to challenge any idea that his, and so my, life
is so far distant from Indigenous sovereignty, and colonialism, that these
things do not shape my life today. ²

Heyfield is on the land of the Kurnai people. In their book about the history of
the Kurnai, local Indigenous man Philip Pepper and his co-author Tess De
Araugo include a map which places Heyfield around the meeting point of the
Brayakoloong, Moomooba Ngattpan and Wooloom ba Bellum Bellum clans of
the Kurnai people (1985: 2). According to the Victoria Tourism website in
1841 an early settler, Malcolm (more usually named as James) McFarlane,
‘viewed a broad plain of waving grass, and chose the name ‘Hayfield’ as an
apt description of the area’ (Tourism Victoria n.d.). This was no doubt not how
the country was known to the Kurnai who lived there before McFarlane came
to ‘settle’. Katrina Schlunke cites Paul Carter to urge attention to ‘the way
places are simultaneously named and brought into an imagined space – of the
picturesque, of domesticity, of nation building, for example’ (2005: 47). How
a whole district of bush in Kurnai country in 1841 could be described as like ‘a
field of waving corn’ as, on another website, McFarlane is credited with seeing
(Central Gippsland Information Centre n.d.) does suggest imagination – and
intent, foresight, perhaps homesickness, delusion. ‘Hay’ became ‘Hey’ by the
1860s and the first post office opened in 1870 (Premier Postal Auctions, n.d.).
As the tourist history suggests, my father was not the first man of Scottish
descent to go to Gippsland to contribute to the colonial settler project of
exploiting the natural resources of the land that belonged to the Kurnai
people. Angus McMillan and Lachlan McAlister were two of the earliest and
boldest settlers in the Gippsland area. Pepper and De Araugo write that ‘It
was Angus McMillan who gave the Kurnai their first lesson on the inviolability
of white people’s possessions’ (1985: 19). In 1840 in response to reports that

² I acknowledge here inspiration from Mick Dodson’s Coroborree 2000 speech at the Sydney
Opera House. Dodson traced then Prime Minister John Howard’s life story alongside his own to
show, through their shared time and space, Howard’s complicity in the Australian race relations
that have dispossessed Indigenous peoples.
Kurnai had scattered his stock, McMillan went on a hunt and ‘massacred any Aboriginal in sight to win back what he looked on as “his land”’ (19). In 1843 McMillan and Macalister formed ‘the notorious private army called the Highland Brigade’. According to Bruce Pascoe, a man of Bunurong and Cornish heritage, this army was formed ‘for no other reason than to engage the Ganai [alternative spelling for Kurnai] (East Gippsland) warriors in warfare’ (Pascoe 2007: 159). Pascoe writes of the ‘close racial and family bonds coupled with shared military and colonial experiences’ that enabled the establishment of this ‘well-trained armed militia’ (159-160). He writes that their first action lead to the massacre of at least sixty Ganai near Stratford, some say one hundred and fifty (159-60). Some say one hundred and seventy (Ryan 2010, p. 264).

Linking my father as a Scot to these early perpetrators of massacre and dispossession seems a bit far-fetched. Baird is a Scottish name and his/my paternal forebears came from Scotland but from an early age my father had very little to do with this side of his family and I never heard him claim any descent from the Scots. What this Scottishness might mean, and how it lives in me – I have little idea. It was not until the 1970s that family friends who had visited the UK brought back gifts of ties and scarves in the Baird tartan. It is even more recently that a Scottish-born friend said to me that I have Scottish eyebrows (yes, they are like my father’s). My argument, however, does not hang on genetic heritage or tourist tartans. The psychoanalytic idea of a ‘telescoping of generations’ has more purchase. Adrienne Harris draws this concept from H Faimberg in her article about fathers and daughters to ‘describe the unconscious transmission of the psychic projects of one generation into the next’ (Harris 2009: 195). I stretch it to refer not just to families but also to communities and indeed nations.

My father’s management of men in Gippsland, and his oversight of the clearing of land for economic development, came only one hundred years after Angus McMillan and Lachlan McAlister and James McFarlane and their fellow pastoralists had pursued similar goals, a short time by some measures. Unlike those earliest Scots, however, my father encountered no overt opposition from the Indigenous owners of the land. But then that had been the case from the 1850s. In his history of Indigenous Victorians Richard Broome writes that the ‘wild times’ of frontier conflict had ended by the 1850s, by which time ‘white hegemony was extended over Victoria’ (2005: 96). Pepper and De Araujo write that in 1842 ‘there were 1800 Kurnai’. By 1846 that number had dropped to thirteen hundred. In 1854 there were 126. In 1855 there were 80 (1985: 19, 43,112). It is not hard to recognise that the absence of any outright Indigenous opposition to my father’s activities in the 1950s was a direct effect of the brutal work of the white men who went to Gippsland before him.

In her review of the number of massacres of Indigenous people in Victoria, where six or more Aborigines were killed, Lyndall Ryan identifies sixteen in the Gippsland area between 1840 and 1851 (2010: 264). A total of three
hundred and ninety people were estimated to have been killed in this way during this time. Nine of these massacres occurred around the area bounded by the Avon River to the west and Lakes Entrance to the east. Heyfield sits at the eastern edge of this massacre zone, and many of the towns that live in my memory of my family’s stories of this area are right in the middle of it – Maffra, Stratford, Sale, Bairnsdale. Indigenous populations in Victoria were also vulnerable to disease – ‘as in any community devastated by mass killings over a short period’ (Ryan 2010, p 270). There were also killings of Indigenous people by other Indigenous people, well into the 1860s (Broome 2005, p. 86). The introduction of cattle and sheep saw the killing of kangaroos to protect pastures as well as the removal of Aborigines, and Phillip Pepper writes ‘that’s when the tribal fights got earnest ‘cos they had to hunt on some other tribe’s ground!’ (Pepper, p. 38). Ryan argues that the term ‘massacre’ has been ‘under-used’ in accounts of nineteenth century settler-Indigenous relations in Victoria and that it was ‘a common tactic that was used by settlers and the agents of law and order to achieve the overall strategic objective of eliminating Aboriginal Victorians when they contested British settler occupation of their land’ (2010: 270). The country of the Kurnai was quickly made unsafe for them as they continued to pursue and defend their economy, their law, their sovereignty. Bruce Pascoe works through the numbers and the statistics about Indigenous deaths in Victoria to come to the conclusion that ‘every adult Aboriginal male in Victoria was shot at between the years 1836 and 1845. Now tell me that there was no war in Australia’ (Pascoe 2007: 158).

I now know about some of the terrible violence of the early white history of Heyfield and surrounds. At the turn of the twenty-first century, historians determined to write about the Victorian massacres ‘found the conspiracy of silence about settler massacres still permeated the region 150 years after the incidents had taken place’ (Ryan 2010: 261). I do not know whether my father knew about this history of massacre and brutal violent dispossession of the first ten to fifteen years of white settlement of Gippsland. It is too late for me to ask him, or to tell him if he did not know, and hear his response. And if the massacres were acknowledged by white people at all in the 1950s, it is possible that this knowledge would already have been known ‘habitually and naturally’ (Schlunke 2005: 14), without moral consequence, without connection to the Indigenous people then living in Gippsland - many of them descended from the Kurnai.

In the 1950s, however, my father did know of the existence of the Aboriginal mission at Lake Tyers, about seventy miles from Heyfield, and of the small groups of Indigenous people living off the mission around Lake Tyers and in Orbost, a town some distance to the east of Heyfield but part of the country he travelled around for his timber work. One of my brothers remembers being told that Indigenous people seen walking along on the highway were ‘going to Lake Tyers’. He also remembers Indigenous football players in teams from Orbost that played against Heyfield. He remembers stories about them too.
The Lake Tyers settlement was initially established as a Church of England mission station in 1861, one of seven reserves established in Victoria. Richard Broome claims that the location of the Lake Tyers mission, known to the Kurnai as Bung Yarnda, had been determined by the Kurnai themselves, a sign of the limited but meaningful strategies available to them in responding to colonialism (Broome 2005, pp. 125-6). It was made into a government station for Indigenous people in 1908 under the Board for the Protection of Aborigines and through the 1920s, when the other Victorian stations were being closed down, became the ‘point of concentration for all reserve-dwellers’ (Broome 2005: 208). Lake Tyers is a place of memory for its Indigenous residents, including memory of family and community. But it was a harsh place of inadequate rations which were often reduced as a form of punishment (Landon 1999: 43; Pepper 1980: 91; Pepper and De Araugo 1985: 249-50), resulting in poor health and early death for many of its Indigenous residents (Pepper and De Araugo 1985: 249-57). It was also a place from where children were removed (244-5, 255). The people worked hard, building most of the infrastructure of the station themselves, but were paid below the basic wage. Their labour, on and off the station, was controlled and their attempts to support themselves and establish economic independence were repeatedly stymied by management, often at the behest of local white farmers (242-58). While authority had been ‘contested daily’ at the station from the early 1920s (Broome 2005: 219) Corinne Manning writes that ‘From the late 1940s, the Lake Tyers community had publicly criticised its management’ (Manning 2002: 171). At that time conditions there were described in the Melbourne press as ‘atrocious’, and the people were reported to be ‘terrified of management’ (171). According to Pepper and De Araugo it was in these post-war years that ‘the general community began to take an interest in the conditions under which Lake Tyers people were living’ (1985: 259). Between 1956 and 1965 the residents requested, protested and petitioned for Lake Tyers Mission Station to become an independent, Indigenous-run farming cooperative. These calls came at a time of significant shifts in Indigenous policy in Victoria, with assimilation becoming the dominant policy model nationwide. But the attempt ‘to merge people into the mainstream met with great resistance from the non-Koorie population.’ (Mission Voices). Finally, however:

The protests at Lake Tyers were successful and in 1965 Lake Tyers Mission was declared a Permanent Reserve. ...In 1970, under the Aboriginal Lands Act (1970), 4,000 acres of Lake Tyers Reserve were handed over to the Lake Tyers Aboriginal Trust. The Trust was made up of the Reserve residents and functions to this day. ... A large community still live at Lake Tyers which is now known [again] as “Bung Yarnda”. (Mission Voices)

Both my parents were interested in current affairs and involved in community activities. Dinner table discussions about local and world events were commonplace. So of course my father would have known of some of the troubles at Lake Tyers. What and in what way he knew is another matter.
Phillip Pepper, of Kurnai and Wotjoballuk descent, whose work has been ground-breaking in telling the history of Gippsland, was born just six years before my father. He tells a story involving Len Rule, the white manager from 1948 until the late 1950s, who had authority over one hundred people at the Lake Tyers station.

One time Dingo Hood was given a pass from the manager to do some bean pickin’ at Orbost ... now, y’see, on the station the men got a pay a long way under what we was getting outside, and it wasn’t enough to get decent clothes for their families or extra food, so in the season they all tried to get permission to work on beans, maize and peas ... so Dingo left his family on the station, but instead of going back when his pass was up, he stayed two more days and went back home with a fistful of money. Now that man had disobeyed rules and because he was late ... he’d ‘ave got into trouble if he’d been two hours late if they’d caught him ... Dingo was told to get off Lake Tyers. Rule hunted him off the station, he was hounded down like a dingo. Anyway he kept racin’ round, keepin’ behind them, they even fired off gunshots into the trees. What would have happened if he’d been up one of them trees? They got the police to get him off, and he wasn’t allowed back for a long time, but he used to sneak in and go to his house to give the family money he earned outside. (Pepper 1980, p. 104, ellipses are in the original text).

This story includes many features of life for those who lived at Lake Tyers in the 1950s. Did my father ever hear of stories like this one, about incidents at Lake Tyers? If he did, who would have told it to him, and how?

In fact Phillip Pepper’s family and community history contains many elements in common with my father’s and my family’s life. My father would have shared an interest in football and cricket had he ever met Phillip Pepper. I am sure that they would have known some of the same people. They would have shared an interest in contributing to their community. Phillip Pepper recalls that, well before my father became involved with the Heyfield Bush Nursing Hospital, the people at Lake Tyers took on a fund-raising project to assist with the purchase of an X-ray machine for the Bairnsdale Hospital. The Lake Tyers concert group, which performed gum-leaf playing, sang and danced, travelled around Victoria and into New South Wales raising money. The community wanted ‘to show their appreciation for what the hospital did for them’ (Pepper 1980:85; see also Broome 2005: 223).

Knowing about the government’s management of Aboriginal people is one thing. I would be surprised if my father knew the name of the people on whose land he lived and worked and travelled freely. How he would have responded to the Australia Day speech by Pauline Mullett, a woman of the Brabuwooloong clan of the Kurnai, at Drouin on the western edge of Gippsland in 2000, I do not know.

I wonder if you realise that the Aboriginal people who have always lived in Gippsland are called Kurnai? We have always been here; we never
left; we never returned; we have been here forever. I am proud to say I am Kurnai. I wonder if you know that on the Lake Tyers Mission Station we were not allowed to speak our language or perform our rituals or educate our children in our traditions? I wonder if you know that our implements, paintings, sacred symbols – our past – were locked up in the museum and kept away from us? (Mullett in Landon 2006: 9.6)

I do remember my father telling me, probably during the 1970s or early 1980s, then in Launceston, that he had heard a Tasmanian Indigenous man speak at a meeting he had attended – it could have been a Rotary club meeting, or related to local government, or maybe it was a timber industry gathering, these were some of his areas of work and civic contribution. Speaking in the early years of the rapid growth of Tasmanian Indigenous politics (Ryan 1996: 263-89) this man may have made similar statements to those made by Pauline Mullett. He had spoken well, my father said, and put his case capably. But my father thought that his claims on late twentieth century Tasmania were – what? I cannot remember his words. I do remember he was unmoved.

I have written ‘I cannot remember’, ‘I have little idea’, ‘I do not know’: the question of knowledge and ignorance, memory and forgetting, are at the heart of questions of race and the nation. Writing from the USA of ‘white ignorance’, which he links to white supremacy, Charles W Mills notes that ‘the editing of white memory … enables a self-representation in which differential white privilege, and the need to correct for it, does not exist’ (2007: 31). In the light of this my repetition of ‘I do not know’ is wearing thin. Letting my father fade in relation to Australian colonial history through a haze of ‘I would be surprised’ and ‘I forget’ disengages us both from knowledge of and a place in colonisation. Jennifer Rutherford (2010) writes of this fading of the father in her psychoanalytic reading of a memoir by Rosa Praed, the colonial Queenslander who wrote at the turn of the twentieth century. Rutherford pursues this reading as a way of giving flesh and bones to the founding mythology of white Australian culture. Praed’s work has been celebrated as feminist and anti-colonial. But Rutherford qualifies her feminism by its ‘enthrallment to the father’ (7) and shows how her memoir is literally based in her father’s memories (of an 1857 massacre of Indigenous people) which she incorporates as her own. Praed takes on his memories, however, in ways that obfuscate his role while maintaining him as ‘the romantic hero’ (10). Rutherford writes of ‘organised’ (8) and ‘cheerful’ (17) amnesias and the detail of the father fades – or is faded – while his heroic dimensions grow.

I cannot remember my father’s exact words in his account of what I imagine was a confrontation with Tasmanian Indigenous sovereignty. But if my personal amnesia is a protection against having to face the implications of my father’s steadfast turning away from Indigenous sovereignty, that leaves me without having to consider exactly my own stand, the work of others – activists, writers, friends, steers me back to a staging of this confrontation. It is hardly fanciful to relate my father’s account as a passing moment where he
performed, again, a masterful way of knowing that appeared fair, and
recognised merit, whilst embodying what Aileen Moreton-Robinson calls ‘the
possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty’. This logic is a way of
knowing that ‘operates to discriminate in favour of itself, ensuring it protects
and maintains its interest by the continuing denial and exclusion of
Indigenous sovereignty’ (2004a: 7). In taking up the project of writing about
my father in this paper I assume the prerogative of telling my father’s story in
ways that turn it towards the other, that take seriously the responsibility to
engage with Indigenous sovereignty, even in the face of my memory of his
unwillingness to turn.

Virtue

It is not that relationships between Kurnai and white people in Gippsland were
all of a kind. As well as documenting the likes of Len Rule, Philip Pepper writes
with fondness of and loyalty towards some of the white men who worked at
Lake Tyers and others who employed him and other Indigenous people off the
station. Clearly relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people
have been complex. Some Indigenous men worked, like my father, in the
timber industry. Philip Pepper writes about working ‘cuttin timber’ outside
Orbost during the Depression (1980: 88). From 1939 until the early 1960s a
community of Indigenous people lived at Jackson’s Track, outside Drouin, to
the west of Heyfield. This was land owned and worked by two white men, the
Tonkin brothers, who employed Indigenous men in falling timber and at their
mill, a mutually satisfactory arrangement (Landon and Tonkin 2000). Sue
Feary’s research into Indigenous engagement in forestry on the south coast of
New South Wales indicates that ‘during the 1950s and 1960s … forestry was a
major employer of Aboriginal people, in the sawmills and as fallers in the
forests’ (2008: 269). Many Koori men remembered it as preferable
employment because it was not fraught with the racism and discrimination
that characterised other kinds of (farm) employment open to Indigenous
people in the area. Whether this situation was also true for Indigenous
peoples living further south, in Gippsland, I do not know (there I go again).

I have no evidence (and again) from the various histories of Kurnai people, or
from family memories, that my father ever worked with or employed
Indigenous men. Whoever he employed, I have always thought that my
father would be a good boss. He thought this too. I remember one morning in
the years when my mother was still alive, but demented and living in an aged
care facility, my father telling me and the woman who came to clean the
house one morning a week that fairness and even-handed-ness were the
main principles of being a good manager. I cannot remember how this had
become a matter of conversation but it was the kind of thing he would like to
talk about, the kind of wisdom he liked to share, and he told the story with
reference to his years as boss at the mill in Heyfield. We must have both then
walked down to the place where my mother lived in time for lunch. Mealtimes
in the dining room, with a group of people in varying stages of dementia,
were often hard to organise but on this occasion there was an extra problem
– not enough lunch had been delivered from the kitchen. My father and I sat
down at the table with my mother and five other residents. When only one
plate of sandwiches arrived at our table I was startled when my father
grabbed it and placed it in front of my mother, for her alone. What of the
fairness and even-handed-ness of the earlier part of the morning? If nothing
else this incident confronted me with the gap between his public
pronouncements and his actions in favouring those he cared for the most.

Fair or not, during the 1950s in Heyfield my father was a leading figure in the
Gippsland timber industry and in local community affairs. After nine years in
Heyfield he left for Launceston, to become general manager at a timber mill
owned by the same company that owned the Gippsland business, Alstergren
Pty Ltd. On our family’s departure the owner of the company, Mr Alstergren
sent my father a letter to mark this career move:

In thinking over the period of your service with us, I am mindful of the
great development which has occurred at Heyfield both as a sawmilling
centre and as a Victorian town. Heyfield has grown enormously over the
period and I am pleased to remember that you and Mrs Baird were
among its leading citizens. I am keen at all times for our Managers to
establish themselves as leaders in the community because this puts our
organization in the position to which its importance entitles it. I look
forward to you becoming leading citizens of Launceston. (Alstergren
1959).

This letter, declaring both my parents ‘leading citizens’ in Heyfield, was
written just a few days after my first birthday. It makes clear that it wasn’t
(or wasn’t only) that my Dad was a good person – intelligent, hard-working,
civic-minded, that made him a leading citizen. This was part of a larger plan
for a big company in the timber industry.

In Heyfield, a small part of a big national picture, my parents represented a
local managerial class. Mr Alstergren’s sense of entitlement for his managers
speaks of a class politics but it is also a racial politics. Aileen Moreton-
Robinson has argued that the concern expressed by Keith Windschuttle and
other conservative warriors in ‘the history wars’ of the late 1990s and early
2000s was about shoring up this entitlement. She argues that the desire that
white men be regarded as ‘the instigators of history, responsible for making
the decisions establishing our political, economic, legal and cultural systems’
(2004b, p. 225) motivated Windschuttle’s position. My parents’ capacity to
become leading citizens was an effect of their classed and raced position. The
regard in which they were held then leaves its social and psychic mark on
them and their family – on me. I grew up as the daughter of a ‘leading citizen’
in a small timber-milling community, then in a bigger regional city. Amongst
other things I inherited a confident belief in my parents’ goodness – indeed of
being ‘leading citizen’ material myself. But, like my repetition of ‘I do not
now’, this confidence now also wears thin.
I have focused on my father’s historical place as a white man in Gippsland where he arrived on an upward career trajectory. His departure for Launceston at the end of the 1950s continued his/our economic and social advancement. As for me – I was born there but did not grow up there. Heyfield is a name in my story of myself but not a place marked by personal memories. But then there do not have to be personal memories to signify my debt to Heyfield. This became clear when well into my thirties I unearthed a Spirax scrapbook from the back of the top shelf of the linen press at my parents’ home. It contained eighty mostly pink cards that were sent to my parents when I was born – cards titled ‘A Baby Girl! How Wonderful’, ‘A Royal Welcome to the New Baby’ – that sort of thing. I was not simply born in Heyfield but Heyfield names the place where my birth was celebrated by a whole community. As Greta Bird writes ‘to be born into whiteness ... is to have your birth celebrated by the nation and your death mourned’ (Bird 2008: 2). Quoting Judith Butler she goes on ‘In contrast, to be born Aboriginal is to be constituted as “less than human, without entitlement to rights, as humanly unrecognisable”’ (Butler in Bird 2008: 2).

But this is not only a story of Heyfield or even of Australia. Neither mine nor my father’s place, materially or in its imagined entitlements, has been constrained by the borders of the Australian nation state. Goldie Osuri and Bobby Bannerjee coin the term ‘white diaspora’ to describe those people in Australia more commonly referred to as ‘settlers’. The idea of a white diaspora ‘provides a space for the analysis of the diasporic relationships that are drawn on in times of crisis’. (Osuri and Bannerjee 2004: 159). Osuri and Bannerjee discuss the crisis prompted by the attacks on the world trade centre towers in New York in 2001 and the subsequent localised Australian responses to this ‘global media event’. I want to place my father, and our family, in this white diaspora at a time of a previous historically small but, for my mother, father and I, significant moment of crisis. In July 1966 my father resigned from his position as General Manager of Kilndried Timber Industries Limited in Launceston terminating a sixteen year association with Alstergren Pty Ltd. I think this was because of disagreements with the Board of Directors of the company. The upshot was that Mum and Dad and I moved from Launceston back to the mainland. When he resigned he must have sent letters to various men with whom he had done business over his seven years in Launceston because I have several letters sent to him in reply. Two came from London. One letter starts:

I am dreadfully sorry to read that you resigned from the Company at the end of last month. This, as you will appreciate, has come as a great surprise and I read it with the greatest regret because I enjoyed the business we were able to do together and I also set great store by your personal friendship during this Association which, after all, is so frightfully important when one is sitting at opposite ends of the world trying to run a business.
I shall be going out to Australia early next year and I sincerely hope that I shall have the opportunity of seeing you when I am in Launceston.

(Fuglesang, emphasis added)
I can only imagine that at the time they were read by him these letters from men in London may have provided my father some comfort. As significantly, through several interstate moves, for a period of thirty-five years, my father kept them and several other letters sent to him at this time, some of them solicited references that testify to his honesty and integrity. The letters document not only my father’s location in the transnational economic relations of empire but also in its homo-social affective economies of recognition and praise among peers, relations which in turn underpin significant economic benefit.

**Possession**

The existence of this small collection of papers which offer some kind of insight into what was important to my father is an artefact of the privilege associated with the material capacity to keep things, and then to know things because of those possessions. By contrast, Phillip Pepper’s stories of Indigenous people living in Gippsland until the 1980s are full of people being turfed off the mission or living in inadequate housing, not circumstances conducive to keeping personal treasures. And more generally, as Pauline Mullett told the Drouin crowd in 2000, Indigenous people’s cultural artefacts were deliberately withheld from them (Landon 2006: 9.6).

In her book *Finding Ullagundah Island* Fabienne Bayet-Charlton writes about the difficulty she had in accessing resources to assist in the tracing of her Indigenous family history. (The book is not an autobiography, or a family history – Bayet-Charlton writes ‘it’s a story of dispossession if anything’ (Bayet-Charlton 2002: unpaginated front page)). The scene in the library at the Aboriginal and Islander Studies Institute in Canberra where the librarian explains why she cannot have access to a 1959 PhD about her grandfather’s Bandjalang people is told like a farce. Explaining that it is ‘institute policy not to release personal and/or potentially sensitive material to the general public without the author’s permission’ the librarian enacts the cruelty of colonial relations of knowledge that have governed Australia, in all their absurdity. Fabienne replies ‘But I’m not the general public! That’s my grandfather’s community there! It’s information about my immediate family.’ The librarian replies ‘That’s exactly why you can’t have it.’ (Bayet-Charlton 2002: 155-6, original emphasis) Because this is a farce, as well as a tragedy, the story ends with Fabienne’s ‘pale-face’ (157) boyfriend doing some illicit photocopying as well as with her tears of frustration at the overwhelming task of confronting dispossession, again and again, just so she can write her family history.

My final story concerns generosity. An abiding image of my parents is that they were both kind and generous people who helped out others, including those less fortunate than themselves, as the phrase goes. While there is much in my father’s, and my mother’s, long history of voluntary work in community organisations, for example, that justifies this view, I now write this memory alert to what it may occlude as well as affirm. When my nephew
and I and our respective partners cleared out my father’s home when it was finally sold in mid 2001 we found a letter from the new owners, recently arrived refugees from Kosovo, left for us on the kitchen bench. It was hand written, in pencil, in poor but readable English, asking that we leave anything behind in the house that we did not want because they had nothing. It began ‘Dear Owner’ and concluded politely, perhaps optimistically, ‘Thank You’. My nephew and I would have left everything but my father was unmoved by this request. Where was the compassion and generosity I had always imagined my parents to embody? I pondered for some time whether I had imagined my father to be much more generous than he really was; whether it was only my mother who had been the kind and generous good neighbour; whether old age, ill health, grief over the loss of my mother and the diminished social circumstances of being semi-institutionalised in an aged care hostel had worn away at my father’s generosity; perhaps he was just stubbornly annoyed at my nephew and I telling him what to do.

My idea of him demanded that he should give his possessions to a refugee family. But I was not confronted with any anxiety about money that may have played on his mind. And perhaps never really cognisant of the realities of the second hand furniture market, he was ignorant of the fact that the lifetime household possessions of even a middle class family home are, in the end, worth very little if, indeed, you can find anyone to buy them. In any case, I no longer feel so confident or qualified to rely on my idea of my father’s generosity as a guarantee of my own goodness. My confidence that my father was generous to me and to other family members still holds but I had thought that his paternal care and protection was not limited only to us.

Or was it that I had thought that his white paternalism should be extended to all? Because it was my sense of self that was at stake here. Even in his last years when he was negotiating a significant loss of the personal power that had been his to wield through most of his adult life I wanted him to be the Good White Father. It is pertinent of course that those household possessions were not mine to give, nor his life mine to direct. In insisting on my investment in him as the White Father I was reproducing the cultural habit - of thinking I could take from others in order to bolster myself, that founds our nation. And take not just their possessions but their self-determination too.

**Conclusion - Turning Towards Others**

I have considered a key relationship, and an intimate one at that, which provides some of the sticky glue that holds together and reproduces patriarchal white sovereignty in Australia. In taking it upon myself to tell my father’s story, and so my own, contrary to the way such stories are imagined in dominant narratives, I have tried to intervene in dominant discourses of race and gender to bring unstuck some of this holding together. The point is to disengage from the colonial history that mandates a lack of knowledge, lack of memory, defence of the W/white Father and the performance of the dutiful white daughter. I have pondered what my father knew, and what I
know, about ourselves and our history and about Indigenous people. Turning towards others is to put this knowledge and ignorance in relation to what ‘they’ know about ‘us’ and about this country. What, for example, would the Kurnai people have thought of us – a white family passing through and living on their country in the 1950s? What would they have thought of our sense of entitlement to virtue?

Given that I have located my father’s story in Heyfield, and that this is my place of birth, it seems apt to conclude with news from Gippsland. In 2010, ten years since first making their claim, ‘Gippsland’s Gunaikurnai Aboriginal people have been granted native title over land stretching from Warragul to the Snowy River’ (Rood, 2010, 10). They will ‘jointly manage 10 parks in Gippsland in a traditional-owner management board’. Notwithstanding the importance here of access to white man’s justice, there is a truth that pre-exists this ruling, whether or not my father or I grasp it. This truth will exist after the native title ruling too. ‘The Kurnai are people who, unlike many others, have never been moved off Country’ (Landon 2006, p. 09.6). The Age news item, from where I draw this information, quotes elder Albert Mullett saying ‘We share our joy and relief for the justice that this ruling gives to our people with many Gunaikurnai elders who have passed away during our long struggle’.

As Albert Mullett turns to his Gunaikurnai elders, so can I, albeit from a different position. My father’s time has passed but in taking it upon myself to tell his story, and so mine, in a way that turns to Kurnai and other Indigenous people, I can change the nature of his story, how he is remembered and his legacy. Setting out on her psychoanalytic exploration of fathers and daughters Adrienne Harris states ‘no fathers without daughters, no daughters without fathers, provided’, she explains, ‘we let these terms float and move’ (2009: 190). Telling my father’s story in relation to Indigenous sovereignty sets the conventional gendered and raced moorings of the white father-daughter pairing scarily adrift but turning to others in this telling of the story of my white father and I is a necessary move towards justice.

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Guess Who's Coming to Dinner? Negotiating Visibility, Encounters and Racism in Entrepreneurship

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Racism in entrepreneurship is often described in the literature in two ways: As something previously experienced in wage work, or within very specific business dealings as entrepreneurs, in particular, when trying to obtain bank loans. I contend that entrepreneurship, as a status of work, induces a series of repeated bodily encounters that racialized women must negotiate. In this paper, relying on empirical evidence derived from fifty-three interviews with women entrepreneurs of Afro-Caribbean descent, I examine the everyday forms of racism Black women entrepreneurs experience and, more specifically, the politics of cross-racial encounters, whiteness and white privilege, the reconstitution of bodily space and their negotiation of how their bodies are read in different encounters. This research reveals that in order for practices of everyday racism to occur systematically, there must be certain ideological conditions that stimulate these practices. The Black female body has historically been conceptualized as inferior. The Black skin acts as a trap or script that enforces Black women’s immobility as workers and their continued occupation in menial labour. Cross-racial encounters and the trapping of Black women are, however, creatively negotiated by using strategies of resistance, such as, deploying the critical gaze, “using” white allies and invisibility.

Keywords: Everyday Racism; Cross-racial encounters; Whiteness; Entrepreneurship

1 The title references the 1967 film Guess Who's Coming to Dinner, which tells the story of Joanna "Joey" Drayton, a young white American woman who has a whirlwind romance with Dr. John Prentice, a young, idealistic African American physician she meets while in Hawaii. The plot centers on Joanna’s return to her liberal upper class American home, where she brings her new fiancé to dinner to meet her parents.
Introduction

Entrepreneurship has come to occupy a significant position in how nations define themselves and their citizens.\textsuperscript{2} Although, the ideal entrepreneur is far removed from today’s reality, individuals are increasingly called upon to be entrepreneurial. Researchers, however, have gone behind the allure of entrepreneurship to examine how processes of race, class and gender simultaneously operate to structure this labour market niche. Histories of slavery, indentured labour and migration have profoundly shaped individual’s experiences as entrepreneurs. Examining the experiences of Black women entrepreneurs, I show that entrepreneurship is a tenuous space of refuge. Despite the fact that entrepreneurship provides Black women with more mobility and independence, a way to escape racist wage work environments and the ability to foster stronger communities, it is also a space where they must contend with racially gendered forms of discrimination. Everyday forms of gendered racism, however, have been neglected by scholars looking at race and entrepreneurship (Essed 1991). Entrepreneurs, unlike most wage workers, are more dependent on obtaining contracts and new clients inducing cross-racial encounters and requiring them to be highly visible. There is the potential for a greater level of forced intimacy and closeness within their work environments. How are racialized women’s bodies perceived as entrepreneurs? How are dominant and subordinate positions established within the space of entrepreneurship? I argue that scholars looking at race/racism and employment, in particular entrepreneurship must account for encounters/closeness, everyday racism, power and the normalization of whiteness.

Exploring racism and entrepreneurship presents certain challenges, as evident in a small study conducted by Frances Henry (1993), entitled “A Survey of Black Business in Metropolitan Toronto”. As a subset to her quantitative study, Henry conducted a separate roundtable discussion with several business owners. Of the 20 participants, 18 were Black women. Although Henry had hypothesized that race would be a significant issue for Black business owners, she discovered that it played no role for 55% of participants and was a non issue for most (Henry 1993: 30). Some participants dismissed or refused to consider the question, saying it was irrelevant. Researchers working on sexual harassment have long noted this problem. Women will

\textsuperscript{2} In this paper the concept entrepreneurship or entrepreneur is defined as an individual who is own account self-employed (no employees) or employer self-employed (with employees).

\textsuperscript{3} I rely on Hall (1996), who argues that we must recognize that the category “black” is “essentially a politically and culturally constructed category, which cannot be grounded in a set of fixed trans-cultural or transcendental racial categories and which therefore has no guarantees in nature. What this brings into play is the recognition of the immense diversity and differentiation of the historical and cultural experience of black subjects” (443, emphasis in original).
often initially claim that they have never experienced harassment but upon further discussion will describe experiences that constitute sexual harassment. MacKinnon (1979) has referred to this as a “problem that has no name”.

Although Henry expresses a great deal of surprise that racism was a non issue for the women, her findings require further analysis. For one, race or colour were identified by some of her participants as a stigma. Others spoke of the fact that Black business owners are perceived as having less credibility than “those who counted” (Henry 1993: 30-31). Although minimal, these reflections are nonetheless important. However, Henry’s primary assertion regarding racism, as well as that of many researchers looking at race and entrepreneurship, is that racism mainly exists in wage work and “pushes” Blacks into entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, racism in entrepreneurship is discussed in terms of the systemic racism Black’s experience from lenders as well as their exclusion from social networks. Since Black women in Henry’s study spoke primarily about racism as pushing them to work harder, she concluded that “race is therefore not an important issue in running a business” (Henry 1993:31, emphasis added). I disagree with Henry and others who posit that racism in entrepreneurship is only either a pre-condition or a specific after-effect of finance or networks. Racism is an everyday experience (see also Essed 1991) for Black female entrepreneurs and is, arguably, even more constant than it is for those who engage in different forms of work. Entrepreneurship, as a status of work, induces a series of repeated encounters where Black women constantly struggle with the manner in which their bodies are read and responded to. How their bodies are read says a great deal about how they are regulated as racialized women and simultaneously how whiteness is normalized within entrepreneurship.

This paper draws on the empirical evidence of a qualitative study conducted in 2005-2006 with women entrepreneurs of Afro-Caribbean descent in Ontario, Canada. Participants were recruited from diverse industries and statuses of entrepreneurship (solo and employer), in order to gain a better understanding of the complexities of entrepreneurship. Two main sampling methods were employed (See: Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2010). Black women entrepreneurs were approached at local business events and recruited through the internet. I conducted one on one interviews with a total of 53 women entrepreneurs of Afro-Caribbean descent, and participants completed a short questionnaire with demographic and business information. The focus of this paper is to examine the experiences of everyday forms of racism, how subordinate and dominant positions are legitimized within cross-racial interactions and how women go about negotiating such experiences.

This article examines everyday forms of racism in relation to spatial theories related to the body. Spatial theories of the body will help me understand the nuanced and direct ways in which Black female bodies are regulated in the space of entrepreneurship. An extensive body of work has examined stereotypes that have been associated with Black women, in relation to wage
work (Brand 1994; Dill & Zambrana 2009; Calliste 1993, 1996; Hill Collins 2000; Hooks 1992; Jones 1984; Jones 1985). These works, however, do not necessarily depict the demarcation of space in a dynamic fashion and how everyday activities and the visibility of bodies change the configuration of work spaces. Spatial theories of the body allow for a more dynamic analysis of where particular bodies are desired and deemed undesirable. They/such theories also allow for the analysis of how dominant privileged positions are sustained and the everyday practices that demarcate this distinction. Using the works of Essed (1991), Ahmed (2004) and Puwar (2004) I look to identify everyday forms of racism which are articulated through reorganizations of bodily spaces where certain bodies retain their privileged status, namely whites, and non-whites are rendered degenerate and configured as out of place. In the final section of this paper, I examine how Black women negotiate these experiences and return the gaze.

**Everyday Racism and Entrepreneurship as a ‘Distinct Space’**

Racism, according to Essed (1991) is, “inherent in culture and social order ... and is more than structure and ideology. As a process it is routinely created and reinforced through every day practices” (2). Her extensive, detailed study on both the Netherlands and the United States theorises how those who experience racism explain it to themselves. In the second part of Essed’s book, which is where my interest lies, she focuses more specifically on “categorising” everyday forms of racism by recounting the story of Rosa N, a geriatrician from the Netherlands. Although Rosa N’s experience is specific in terms of the context and employment, I find Essed’s categorization of everyday forms of racism useful. Essed identifies what she describes as “three forces of racism” in Rosa N’s story. These three forces symbolise the framework in which all her other experiences may be placed:

(a) **Eurocentricm**
(b) The dominant group impeding the efforts of Blacks to achieve (which is rationalised with, among other things, *attribution of incompetence*), and
(c) Whites exercising covert pressure with the aim of enforcing cultural *assimilation*. (Essed 1991: 160, emphasis in original)

Examples of the sub-categories of everyday racism that fall within these three forces of racism include: underestimation, pathologising, rejection, indifference, incompetence, containment, humiliation, exclusion, segregation, criminalisation, pacification, cultural denigration, denial of dignity, etc. I define particular forms of everyday racism that were relevant to my study participants as they emerge throughout the paper. My work is distinguished from Essed’s not only in terms of context but in terms of the status of work. Entrepreneurship, I contend, produces a series of repeated encounters where everyday forms of racism and everyday negotiations are more intense than perhaps they would be in most wage work environments. According to Lewchuk, et al. (2005), strain in precarious employment can emerge while finding work, keeping work and balancing multiple employers. For Black
women, everyday forms of racism emerge in areas that have been neglected by scholars looking at race and employment. Racism is not only experienced ‘on the job’, but as entrepreneurs, racism enters into many segments of their lives as workers (e.g. networking, etc.).

The Politics of Visibility and Cross-Racial Encounters

When I asked participants specifically about their experiences as Black women in business, many spoke of the anxiety they felt around what I call ‘the encounter’ with prospective clients, new colleagues and employees. Ahmed (2000) defines the encounter as “a meeting which involves surprise” that shifts “the boundaries of the familiar, of that which is already recognisable or known” (87). The nature of this status of work, as opposed to wage work, presents different challenges for Black women. Networking, although daunting, is an essential component of business survival. Networking connects people for mutual benefit. However, with networking comes visibility. Black women repeatedly and continuously encounter others and are being encountered. Networking discourses are largely framed as being unaffected by race, class or gender. The assumption is that all women can participate and benefit equally from networking. In a study that examines racialized and white immigrant and non-immigrant women entrepreneurs in Nova Scotia, Mirchandani (2002) notes that that many women of colour experience networks as “structures of nepotism and exclusion” (30). This research participant from my study expresses a similar sentiment:

I was at a dinner two nights ago and was at a table and the ladies all sat there and they were talking.... and they absolutely negated my presence. The conversation goes on around you as if you didn’t exist, as if you’re not even in the room, and you sit and you look, you try your own ways to get into the conversation but the conversation just totally escapes you, and you are totally excluded from the conversation (Interview No. 36).

I do not suggest that entrepreneurship is somehow more oppressive or marginalizing than other forms of work, but I take issue with the image of it being a relatively safe space, were it not for discrimination from banks. The participant’s exchange is similar to the one described by Essed (1991) as an experience of marginalisation, “a process in which a sense of ‘otherness’ is perpetuated” (112). Beyond exclusion, where does power lie in this moment? Practices of racial looking/visibility of the ‘Other’, as history has shown, has not ensured that the ‘Other’ is seen. As Bernasconi (2001) notes, “it has not been necessary for Whites to look Blacks in the face because Blacks were taught to divert their gaze” (287). He goes on to say that “the refusal of Whites to see Blacks was predicated on the fact that they knew who was there to be seen and sought to control and discipline by choosing not to see them. That is to say, Whites saw Blacks without seeing them” (287). The ‘end effect’ in the example above is invisibility, marginalisation and exclusion. How are particular bodily spaces reconstituted when foreign bodies are seen to inhabit unfamiliar spaces? For other participants, the encounter produced more nuanced racial politics as the following examples show.
I have actually heard from my clients that they were surprised to see that I was black when I showed up. A lot of my business activities are done by phone and email and they are expecting someone that is blond, tall and has blue eyes, I don’t fit that category at all…. all of my clients have told me that they thought I was white and blond. They said “you sound so perky on the phone”. I understand, so I play up to it (Interview No.9).

I guess it helps because a lot of it [my business] is online. No one knows that you’re of one race or another. So they only see what you offer…. I can honestly say I’ve had experiences where people realise that I am black and they [whites] are astounded by that. You see the expression on their faces (Interview No.45).

People [whites] come in here and they are shocked, I think.

Interviewer: At what?
That a black woman owns an art gallery on (Fall Street). Like they just, they act shocked. Like they don’t pretend…. When they go “whoa, where did you come from?”

Interviewer: So it’s not the art but it’s you physically?
The two things are so foreign to them. Black people in an art gallery is so foreign to them... when some people say “you own the place”, I’m like “yeah, yeah I do. Why do you look so shocked? (Interview No. 31)”

We are heavily invested in phenotype and in the “evidence of our eyes” to shore up symbolic positions (Seshadri-Crooks 2000: 4). The encounter (being encountered and encountering), described by the participants as “showing up”, “walking through the door”, “coming in their places of businesses”, produce, as Ahmed (2000) identifies, a reconstituting of bodily space, which involves a process where “others” become differentiated “into familiar (assimilable, touchable) and strange (unassimilable, untouchable)” (91). The “look of shock”, “surprise” and “expressions on their faces” and the comments of “where did you come from?” and “you own the place?” render particular bodies, in this case those of Black women, as strange and unfamiliar or, as the gallery owner notes, as foreign.

As an interesting introduction to her chapter on embodying strangers, Ahmed (2000) describes Audre Lorde’s experience as a young child when she discovers that her body is hated when encountered by a white bystander. Ahmed contends that this emotion of hate “functions to substantiate the threat of invasion and contamination in the dirty bodies of strangers. The gestures, which allow the white body to withdraw from the stranger’s body, hence reduce that body to dirt, to ‘matter out of place’” (86). Similarly, the emotion of suspicion, directed at the Black female gallery owner (Interview No. 31) works to substantiate the threat of invasion and contamination. The threat requires that Black women be made aware that their presence is suspect. In the example of the gallery owner, the white body usually comes to know itself as familiar through its ability to gaze at the Black bodies that are on display, either through photographs or as real bodies. In those instances very little agency or counter looking is possible. Uneasiness for the body that come to matter and usually materialised as familiar, emerges, as
evident from the experiences shared by participants, when the foreign Black female body that inhabits the gallery, owns it. The Black female body has altered “the rules of engagement”. The familiar must once again construe strangeness outside of itself in order to restore the feeling of familiarity. The comment of “you own this place?” establishes doubt and this very strangeness.

Also evident from participants’ quotes above, is the great deal of anxiety that is produced in cross-racial encounters, especially for the white bodies that experience a reconfiguration of privilege, familiarity and order. Puwar (2004) notes that during cross-racial encounters the visibility and the presence of racialised bodies that are deemed foreign and out of place induce emotions of disorientation and amplification on the part of privileged white bodies. Disorientation occurs when racialised bodies occupy spaces that challenge the familiarity, order and fixity of white bodies in privileged spaces. The disorientation produces the looks of shock, the surprise and ‘double takes’. Examining wage work, in particular the Parliament and MPs, Puwar (2004) recounts how racialised MPs in senior roles are noticed “as matter out of place” (43). The status of the gallery owner above and of the following participant who owns an artist representation company produces a similar reaction.

There’s not that many black people in general in this industry [artist representation company].... when you show up, especially I don’t necessarily tell them I’m black on the phone, so when you show up and you see the look of shock on their faces. They try to hide it but you still see it. It is not necessarily that I encounter anything bad or derogatory. People are watching you to see if you do what they are expecting you to do (Interview No. 38).

Amplification, is defined as a context where racialised bodies are perceived as threats that have the chance to overwhelm or change the status quo. Fear causes their presence to be amplified and described as being more eminent, prominent and powerful than they actually are. Their bodies are therefore watched very closely, something which the participant above is cognizant of. Even though there are moments where the participants reported being able to remain invisible with the help of technology, ultimately at some point their business dealings requires them to become highly visible. This visibility, as I have shown above, produces anxiety on the part of whites because of the reconstitution of a privileged bodily space.

Also, the independent status of Black women entrepreneurs generates feelings of suspicion and doubt on the part of whites. The following examples will allow me to elaborate further.

I actually ran into quite a few issues with older white women who thought “how can you do this [run a business] and I can’t”. Women who have more access, have more cash, own homes and whatnot. They were surprised and unsure of how I could keep this going (Interview No. 33).
Oh yeah it’s a problem we do feel [the fact that we are both black women]... sometimes when you go to trade shows... I find that white people tend to pass our booth, tend to pass us, and what I’ve noticed too with them, they question you so much about your product so many questions they ask you, like they’re questioning if you are capable of doing this. How did you do that? Where did you learn it from? How long does it take to make this? They ask a lot of questions that I don't think if we were white they would ask (Interview No. 12).

The first participant (Interview No. 33) who owns a daycare business reports sensing a great deal of anxiety on the part of the white women around the fact that she has come this far and has been able to sustain the business. The second participant (Interview No. 12), who owns a web design company and sells bath products recounts experiences in which she is often questioned excessively on her methods and techniques by white patrons. Both experiences could be characterised as disorientation, when racialised bodies occupy spaces that challenge the familiarity of white bodies. In addition to disorientation, there is another component to these cross-racial encounters. We can infer from the exchanges that Black women are being implicitly seen as deceitful. The watchful eyes or the constant questions suggest a level of mistrust on the part of white patrons. There is an assumption that something suspect is occurring behind the scenes in order for them to have come this far. I am also reminded of the work of Frantz Fanon (1967) in “Black Skin, White Masks”. Recounting his observations of cross-racial encounters between Whites and Blacks in high status positions, Fanon notes how Black teachers and doctors were imprisoned by their skin or blackness. Beyond imprisonment, these professionals were continually watched, scrutinised and regulated. He goes on to say, “I knew for instance, that if the physician made a mistake it would be the end of him and all those who came after him.... As long as everything went well, he was praised to the skies, but look out, no nonsense, under any conditions! The black physician can never be sure how close he is to disgrace” (117). This practice symbolises to me the fact that Black teachers or doctors were suspicious and somewhat fraudulent. A mistake would only solidify the perception of their ineptitude and fraudulent status. I see a similar pattern manifesting itself for the participants described above who are independent business women. One mistake will reflect on the entire race and also confirm their fraudulent status.

So far I have discussed cross-racial encounters where whites encounter Black women in spaces Blacks have normally been deemed out of bounds. There is a slight difference when Black women encounter whites in spaces where whites hold the power. The following examples are of Black women entrepreneurs entering predominantly white establishments either to find employment or to work.

One time I had an interview at one of those vocational schools to do some graphics. I talked to the lady over the phone and she was so personable and she took a liking to me and I took one to her. But what they see on paper is not what they are going to see when I come to the
door. I do not have West Indian accent. I am Canadian born but of West Indian descent, the perception is that my name sounds a little bit more European. When I went in she said “I don’t want to sound rude, but I thought you were Russian.” And I didn’t get the job but then that kind of brings up that whole thing...as a black woman (Interview No. 21).

I would go into these European spas [as a graduating student] and get turned down once, get turned down twice, and then three times, you’re like, well, what’s going on here? Because for me, I felt like, again, what is it that I’m doing wrong at the spas? And when I started thinking about it, I realised I wasn’t really a reflection of what they needed or wanted because I’m a full-figured woman, I’m a black woman; and maybe also there was a little bit of fear. I don’t know what they’re kind of judging everything on, but considering that my other colleagues were getting placements and they were less qualified in terms of their qualifications than I was, it was extremely upsetting to me (Interview No. 42).

Ahmed (2000) contends that strange bodies have a dual function in that they act as the border into which “the familiar body – the body which is unmarked by strangeness as its mark of privilege – cannot cross, and the space in which such a body constitutes itself as (at) home” (95). In both examples, the white individuals that participants dealt with did not cross the border. This is accomplished by refusing the entry of Black female bodies. Therefore the space or the white bodies remain “at home”. The white body removing itself or preventing itself from crossing the border is, according to Ahmed, “precisely to be touched by those bodies, in such a way that the subject is moved from its place” of privilege (92). Again, removal on the part of the familiar bodies is not necessarily accomplished through their actual mobility but through the expulsion of foreign bodies. Regimes of difference, produced in these encounters, involve “the refusal to share social space, to touch each other, a refusal of cohabitation that contains the black body as body, and allows the white body to move away, even away from itself” (95, emphasis in original).

Using Essed’s (1991) work, these encounters could be categorised as underestimation and marginalisation. Underestimation and the perception of incompetence lead to the marginalisation and rejection. As in the case of Rosa N’s experience of underestimation as a geriatrician, a participant who is a Black female graphic designer also reports having these experiences. At the time when she was looking for a placement, the second participant (Interview No. 42) was reminded that her body was incongruent with the image of a European spa. One might assume that a Black woman servicing a privileged clientele would be desired and deemed natural. This Black female participant, however, may have been perceived as better suited for manual service work as opposed to dealing and interacting with customers. Close proximity of abject bodies is, on the one hand, feared since it threatens the boundaries that define the “the ‘clean body’ of the privileged subject”, but is also desired as it solidifies that privilege through the expulsion of the abject body.
The Discursive Black Female Body

In order for practices of everyday racism to occur systematically there must be, according to Essed (1991), “certain ideological conditions that both stimulate and legitimise these practices” (166). The Black female body symbolises “a site where the vast (and largely problematic) complexities of gender and race [and sexuality] are represented” (Wallace-Sanders 2002: 3). I use an event described by Bennett and Dickerson (2001) to provide a more detailed explanation. In May 1998 a fight ensued at a Speedway in the United States between two Black and two white women, which resulted in physical blows thrown by all four women. When police arrived to assess what had happened, bruising was observed only on the bodies of the two white women. Despite the fact that the two Black women expressed that they too were physically injured, this was not visible to the naked white eye. The Black women were the only ones arrested. A week later, however, their wounds were still visible. Markings of a bruised eye, a bite mark, a knot on the back of the head and scratches were plainly evident. The Black women, however, were not seen as needing rescue. Their bodies are “seldom perceived as the body of the ‘damsel in distress’, in the Western culture it is not the rescuable body” (2). Most telling in this incident was that “the discursive body society has created for the black woman—savage, strong, and ugly—was more powerful than the material bodies that actually presented themselves” (2). Fanon’s (1967) depiction of his skin or blackness as a form of imprisonment is useful to my analysis. Fanon recounts how his corporeality was a burden to his everyday existence. He became aware of what he describes as his uniform. His being was no longer his own but one that had been, as he describes, woven out of a thousand details, anecdotes and stories. His racial epidermal schema required more of him. He notes, “I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors” (112). Expected to behave like a Black man, as opposed to a man, Fanon describes the feeling of being “locked into the infernal circle” (116). I see this lock, script or trap as an “externally imposed second skin of misconception and misrepresentation. This shell is both skin deep, as it emphasizes the most superficial versions of Black women, and skin tight, as it has proved to be nearly inescapable, even in Black women’s self-conception and self-representation” (Wallace-Sanders 2002: 4). Fanon (1967) describes this representation of self as being “overdetermined from without”. He goes on to say, “I am the slave not of the ‘idea’ that others have of me but of my own appearance” (116). The superseding of the discursive body, again as manifested to a greater extent through encounters, is demonstrated in the following examples.

You go to these conferences and you meet all these wonderful people and they think that what you do is really interesting, “give me your business card”. You go home and you try to do the follow up and ‘(#34) who?’ I just wonder to what extent if I were selling hair products or records or music or something to do with athletics maybe, I would be believed. If, I am selling something that has to do with training and teaching people ... they [whites] have an image that you don’t have the cache.... If I had a business selling groceries and you could come in and get nice roti, a
couple of yams, they would believe me…. Now, I can sell you some strategies, how to make an effective presentation, or how to improve your communication skills or how you could write an effective proposal, and they say, "how would you know that?", "where did you learn that stuff?" and that is the sense that I get from these people (Interview No. 34).

These are not simply moments where this participant experiences difficulties in finding work, but fails to capitalise on opportunities or does not master the art of networking. Rather, these are moments where her body is perceived as being ‘matter out of place’. Her calls go unanswered because her body does not coincide with the type of knowledge which she proposes to possess. She feels confident that if she were there as a servant or as a Black business woman in the service industry she would have more credibility. Fanon (1967) describes his experience of cross-racial encounters:

I move slowly in the world, accustomed now to seek no longer for upheaval. I progress by crawling. And already I am being dissected under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am fixed. Having adjusted their microtomes, they objectively cut away slices of my reality. I am laid bare. I feel, I see in those white faces that it is not a new man who has come in, but a new kind of man, a new genus. Why, it’s a Negro! (116)

The following participant is aware of the script or ‘trap’. As a successful accountant, the discursiveness of her Black body does not coincide with her profession.

If I were doing cold calls or just started walking around on the street to businesses and started asking “are you looking for an accountant or whatever?” I won’t be believable because people see me as a Black women, chubby, or whatever. You know the physical always comes first…. A lot of people would say “no” up front because they would think it was a scam. So it is not something that people are used to, like a black person being a tax accountant or that sort of thing (Interview No. 15).

Interestingly, this participant is thinking of leaving her job as a consultant to open a pastry shop. She is contemplating the idea of selling her pastries primarily to grocery stores. When asked about the marketing approach for her pastries, she describes her feelings on her approachability to sell pastries very differently.

I have gone into chains of supermarkets and I have asked them, just like that. I said “if you were to be introduced to a new line of Caribbean type pastries, not the ones that are out there today. Would you be willing?” They said “sure, it is something we have been sort of looking for, somebody to come up with” (Interview No. 15).

Another participant, who owns a “personal service agency”, had a similar experience. Her business does any kind of personal service (errands, taxes,
groceries, etc). Even though she is the certified accountant that runs the business, her body is discursively understood to be something else.

When I say I’m a personal assistant, or even before I say what the business is, I think sometimes I notice that people will jump to the conclusion that I’m a nurse (Interview No. 29).

Puwar (2004) discusses the notion of the universal as a way to explain how white MPs are able to represent all humans whereas Black or Asian MPs can only represent their respective groups on very specific issues. She refers to the MPs of colour as being trapped in a strait-jacket, since they are unable to escape their “racial particularity”. Participants are in a sort of strait jacket, trapped in their skin. They are infantilised, which is defined by Puwar as a form of underestimation and reduction of their capabilities. Essed (1991) defines this underestimation as linked to the historical idea of white intellectual superiority that is “one of the most persistent features of Euro-American ideologies on race. When Whites began to relate color to intelligence in the eighteenth century, blackness began to mean mental inferiority” (232). Selling pastries or working in a food establishment are congruent with the stereotypes of Black female abilities.

Black women who are in leadership roles or in positions that resemble “the engineer”, as Mohanram (1999) defines it, are either underestimated or perceived as being ill suited for these particular jobs. Calliste (1996) in her analysis of ideologies of race, gender and the nursing profession, asserts that the history of colonialism and slavery and the various stereotypes of the Black woman continue to influence their employment positions as workers. She contends that “the ideological forms of racism that justified slavery stigmatised blacks as inferior and better suited, even inherently suited, to unskilled service-oriented jobs and those requiring heavy physical labour, rather than to skilled and supervisory positions” (369). The Black female body was historically “dehumanized as a machine built for endurance and little else” (Bennett and Dikerson 2001: 13). Constructed mental inferiority translates itself into manual suitability.

Often times the privileged body’s power comes through its ability to transgress into unfamiliar spaces. The act of transgression consists of “the desire to make contact with those bodies deemed Other” (Hooks 1992: 25). Transgression with no apparent will to dominate lessens the guilt of the past and denies accountability and historical connection (Hooks 1992: 25). This example of transgression still reflects the Black female being trapped in a particular racial script. The stereotype and social identity/racial script of the oversexed Black female continues to be an issue, even in entrepreneurship. The following example of a participant’s experience at a trade show, demonstrates the vulnerabilities in the visibility of Black women who are in businesses that expose their sexuality to a greater extent.

Most of them [other vendors] were dressed very provocatively or sexy and as a black woman we are already put on display because of historical
reasons, slavery and all of that. ... at a tradeshow this guy came over to me and he said “are you going to be offended if I say this?” I was like, oh bloody hell “what”. “You have the second best looking bubbies [breasts] here at the show”. And then he went on to say that he has these magazines that he always buys and they only show black women and how black women’s butts and boobs are always bigger and they are sexier.... I felt violated, like I had been raped or something. You know as a black woman, people expect certain things...white men already have a certain image of what black women should be. And they already sexualise us, no matter what we do (Interview No. 19).

As Guy-Sheftall (2002) notes, “there is nothing sacred about Black women’s bodies, in other words. They are not off-limits, untouchable, or unseeable” (18). Dikerson (2001) contends that even “when the black female body is looked upon or made the object of the gaze, the body is still perceived as unworthy, if not worthless” (197). A Black female body with no limits or boundaries means that she is accessible to all that is deemed inappropriate. When survival depends on visibility, we must ask ourselves, what is endured as a price for this visibility? This participant decided to abandon her business because of the pain and vulnerability that was associated with the objectification of her body. Collins (2002) shares the work of artists and cultural historians who are trying to make visible Black women’s nude bodies without reproducing problematic stereotypes. These artists make Black female nudity possible by changing the rules of gazing and by using different types of materials to show the Black female body. Other techniques include, altering the positions and limbs of the body and adding different kinds of objects to adorn it. For example, Alison Saar’s tin covered wood sculpture. The arm placement behind the head displays sensuality while her other arm cradled around her stomach suggests protection. Another who expands the representational potential of the Black female body is Renée Stout and a sculpture of her own nude body adorned with minkisi, “sacred medicines and charms thought to enclose spirits that are prepared in Kongo territory (part of present-day Congo and Angola) for both healing and aggressive purposes” (Collins 2002: 120). Collins goes on to say that, “since the Black female body has been overly visible – and dangerously so – for so long, it makes sense for heirs of the culture of dissemblance to remove the body, cover it, and protect it from harm. Yet this absence is really not an absence, for it draws attention to itself by attempting to hide” (122).

The difficulty for Black women entrepreneurs is to find ways to alter their bodies so as to prevent their vulnerability. In the example above, the participant (Interview No. 19) felt safer to start another kind of business related with technology. The gaze that abject bodies or Black female entrepreneurs are subjected to has not gone uncontested. Vulnerability, pain and the “physical terrorism” Black women experience have forced them to find creative ways to “hide”. In the following section I examine the strategies Black women deploy to negotiate their bodies, which includes making themselves less visible.
Negotiating Racism

When it comes to matters of racism, Black women are not without agency. Participants’ interactions, within encounters, reveal that there is a “critical ‘ethnographic’ gaze” (Hooks 1992: 167) that is often projected back. The control of this Black gaze, historically done to dehumanize and deny the subjectivity of Blacks and also to prevent whites from experiencing “themselves as they were seen by Blacks”, is now being challenged (Bernasconi 2001: 287). The gaze, for Hooks (1992), has been and is a site of resistance for colonised black people globally. Subordinates in relations of power learn experientially that there is a critical gaze, one that “looks” to document, one that is oppositional. In resistance struggle, the power of the dominated to assert agency by claiming and cultivating “awareness” politicises “looking” relations—one learns to look a certain way in order to resist (116).

Although Hooks’ analysis is focused more specifically on the gaze of Black moviegoers towards white dominant cinema, this practice is nonetheless relevant here. The critical gaze is defined as the gaze Black spectators subject white-dominated cinema to in a process of critical interrogation by “looking against the grain”. This is accomplished when Black women look past or do not identify with racist sexist images of Blacks. Possessing an oppositional gaze also means to possess an “awareness of the politics of race and racism” (123). Many of the women I interviewed know they are being watched, and they return a critical gaze by knowing the racial politics they are involved in and by choosing to define themselves in different ways. Second, they return the gaze by responding to assaults and confronting individuals more aggressively, as this participant does;

I called up a lubricant company…. she said that she would sponsor my show and give me a few gift baskets with sensual products in it. By the third phone call I was getting ready to pick up the baskets from her [I suspect the participant told the sponsor she was Black]. So we were arranging a date and time and the last thing that she said to me was “you don't sound Negro” so I said to her….right…so when I went to pick up the packages I said to her “first of all, people don't use that word anymore when people refer to black people and secondly I am not sure how Negros are suppose to sound but this is how I talk and this is how most black people talk.” “Oh well you have educated me” (Interview No.19).

When I asked another participant about her experience as a Black woman entrepreneur, she replied that it was extremely difficult. Located in a smaller community outside of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), she feels isolated. When meeting white colleagues, she recounts that they are often astonished that she is still in business, saying, “I thought you would've quit by now”. During these encounters she chooses to relay an air of comfort around whites and tries to keep her emotions and feelings covert. This practice is similar to what Hooks refers to as learning, “to ‘wear the mask’” (Hooks 1992: 169).
This strategy of pretending “to be comfortable in the face of whiteness” only to turn around and express “intense levels of discomfort” (Hooks 1992: 169), in this case, demonstrates how this status of work presents immense challenges. Since social and network gatherings are vital to their business survival, Black women have no choice but to make themselves visible. Simple acts of walking into a room, having people come to your establishment or showing up for an appointment are all encounters that induce a reading of Black women’s bodies which they must negotiate.

Aside from returning the gaze and wearing the mask, Black women entrepreneurs negotiate their visibility by relying heavily on strategies of invisibility in day to day business activities. Invisibility, as Dickerson (2001) notes, “may understandably become a cloak preferable to the nakedness and exposure of visibility” (197).

Being black in this world, it's not an easy thing. We've always said that if the business grows. We've been looking at other people and we say do you know who we're going to put on the front-line, we aren't going to put ourselves on the front lines, we’re going to put somebody white on the front line and capture that market, because the thing about it you’re looking for a market and who has the money, not us, but you have a certain group of people out there, they have the money and they will come and spend the money once they feel comfortable with who is selling it. So I think that is what you have to tap into...if I want to remain competitive in the business and I know this is what it takes I think I will do it, I will do it (Interview No. 12).

This participant contemplates using a white person as the front person, not so much in response to vulnerability but as a form of economic survival. She recognises the value of white skin. The practice of “using” a person to sell or represent your product is, perhaps, a risk, but one that is perceived as being essential. For others “using” a white person is more a question of shielding themselves from vulnerable positions. As a consultant who does workshops and seminars on anti-oppression in the workplace, this participant often feels the need to protect herself and does so by employing the help of a white colleague. People of colour who try to challenge the status quo and question white privilege often stand in the line of fire on their own. Essed’s (1991) notion of containment is similar. She defines containment as when “the dominant group does not accept dominated groups’ pursuit of equality, justice, and power, its [the dominant group’s] reaction will be one of suppression” (114). There is often a great deal of suppression from white individuals who feel they are being targeted and unfairly represented. The participant’s fear associated with audience members was not her only concern. Doing this type of work can have severe consequences for future employment. If she is unable to ‘manage’ the audience or to provide them with a warm ‘touchy feely’ atmosphere, which is much desired in mainstream organisations, the participant may lose business, especially if she does not receive positive referrals or client evaluations. Using whites as front people
can help negotiate tension and hostility and deflect these emotions away from Black bodies.

Similarly, the websites of a number of participants were constructed in very strategic ways. In some instances the images displayed were diverse, with whites prominently represented in strategic places. Conducting telephone interviews, I often viewed participants’ websites in order to have more information at my disposal. Only a small number actually included a picture of themselves on their websites. For other participants, it was difficult to even know who the business belonged to by just looking at the websites. In two instances, white blonde women were displayed on the “contact us page”, which made business ownership even more cryptic. The diversification of participants’ websites or protecting one’s target market by being generic was described by some as a form of economic survival. Invisibility, either by employing white bodies to shield their own or by camouflage themselves, is a strategy of resistance.

**Conclusion**

Scholars often define racism in entrepreneurship as either experienced in wage work or related to financing in entrepreneurship. In this paper I examined how racism, for Black women entrepreneurs, is in fact an everyday occurrence. I contend that entrepreneurship, as a status of work, produces a series of cross-racial encounters that require Black women to be visible. It is in these moments of visibility that Black women are often construed as unfamiliar and strange. To identify them as foreign or strange legitimises their surveillance and discipline. When and where do Black women become visible? What does this visibility reveal about how they are disciplined and how superior symbolic positions are secured? As the data show, for many of the Black women interviewed, strangeness emerged when they occupied privileged positions. In moments when privileged white familiar bodies were displaced, Black women were reminded of their foreignness. Unlike wage work, entrepreneurship entails a series of repeated encounters where Black women must constantly struggle with how their bodies are read and responded to. The Black female body, discursively constructed as “savage, strong, and ugly”, functions as a trap and is incongruent with the versions of Black femaleness that are being projected back. Black women negotiate everyday forms of racism by employing multiple strategies, including the critical gaze, “using” white “allies” and using invisibility in creative ways. These strategies of resistance may only provide temporary relief. Ultimately, entrepreneurship is still a tenuous space that contains many of the same challenges that Black women face as wage workers. Nevertheless, the women in this study continue to perceive entrepreneurship as offering them more possibilities than they could experience as wage workers.
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Notes on Captain Cook’s Gambling Habit: Settling Accounts of White Possession

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This article brings critical race and whiteness theory and gambling studies together with recent academic ‘history experiments’ to engage with a field of academic research surrounding the figure of Captain Cook. An investigation of how ‘Cook culture’ is refracted through everyday practices, spaces and products of gambling highlights a habitus of white possession which continues to define Australian belonging against Indigenous sovereignty claims. I show how the belief that Cook, as an agent of history, couldn’t have done otherwise in his first encounters with Indigenous people in this place renders non-Indigenous people incapable of being otherwise than subjects of white possession. After linking processes of white home-making to a gambling logic implicit to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the illusio, I conclude with personal reflections to illustrate the role of fantasy in sustaining everyday manifestations of Cook Culture.

What does the non-recognition of Indigenous sovereignty impart about the constitution, currency and circulation of white possession? (Moreton-Robinson 2009:28).

Introduction

Completed two years prior to the bicentennial celebrations planned to mark 200 years of British settlement in Australia in 1988, Babakueria (1986) is an early example of the now familiar ‘mockumentary’ genre of film and television. With a treaty or other form of ‘compact’ between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australian still on the agenda of serious federal political debate, the bicentennial celebrations became the focus of significant political activism. Massive protests were held in Sydney by Indigenous activists and non-Indigenous supporters to assert Indigenous rights and to dispute the narrative of national settlement being re-enacted and celebrated. Babakueria
refers explicitly to this context at the beginning of the narrative. The invasion of a harmonious white society based on recreation activities and a staple diet of beer and burned meat is depicted with the arrival of a boat of armed Aboriginal soldiers who promptly take possession of the land. After asking the natives what they ‘call this place’, they decide to retain a version of its quaint native name: ‘Barbeque Area’. Through a series of ingenious imaginative scenarios devised by writer Geoffrey Atherden and superb acting by the key cast members of police superintendent (Kevin Smith), presenter and investigative journalist (Michelle Torres) and the sinister Minister for White Affairs (Bob Maza), Babakueria brilliantly captures the \textit{habitus} of white possession with which this article is concerned.

A scene shot inside a TAB shop is suggestive of how everyday cultural practices of gambling derive from and reproduce Captain Cook’s possessive gamble against Indigenous property rights. Why, wonders Babakueria’s investigative journalist of white culture, do groups of men gather in these shops and exchange money for tokens?

Investigative Journalist: Their austere design, the complete lack of decoration or adornment gives no clue to the large sums of money, which pass through these doors everyday, as the followers of this religion exchange their donations for more prayer tokens. We can see some of the worshippers now as they stand, heads bowed in deep reverence, listening to incantations broadcast over the television set and study the details of their prayer tokens.

[The race is screened and shot from the point of view of the television so that we see faces gazing upwards towards us]

And then they pray, they pray for success, for wealth, for happiness. They believe that the course of their lives will be foretold by watching some trained horses run around a large circle. Strange isn’t it that at the end of the broadcast we saw many people tear up their tokens and throw them away. But if you thought this action indicated a loss of faith in their religion, you’d be wrong. Many of these people will be back here tomorrow to exchange new donations for more prayer tokens. What simple faith!

Invoking the idea of ‘simplicity’ is comically effective here because it evokes a binary opposition between ‘complex civilizations’ and ‘primitive cultures’ from which the white anthropological voice parodied by the investigative journalist derives its authority. As David Theo Goldberg (2009) argues, an implicit opposition between complex and simple societies continues to subvert neoliberal discourses of racial difference, albeit in ‘cultural’ or ‘historical’ rather than discredited ‘biological’ terms. This opposition can be observed operating in ‘postcolonial’ scholarship on Cook whenever Indigenous responses to his being and legacies are dismissed as simply (and it is implied, unfashionably) oppositional. The following exploration of gambling’s role in shaping the possessive subject of white states will suggest that maybe things are less complex than Cook scholars (of both anthropological and historical flavors) would care to acknowledge.
Goldberg defines ‘white states’ as those which have ‘the design or effects of ... (re)produce[ing], manag[ing], and sustain[ing] overall the conditions and structures across all dimensions of social, political, economic, legal and cultural life of the relative power, privilege, and properties of whites (2003: 196). Preempting the objection that ‘race’ has been ‘moved beyond’ in a post-civil rights, post Apartheid era, he argues that ‘White privilege reigns whether the social conditions it signifies are taken to be ‘non-white states’ or (in some idealized, normative sense) raceless states’ (96). Within a nominally ‘raceless state’, like Australia, the term ‘non-Indigenous’ often appears to be a neutral and inclusive category even as it is predominantly wielded by and in the interests of Australians racialized as white. Australian critical race and whiteness theorists have shown that contemporary expressions of whiteness are as likely to take the form of valuing the cultural inheritance of the Irish or the political and legal institutions bequeathed by Britain (See Moreton-Robinson 2005; Haggis and Schech 1999) as the violent protests at Cronulla beach against Australians of ‘middle-Eastern appearance’ in the white enclave of the Sutherland Shire in Sydney which captured world media attention in 2005 (See Nicoll and Moreton-Robinson 2006; Perera 2006). It is also important for the following argument to note that white states are not always or necessarily exclusive of citizens racialized as non-white; they may actively solicit the investment of such citizens in ‘having a multicultural society’ (See Hage 2005).

To the extent that Australia continues to function as a white state, our institutions and subjective dispositions are shaped by what Aileen Moreton-Robinson has defined as the ‘possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty’. She argues that this logic ‘...works ideologically, that is it operates at the level of beliefs, and discursively at the level of epistemology, to naturalize the nation as a white possession ... [and it] is predicated on exclusion; that is it denies and refuses what it does not own - the sovereignty of the Indigenous other’ (2004a para 5). The absence of a legitimate foundation of British sovereignty, and the white state that subsequently came to encompass this continent, is a problem that frames the following consideration of everyday spaces, products and practices of gambling.

I find it useful to approach ‘patriarchal white sovereignty’ as habitus defined by Pierre Bourdieu as ‘this sense of what “can-be” which tends to produce practices objectively adjusted to the possibilities, in particular by orienting the perception and evaluation of the possibilities inscribed in the present situation.” In this context our investment in the game of society (or the “illusio”) requires the relationship between subjective expectations and objective possibilities to be neither absolute (always winning) nor nil (always losing) (2000: 213). This article explores gambling’s role in maintaining a habitus of white possession which continues to define Australian belonging against Indigenous sovereignty claims. It shows how a national illusio is sustained through the belief that Cook, as an agent of history, couldn’t have been or done otherwise in his first encounters with Indigenous people and
demonstrates how this belief renders non-Indigenous subjects incapable of being and doing otherwise than as subjects of white possession.

**On Picking up (on) Things from the Intersection of Cook Culture and Gambling**

The challenge in attempting to interrupt Cook as a historical figure is that he already works through replication and chaotic proliferation that solemnly monumentalize him with a fake reason and at the same time popularize him in delirious rhyme (2008:43).

– Katrina Schlunke

In forging links between Captain Cook and gambling my method is inspired by Katrina Schlunke to understand how ‘history … works through people and things to produce a force of knowing that makes itself at home in specific skin’ (2008: 44). My approach is also shaped by Stephen Muecke’s useful meta-historical suggestions for cultural studies researchers working with the figure of Captain Cook. Rather than approaching Cook simply as the object of competing representations and as the subject of human(ist) agency in and on ‘the world’, he suggests that ‘Cook culture’ might also be studied synchronically by looking at contiguous things and happenings within broader assemblages of history:

...Cook has had one foot, as it were, well and truly out of history for a long time, and has spread far and wide in the spaces of culture. When you encounter him metonymically as an Endeavour in the name of a high school in the Sydney suburb of Rockdale, or as a miniature Endeavour in a bottle, or as the name of a convenience store, history is not the narrative that comes to mind. It is something more cultural like a sense of identity or belonging (2008: 39).

Muecke suggests further that focusing on the performative work of language might cultivate sensitivity to the magical effects of contiguity in those things and places touched by Cook and by which we are touched in turn as well as to the contagious spread of Cook culture (2008: 40). I extend Muecke’s method slightly by framing my research as an exercise both in ‘picking up things’ and in ‘picking up on things’ about Cook culture made possible by an eye for gambling and a commitment to supporting Indigenous sovereignty claims in Australia.

Below is a list of some of the things I have picked up on at the intersection of Cook culture and gambling and through which I will weave the strands of an argument about relations of sovereignty, willpower and possession.

- ‘Captain Cook’s Tavern’, a suburban pub attached to a shopping mall in the outer Brisbane suburb of Redcliffe advertising the entertainment of ‘TAB, KINO and POKIES’.
- A pokie jackpot called ‘Captain$ Ca$h’ and other games related to Cook culture through a racialising ‘family resemblance’.
• My childhood memories of induction to Cook culture through Captain Cook’s Cottage in Melbourne.

In the manner of Muecke’s ‘new historian’ I am guided in this selection of things and memories by ‘questions of what is most urgently at stake’ (2008:40) in the present. Approaching Cook and gambling, Cook as a gambler, and Cook as the object or stake of gambling raises broader questions about unresolved relations of sovereignty between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. How can the passive way that non-Indigenous Australians ‘come into possession’ through a national inheritance of whiteness be reconciled with narratives of will and effort and rationality tied to figures such as Cook, the miner, the pioneer and the digger? What are the cultural processes which enable Indigenous Australian dispossession to be rendered as the ‘bad luck’ carried by ‘historical tides’ and disarticulated from non-Indigenous agencies past and present? How might a focus on gambling and Cook contribute to existing accounts of various interests at play in the serious if not ‘rational’ game of colonization? What new understandings might it generate of gambling’s enduring popularity and of the role played by Cook in sustaining a sense of white possession in contemporary Australia? Before addressing these questions I want to explore the implications of historical narratives of first encounter which assume that Cook couldn’t have done other than he did.

**How Many Captain Cooks?**

When Cook deployed racialised discourse to mark the “Indigenous Other” as will-less and black he is producing through knowledge a subject of his own making, one that he interprets for himself. This process violates the subjectivity of Indigenous people by obliterating any trace of our ontological or epistemological existence (Moreton-Robinson 2009: 32).

Captain James Cook’s ‘discovery’ of Australia occurred at a moment in the Western European cultural formation when the relationship between the spheres of theory and practice which were to become clearly distinguished as ‘gambling’ and ‘finance’ was a subject of heated political and philosophical debate. Joint stock companies were formed, such as the South Sea Company, to support an imperial trade in slaves and commodities. As Marieke De Goede explains ‘It was the long-term time horizons and uncertainties involved in colonial voyages that underpinned financial innovations such as shares and insurance.’(2005: 4) Ian Hacking describes an epistemological shift as the development of sciences of probability during this period promised governments, institutions and individuals the capacity to ‘tame chance’ (1990). Gerda Reith identifies a paradox within probability science insofar as ‘it did not tackle the pure form of chance but instead redefined the parameters of the debate into a form which could be made sense of by science. Probability dealt with chance by abstracting reality to such an extent that it was no longer relevant to any specific moment or situation. In the law of large numbers it could safely make pronouncements as to what should happen in the long term, but never what would happen.
next’ (1999:32). Certainly, Cook’s voyages were on the pointy end of probability calculations, entailing many unpredictable factors including the turning of tides, the availability of winds, the presence of deep harbours for landing and the willingness of Indigenous people to accommodate European commercial and political interests in their territories. If Cook most often appears to us as an exemplary product of ‘the age of reason’ and the deliberative nature of his voyages are emphasized over their inherently chancy aspects, it is at least partly because of the role he has been given retrospectively as a central protagonist within national historical narratives.

The historical sense that is made of Cook has ongoing implications for the claims to rights and property made by descendents of both colonizing and colonized people in Australia. As Chris Healey argues, the name of Cook:

... has been used by Aboriginal people as a means of accounting for certain kinds of change and as a metaphor for ethical dilemmas. In these ways Cook can be considered a term which creates a possibility of dialogue between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ways of making histories... (1997 np)

While explicitly rejecting a single historical account of the man and navigator sought by the former Howard government for the purpose of national celebration, it is important to recognize that partial truths exist within the spectrum of stories that have been and will continue to be told about Cook.

It is in an apparently pluralist spirit that Nicholas Thomas’ study Cook argues against univocal historical representations of Cook which ‘define what has happened since’ (2003: 413). While conceding that ‘... Cook was in the business of dispossession: he claimed inhabited islands and lands right around the Pacific for the Crown’, Thomas warns:

...when we damn Cook for inaugurating the business of colonization, we are in underlying agreement with traditional Cook idealizers – we are seeing the explorer above all as a founder or precursor, and judging him according to how we judge what happened afterwards. He is history’s man. This book aims to step behind the false certainties of both the heroic and anti-heroic biographies of this navigator, to deal with the messy actualities of the past. Cook’s voyages were not blameless humanitarian ventures, nor were they purely invasive... but there is no doubt that Cook was ... the single most important European protagonist in Oceania in the eighteenth century’ (2003: xxxvi).

Like other authors of contact histories and ethnographic studies of Indigenous experience of ‘encounter’, Thomas cites Paddy Wainburrranga’s bark painting titled ‘Too many Captain Cooks’ to ‘sum up’ the attitude of Australian Aborigines, Hawaiian nationalists and Pacific Islanders for whom Cook appears as a ‘relentlessly violent figure...’ (2003: xxxiii) However Schlunke’s reading of this story suggests that Wainburrranga’s story is not so straightforward for Indigenous people, entailing two interlinked versions of Cook’s arrival. In the first version, the explorer arrives from the North and travels around Australia with his two wives and, after an epic struggle with the devil, is eventually
speared by relatives and buried on Garden Island in Sydney Harbor. In the second version, a new lot of Captain Cooks arrive, bringing ‘warfare’ and ‘welfare’ and wanting to have ‘anything they could get’ (2009: 2-3). This story’s articulation of a relationship between an original Captain Cook and the new Captain Cooks who arrived without regard for Indigenous lives and property suggests ethical issues entailed in not damning Cook at least partly on the basis of his legacies for Indigenous people in Australia and the Pacific. Rather than deploying Wainburrranga’s work descriptively as a shorthand way of dismissing those who would pass moral judgment on ‘the messy actualities of the past’, it is possible to read ‘Too many Captain Cooks’, in part, as a judgment passed by Indigenous subjects to whom subsequent generations and descendents of non-Indigenous migrants are ethically accountable. At stake in this distinction is whether ‘too many’ is taken primarily as an epistemological statement about historiography (that there are too many versions of Cook’s story to decide which is correct) or an epistemological and ontological statement articulated from the standpoint of Indigenous sovereignty (that too many Captain Cooks are a problem).

Moreton-Robinson presents Cook both as a ‘white man of modernity’ and as an individual subject who made a willful decision, against the orders of the Royal Society which commissioned his voyage, not to gain consent for possession from the natives he encountered. She illustrates her argument that ‘possessiveness functions socio-discursively, informing and shaping white subjectivity and the law’ (2009: 28) through a comparative reading of Indigenous and non-Indigenous records of ‘first encounters’ between Cook and the Bubu Gujin clan in Northern Queensland. Hostilities that broke out after clan members tried to reclaim turtles captured by the ship’s crew highlight contested possession as an issue from the outset of Cook’s encounters. When these concrete struggles of will are remembered, Thomas’ positioning of Cook condemners and Cook celebrators on the same ground seems less convincing. Different cultural expressions of Cook can be explored which acknowledge the ‘messy actualities’ of the past and address ethical issues arising from continuing struggles between the possessive prerogatives of whiteness and the counter claims of Indigenous sovereignties today.

Thomas notes that Cook’s decision not to gain permission from the natives to land and take possession of the continent, his ‘impulsive imperialism’, was accompanied by a lengthy reflection about ‘the Natives of New-Holland’. His journal entry, written on Possession Island, emphasized the tranquility, happiness and egalitarian aspects of the natives’ lives and presents this as the reason ‘...they seemed to set no value on any one article we could offer them; this in my opinion argues that they think themselves provided with all the necessaries of Life and that they have no superfluities’ (Cook cited in Thomas 2003: 128). Like the cultural warriors of the Howard-era who took any evidence of Indigenous entitlement as being ‘too much’ and as an implied threat to the happiness of ordinary Australians, Cook’s diary entry cites the imagined plentitude of native life as sufficient grounds for the denial of Indigenous sovereignty.
British political theorists including Hobbes and Locke saw continents that the Empire claimed for settlement as *terra nullius*; the absence of private property, land and animal husbandary and money were cited as evidence against Indigenous sovereignty. This construction of Indigenous country as a ‘state of nature’ formed the basis for what Carole Pateman and Charles Mills call ‘a racial as well as a social contract. The Native peoples are not part of the settler contract – but they are henceforth subject to it, and their lives, lands and nations are reordered by it’ (2007: 56). Cook’s defiance of his instructions to gain consent of the natives before claiming possession can be understood in light of this forthcoming contract (2007: 63). It meant that an important opportunity was missed for negotiated terms of consent or outright refusal on the part of Indigenous people to be registered in the colony’s foundations. To put it another way, Cook’s failure to address the matter of Indigenous consent installed *terra nullius* at the constitutional heart of the settler-colonial nation to come.

![Responsible Gambling Poster](http://www.olgr.qld.gov.au/resources/responsibleGamblingDocuments/ResponsibleGamblingSignageAllSectors.pdf)

**Figure 1** Responsible Gambling Poster, Queensland Government.
To consider Cook’s coming to possession in Australia is to reflect on how racialized habits of power construct particular accounts of individual and collective subjects of will. When I think about why all the Cooks that followed in the wake of the first Cook cling so stubbornly to fantasies either of Indigenous plentitude (romantic constructions of the noble savage) or pathology (ignoble constructions) I am reminded of discourses of ‘addiction’ which construct individuals as deprived of their willpower and enslaved to the desire or need for a process or substance. Refracted through the discursive lens of addiction, Cook’s failure to carry out his instructions to gain consent for his possessive claim resonates with the denial process ascribed to gambling addicts. For example, a ‘Responsible Gambling’ poster placed in Queensland pokie venues depicts a mother who goes out for groceries to feed her family but loses the money in a poker machine en-route reassuring herself by saying ‘The kids will be ok. They can have cereal for dinner.’ This is one way of reading Cook’s reassurances to himself in his journal at the point of proclaiming possession of Australia. If the natives have everything they need and do not value anything of ours in any case then Cook and his British masters have everything to gain and nothing to lose by maximizing their possessive scope in this place. Perhaps Cook thought, felt and believed, like the addict in the Responsible Gambling ad, he somehow had to claim possession, regardless of evidence of Indigenous sovereignty, which he encountered. And perhaps, for those of us who are non-Indigenous beneficiaries of Cook’s possession, our settled sense of belonging in Australia requires us to think, feel and believe that he had to do what he did.

In the remainder of this article I will show how discursive practices of gambling illuminate collective investments in a fantasy of legitimate settlement that we are complicit in reproducing as the inheritors of property bequeathed through Cook’s compulsive willfulness. I have suggested that invoking ‘the messy actualities of history’ can work to prevent us from addressing the equally messy actualities of the present from which future race relations will take shape. Rather than relegating questions about the rights and wrongs of his way of coming to and of taking possession of Indigenous countries to the past, recognition of the living legacies of Cook’s willful choice (from stolen country to stolen children and wages) might become the ethical ground for effective redistributive actions in the present and future on the part of the living beneficiaries of this choice. Now I wouldn’t bet on this happening. And this is not because I am not a betting woman (I am!). But to wager on the probability of future social justice outcomes is as disingenuously passive as contemplating how the worlds of Indigenous people in Australia and the Pacific would have been different had Cook not arrived at the time and in the way that he did. It is to perpetuate white possession through a refusal to recognize our active part in the history of Cook that is happening now. As Moreton-Robinson points out, Cook’s legacy continues to animate the institutions within which Indigenous rights claimants negotiate today: ‘the legislative and administrative arrangements that circumscribe Indigenous ‘ownership’ in its current forms, effectively reduce it to hunting and gathering rights and some rights of residence. This resonates with Cook’s assumption
that Indigenous people continue to live in a state of nature with a sense of property that is confined to our immediate needs’ (2009: 38-39) Below cultural practices, spaces and products of gambling will provide a lens to understand how the Australia nation has been and continues to be constituted through ‘preferred’ patterns of migration.

**Playing Inside the Captain Cook Tavern: Britishness and the Symbolic Capital of Whiteness**

Contemporary and historical narratives of Britishness and Australian national identity reveal that the values [of virtue, intelligence, resilience, loss and hard work] required to establish the nation as a white possession are those that were also required to dispossess Indigenous people of their lands. That these values can be linked across generations of those who trace their ancestry through British-ness is evidence of the perseverance of a white national identity and its possessiveness (Moreton-Robinson 2004b: 9)

Manifestations of ‘Cook culture’ in spaces, practices and products of gambling demonstrate how the symbolic capital of whiteness shapes what Michael Billing calls ‘banal nationalism’: ‘ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced’ (1995: 6). In contrast to cultural, economic, educational and social capital, Bourdieu argues that symbolic capital encompasses corporeal attributes of which individuals are inescapably bearers such as race and gender. He associates symbolic capital with pre-capitalist social formations where embodied prestige rather than the abstract form of currency lies at the centre of social organization. Symbolic capital thus imposes limits on the capacity of individuals to enact everyday processes of ‘conversion’ whereby, for example, economic capital is transformed into educational or cultural capital. He writes:

> [E]ntry into life ... starts with an assignment of identity designating a category, a class, an ethnic group, a sex, or for racist eyes, a ‘race’. The social world is essentialist, and one has that much less chance of escaping the manipulation of aspirations and subjective expectations when one is symbolically more deprived, less consecrated or more stigmatized, and therefore less well placed in the competition for the ‘esteem of men’, as Pascal put it....’(2000: 238)

As a form of symbolic capital, I’d argue that race continues to play an important role in capitalist social formations shaped by the legacies of settler-colonialism. To the extent that being non-Indigenous and passing as white continues to confer symbolic capital in Australia, this not only shapes *habitus* in conjunction with other axes of subjectification. It also structures the national *illusio* like gambling’s house’ by ensuring that losing in the competitive games of society – even when one is in possession of economic, educational, cultural and social capital - is more likely for some racialized subjects than others.
I first encountered Captain Cook’s Tavern in the suburb of Redcliffe en-route to view an independently produced Australian feature film *Blessed* (2009) by Ana Kokkinos which includes one of the few scenes in Australian cinema set in a pokie lounge. I was struck by how the signage advertising Kino, TAB and Pokies seemed to belong so ‘naturally’ to an establishment named after the mythical ‘discoverer’ of Australia as well as how the choice of the name ‘tavern’ rather than the more usual terms ‘hotel’ or ‘public bar’ seemed to reinforce a sense of Captain Cook’s Britishness. Redcliffe is a significant site of colonial history in Brisbane; it also has a ‘Captain Cook Park’ due to the...
area being part of the mainland mentioned in Cook’s journal of his voyage through Moreton Bay. In 1799 the area was revisited by the navigator Mathew Flinders where it was the scene of interracial violence in which two Indigenous people were killed at a nearby site that was named ‘Skirmish Point’. Originally intended as the site of the penal colony for which purpose Brisbane was established, Redcliffe was abandoned by colonists and later by German missionaries partly due to ongoing conflicts with the settled owners of the area, the Ningy-Ningy (Evans 1999: 52).

Cook culture extends beyond the naming of the Captain Cook Tavern to encompass the iconography of gambling products that consumers are likely to encounter when they walk through its doors and those of Australia’s numerous gaming venues. One of the most semantically rich forms of gambling, electronic gaming machines (henceforth referred to as ‘pokies’) have proliferated since deregulation in most states. Richard Woolley and Charles Livingstone examine the particular quality of consumption that is provided by the pokie. They argue that its provision of:

... ‘immersion in a continuous flow or “a stream of indeterminacy”, makes available a “relatively “open” space for meaning-making activity’... Such activity occurs not in a vacuum, but in response to the conditions under which humans live, and, as an extension and adoption of the already given, the socio-historical circumstances under which people make the most of their lives (2010: 52-58).

It is in relation to the iconography of pokies that the specific historical circumstances which link individuals to socio-cultural formations can be most clearly observed.

The use of gendered tropes of colonialism is a striking aspect of pokie machine iconography. To walk into a pokie lounge in any Australian gaming venue is to encounter innumerable images of warriors without war, miners without taxes or native title negotiations and white male explorers of every ‘exotic’ locale. Prominent images are reclining pacific beauties, noble savages, geishas smiling enigmatically behind fans and hidden treasure troves and gold deposits. While many of these nostalgic and exotically themed games are produced by ‘Aristocrat’, an Australian company launched in the early 1950s, others are produced by its competitor, International Gaming Technologies, a US based manufacturer. On a very basic level, Aboriginalist and Orientalist iconography in Australian poker machine and gaming venue design seems to appeal to and reinforce a sense of white national belonging anchored to celebratory settler-colonial narratives.

Captain$ Ca$h is a fluoro-lit cartoon image of a bewigged explorer wearing eighteenth century naval headgear in a boat splashing happily in coins and benign white-capped waves. He looks like the kind of Cook that might have been dreamt up by Warner Brothers or Disney cartoonists. The pokie in the middle of the jackpot over which he presides is Aristocrat’s extremely popular ‘Indian Dreaming’ game which features kitsch icons such as dream-weavers
and stern-faced chiefs in feathered head-dress and triggers a sound track of low pitched chanting when free games are won. Cook’s legacy also seems evident in IGT’s popular ‘Major Money’ series of games and linked jackpots which feature a pith helmeted, lantern jawed explorer in a range of exotic global environments, from Egypt and South America to the Australian ‘outback’. I’d also link the character of ‘Rich Uncle Penny Bags’, adapted from the board game ‘Monopoly’ for pokie machines, to Cook culture through its emphatic British-ness. Described by Macau based *World Gaming* magazine as the ‘most famous board game the West has ever produced’ and as having ‘moulded many a business man over the decades’ (2011: 56-61), ‘Monopoly’ is both an apt description and a performative practice of the values of patriarchal white sovereignty in Australia and other settler colonies. That the consumer of pokies is constructed as implicitly non-Indigenous is evident not only in the representation of Indigenous people and countries through strong discourses of ‘primitivism’ within pokie venues but also in broader discourses of pathological gambling which circulate around Indigenous gambling consumers.

Intersections of race, gender, class and Indigeneity in Australia are undeniably complicated. However, at the very least, the pokie iconography I have discussed seems to invite a level of resignation or ‘reconciliation’ to a settled order of race relations of which Cook is a master-signifier. Within this settled order it is not necessary for non-Indigenous Australians to actively claim privileges or rights as national subjects – these passively accrue to us from institutions and legal decisions enabled by Cook’s declaration of British sovereignty in 1770. As a corollary, it is not necessary for Indigenous subjects to actively make native title claims to their country to know that recognition for most claims will be precluded in advance by the Crown’s assumption of the right to extinguish Indigenous rights where ‘settled’ title already exists. Agency in the field of race relations comes into play only when non-Indigenous Australians willfully demand the right not to benefit from the occupation of Indigenous countries that were never ceded and when Indigenous Australians refuse to accept the premise of extinguishment and contest the rights of Australian Courts to rule justly on the issue of sovereignty (See Falk and Martin and Foley 2007).

A focus on enduring dimensions of white privilege as well as actual and perceived threats to it is required to understand Cook’s capacity to engage individuals within gambling’s ‘democracy of chance’ (Reith 2007: 37). Migrants’ capacity to experience social hope through the figure of Cook is mediated by what Aileen Moreton-Robinson describes as ‘Anglocentric whiteness’:

...Anglocentric whiteness  [became] the definitive marker of citizenship and as a form of property born of social status to which others were deprived access including Indigenous people ... The Anglocentric culture of Australia shares features consistent with other white Western societies and is a powerful producer of national identity shaping ideologies of individualism, egalitarianism, mateship and citizenship(2004: 79).
Anglocentric whiteness was implicit in discourses of border control to which both major political parties appealed during the 2010 election campaign. In contrast to legal immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Afghani ‘boatpeople’ who were identified by focus groups in some electorates as ‘undesirable’ arrivals, Labor leader, Julia Guillard, and her Liberal opponent, Tony Abbott, both white immigrants to Australia from the UK, were accepted as unproblematic embodiments of different ideological versions of ‘Australian values’. These naturalized relationships between British-ness, national identity, and possession provide a clear context within which to understand Cook’s function within Australian gambling discourses and material culture.

To understand how gambling mediates racialized relations of sovereignty, it is important to disaggregate white subjectivity and statehood from the wider category of ‘non-Indigenous’ Australians who collectively benefit from Cook’s dispossessing claim of British sovereignty. Government policies and academic and popular discourses of multiculturalism in Australia have tended to focus on racialized others as a potential or actual threat to ‘ordinary Australians’. Ghassan Hage diagnoses a condition of ‘paranoid nationalism’ in the face of economic and cultural processes of globalization in Australia. Refusing a comfortable social distinction between relatively affluent and ‘tolerant’ white people and their (allegedly) racist underclass counterparts, he highlights instead the \textit{conditional} terms on which national belonging is extended by \textit{all white Australians} as a gift to ‘third world looking people’ (2003: 21). In this context Hage poses the following questions about collective responsibility for the impact on Indigenous people of past practices of colonialism - on one hand – and the participatory belonging of migrants racialized as non-white – on the other:

> Is there a difference between the migrant saying ‘these events do not concern me’ and the established Australian citizen saying the same thing, but on different grounds? Can a migrant relate affectively to a past that is not his or her own? Can a migrant ever genuinely care for the nation without such an identification with its past? Can he or she ever experience the same intense sense of participatory belonging that people who are assumed to identify more fully with the past feel? (2003: 83)

He concludes that non-Anglo migrants’ experience of communal solidarity and being cared for is a pre-condition for ‘identifying with all or some of [the nation’s] we and we’s and all the affective baggage they carry with them’ (2003: 100). This means that Cook only becomes an ethical problem for migrants to the extent that they experience an equal sense of belonging with descendents of the First Fleet. Hage cites the macabre sense of humor with which two Arab-Australian youths expressed this at a community event: ‘If the Anglos didn’t do the killing you wouldn’t have been able to emigrate here. You owe ‘em mate. They cleared the land ...ESPECIALLY FOR YOU!’ (2003: 100). The inclusion of Arab-Australians within a national ‘we’ here provides the mythical basis for the disavowal of Indigenous sovereignty through which ordinary Australian citizenship is performed. This disavowal is the price of
entry to ‘Captain Cook’s Tavern’ and the possibility of social mobility promised to punters by the Captain$ Ca$h jackpot.

**Remembering Captain Cook’s Cottage**

The social world is not a game of chance, a discontinuous series of perfectly independent events like the spins of a roulette wheel...Those who talk of equality of opportunity forget that social games – the economic game, but also the cultural games... are not “fair games.” Without being, strictly speaking, rigged, the competition resembles a handicap race that has lasted for generations or games in which each player has the positive or negative scores of all those who have preceded him, that is, the cumulated scores of all his ancestors (Bourdieu 2000: 214-15).

**Figure 4** Captain Cook’s Cottage, Fitzroy Gardens, Melbourne. Photograph: Fiona Nicoll 2010

I began this article by exploring Cook’s decision not to gain consent prior to claiming the East Coast of Australia in relation to Moreton-Robinson’s question ‘what does the non-recognition of Indigenous sovereignty impart about the constitution of white possession?’ She not only clearly poses the problem as one related to Cook’s will, but preempts invocations of the ‘messy actualities of the past’ which would infinitely defer the answering of her question. This section will link gambling’s economic logic of ‘the house’ to our most ‘personal’ investments in material and emotional aspects of homemaking. Drawing on Bourdieu’s essay ‘Social Being, Time and the Sense of Existence’, I will explain how an intergenerational sense of belonging within the nation is produced and reproduced on the foundations of white settler colonialism.
Inspired by Pascal’s famous wager on the existence of God, Bourdieu considers the wager that individuals within modern secular states place on the value of society as such which he refers to as the *illusio*. By this he means not only an almost spiritual belief in the value of competitions within different social fields of endeavour, but also a more fundamental confidence in ‘the forthcoming’, in the most banal senses of getting up and going to work in the morning and of having one’s investment of time socially recognized and valued. The *illusio* can be distinguished from garden-variety illusions by its social rather than individual basis. While an illusion of grandeur can be a deeply personal matter, the *illusio* requires concordance between subjective and social schemes of value and understanding; it is objective to the extent that one’s sense of grandeur is *shared* by relevant social others. With reference to my childhood memories of Cook culture, I will argue that it is through the figure of ‘the house’ that gambling’s intimate connection with the *illusio* is expressed and experienced as opposed to Indigenous sovereignty claims.

In auto-ethnographic reflections on a research trip to Possession Island, Schlunke highlights the strangeness both of the way, and of the place from which, Cook made his possessive claim to a continent from an island. Recounting her experience of a place so apparently hostile and disconnected from the everyday comforts conferred by white possession on the ‘mainland’, Schlunke considers the power of Cook culture to comfort. She cites a scene in Michael Gow’s play *Toy Symphony* in which the protagonist, asked to remember a happy experience, recalls being a third grade student learning about Cook’s expeditions on the East Coast (2009: 4-5). Schlunke’s exploration of feelings triggered by Cook’s place and project of taking possession evoked my own childhood memories of Cook culture. In my mind these memories are also linked to the subsequent discovery of my family’s claim to a white ancestral whaler who ‘built the first house’ in Western Victoria, the heritage listed “Mott’s Cottage’ in Port Fairy.

In 1934 ‘Captain Cook’s cottage’ was assembled in Melbourne’s Fitzroy Gardens, having been purchased the previous year by Russell Grimwade, a scientist, businessman and philanthropist as a gift to celebrate the centenary of British settlement in Victoria. I remember visits to this cottage as a child quite vividly. Like taking on a mortgage and pretending not to savor the fries from the ‘new’ McDonalds restaurant on Smith St across the road, visiting Captain Cook’s cottage seemed primarily to be for grown ups. Whether or not we grew up to own homes, I think that white kids dragged through this heritage building, bored and claustrophobic, re-emerged with a sense of the rewards (if not the details) of history. At the very least, as we followed our fathers, mothers, aunties and uncles as they stooped through doorways and dodged dark wooden ceiling beams, we learned to associate our inherited nation with the freedom to expand the self within spaces of suburban homes and virgin bush blocks. A sense of Indigenous absence in the Fitzroy gardens is produced both through its manicured ornamental gardens and the density of markers of British colonial and modern history. For example there is a
replica Tudor village outside the café donated by the citizens of Lambeth ‘in appreciation of gifts of food dispatched from Victoria’ after World War Two and a bust of Mary Gilbert, a servant on the first ship to the Port Phillip colony and ‘mother of the first white child born in the colony’ in the plant conservatory.

Significantly absent from my early childhood memories of Cook’s cottage and my primary school lessons about the explorer’s ‘discovery of Australia’ was the fact that, on the bicentennial of Cook’s taking possession of Australia in 1770, Koorie people held a protest which concluded with an all-night vigil held under banners that denounced Cook as an invader: As Chris Healey writes, ‘Less than forty years after it was landed in Victoria, the cottage was used by indigenous people for political and historical remembrance of a kind which Russell Grimwade could not have imagined...’ (1997: np). It is interesting to consider these protests in light of Maryanne McCubbin’s research on the Captain Cook’s cottage project which found that there was very little impact on the explorer’s public reputation when ‘the question [was raised] of the young James Cook being forced out of his first position of grocer’s assistant ... because of petty theft... (1999: 37). This question of Cook’s capacity for theft might have acquired more salience with the overturning of the legal doctrine of terra nullius in the High Court’s 1992 Mabo decision had a treaty not been displaced by the more amorphous project of reconciliation. For if the people Cook encountered here were already members of different nations involved in relationships of communication, marriage and trade and, as such, possessors of sovereign rights to this country, there are only two possible conclusions to be drawn about the foundations of the nation. British sovereignty was either illegally acquired by Cook or else it arose through a magical process to which Captain Cook’s [parents’] Cottage provides strange material testimony.

The protests can also be considered in relation to the fact that this ‘heritage’ building wasn’t actually Captain Cook’s home but was purchased and built by his parents in 1755 - the same year their son joined the Royal Navy. While the more accurate name of ‘Captain Cook’s Parents’ Cottage’ evokes unsettling connotations of inherited privilege, ‘Captain Cook’s Cottage’ makes the explorer’s home seem to literally follow him to a nation, which takes him as its founder. And it does so in spite of our knowledge that Cook never returned from Hawaii to take possession of the cottage that would be bequeathed to him by a grateful nation over a century later in a different part of the world.

Captain Cook’s cottage exemplifies Bourdieu’s concept of the illusio as a collective confidence trick on which basis social institutions are established and reproduced over time. Intergenerational attachments to the white magic of sovereignty (re)produced by Cook culture not only confer a privileged sense of being at home; they can render us oblivious to counter-articulations of sovereignty and belonging from Indigenous people who, as Moreton-Robinson reminds us invoking the lyrics of Peter Allen, ‘still call Australia home’ (Moreton-Robinson 2003) and in different ways convey their
understandings of a country that is unavailable either for white possession or gambling.

**Conclusion**

The authority of laws rests only on the credit that is granted them. One believes in it; that is their only foundation. This act of faith is not an ontological or rational foundation. Still one has yet to think what believing means (Derrida 1992: 240).

I have carved a tree in the Fitzroy gardens for you and the fairies but mostly for the fairies and those who believe in them, for they will understand how necessary it is to have a fairy sanctuary – a place that is sacred and safe as a home should be to all living creatures. - Inscription on fairy tree enclosure by Ola Cohn, Melbourne, 23 May 1932

**Figure 5** Fairy Tree, Fitzroy Gardens, Melbourne. Photograph: Fiona Nicoll 2010

I have explored the intersection of Captain Cook and gambling in Australia as a way of linking whiteness as a form of symbolic capital to the establishment and maintenance of a ‘house edge’. Cook’s proclamation of British sovereignty off the North Coast of the continent on Possession Island in 1770 enabled subsequent generations of white migrants to collectively form a ‘house’ that would be formally constituted as a nation in 1901. For much of
the nation’s history, racially discriminatory policies and practices ensured that the type and organization of social games would be stacked against punters racialized as Indigenous and non-white. To the extent that white people in Australia continue to benefit from this ‘house edge’ we are able to uniquely experience a sense of being ‘at home’ both as property owners and as gamblers. This is why the prospect of political and legal moves to adjust the house margin to accommodate the rights of Indigenous people such as briefly appeared in the wake of the High Court’s Mabo and Wik decisions are so frequently (and sometimes violently) resisted.

I want to end by recalling that my favorite part of childhood trips to Captain Cook’s Cottage was not being dragged through dark rooms filled with the explorer’s memorabilia but going to see the Fairy Tree outside which featured relief carvings of fairies on the base of an ancient red-gum tree executed by East Melbourne Sculptor and children’s writer Ola Cohn in 1933, at the time of the cottage’s importation from Yorkshire in England and re-construction. My grandmother told me these sculptured carvings were created by the fairies themselves to convince skeptics of their existence. This settled for me all the disturbing rumours about one’s parents “really” being the tooth fairy. History and fantasy are woven together in these memories - reconstructed here as early lessons on the relationship between whiteness, possession and the comforting sense of being at home as “Australian”. Reflecting on them helps me to recognize the legacy of Cook’s willfulness in legal euphemisms such as the ‘tide of history’ on which basis, for example, the Federal Court determined that the rights to native title of the Yorta Yorta (who have never relinquished their sovereignty) were ‘washed away.’

Cohn’s fairy tree underscores how the possessive title of ‘Captain Cook’s cottage’ functions as a kind of ‘mythical speech’ (Barthes 1973), working to naturalize the nation as a racialized social order from contingent histories of colonial exploration and subsequent waves of migration. Bourdieu suggests that the hopes modern subjects place in the value of ‘society’ may be no more solidly based than those previous generations placed their faith in God. We know that Cook never lived in ‘his’ cottage; we know that Cook was not physically on the East Coast when he claimed possession of Australia on behalf of the crown. And we know that Captain Cook’s cottage is no more evidence of British sovereignty than the fairies carved onto the ancient red-gum stump are evidence of their existence. In spite of this, the pervasiveness of Cook culture in everyday practices and products of gambling demonstrates the extent to which habitus in Australia is shaped by an originary myth of white possession embodied by the British explorer.

In this article I have traced a thread of constitutive irrationality through intersections of Cook and gambling; from the punters parodied in Babakueria’, though Captain Cook’s Tavern and the cottage in which Captain Cook didn’t live. But to join Schlunke in emphasizing the irrationality of Cook culture is not to deny the operation of a ‘practical reason’ that makes sense of
otherwise disparate practices, products, spaces and dispositions. In his discussion of ‘the “mythology of the house”’ Bourdieu observes:

> What is being tacitly asserted through the creation of a house is the will to create a permanent group, united by stable social relations, a lineage capable of perpetuating itself over time in a manner similar to the durable, stable, unchangeable residence. It is a collective project for, or wager on, the future of the domestic unit, that is, on its cohesion, its integration or, if one prefers, on its capacity to resist break-up and dispersal. (2005:20)

If the investigation I have undertaken into the intersection of Captain Cook culture and gambling has presented the explorer’s possessive claim without Indigenous peoples’ consent as a calculated gamble, the question still remains as to ‘what is most urgently at stake in the present’? I think the most urgent ethical challenge facing every non-Indigenous citizen whose possession and sense of belonging is secured through Cook culture, is to place our bets against the house established to protect the symbolic capital of whiteness. This requires us to address the following question: ‘what are my investments in the continuing non-recognition of Indigenous sovereignty in Australia?’ Whether we are Anglo or non-Anglo migrants this question opens a space for imagining how our relationships with Indigenous Australians would change if we refused together to pay our debts to white ancestors as though they had ‘cleared the land …ESPECIALLY FOR [US]!’

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**Notes**


ii In a seminal essay published in 1993 critical legal scholar Cheryl Harris forges a link between white race privilege and possession, demonstrating how whiteness in America was simultaneously constructed as a privileged right to property (which included the labor of slaves and the lands of Indigenous people) and as a property of persons able to pass as white. See ‘Whiteness as Property’, *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 106, No. 8, 1993. For a valuable account of how white possession operates between national boundaries see Osuri, Goldie and Bannerjee, Bobby, ‘White Diasporas: Media Representations of September 11 and the Unbearable Whiteness of Being in Australia’, *Social Semiotics*, vol.14, no.2, 2005

iii Lest Aboriginality appear to be relatively ‘fixed’ in relation to white diasporic subjectivity it is important to register contexts within which this dialogue about Cook’s historical meaning is salient for Indigenous people today. The first relates to ongoing connections of descendents of dispossessed Indigenous people to countries settled by possessive white interests. The second is the use of international forums to produce conversations and promote the interests of Indigenous people who remain within the boundaries of nation states established in Cook’s wake. And the third involves the
experiences and rights of members of Indigenous diasporic communities who have out-migrated to different parts of the world. See for example, J Kehaulani Kauanui, ‘Diasporic Deracination and “Off-Island” Hawaiians’, The Contemporary Pacific, vol.19, no.1, 2007


‘White resistance to Indigenous rights is also reflected in pathologizing representations of Indigenous Australians exclusively as ‘vulnerable consumers’ of gambling products. As we saw in the previous section, in contrast to the US and Canada, hereditary prerogatives of white possession have prevented the recognition of economic rights embodied in Indigenous ownership of gambling from appearing on the table of political negotiations in Australia.'
Grindring Bodies: Racial and Affective Economies of Online Queer Desire

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Online technologies provide new participatory spaces for gay men to organise sexual and intimate encounters. While these spaces are often characterised as enabling new forms of sexual subjectivity and queer sociability, they also mobilise new sexual templates or rules around discourses of whiteness and cultural otherness. Using Foucaultian concepts of subjectivity and disciplinarity in conjunction with Sara Ahmed’s (2006) concepts of racialised affects, labour and performativity, this paper traces the ways in which Grindr, a social networking iPhone application for same-sex attracted men, shapes and regulates intimacies and sexual subjectivities. It is suggested that whilst Grindr provides a forum for users to engage in new forms of pleasure and erotics, the encounters between bodies are marked by profiles and conversations which filter and govern intimacy through disciplinary norms around race, masculinity, whiteness, physical aesthetics and geography. Whiteness, in particular, becomes a privileged form desiring capital, enabling bodies that ‘pass’ as ‘White’, while marking out bodies which do not. Racial ‘others’ become produced in this economy of desire as fetishes or repugnant objects. Exploring the construction of multiple sexual subjectivities through an autoethnographic lens, I que(e)ry the transformative and liberatory potential of Grindr by critiquing the intimate relationship between sexuality, desire and race in the context of gay male social networking.

Introduction

Exploring the question of an ‘intimate history’ in relation to oneself requires a focus on how subjectivity emerges at points of social and cultural contestation. Online technologies provide new participatory spaces for gay men to organise sexual and intimate encounters. While these spaces are often characterised as enabling new forms of sexual subjectivity and queer
sociability, they also mobilise new sexual templates or rules around discourses of whiteness and cultural otherness. In particular, whiteness becomes a bodily inheritance that enables some bodies, while dislocating others. Using Foucaultian concepts of subjectivity and disciplinarity in conjunction with Sara Ahmed’s (2006) concepts of racialised affects, labour and performativity, this paper traces the ways in which Grindr - a social networking iPhone application for same-sex attracted men - shapes and regulates intimacies and sexual subjectivities in online space. It is suggested that whilst Grindr provides a forum for users to engage in new forms of pleasure and erotics, the encounters between bodies are marked by profiles and conversations which filter and govern intimacy through disciplinary norms around race, masculinity, whiteness, physical aesthetics and geography. Whiteness, in particular, becomes a form of desired social capital, enabling bodies to ‘pass’ as ‘White’, while excluding other bodies. Racial ‘Others’ become produced in this economy of desire as fetishes or repugnant objects. Exploring the construction of multiple sexual subjectivities through an autoethnographic lens, I que(e)ry the transformative and liberatory potential of Grindr by outlining the intimate relationship between sexuality, desire, race and whiteness in the context of gay male social networking. In doing so, I briefly share my own intimate history, mobilising my own anxieties and experiences as a way of ‘undoing’ the ways racial affects shape subjectivities and construct identities.1

**Networking social identities**

Online technology facilitates new forms of sociality, as online participation produces new affective and sociosexual landscapes for gay men to negotiate (Race 2010: 1). In a heteronormative environment where the possibility of meeting and organizing intimacy in face-to-face encounters is fraught with insecurity and possible violence, online social networking has been key to facilitating intimacy for same-sex attracted men. Extending this further, Robert Payne argues that cyberspace has been critical to the formation of queer sexual subjectivities, and should be conceived of as an extension of the ‘gay scene’ (2007: 1). While the ‘gay scene’ is a rhetorical construction defined through spatial tropes – a ‘destination’ point for sexual possibility and socialisation – it provides a useful frame for understanding the social imaginaries used to define belonging for queer subjects (Payne 2007: 1). That is, the imagined ‘gay scene’ emerges as a space for social connection with those with shared desires and expectations.

In order to understand the way online space has been utilised by same-sex attracted individuals, it is necessary to locate sexuality within a particular historical context. Through Foucault’s work in *The History of Sexuality*, sexuality can be seen to operate as a historically specific field of knowledge/truth with biopolitical consequences (Foucault 1977: 106). That is,

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1 With the exception of my own profile, the names and identities of other users have been changed to protect their privacy.
the state intervenes to police sexual behaviour. In promoting the ‘health’ of the population, proper sexual citizenship or behaviour is marked by monogamous heterosexual matrimonial/reproductive relationships (Foucault 1977: 103). Sex that does not conform to this social imaginary is normalised as dangerous to the health and wellbeing of society. Responding to these ‘harmful’ biopolitical configurations, Foucault proposes that same-sex intimacies should not be limited within political rhetoric’s of disease or fatality (1984: 163). Rather, by refusing to locate all sexual activities within a socio-political context of matrimonial reproduction or pathological perversion, new pleasures and friendships are capable of innovation (Foucault 2000: 290).

Grindr exemplifies elements of these Foucaultian politics. Grindr emerged in 2008 as an application for same-sex attracted men who had Apple iPhones. The device was marketed very simply - ‘It’s a guy thing’.2 Grindr’s tag line locates the application exclusively in the province of maleness and subsequently markets itself as the largest location-based ‘mobile’ social networking facility for men:

Unlike other dating or social network sites, Grindr is meant to be mobile. And it uses GPS technology to instantly zone in on guys in your area. New in town? Tap into Grindr to check out who’s on the scene. On a trip? Use Grindr to find a local who’d like to show you around. Hanging at home? Make Grindr your go-to place and see who’s looking to meet up. No matter where you find yourself, Grindr is the go-to app for socializing in seconds with the guys around you...Whether you are in the mood to chat, a date, or a buddy to grab a drink with, Grindr makes it happen.3

Grindr offers the promise of sexual possibility – regardless of your physical location, you can ‘zone in on guys in your area’. Whether for companionship, professional networking or socialisation, the application offers the consumer multiple formats to construct intimacies with other men. Such possibilities are only a ‘tap’ away.

From the moment I ‘sign on’ to Grindr I am connected to a range of other profiles via my geographical proximity to them. As one profile describes it, the act of tapping an online body to chat with mimics a process of ‘window shopping’. The interface architecture displays bodies in a grid-like fashion, like products to select and experiment with. One such profile states ‘keen for mates [,] dates & whatever develops’, while the next profile is of a ‘cub’ couple seeking ‘a third for play’. In thinking about how sexual possibilities develop online, it is clear that there is no singular referent or ‘truth’ for defining a genuine or ‘normal’ encounter. From a Foucaultian perspective of intimacy, Grindr provides a space where sexuality becomes a creative ‘procedure’ or practice of ‘freedom’, as it is a process through which individuals are able to develop new social and sexual relations that produce

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3 Ibid.
multiple and differentiated forms of intimacy (1984: 166). It is not fixed. As Kane Race identifies, these technologies work to organise erotic play in both online and offline contexts (2010: 3).

When using Grindr, I am enmeshed in a disparate politics of ‘window shopping’, as what users ‘shop’ or search for within this online sexual space will vary. Some profiles display semi-nude bodies in search of ‘hot hung tops’, while others display party shots to indicate a search for ‘friends and maybe more’. Other profiles remain purely pictorial or display only text. In the context of such an online space, heteronormative discourses of sex are problematic because they fracture, circulating between individual expectations, collective practices and counterpublics (Berlant and Warner 2000: 322). As Berlant and Warner note, the sexualisation of non-heterosexual intimate relations transforms resistant queer sexual practices into counterpublics that are not reducible to domesticity, reproduction or the nation (2000: 322). These practices produce intense and differentiated personal affects that are not easily organised within a simple trajectory of romance and conjugal intimacy. Using the work of Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, it is clear that these differing performative statements sexualise a range of social relations (2000: 322). Participants can use Grindr to organise casual sex, social networks, neighbourhood parties, orgies and dating. New sexual counterpublics emerge that do not organise intimacy around the normative ideal of the monogamous (heterosexual) conjugal couple. Instead, intimate practices, profiles and conversations assume significance in relation to the different forms of pleasure and sociability they engender (Foucault 2000: 282).

However, Grindr relies on normative categories of defining bodies (race, height, weight, age) in order to mediate sexual desire. Therefore, while new forms of social relations mediated by technology have the capacity to transform and (re)invent subjectivities, online social spaces such as Grindr recuperate sexual norms and aesthetical capital in the context of an online consumer space (1984: 166). Grindr, while not solely a cruising application, demonstrates the fusion between consumption practices and sexual relations. As Don Slater defines, consumption is a site of reproduction, where identities and relationships are negotiated (2005: 175). In locating consumer subjectivity within this application, bodies are not only visual commodities that are ‘browsed’ or ‘loaded’, but conversational interfaces where intimacy or sex can be secured in an ‘offline’ setting.

**Affective online intimacies**

Flows of communication on Grindr produce subjectivities that are no longer easily differentiated or rendered as coherent identities. Within Grindr I am required to negotiate codes of being ‘gym fit’ or ‘masc’ while looking ‘dte’ (down to earth). While Foucault’s discusses the dissolution of ‘programs’ in order to generate creative forms of pleasure, it is clear that new technologies also facilitate the development of new ‘controls’ and anxieties in generating
intimacy (1984: 172). Framing bodies in a neoliberal space of capitalism and
globalisation, David Ruffalo argues that Foucault's model of ‘discipline’ is
limited in conceiving of ‘dividualised’ subjectivities in online space (2008: 1).

Whether I am a ‘btm’ (bottom), for example, becomes crucial to my
desirability for the ‘total top seeking submissive slave’. My subjectivity
becomes managed within an online logic of making myself simultaneously
sexually desirable for cruising (by identifying with a particular sexual role) and
‘cute’ enough to have a conversation for those ‘not looking to hook up’. In
these moments, the body becomes bound within a discursive space that
defines my erotic potential in fragmented terms like ‘slave’ or ‘btm’. My
subjectivity, however, becomes increasingly mobile, as my corporeal and
online discursive identifications become meshed by using the iPhone as a
multi-media technology.

The previous linguistic statements titillate my body – gesturing to the
potential desire that can be actualised within moments. Generating intimacy
is no longer structured within fixed or delineated space, but fragmented and
shared across a range of conversational spaces on Grindr (Ruffalo 2008: 3).
These different subjectivities modulate affective responses. I am erotically
aroused by the potential to ‘fuck’, while amused and relaxed by a
conversation that revolves around platonic friendship rather than a sexual
rendezvous.

Extending the rhizomic conception of bodies offered by Ruffalo’s analysis,
Grindr exemplifies the affective labour of negotiating multiple sexual and
intimate subjectivities. The constant (re)writing of profile statements and the
various exchanges of photographs represents the differential points that
bodies use to ‘connect’. Connection, however, involves conversational and
emotional labour to articulate a response to generic questions such as ‘So
what are you looking for?’. This type of question is often asked within
minutes of initiating a conversation, such as in a conversation I had on Grindr
with ‘Arab Bottom Boy’. He sends a sexually explicit photograph and I
respond similarly:

ABB: “Hot pic dude...I’m hard, care to assist? :P”
S: “More than happy to oblige mr”
ABB: “Come over in 15 sexy”
S: “Sure”
ABB: “Can’t wait to fuck you”.

My exchange with ‘Arab Bottom Boy’ includes an extended romantic flirtation
involving virtual ‘hugs’ and ‘kisses’ with my ‘favourite’ Aussie 25,

A25: “Evening gorgeous,”
S: “Hey cutie”
A25: “How’s things...you finished cooking that pasta?”
S: “Hehehe...yep...all good...now just chilling”
A25: *virtual hug*
Negotiating these simultaneous online connections involves managing my multiple conversational positions. The physical and emotional labour in this connection online involves initiating a conversation with the hope of casual sex and romantic intimacy. Using Arlie Hochschild’s concept of affective labour, the body must ‘sustain’ different connections through two very distinct emotional performances (1983: 43). Not only must I take a photo of myself, but I am also forced to negotiate what pants/shirt (if any) to wear in the picture I provide, and whether to use emoticons or other affectionate and sexual terms. With ‘Arab Bottom Boy’ the explicit nature of the conversation coupled with erotic imagery arouses me. Simultaneously, as I switch conversations to ‘Aussie 25’ my body relaxes. My mood shifts from desiring sex to furthering my flirtatious and seemingly banal repartee about cooking. While both conversations involve pleasures which are no longer necessarily bound to coercive norms, my subjectivity fragments. It is implicated in an exhaustive negotiation of differing embodied states (Hochschild 1983: 46). In order to maintain the rhythm of the flirtation in each conversation, I must appear to act as a coy romantic in one conversation and transition into being sexually assertive in another. My online ‘self’ and offline embodied subjectivity becomes differentiated through the intensities of emotional labour.

The conversations recounted above illustrate the need to question neoliberal assumptions of sexual agency that rely on delineating fixed subjectivities that are singular and atomistic. Assumptions of a fixed subject fails to account for the ways norms circulate in online space and how we are implicated in (re)writing the self across a range of affective and discursive terrains (Foucault 2000: 284). I could be seen as an attractive gay body (in Grindr space) by wearing more fashionable clothes and performing a ‘fit’, ‘toned’ and ‘straight acting’ body on Grindr. Supplementing these discourses, my body can also read as ‘romantic’ through the use of a Shakespearean quote (‘A rose by any other name…) as a caption for my profile. Changing my bodily appearance in my profile picture (shifting from facial close-ups to sexually suggestive torso shots) and rewriting my captions became an ‘expression’ of the discourses on masculinity and fashion that I was cultivating (Butler 1990: 30). Online textual and visual performances of the ‘self’ are habituated and define my identity as the ‘queer romantic’. My sexual identity is rendered intelligible through how my pictures, conversation and captions are negotiated through norms surrounding physical aesthetics, muscularity (masculinity) and intellectual wit online (Butler 1990: 29).

**Erotic economies of race and whiteness**

*Grindr* allows visitors to filter the profiles displayed to them. Filtering is possible in terms of age, ethnicity, height, weight and relationship status. Kane Race (2010) suggests that many online social media sites, such as *Gaydar* or *Manhunt*, facilitate cruising that involves ‘serosorting’, a
differentiation between HIV-positive and HIV-negative bodies (2010: 3). Racial organization operates in a similar vein to serosorting, where discourses of whiteness rather than disease polemics ‘sorts’ bodies in online space. For Foucault ‘freedom’ from this discursive regime is fraught. No subject can escape the knowledge/power systems that structure subjectivity (Foucault 1977: 95). Similarly, Juana Rodriguez argues that online space is an informational assemblage that reproduces colonial relations of power to construct racial otherness (2003: 117). Gilbert Caluya argues that the racial recognition of bodies involves being marked as either exotic (through a fetishising of racial minorities) or sexually undesirable through a discourse of whiteness (2006: 2).

Whiteness is difficult to define. Ghassan Hage argues that whiteness is not simply the notion of colour, but rather it is a hegemonic category or form of cultural capital (1998: 55). That is, whiteness is not a question of geographical location necessarily, but in an Australian context, seems to hinge upon a ‘yearning’ for an imagined position of national belonging or citizenship – a fantasy that exists through the existence of a racial ‘Other’. Such belonging is marked through uses of language, sartorial styles, cultural tastes, economic mobility and political activities (Hage 1998: 51). Whiteness, then, is an inherited system of privileges (Han 2006: 3). By extending this conception of whiteness as a ‘yearning’ for social mobility or citizenship, we can observe how whiteness must already be embedded within a particular relationship of power (Hage 1998: 52). From a Foucaultian perspective, ‘whiteness’ is a discursive category that ‘naturalises’ what it means to ‘be’ white. White bodies, therefore, take shape through the repetition of particular social practices that are structured within a particular historical context (Foucault 1977b: 19). In the context of gay male social interactions, Alan Han describes whiteness as desired capital, one that attaches to white (read: Caucasian or European) bodies (2006: 4).

Whiteness is not confined to discursive politics, it also positions bodies in relation to particular affects and spaces. Sara Ahmed argues that ‘whiteness’ works by constructing distances between objects. It is a particular ‘orientation’: how we understand our bodies by registering our proximities to particular objects or ‘others’ (2006: 11). In a similar vein to Hage, Ahmed argues that ‘whiteness’ is a proximate point from which the subject can orient himself or herself (2006: 121). Ahmed elaborates that whiteness fractures – it is not always a site of privilege or abstracted distance. Whiteness, therefore, reproduces itself in terms of how we align our bodies in particular spaces: it has multiple formations (Ahmed 2006: 55). The multiple ways of understanding how whiteness interacts with ethnicity illustrates how it can be conceptualized as a performative or spatially contingent category - one that constructs our identities. ‘Being’ white becomes a constitutive ‘doing’ which is meaningful in a particular cultural location (Butler 1990: 30). As Ahmed elaborates, whiteness shapes how we act and inhabit space, bringing objects into our reach, depending on our ability to ‘move’ through this space (2007: 155). Racialised bodies, which are ‘stressed’ in such spaces, or that act with limited mobility, fail
to pass through whiteness (Ahmed 2007: 157). Whiteness is not reducible to simply discursive formulations; it has affective and spatial dimensions.

Whiteness manifests in how profiles are created and managed on Grindr. Grindr’s ‘Terms of Service’ state that in order to use the application you must not:

“11. post, store, send, transmit, or disseminate any information or material which a reasonable person could deem to be objectionable, libellous, offensive, indecent, pornographic, harassing, threatening, embarrassing, distressing, vulgar, hateful, racially or ethnically offensive, or otherwise inappropriate, regardless of whether this material or its dissemination is unlawful;”

Ethnicity and race, unlike other categories of difference, are marked out specifically in the Terms of Service. Despite this, racial signs still saturate the online space. Performative statements, such as ‘not into Asians sexually’ or ‘ONLY ATTRACTED TO CAUCASIANS’, organise and dominate bodies on Grindr. As Caluya elaborates, the proliferation of racial signs effectively segregates online cruising spaces, as evidenced by the materially isolating effects of being denied sexual desirability (2008: 286).

In marking or recognising different bodies, Elspeth Probyn argues we distance ourselves from them, producing a proximity in which our identities can be differentiated or ‘moved away’ from (Quoted in Caluya 2006: 8). My ‘Indianess’ becomes a point that bodies turn away from. As one profile articulates, ‘not into Asians/Indians for sex... friends welcome’. My skin colour extends only to platonic intimacy rather than sexual desire (Ahmed 2006: 132). On Grindr, bodies assume a position of desirability through a conflation of whiteness and nationhood, ‘Aussie looking for other Aussie men’. In the act of naming myself as ‘Other’ (no category exists for Subcontinental ethnicities), I am refused some social and sexual mobility in this dominating space of whiteness, a space often conflated in relation to nationhood.

If bodies are oriented towards a white aesthetic, those who desire whiteness often find their ‘orientations’ moving away from the racial ‘Other’. ‘Looking away’ shames me. The affect inscribes itself onto my body – tightening my posture, generating greater concentration and perspiration accrues on my forehead. One user responded to a ‘hey’ with ‘not into your type man’. This ‘speech act’, designating my race as a ‘type’, affects my confidence (Butler 1990: 32). I am ‘Othered’ and repudiated as a site of possible sexual consumption. Using Frantz Fanon, Alan Han argues that bodies become ‘overdetermined from without’ – non-white bodies are either invisible in the space of desire, or castigated for being unappealing (2007: 5). Rhonda MacRae contends that such a process is a way of networking the ‘self’ (and

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our practices of consumption) by marking distances of desirability between different bodies (2004: 57). In this intersubjective exchange, the profile refuses my sexual agency, as another user apologetically prefaces that he is ‘not into Asians/Indians...sorry just a preference’. Clicking and subsequently reading the profile I become aware of my race as one which is not ‘preferred’. My body is overwhelmed with frustration and anger. Within moments, the profile which refuses my sexual desirability vanishes from my screen, a sign that I had been ‘blocked’. Blocking cuts through me. I become defensive of how my body is rendered intelligible through a gaze of whiteness. That is, the shame engendered by this performative statement wounds my pride and affects my opportunity or willingness to consume further.

Whiteness, as a discursive position articulated through online conversations, bleeds my online and corporeal subjectivity. My online exchange generates physical and emotional responses. Ahmed extends the politics of normalisation to argue that feeling ‘out of place’ is a question of a disoriented body, one where the ‘familiar’ becomes rendered ‘strange’ because of coercive power relations (2006: 141; McWhorter 1999: 51). My body suffered a visceral response; I was physically tense and felt myself as an unwanted subject in a strange (online) space. In this moment, I was produced as an object looked at by others and became self-conscious. Not only did the gaze penetrate my online body, it produced anxieties about how I acted and negotiated my flirtatious encounters offline.

For a non-white body attempting to claim sexual belonging, whiteness often becomes recuperated in distinctive terms. One profile statement I have used gestures to this: ‘White washed Indian aka coconut’. Here the connection between whiteness and bodies is exemplified in a coconut analogy. That is, while the subject may have ‘coconut’ (read: South Asian) skin, there internally (read: personality) is ‘White’. Not only is my ethnicity homogenized, it also becomes a point of departure, as I lay claim to an internal ‘Whiteness’ that allows me to belong. Such performances of whiteness become important ways of claiming desirability despite one’s phenotype. While whiteness is dislocated from a physically white body, I lay claim to it as a form of cultural capital in order to mobilise my own desirability. In one telephone conversation with a person from Grindr my performance is rendered ‘successful’:

X: “Wow- you are nothing like expected”.
S: “What do you mean?”
X: “Well, you don’t have an accent – you sound oddly British (laughs). I think it’s cute – you aren’t really Indian after all mr”.
S: “Oh, why thanks”.

My ability to perform whiteness through my speech, ‘passing’ with my pseudo-British accent, added to my desirability as a non-white subject. Locating myself within the desiring capital of whiteness, I was able to claim sexual currency to flirt with this individual, who was attracted to my status as a coconut. Whiteness in this instance operated to preserve my desirability, by
allowing my ethnicity to be obscured. My gratitude at the end signifies my sense of joy and excitement – my breath hurried, my skin relaxed and I felt electricity pulsing through my head, having performed whiteness successfully enough to further an intimate conversation.

Conversely, for self-identified ‘white’ men who are only ‘looking to dominate willing GAM [gay Asian male] or GBM [gay black male] slaves’, my racial phenotype assumes a cultural significance (cast in the statement as a ‘slave’) and becomes a commodity. My racial otherness (my brown skin colour, elongated nose, black eyes) becomes a discursive statement determining my sexual position. My racial/sexual subjectivity, as a fetish, is negotiated in this proximity of whiteness. Bodies are ‘oriented’ towards my exotic skin and desire my sexual submission as they top me (Ahmed 2006: 285). I am immediately domesticated, positioned as a commodity for pleasure, an object of sexual desire for white queers. Han contends that such a politics reflects a particular history of interracial intimacy in Australia (specifically Sydney) where white men ‘expect them [Asian men] to perform the role of submissive Asian’ (2007: 9). Words such as ‘boi’, ‘passive’ or ‘fem’ are discursively deployed to fix my sexual capacity into a particular role. While I find such an encounter troubling on a theoretical level, there is a bodily excitement that emerges in being desired. I become titillated by the recognition of a white body that often refuses my agency. Similar to Han’s experiences, whiteness claims possession of my body, it becomes the standard by which desirability is measured (2006: 5).

Simultaneously, the statement produces my body as a sexual object by reproducing an orientalising knowledge in which coloured men are characterised as effeminate, submissive bottoms seeking to be ‘dominated’ by an older white top (Said 1979: 21). Colonial domination, as articulated through discourses on racial masculinity and sexuality, is reproduced in this intimate exchange. That is, masculinity is coded in terms of the Caucasian male body, while the queer Asian body occupies the marginal position of femininity (Han 2006: 10). Vikki Bell argues that for Foucault, ‘freedom’ from these discursive regimes is paradoxical. In one sense, no subject can escape the norms that discipline subjects. However, ‘freedom’ (as an ongoing practice) can be realised through new technologies of the self that seek to minimise or subvert such relations of domination (1996: 85). Grindr exemplifies this paradox. While it can facilitate multiple forms of erotic and intimate play, the uniformity of statements such as ‘no Asians’ or ‘GAM only’ also reproduces relations of power that reinforce racism.

Conclusion

Online technologies allow users to organise new forms of queer sociability, intimacy and pleasure that resist a heteronormative sexual public. It is important to celebrate the potential for new forms of pleasure to transform subjectivity, and Grindr offers a space for such pleasure to be negotiated and practised. However, while such technologically mediated exchanges offer
possibilities for queer transformations, they often recuperate sexual, racial and consumer norms that seek to organise queer identities in hierarchies or binaries. In examining the affective labour of racial politics that must be managed online, new forms of intimacy become increasingly fraught with insecurity and uncertainty. By que(e)ryng the potential for pleasure and practices of ‘freedom’ in online sexual spaces, it is clear how these new assemblages transform the space for negotiating intimacies. However, such transformations simultaneously reinforce disciplinary norms around race, masculinity and aesthetics that govern intimacies and erotic practices online. In developing an ethics to negotiating desire and intimacy in such spaces, the question we must ask then, is, how do we articulate desires in ways that minimise, rather than reiterate, relations of racial subordination?

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Loving Other-Wise: Race, Relationality and Respectability in Wilkinson v Kitzinger

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Attempts at securing legal recognition for non-heterosexual relationships continue to be undermined by the ways in which the law produces particular intelligible subject positions for non-heterosexual people within a human rights discourse. As I outline in this paper in relation to one judgement - Wilkinson v Kitzinger - non-heterosexual relationships were primarily constructed as private matters that were not the concern of the state. Furthermore, non-heterosexual relationships were constructed via particularly narrow understandings of such relationships, which depicted them as formed primarily through monogamous, long-term commitments between two people. Finally, the judgment in Wilkinson v Kitzinger evoked analogies between past prohibitions on interracial marriage and current prohibitions on non-heterosexual marriage. Such analogies are problematic for the racial politics they produce and the histories they overwrite. As a counter to these limitations I outline one particular understanding of relationship recognition that involves a focus upon the development of respectful communities of difference. Such communities, I suggest, may serve not only to extend recognition beyond the realm of the State, but may also engender ways of thinking about difference that move beyond singular identity categories as typically evoked by a human rights framework.

Introduction

Public debate and academic commentary on non-heterosexual relationship recognition continues to be marked by contention. Most obviously, this occurs when those who locate themselves on the liberal left (who by and large support some form of non-heterosexual relationship recognition) are directly opposed by those who wish to perpetuate discrimination against non-
heterosexual people. Yet such disagreement is also evident within non-heterosexual communities, where some non-heterosexual people call for full inclusion within the institution of marriage (e.g., Eskridge 1996), whilst others view the desire for marriage rights as a form of co-option or domestication (e.g., Ettelbrick 1989).

For those who call for full marriage rights for non-heterosexual people, a discourse of human rights is often drawn upon (e.g., Bourassa and Varnell 2002). Whilst this has at times been a productive approach to conceiving of the rights of non-heterosexual people in general, it brings with it a range of problematic assumptions about the individual being referred to in terms of ‘human rights’, and the ways in which rights claims are made (Riggs and Walker 2006; Wright 2001). More specifically, recourse to notions of human rights often fail to adequately explore how particular (dominant) groups of people are often implicitly constructed as ‘more human’ than other groups, and that as a result, it is the interests, desires or values of dominant groups that become the focus of ‘human rights’, often to the exclusion of marginalized groups of people. With this problem in mind, my interest in this paper is to examine the terms on which claims for the legal recognition of non-heterosexual relationships are made. In so doing, I outline three particular aspects of claims to recognition that require ongoing consideration in regard to the limits they potentially establish for relationship recognition, and the norms they perpetuate in relation to rights claims. Specifically, these three aspects are: 1) analogies that are made between histories of racial discrimination and discrimination based on sexuality, 2) claims to marriage rights and their relationship to notions of privacy, and 3) the identity claims that come from the first two, and the ways in which they potentially proscribe a particularly narrow version of both state sanction and relationality.

In order to elaborate these points, I provide a reading of the judgment in Wilkinson v Kitzinger, a case brought before the UK High Court and decided upon in 2006. My intention in reading this case is not to determine the validity of the findings per se, nor to make comment on the desires of the Petitioner and first Respondent (two women seeking to have their Canadian marriage legally recognized as such in the UK). Rather, my intention is to demonstrate the limitations introduced by the particular forms of sanction offered by the law within a human rights framework, and to outline one way in which existing access to rights for non-heterosexual people may be supplemented not solely by the call for further legal recognition of non-heterosexual relationships, but also by non-heterosexual (amongst other) communities ourselves determining how we will accord recognition to our relationships.

Drawing on the work of Dean (1996, 2006), and extending my own previous work on state sanction (Riggs, 2006), I outline the notion of ‘loving otherwise’. Such a concept, I suggest, involves being mindful of the relationships that we are always already in with those other than ourselves. Focusing on recognition from the standpoint of these relationships may create opportunities for understanding the multiple ways in which all of us are
positioned in regard to the legal norm of the ‘universal subject’ as evoked in human rights discourse, a category that is not only normatively gendered and sexualized, but is also premised upon a white middle-class understanding of state sanction. An emphasis upon relationships, I suggest, may go at least some way towards freeing us from the quest for state sanction as the only way of gaining recognition for our relationships, whilst nonetheless utilizing the rights that are available to us, and supporting the rights of all groups who are alienated from state recognition.

**The Politics of ‘Miscegenation Analogies’**

In this first section of the paper I outline some of the problems associated with the use of analogies between current refusals of non-heterosexual marriage and historical refusals of interracial marriage. In so doing I draw attention to the racial politics of non-heterosexual marriage claims, and I focus on some of the limitations that arise when rights claims about sexuality are tied to a historical framework that is rooted in histories of slavery and oppression. Whilst my interest is not to necessarily argue against the use of such analogies, it nonetheless is to suggest that it is important to pay ongoing attention to the ways in which multiple forms of identity simultaneously impact upon non-heterosexual communities, and the implications of this for the ways in which rights claims are made.

Whilst *Wilkinson v Kitzinger* was not centrally concerned with this ‘miscegenation analogy’ (as it has been termed), both the Petitioner and the first Respondent provided arguments for the recognition of their Canadian marriage that at the very least cited the analogy. In the judgment provided by Sir Mark Potter on July 31st, 2006, the Petitioner is reported as stating in her application that:

> Marriage is our society’s fundamental social institution for recognising the couple relationship and access to this institution is an equal rights issue. To deny some people access to marriage on the basis of their sexual orientation is fundamentally unjust, just as it would be to do so on the basis of their race, ethnicity, and nationality, religion, or political beliefs.

As is also reported in the judgment, the first Respondent made a similar statement, in which she:

> Dr[ew] historical analogies between the exclusion of gay persons from the institution of marriage and the banning of marriage between persons of different races under the apartheid regime in South Africa, the Southern States of America and Nazi laws banning marriages between Jews and ‘Aryans’.

A growing body of literature has examined the issues associated with making analogies between legal cases aimed at ending anti-miscegenation laws in the US, and legal cases aimed at securing marriage rights for non-heterosexual people (see Coolidge, 1997: footnote 7; Somerville, 2005: footnote 6).
Coolidge (1997) refers to deployments of the ‘miscegenation analogy’ as ‘playing the Loving card’, and in so doing references the key legal case – *Loving v Virginia* – that was central to the overturning of anti-miscegenation laws in the US. The case involved Mildred and Richard Loving, an African-American woman and white man who appeared before the US Supreme Court in 1967 in a series of appeals against their prosecution for breaching the 1924 Virginia ‘Act to Preserve Racial Integrity’, which prohibited white people from marrying ‘outside their race’. This resulted in the Supreme Court finding that (heterosexual) marriage was a fundamental right and that the arrest and subsequent indictment of the Lovings was a form of racial discrimination. As Somerville (2005: 341) states; ‘the ruling was thus a significant victory in a series of decisions that attempted to dismantle the legitimacy of white supremacy in the law’.

In the same breath as celebrating this outcome, however, it is important to pay attention to the word ‘attempted’ in the above quote from Somerville. It must be remembered that whilst *Loving vs. Virginia* resulted in the legalization of interracial (heterosexual) marriage, it did not stop either individual or institutional discrimination occurring against interracial couples. Moreover, other cases (such as *Brown vs. Board of Education*) aimed at ending legal discrimination and segregation have yet to significantly realize their promise of ‘racial equality’. Dorothy Roberts (2002), for example, outlines clearly in her book on child welfare how ‘equal rights’ have not translated into equal benefits and economic security for African American families. It would therefore seem problematic to presume that the sanctioning of non-heterosexual marriage would actually result in social change significant enough to secure a life free from everyday discrimination for non-heterosexual people. From this first point, then, the ‘miscegenation analogy’ is problematic as whilst it promises much, in practice it may do little to significantly change the discrimination and social exclusion that many non-heterosexual people experience.

The problems associated with drawing analogies between racial- and sexuality-based discrimination do not end, however, at the fact of the failure of legal rights to translate into social benefits. In her work on the construction of marriage in the US, Romano (2003) reminds us that the act of striking down anti-miscegenation laws served implicitly to locate racism outside of marriage, thus ignoring the ways in which racial privilege and discrimination may well continue to operate within interracial relationships, and between interracial couples and the wider social context they live in. For example, to be a white woman in an interracial marriage is not to be outside of racism or racial privilege, much the same as interracial marriage does not necessarily mean that her African-American husband will live a life free of racism (see also Poon and Sin, 2008).

In this regard, then, it is important to question exactly who benefits from the extension of marriage (or other forms of relationship recognition) to non-heterosexual people. Whilst it is often suggested that state sanction for non-
heterosexual relationships is as much significant for its symbolic value as for its material benefits, it is important to question how the granting of state sanction can also serve to mask ongoing discrimination against non-heterosexual people. For example, whilst in some jurisdictions across the world marriage (or other forms of relationship recognition) has been granted to non-heterosexual people, these same jurisdictions are not necessarily free from discrimination (legal or otherwise) that occurs in regard to other forms of social marginalization (such as racism, ableism and classism). As such, whilst it might be symbolically important for some people within non-heterosexual communities to call explicitly for access to the institution of marriage (rather than other forms of relationship recognition), it is important to consider the racial politics of such calls, and how they may represent the investment of privileged members of non-heterosexual communities (e.g., those of us who identify as white and middle-class).

This brings me to a related point about the use of analogies between anti-miscegenation laws and prohibitions on non-heterosexual marriage, namely the ways in which forms of discrimination intersect with one another. A focus upon claims to either racial discrimination or discrimination on the basis of sexuality overlooks instances where both of these occur simultaneously. Recent high-profile cases in the UK and Australia of non-heterosexual refugees being denied sanction demonstrate that whilst an individual may have their rights to sexual freedom (to a certain degree) granted, their right to a life free from cultural persecution (or in some instances death in their home country) is not equally guaranteed. Thus as Lenon (2005) emphasizes, when human rights claims are made for ‘equal marriage’, such claims are primarily made on the basis of a single identity category, which does very little to examine how the fact of simultaneous identity categories problematizes the claim to ‘universal rights for all’. As such, and in this instance, it may be suggested that ‘human rights’ are very narrowly defined on terms that promote the needs or values of those in possession of cultural capital that allows them to closely approximate the norm of white middle-class heterosexuality. So, for example, whilst human rights claims by white middle-class lesbians (for example) may be recognized (even if not granted), the rights claims of heterosexual Muslims seeking protection from persecution may not even be recognized, let alone granted. In other words, the possession of cultural capital affords certain groups of people the economic and legal protection required to mount rights claims, whilst other groups of people are left with little opportunity or voice to call for rights that they are legitimately entitled to as humans.

Lenon (2005) thus suggests that the category ‘universal rights’ in reference to the rights claims of non-heterosexual people is in many ways a white and middle-class category, and one resulting from the fact that those seeking such rights already hold the privileges of whiteness and middle-classness that make it possible for them/us to speak only of discrimination on the basis of sexuality: their/our rights as white middle-class people are already secured (see also Barnard 2003; Riggs 2006; Riggs and Walker 2006).
construction of the subject of non-heterosexual rights claims as implicitly white thus marginalizes the experiences of those non-heterosexual people who do not identify as white (or middle-class), and contributes to a legal system that compartmentalizes differing forms of discrimination and thus fails to recognize the ways in which multiple forms of oppression compound one another. (It is of course important to point out that not only do multiple forms of oppression compound one another, but that a life lived through the intersections of privilege and oppression results in both access to material resources and potential experiences of discrimination, for instance in the lives of white middle-class gay men such as myself, see Riggs 2010 for more on this).

In this section I have outlined some of the main concerns that arise from any use of the ‘miscegenation analogy’, and I have discussed the implications of such analogies for claims to non-heterosexual relationship recognition. These concerns may be summarized by their focus on 1) the ways in which changes in laws relating to interracial marriage have not resulted in the cessation of racism, 2) the ways in which ‘miscegenation analogies’ appear to bracket off race from sexuality and 3) the implicit construction a normative white middle-class subject as the focus of human rights discourse. In the following section I explore how rights to relationship recognition were constructed as a ‘private matter’ in the judgment on Wilkinson and Kitzinger, and how this again may be seen to reinforce a particularly narrow account of what constitutes human rights.

The Subject of Privacy

If the judgment in Wilkinson v Kitzinger to at least to some degree included the analogy of race and sexuality in the presentation of statements from the Petitioner and first Respondent, and if, relatedly, the logic of discrimination as targeted towards a particular aspect of an individual’s identity was accepted as reasonable grounds upon which to lodge a legal case, then it is important to further examine the type of legal subject that was constructed within the judgment. One of the primary ways in which the Petitioner and first Respondent were represented within the judgment was as ‘private citizens’ claiming a right to marriage, or at the very least, a right to privacy. This claim was made on the basis of Section 1, Article 8, of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR), which states that: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence’. The weight of the Article is acknowledged by Sir Potter in his judgment when he recognizes an argument presented by the Petitioner’s representative, Ms Monaghan, suggesting that prior cases regarding sexual orientation have ‘recognised that sexual orientation is the most intimate part of the person's private life, and there must exist particularly weighty reasons to justify any restriction on or interference with that right’ (69). In response to this, however, Sir Potter states in his verdict on the relevancy of Section 8 to the case that:
In my view, by declining to recognise a same-sex partnership as a marriage in legislation the purpose and the thrust of which is to enhance their rights, the state cannot be said improperly to intrude on or interfere with the private life, of a same-sex couple who are living in a close loving and monogamous relationship as is the position in this case. Nor has the state acted improperly within the sphere of any duty to afford respect to it. The primary proscription of Article 8 is against measures by the state which interfere with the respect to the private sphere (for example by criminalising or condemning consensual sexual conduct between two adults). (85)

This example from *Wilkinson v Kitzinger* highlights the role that particular constructions of privacy played in making available (or prohibiting) legal recourse to claims for the recognition of the two women’s marriage. If, as per Article 8 of the *ECtHR*, privacy is constructed in terms of the ‘universal man’ – ‘his private and family life’ – then the law begins from the assumption that privacy takes the form deemed most appropriate to the life of this legal entity. Of course, stating that the legal entity of the ‘universal man’ represents the interests of white, heterosexual, middle-class men is not to state anything new. Nonetheless, by considering what the evocation of that subject position means in the context of claims for non-heterosexual relationship recognition, as I do in the remainder of this section, it is possible to see how the binary of public and private is reinforced within the judgment to the detriment of the Petitioner and first Respondent, but ultimately to the benefit of a normative conception of human rights where it is the ‘private man’ with access to considerable cultural capital who is the nominal benefactor of such rights.

Notions of ‘private life’ are constructed within the *Wilkinson v Kitzinger* judgment as referring to the life that individuals live outside of the public sphere. These lives include those of couples in ‘loving and monogamous relationship[s]’ who wish to go about their business ‘in private’. This particular understanding of ‘private’ in a legal sense constructs an understanding of sexuality as an entirely private affair, and one for which courts of law are not the appropriate place through which to seek sanction. In other words, through the construction of relationships as ‘private matters’, and legal discrimination as a ‘public matter’, Sir Potter is able to construct the application of Article 8 to *Wilkinson and Kitzinger* as essentially a ‘red herring’ – if non-heterosexual relationships are ‘private matters’, and if the State does not impose upon such matters, then it cannot, in effect, be discriminating against the private lives of non-heterosexual people. Only were it to actively intercede in the lives of non-heterosexual people (i.e., ‘by criminalising or condemning consensual sexual conduct between two adults’) would the State by guilty of discrimination.

A such, and by taking as its starting place the individualized private ‘family life’ of the ‘universal man’, the law represented by the *ECtHR* (and its interpretation by Sir Potter) is able to justify discrimination against non-heterosexual people by committing our relationships to the same realm as those of the ‘universal man’ – out of sight and out of mind. Yet this reading of
‘privacy’ (and with particular reference to the lives of non-heterosexual people) is fundamentally incapable of engaging with the historical contingencies of non-heterosexual existence. In other words, if non-heterosexual lives (for as long as they have been considered as such) have always already been at once public and private (through the simultaneous enforcing of secrecy around non-heterosexual sex and the very public abhorrence of even the very notion of such sex), then the lives of non-heterosexual people (particularly those who present before the court) cannot be assessed on the same terms as the ‘universal man’. As such, recourse to notions of privacy as they are contained within the ECtHR cannot help but fail to resituate non-heterosexual people away from the public eye – such laws will always take ‘the public’ as being explicitly heterosexual, and it will thus necessarily construct the ‘private’ needs of non-heterosexual people as incommensurable to the management of public institutions (such as marriage). In his judgment Sir Potter makes it clear in this regard that that ‘the ECtHR will not require Member States to establish particular forms of social and legal institution to recognize particular relationships, especially in areas of social controversy’ (86, see also 44 for an elaboration of this point). By positing non-heterosexual relationships as controversial in an (implicitly heterosexual) social context, the judgment effectively uses the logic of the ‘private individual’ to return the Petitioner and first Respondent to their ‘rightful place’ – that of their private (i.e., out of public spaces) relationship.

A further implication of this judgement is that a human right can only be constituted by that which is deemed legitimately public. For those people marginalized in multiple ways by the law, and who have little recourse to a public claim to rights (for example refugees who enter a country through channels deemed ‘illegal’, and who thus have no legal public standing as citizens), the binary of public and private can again be wielded to in effect shield the law from any accusations of discrimination by making recourse to the limit of its jurisdiction. Whilst this logic is obviously not the fault of the Wilkinson v Kitzinger decision, it again highlights how human rights claims made in the service of non-heterosexual relationship recognition must consider how the ruling of particular judgements can, in the future, be potentially misused (as precedent) to argue against the rights of other marginalized groups of people. Furthermore, and as I elaborate in the next section, the finding presented within the judgment renders intelligible a particular identity that is deemed acceptable for non-heterosexual people – one that constructs a narrow view of non-heterosexual relationships.

**Constructions of the ‘Respectable Same-Sex Couple’**

In her analysis of representations of US non-heterosexual couples seeking and undertaking marriage ceremonies, Valverde (2006) suggests that such couples represent a ‘new entity in the history of sexuality’: that of the ‘respectable same-sex couple’. This couple, which is clearly defined as engaged in the pursuit of marriage and happiness, projects an image that,
Valverde suggests, is very much the product of legal battles to secure non-heterosexual marriage. It is a desexualized, normatively aestheticized image of non-heterosexual sexuality that is considered at least palatable to the heterosexual majority. This notion of the respectable same-sex couple was evoked in the judgment of *Wilkinson v Kitzinger*, where Sir Potter states that 'Not only does English law recognize and not interfere with the right of such couples to live in a very close, loving, and monogamous relationship; it accords them also the benefits of marriage in all but name' (88). His argument here is concerned with presenting civil partnerships as a viable alternative to marriage, the suggestion thus being that civil partnerships should be sufficient to meet the needs of the Petitioner and first Respondent. Yet in so doing, it constructs for the two women a particular intelligible subject position as a couple, namely one that involves a 'very close, loving, and monogamous relationship'. This construction of only a particular form of non-heterosexual relationship as deserving sanction from the state is elsewhere elaborated in the judgment in similar terms. Thus, for example, Sir Potter refers to civil partnerships as ‘designed to redress a perceived inequality of treatment of long term monogamous same-sex relationships’ (50). Thus not only are ‘respectable same-sex couples’ in monogamous relationships, but these relationships must be long-term. Similarly, the Petitioner is reported as making statements that reaffirm a particular model of the ‘respectable same-sex couple’. This occurs through reference to the first Respondent as her ‘life-partner’, thus evoking a focus on the long-term status of her relationship to her wife.

In these multiple ways, not only are non-heterosexual relationships constructed on particular terms as ‘respectable’, they are also constructed as both financially motivated and as asexual. In regards to the first construction, and much like Valverde (2006) found in her analysis of the representations of non-heterosexual couples she examined, the judgment at least in part represents the two wives as consumers. Thus, for example, the Petitioner is reported as stating that ‘I want our marriage to be recognized institutionally by banks, insurance companies, the tax office, and so on’ (21). By this statement the women are represented as citizens entitled to rights that will protect their financial well-being.

In regard to the second construction, the two women are not presented as desiring subjects – as people brought together not simply by ‘love’, but by love between two women. The closest the judgment comes to recognizing lesbian sexuality is in the provision of a quote from Ms Monaghan, the Petitioner’s representative. Ms Monaghan is reported as stating that in failing to recognize the marriage of the two women as a marriage, ‘the law manifests a lack of respect for the most intimate aspect of the Petitioner's private life, namely her sexual orientation and her choice of spouse/partner as a result’ (98). The word ‘intimacy’ here may potentially be taken to signal something other than ‘private’ (in that it is depicted as an ‘aspect of the Petitioner’s private life’), and instead may be read as referencing intimacy between the two women (in the way the statement brings into metonymy reference to
'sexual orientation’ and ‘spouse/partner’). In this sense, one’s sexual orientation becomes intimate primarily in relation to one’s spouse or partner. This single (possible) reference to lesbian sexuality (as opposed to the intelligible identity of the ‘respectable same-sex couple’) marks the limitations that cohere around the forms of intelligibility that are willingly conceded to non-heterosexual people in this judgment.

My argument here is of course not that we should have been made privy to the two women’s intimate relationship, nor that we should be making non-heterosexual relationship rights all about sex. Rather, my point is that it would seem permissible for reference to non-heterosexual intimacies to at least shape the context through which relationship rights are argued for. Certainly this is the case with regard to references to heterosexual marriage within the judgment. Reference is made in the judgment as it pertains to Section 1, Article 8, of the ECtHR, to the ‘purpose’ of heterosexual marriage, where Sir Potter states that

'It is apparent that the majority of people, or at least of governments, not only in England but Europe-wide, regard marriage as an age-old institution, valued and valuable, respectable and respected, as a means not only of encouraging monogamy but also the procreation of children and their development and nurture in a family unit (or "nuclear family") in which both maternal and paternal influences are available in respect of their nurture and upbringing.

The conflation of ‘monogamy’ with ‘procreation’ and the ‘nurturing’ of children may feasibly be taken to reference heterosexual reproduction through intercourse. Whilst this is of course not the only way in which heterosexual reproduction occurs, it is fair to presume that this is the form of procreation that Sir Potter had in mind. If, then, the judgment can make reference (however subtle) to heterosexual intercourse (or at the very least intimacy) in an argument for marriage for heterosexuals, surely there should be equal space available to acknowledge that non-heterosexual sex occurs in non-heterosexual relationships, and that the intimacy symbolized by such sex is as equally deserving of protection by (marriage) law? Obviously part of the problem facing this argument is that Sir Potter ties heterosexual intimacy to reproduction. Yet, as is increasingly being argued for within research on non-heterosexual parenting (e.g., Malone and Cleary 2002; Riggs 2007), space must be provided for recognizing the intimate desires that drive non-heterosexual reproduction: non-heterosexual families, one would imagine, are not formed by people who do not care about one another: the adults in non-heterosexual families express care for one another in intimate (and/or sexual) ways. In this sense, sexual identity is as much at the heart of discussions about non-heterosexual families as it is about heterosexual families.

So, to summarize, in this section I have outlined some of the ways in which the ‘respectable same-sex couple’ (Valverde 2006) is constructed within the judgment. The construction of this intelligible identity for the Petitioner and first Respondent provides a very narrow reading not only of their relationship (i.e., it is almost exclusively constructed in non-sexual ways), but also of non-
heterosexual relationships more broadly (which are constructed as monogamous, loving and long-term). This limited form of intelligibility thus proscribes those relationships not constituted through monogamy, and which are not long-term, but which are nonetheless equally deserving of state sanction. As such, by reinforcing a particular model of relationships as the only form worthy of consideration in the case, other forms of relationships are left outside of human rights considerations, thus leaving them vulnerable to future judgements that may be evoked to consider their merits for protection under the law.

**Loving Other-Wise**

Elsewhere (Riggs 2006) I have discussed the concept of ‘loving other-wise’ in order to provide a theoretical space in which to think through how non-heterosexual rights claims are made, and more specifically, how they are made by white, middle-class, non-heterosexual people. In this work I was interested in elaborating how examining intersections of privilege and oppression must involve not simply a reflexive examination of one’s own position, but also, following Ahmed (2004), a ‘turning toward the other’. Such a turn toward the other, I suggested, would not involve the extension of a benevolent gesture towards those other than ourselves, nor would it involve asking what those other than ourselves can do for us. Rather, ‘turning toward the other’ is about recognizing the contingency, indeed the dependency, of the self upon the other, and thus the ethical responsibility that one owes to those other than oneself. Bringing such an understanding of the self to an application of legal claims in regard to non-heterosexual relationships presents one possibility for reconsidering not only the legal subjects that we present ourselves as being, but also the kinds of recognition we engage in.

In her work on Zizek, Dean (2006) provides us with one particular understanding of the law, and how it shapes our desires for sanction on very particular terms. Dean suggests that:

Law lets the subject think it could get what it wants were it not for law’s prohibition. Here law lets the subject avoid the impossible Real of its desire. Our attachment to law is a symptom in that it is a way for us to secure our desire (that is to say, the space for it, not the object of it) by avoiding confrontation with the impossibility of fulfilling it (147).

Dean’s argument here has particular implications for how we understand the quest for state sanction on the part of non-heterosexual people. If the law is, as Dean suggests, fundamentally about the perpetuation of an illusion of freedom, and if that illusion results from the belief that legal sanction would represent an escape from persecution, then at least part of the struggle for recognition of non-heterosexual relationships must involve reconsidering where we place the weight of recognition, and the possibility for shifting this away from the law. Certainly a desire for the illusory protection of the law is
evident throughout the *Wilkinson v Kitzinger* judgment, for example where the Petitioner’s representative, Ms Monaghan, is reported as stating

that the position in society whereby a homosexual person who wishes to establish a formally recognised partnership with another homosexual may do so by establishing a civil partnership, but is denied the title and status of marriage, creates a conflict between social reality and the law in which that person may well experience feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety as the Petitioner and first Respondent say that they feel in their witness statements (96).

Here the Petitioner and first Respondent are depicted as suffering from ‘feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety’ as a result of the denial of their marriage. Ms Monaghan’s claim is thus that these feelings would be reduced should state recognition be granted. Whilst it is no doubt the case that recognition of any marriage functions at a practical level to grant rights and protection on the basis of those rights (e.g., in regard to hospital access to spouses, medical benefits, superannuation, inheritance), it is a somewhat different argument to make that legal recognition prevents feelings of ‘vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety’. Living in a society that actively maintains heterosexual hegemony inevitably results in the large majority of non-heterosexual people feeling vulnerable and excluded. Thus, and as I suggested in regard to the use of ‘miscegenation analogies’, the extension of marriage rights will not automatically guard against everyday discrimination in the lives of non-heterosexual people. An investment in state sanction as offering protection against negative feelings thus displays the logic of the law, which encourages the belief that legal sanction offers the potential for the realization of one’s desires.

As a counter to this particular understanding of the law, and through engagement with both Dean’s (2006) work on Zizek and her earlier work on feminism and solidarity (1996), it may be possible to elaborate an alternate understanding of the law and our relationship to it. Dean provides us with an understanding of ‘loving other-wise’ that requires a radical reconfiguration of our relationship to the law. In her work on Zizek, she suggests that an investment in the law as the primary site for identity recognition will always serve to perpetuate the hegemony of the law. Dean suggests, in contrast to this, that we may conceptualize the law as ‘non-all’ – whilst at a practical level it very much does arbitrate our ability to move in public spaces, it does not prevent us from claiming particular identities for ourselves that are beyond legislation. In other words, as long as the practices we engage in do not go against the letter of the law, our identity claims can exceed the limits of the law. This understanding of the law limits the incursion of the law upon our lives precisely by drawing the boundaries of where the law stops. So, for example, if as a result of the *Wilkinson v Kitzinger* judgment the role of the court is depicted as stopping at the level of ‘the private’, then it is at this level that recognition on one’s own terms can begin.
Dean’s earlier work on feminism (1996) provides us with one way of understanding an approach to resistance to the law that starts with ‘the private’, or at the very least at the level of the interpersonal. Dean elaborates the concept of ‘reflective solidarity’, in which she suggests that our engagement in practices of the self must be fundamentally engaged with accountability towards those other than ourselves. Importantly, Dean outlines the ways in which an understanding of ‘reflective solidarity’ offers ways of being in and through our relationships with others that does not deny differences (as per identity politics and the potential to reify singular identity claims), but which instead takes difference as the primary site of political engagement. In this sense, and as opposed to the use of the ‘miscegenation analogy’ (which requires the choosing of one identity category over another), the concept of ‘reflective solidarity’ requires us to actually see the people we engage with as whole beings, the corollary being that we must recognize the multiple ways in which we are all positioned. As such, our engagement with those other than ourselves must occur because of, not despite, our differences.

Dean (1996) goes on to suggest that instead of conceptualizing claims to rights from the perspective of the self, we must conceptualize them from the standpoint of the relationship we are in with others. From such a starting place we may be more likely to consider not only the implications of our rights claims for a wider range of people, but also to engage in ways of having our rights (and relationships) recognized in ways other than through the law. When we engage with the law, we are forced into relationships where the court and its representatives are positioned as able to decide between right and wrong. Taking recognition back into our own lives, and being mindful of the relationships and responsibilities we have to those other than ourselves, means that the ability to accord recognition is dispersed, thus broadening and strengthening the groups of people who can recognize our relationships.

Finally, Dean suggests that when we consider the values and beliefs of those other than ourselves we remain open to interrogating our own privileges and limits, and our own investments in claiming certain identities and rights. With particular reference to the ‘miscegenation analogy’, and its potential to marginalize the experiences of non-white, non-heterosexual people, a consideration of the broad range of people who identify with the category ‘non-heterosexual’ may encourage white, middle-class, non-heterosexual people to examine the possibility that our claims to rights may come at the expense of others, and that our recourse to the subject position ‘universal man’ signifies, at least in part, our inculcation in hegemonies of race and class.

To ‘love other-wise’, then, and with particular reference to non-heterosexual relationship rights, it is important to pay particular attention not only to our immediate relationships, but also to the relationships we are in with broader communities. Recognizing our contingency upon the existence of others would suggest that the rights claims of individuals must always be situated in the
context of a broad range of rights claims. Such a suggestion should not be read as involving the ‘ranking’ of oppressions, or deliberating over whose rights should come first. Rather, Dean’s (1996; 2006) point is that engaging in reflective communities of difference may produce alternate ways of conceptualizing recognition that are focused on valuing the standpoint of multiple relationships that hold the potential to affirm our positions in the world. Furthermore, and following Ahmed (2004), such an approach would acknowledge the possibility that those other than ourselves may not want to recognize us, and that attempts at recognition may thus fail. Bringing the focus back to relationships thus serves as a reminder that recognition requires negotiation between individuals and communities, and that such negotiation requires at the very least for all voices to be heard, and for differences to be acknowledged. The reflection of our own calls for recognition back to us through the standpoint of the relationship that we are in with those other than ourselves creates opportunities to consider our own position within a range of social hierarchies and the implications of this for our desire for sanction or recognition.

To return to the analogy drawn from the Loving case, then; if, instead of seeing identities as constituted by discrete parts, we see identities as formed through simultaneously experienced locations, then Loving was about granting heterosexual interracial marriages in a context of racism. This is markedly different to seeking non-heterosexual relationship recognition (between whatever parties) in a context of heterosexism, classism, racism and so forth. What is important about Loving, however, is not the outcome of the case per se, but rather the fact that despite living in a context of state-sponsored racism, the Lovings were in a relationship that they publicly and privately celebrated. If we wish to make an analogy, then, it is that possibilities for recognition exist, even if they are legally denied. Developing forms of community that connect through difference, and which celebrate the fact of difference and our own place within it, is one starting place from which to celebrate non-heterosexual relationships of all forms.

Conclusions

Throughout this paper I have elaborated one particular reading of Wilkinson v Kitzinger that focuses on the implications of the particular legal subject that is constructed within the judgment, and the limits this places upon the lives of a range of non-heterosexual people. As I stated in the introduction, my interest has not been to argue for or against non-heterosexual marriage, nor to provide a legal analysis of the contents of Sir Potter’s judgment. Rather, my interest has been to look at how claims to legal sanction make available particular intelligible subject positions for non-heterosexual people, and to explore alternate ways of understanding relationship recognition.

Though an engagement with the work of Dean (1996, 2006), and as an extension of my own work on state sanction (Riggs 2006), I have drawn
attention to the racial politics of non-heterosexual rights claims, and I have proposed ways for those of us who identify as non-heterosexual to locate ourselves within broader social contexts that are mindful of a diverse range of forms of social exclusion. In proposing a focus upon the relationships we are always already in with other people by the very fact of our dependency upon others for our sense of self, I have suggested that a ‘turning toward the other’ should be read neither as a duty, nor as a benevolent inclusive gesture. Rather, I have suggested that such a turn is about identifying ourselves as living through simultaneous categories of difference, and considering how these categories variously position us in relation to the location of the ‘universal man’. Being mindful of our locations, I would suggest, provides opportunities to engage in forms of relationship recognition that both take advantage of the sanction already available to non-heterosexual people via the state, but which extend this by recognizing the status of the law as ‘non-all’, thus providing opportunities to engage in respectful communities of difference that offer recognition as the foundation for engagement.

In regards to human rights claims, then, my argument has been that whilst there will likely always be a need and space for such claims to be made, we must be mindful of how evoking the category ‘human rights’ holds as much potential to exclude as it does to include. Premised as they are largely upon the norms and values of dominant groups (primarily in relation to definitions of the individual and community), human rights will always only provide one solution to challenges of recognition. Of course the deployment of human rights will continue to be a powerful tool for recognizing legal rights such as those that evoke sanction from violence or persecution, as such sanction cannot not easily (within the word of the law) be granted by communities or individuals outside of the law. Nonetheless, how we mount legal cases, and what happens to people once their lives are potentially sanctioned by the law, is another matter altogether to which we must continue to pay attention, with particular focus on the implications of the normative functioning of the law which typically upholds white heterosexual middle-classness as the norm against which all people are assessed.

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I begin by acknowledging the sovereignty of the Kaurna people, the First Nations people upon whose land I live in Adelaide, South Australia. Thanks must go to Shannon Stettner for organising the blind reviewing of this paper.

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Un/Settling Accounts: Telling Holocaust Stories in Colonised Australia

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Cultural fascination with the Holocaust in Australia is often thought to distract attention from the history and legacies of colonialism. Here I tell fragments of stories about my family’s implication in both issues, in order to explore the ways in which they turn out to be part of the same narrative, or rather the same failure to narrate. The issue of Australia’s implication in the Holocaust does not so much compete with colonialism, as it cohabits in the ‘Great Australian Silence.’ Searching for ways in which to bring the story of the Holocaust ‘home’, I find myself ‘displaced’ by my inability to avoid this failure of narration, but also, in accordance with Butler’s theorisation of the ethical possibilities of such failures, brought to a space of ethical exposure in the present.

‘My being-in-the-world or my ‘place in the sun’, my being at home, have these not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world; are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing?’ (Levinas 1989: 82).

Two stories:

1. I have written before about the discovery that my father’s father was a Nazi collaborator (Szörényi 2010). Although no-one in my family knew it until 2009, this is a matter of public record, noted in memoirs published in Hungarian and in historical research published in English (Nagy 1986, Macartney 1957). My grandfather is recorded as one of a party of conspirators on the General Staff of the Hungarian Army, who in October of 1944 deliberately and effectively sought to block the Regent’s attempts to make peace with the Allies, and also to block any Hungarian resistance to the resulting German invasion. The events in which he played a part have become iconic, often referred to simply as ‘October Fifteenth’, and are invariably invoked in any discussion of Hungary’s culpability in the Holocaust. At least one account names my grandfather
specifically as the author of the ‘counter-proclamation’ broadcast on the radio on that day, withdrawing the Regent’s earlier proclamation of Hungary’s exit from the war (Szent-Miklosy 1988). Without providing a name, another account says that the author of this counter-proclamation was a member of the Arrow-Cross Party, Hungary’s far-right National Socialist party, which was installed into power on the night of the 15th October, and whose party members began to murder Budapest’s remaining Jews on the 16th (Horthy 2000).

I cannot be sure exactly how much my grandmother knew about these actions. My grandfather died from a car accident only nine days after the crucial day, and without having spoken to her in the interim. But she would have known his politics. I don’t think that she kept secrets, exactly. Or at least I don’t think she lied. One memory says that when I was a teenager, perhaps sixteen, she told me and my father quite directly that he had been a Fascist. But on the whole she simply did not speak about him much. His framed photograph in military uniform looked down upon the hallway of her tiny yellow brick flat in Adelaide, where everyone commented on his good looks. A smaller photograph stayed by my grandmother’s bed for the fifty years of her life that anyone in Australia can remember. I remember her looking at it and saying ‘I do love that man.’ And I remember her on her deathbed, drifting with the ‘morphia’ and wondering aloud, ‘Who knows what that man had to see’. I can’t say whether it is significant that she did not call him by name, whether it was a kind of distancing, a hint of something she did not quite want to own. And we, the family, didn’t think to wonder what he may have done, as well as seen.

2. In 1992 a relative of mine, Rod McLeod, published a family history. It tells ‘[t]he story of the descendants of John and Ann McLeod of Pabbay, who came to South Australian in 1855 and established themselves as pioneer pastoralists in the Mid North of the State in the Jamestown-Belalie Districts’. My great-grandfather, John McLeod, was the second of four brothers of the family who moved to South Australia’s Mid North, working on Bundaleer and Yongala stations. John’s three brothers Murdock, Malcolm and Alexander, as well as his father Donald, were among the first to appropriate land under the 1869 Strangways Act in the Jamestown area, and Malcolm and Murdock became successful pastoralists. There is no mention of this being Ngadjuri land, but Rod McLeod reports that the first-built house of Murdock and his wife Mary, on the Three Chain Road north from Jamestown, ‘was built around an underground well with heavy wire and a high wall sealing off the back of the house as protection against local [A]borigines’ (1992: 18). The family called the property ‘The Fort’ (McLeod 1992: 18), as if they were not invaders, but defenders.

The McLeod history makes much of the Scottish ‘Clearances’ that removed the family from the Isle of Pabbay to Taghay, an island so small it had no grass. Rod McLeod also laments the disappearance
of the family from the Mid North of South Australia, writing 'It is sad that so little remains of the McLeod family in the Belalie district. “The Fort” no longer stands’ (1992: 1). Of deliberate attempts to clear Aboriginal people from their land, and the ‘little that remains’ of them in the Belalie district, Rod McLeod makes no mention.

In juxtaposing these two stories, I do not mean to say that they are equivalent, but I do mean to raise the question of their relationship. The status of the Holocaust in relation to Australian cultural memory of colonialism is a question that recurs perennially in Australian public debate (Barta 1985, Moses 2004, Levi 2007), usually over the issue of whether the dispossession, imprisonment, exclusion and attempted assimilation of Australia’s Indigenous people can be called a ‘genocide’. My intent here is not to draw a conclusion about that particular question, but it is to use my familial implication in both issues as an opportunity to explore this debate further, engaging along the way with the intricacies of familial memory and forgetting, and the challenge of attempting to write about later-generation responsibility. While first acknowledging the differences in the ways these two family violations have played themselves out, I also note that there are some similarities, not so much in the way they are remembered, but in the ways in which they were (not quite) forgotten. Noting these similarities, I find, leads towards more complex and interlinked ways of imagining the relation between the Holocaust and white settler history in Australia. Hence this paper might be understood as a kind of autoethnography, in which I examine my own responses in order to understand something about the wider culture in which we live. It becomes clear that the problem with debate over ‘comparisons’ of genocide is that it assumes the two genocides being compared are distinct entities. This neat distinction works to foreclose the question of Australian responsibilities for both colonialism and the Holocaust, which emerge here as not competing issues, but as continuous and mutually implicated.

**Comparing Stories**

The day I remembered as an adult what my grandmother had said about my grandfather being a Fascist is marked on my memory. At the first intimation, I found myself feeling exposed, vulnerable and disoriented. A family history that I had always found fascinating and a source of unique identity, populated by Countesses and grand homes, and climaxing in war trauma and refugee dramas, had to be rewritten in my mind, and my difficult but loving relationship with my late grandmother had to be rethought in ways that impacted on how I think of who I am. I felt undone, and still do, each time I find out something more.

At the same time, I embarked on several years of searching for evidence, for the truth, which are not yet over, and which allow me to continue the old fascination with the Hungarian family story. It has been a confronting and painful journey and sometimes the impact on my sense of self has been frightening. Even so it has become part of my identity, both personal and intellectual. Whole groups of people know me in this role, sympathise with my feelings of guilt and horror, and, strangely I
sometimes think, always want to know more. Indeed, much to my surprise, when I tell the story I am as likely to be met with fascination as with the repulsion I first expected.

The second story follows a different trajectory. Since reading the family history, I do bring it up in conversation occasionally, but these conversations are palpably different from the ones about my grandfather. The reaction is far more muted, and the conversation rarely continues. I am not sure how much of this is due to my own ways of presenting the stories, but if I had to sum up the difference, I would say that the first story challenges my identity, the person that people think I am. The second story does not. This, I am forced to acknowledge, may mean something about the ways in which, while murder of Jews is surprising, shocking and unexpected, dispossession (and possibly murder) of Aboriginal people is still implicitly, secretly, without being mentioned, acknowledged as a part of white Australian identity. While the situation is no doubt different in Germany and Eastern Europe, in Australia the fact that my grandfather was a Holocaust collaborator singles me out, makes me unusual, marks me as associated with the particularly, paradigmatically bad. On the other hand the fact that my great grandparents were invaders and occupiers whose appropriation of Aboriginal land was established in violence makes me white Australian, the thing that the mainstream of this nation defines as ordinary; if it is bad, it is ordinarily bad. As Katrina Schlunke puts it in discussing massacres in New England, ‘…knowing Aboriginal people died did not have the effect it should have. It was not the sort of moral tale that automatically brought forth the “never, ever again” response. These historical deaths were part of the shutting down of a history, not of its continuous opening up’ (2005: 13).

**Comparing Genocides: The ‘Screen Memory’ Theory**

Schlunke’s statement is, of course, an implicit comparison with responses to the Holocaust. Both her comparison and my own, in which one atrocity calls for the utmost attention, while another seems to fade into the background, seems to support the theory of the Holocaust in Australia as ‘screen memory’. This is Freud’s term for a memory that occupies the place of another, more important memory, obscuring and distracting (Levy 2007). Peter Novick (2000) argues that in the United States, the cultural fascination with the Holocaust occupies the space that might otherwise be occupied by the more uncomfortable task of addressing violence committed by the home nation – slavery, the Vietnam war, the dispossession of Indigenous peoples. The theory expresses a worry that the popular fascination with the Holocaust, expressed in endless dramas and documentaries, novels and films, is too convenient. Why, these commentators ask, is everyone so excited by this tale of easily identified, paradigmatic evil? Is it because it is such a simple narrative? Is it because the perpetrators are easy to identify, easy to condemn? And above all, because the perpetrators are not ‘us’? Because this is a story of atrocity that took place ‘elsewhere’, and in the past, that does not complicate our daily living or call us to responsibilities we would rather not have to think about?
Tony Barta offers such a theory in the Australian context when he argues of genocide:

The images which cluster round the name Auschwitz make the concept concrete. And these images, making pale all other deeds of violence committed by one people against another, now play an active role not only in Germany history [sic] and Jewish history but in our understanding of Australian history as well. By associating genocide uniquely with the Holocaust, Australians have been able to make a classical transference of an unacknowledged shadow in their own past to a publicly acknowledged worse – indeed worst – case (1988).

An example from Rod McLeod’s family history illustrates how such a screen memory can work. Under the heading ‘Just who is Rod McLeod’, he writes:

The year 1929 was not really a good one – the start of the Great Depression, an unknown Austrian – ADOLF HITLER – was making his presence felt in Europe and a strange reign of terror was unfolding in the small Mallee town of Red Cliffs in North Western Victoria. Relatives were either fleeing the district or locking themselves into their homes because that was the year RODERICK HARDING McLEOD arrived on the scene. It is well recorded that I was an incredible horror of a child… (1992: 3)

It is McLeod’s practice throughout the book to put proper names in capital letters – nonetheless they work to emphasise his proposed symmetry here – a ‘strange’ equivalence between the instigator of the Holocaust and a white child in rural Australia. The image of Hitler refers to the question of genocide, while at the same time rendering it irrelevant. No-one, of course, is expected to take the comparison seriously; the joke only works as a joke from a perspective in which Hitler and McLeod are obviously not comparable. The most serious response that might be expected is that the comparison is in bad taste because it trivialises the Holocaust. So the screen remains in place and the alternative, that the birth of white children in Australia might indeed be associated with genocide, remains unthinkable. The mention of the Holocaust works precisely to locate genocide elsewhere.

Such screening works on the level of intellectual debate as well. Following Barta, Moses (2003) points out that the Holocaust has come to stand for genocide, culturally if not technically, and any attribution of the term inevitably results in comparisons with this apparently ‘unique’ event. This produces something of a paradox: if the Holocaust is ‘the’ genocide, and the Holocaust is unique, then nothing else can be a genocide without being compared and found lesser. In this way the Holocaust discursively occupies the ‘territory’ where ethical engagement with Australia’s Indigenous history might take place.

It is in reaction to such debates that there is a certain suspicion about attention paid to the Holocaust in Australia, as I have discovered in response to my earlier papers about my Hungarian grandfather. One thing that happens when I write is that I am asked to address the question of why I am telling this story now, here – and in particular
whether it is right to participate in an ongoing cultural obsession with the Holocaust when there are other stories about genocide located much closer to home, that are struggling for attention.

But does this mean that in Australia, all attention to the Holocaust must be diverted instead to colonialism? I am not sure that this is a productive or an ethical approach – precisely because although it attempts to reverse priorities, it leaves uninterrogated the terms of the comparison, which assume that we are discussing two separate atrocities, that they are in competition with one another, and that only the winner of the competition deserves attention. We are forced to choose between deserving victims and irrelevant victims, as if ethics were a finite resource that can only be delivered to the few.

So I would like to explore here what happens if rather than thinking of the Holocaust and Colonialism as separate events, we focus on the ways in which they are connected, as their convergence in my own family history suggests. Might this lead towards other ways of approaching ethical responsibility, ways that do not position genocides as pre-defined and separate entities, but instead ask after continuities and co-implications? Perhaps, as Neil Levi (2007) hopes, attention to the Holocaust in Australia may prove ethically productive, in that it encourages a focus on historical responsibility that may then extend to considerations of colonial history. It may, he suggests, result precisely in an opening of the question whose closing Schlunke identifies – the question of ethical responsibility towards the past in general and the appropriation of Aboriginal land in particular. I will undertake this exploration firstly by considering ways in which the Holocaust is an Australian issue, and secondly by comparing, not genocides, but the ways in which genocides are not-spoken about.

**The Holocaust as Australian Issue**

Several authors have drawn attention to parallels between colonialism in Australia and the practices that made up the Holocaust. While popular discourse positions the Nazis as the sole authors of ‘eugenic principles and racial technologies’, historians point out that these had in fact ‘been rehearsed under colonial regimes’ (Lake and Reynolds 2010: 331). As W.E.B. Du Bois famously said ‘There was no Nazi atrocity – concentration camps, wholesale maiming and murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of children – which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long been practicing against coloured folks in all parts of the world in the name of and for the defense of a Superior Race born to rule the world’ (Du Bois 1965: 23, quoted in Veracini 2008: 159).

In relation to Australia specifically, once again much of the subsequent debate has taken place within genocide studies, revolving around whether acts such as stealing children can be defined as genocide. Ann Curthoys points out that Lemkin, the originator of the concept of genocide, both explicitly named the appropriation of children as a potential act of genocide, and in unpublished work considered what happened in Tasmania to be a case of genocide. While Australian historians debate this, genocide scholars have long taken the Tasmanian case as a
paradigmatic example of genocide, and, Curthoys concludes, it was (Curthoys 2008). In any case, whatever the term used, it is clear that Australia’s pursuit of racial superiority under the name of ‘whiteness’ drew on the same philosophies of eugenics, social Darwinism and racial purity that inspired the Nazis and the Hungarian Arrow Cross. It has been argued, indeed, that what made the Holocaust so shocking was that these ideas and practices were applied on European territory – and that this in turn was a result of Germany’s thwarted colonial ambitions after Versaille (Veracini 2008).

Jennifer Rutherford (2010) also traces a genealogy from Australia to 1930s Europe, citing Jacqueline Rose’s (2005) discussion of Freud and Jung’s debate over the Arunta during the writing of Totem and Taboo. Beginning from discussions of Aboriginal ‘primitivism’, they ended in a disagreement in which Freud’s Jewish mythology was opposed to Jung’s ‘Aryan mysticism’, a disagreement which was soon to be write large in Europe and to impact on Freud’s own future. Thus in this important intellectual struggle, myths of ancient Australia were used to enact a debate that foreshadowed the Holocaust. But Rutherford argues that Freud’s myth of the killing and sanctification of the father is an accurate description not of the Arunta, but of the process of colonisation in Australia. ‘If Freud’s falling out with Jung presaged the death camps’, Rutherford writes, ‘Rose recognises that so too did the dispersals of Australia’ (2010: 16).

When Freud wrote Totem and Taboo, the Australian nation had already been founded through race laws built on the myth of nation as kin, the dispersals had already happened, the land had already been cleared, the sons had already expelled and sanctified the memory of the primal father, the aristocratic Lord of the Manor, the rapine murderer of the frontier (2010: 16-17)

In concluding that Freud ‘failed to recognise that his myth did not come from his limited encounter with the Arunta but from the unfolding present of European culture qua its colonial frontier’ (2010: 17), Rutherford draws attention to the fact that the Holocaust drew on constructions of race and racial exclusion, the ‘primitive’ and the ‘civilised’, that were developed out of the need to justify colonial expansion and appropriation (Ashcroft et al 2007: 181). In this way, Australian history is not separate from the context of the Holocaust; instead both are part of the same story of European appropriation and its management of guilt through the construction of myths of ‘civilisation’ and essentialised ‘national cultures’, dependent on the expulsion and annihilation of contaminating ‘others’.

By the late 1930s when these ideas were becoming prominent in Germany, in Australia the work of Max Dupain was celebrating the white Australian as an embodiment of racial purity and eugenic superiority, signified in photographs of sculpted white bodies on the beach (Perera 2006, Crombie 2004). Dupain was an avowed Eugenicist, drawing on the same ideas that inspired the National Socialists in Germany. There is contiguity between Australian and German models of racism. But the colonial model came first.
From this perspective, it is not mere coincidence that during the Second World War Australia made consistent efforts to avoid taking Jewish refugees, even while proclaiming its non-discriminatory policies. The fear was that they would not assimilate; Paul Bartrop offers the following quotation from Army report of 1943 as indicative of the basic attitude:

> When the persecution of the Jews first began most people felt sorry for them and were prepared to welcome them, but their actions since they reached here show that they are no good as citizens and are merely parasites on the rest of the community. It is considered that if a plebiscite were taken, this would represent the opinion of nine out of ten of the community (Security Service Report 1 May 1943 quoted in Bartrop 1994: 231).

In this context it is also not surprising that Australia has become a haven for Nazi war criminals (Aarons 1989, Balint 2010). In spite of several documented cases, more than one of them Hungarian (Robinson, 2005), most have not been prosecuted (Markson 2006), and this is a phenomenon that has produced little cultural soul searching – suggesting that indeed, fascination with the Holocaust in Australia is predicated on that issue being firmly distanced from issues of national identity. But national identity is precisely the point. Ruth Balint notes that Australia’s preference for immigrants who were blonde, blue-eyed and from Eastern Europe, combined with its policies of assimilation, made perfect conditions for former Eastern European Fascists to reconstruct their lives. She suggests that not only a certain kind of forgetting, but a certain kind of duty to forget were crucial in this process.

Such individuals were to resemble Australia’s “own kind” as closely as possible. Beyond this, a philosophy of assimilation governed immigration policy and popular attitudes towards new arrivals. Immigrants, labelled “New Australians”, were expected to merge, quickly and quietly, into the Australian cultural and social landscape. This kind of thinking also implied, of course, that people’s political pasts were as irrelevant as their cultural pasts: a slate wiped clean by the promise of Australian acculturation (Balint: 298).

Reading this, I cannot but be reminded of my grandmother’s 1954 application for Australian citizenship, on which the assessor commented ‘Very fine type of applicant, who speaks perfect English’. But I am also reminded of what my grandmother said and didn’t say about my grandfather. As I said above, she did not exactly keep my grandfather’s political allegiances a secret. She even explicitly mentioned them. And yet the knowledge did not take hold in us, her interlocutors. According to my isolated memory, I was about sixteen when she said, as we looked at his photograph, ‘Do you see that black armband he is wearing? That meant that he was a Fascist. He was in the army and at that time the Hungarian army were Fascists.’ Although I had a vague intuition that a Fascist was Right wing and therefore not in agreement with my own Left wing family, that was as far as my thinking went for the next twenty years. My grandmother did not have to answer any questions about the role of Hungarian Fascists in the Holocaust; my contextual knowledge was not even enough to place my grandfather in the Second World War, let
alone connect Hungary to the ‘German’ murder of the Jews. So it was not so much that she kept the secret, as that the entire culture did, and I cannot exclude myself from that accusation.

I have been unable to corroborate my memory – it occupies the status of one of those isolated childhood memories that, not being reinforced by any subsequent experience, remains tentative, questionable. I remember my father in the scene also, but he does not recall it, and my searches for a photograph showing an armband have been fruitless. Nonetheless, when in 2005 I finally looked up Hungarian Fascists, I knew to search for an armband, and in fact an armband marked by crossed arrows turned out to be the signifier used by the Hungarian military and Party members to demonstrate their allegiance to the Arrow Cross. So I can’t say that I didn’t know. I did. I had, or had access to, all the necessary facts; I just hadn’t put them together. It was knowledge with no accompanying discourse, no entry into social relevance.

In other words, the histories of Australia’s Fascist immigrants found a ready home within the pre-existing silences of Australia. Thinking this way, it not only becomes possible to understand the Holocaust as an Australian issue, but also to understand that the Holocaust became an Australian issue precisely because Australia already had a commitment, a habit, of sticking to the assimilation story, of not asking about the past. It might even be possible to say that Australia preferred to take in Nazis who looked like them, than darker people who might remind them of certain other issues of racial politics. From this perspective, the Holocaust no longer works as an alibi, or a distraction from Australia’s own history. Australia has its own Holocaust history; and that history is in turn a part of the older story of colonialism and racism. The story of Australia’s implication in the Holocaust does not compete, but cohabits within the ‘Great Australian Silence’.

From this perspective, it becomes more difficult to position the Holocaust and colonialism as separate entities which are in an individualised competition with one another, seeking to claim a share of finite ethical and cultural resources. The ‘territory’ on which the struggle takes place, the constructed realm of collective cultural responsibility (the ‘nation’) is itself defined in terms of both of these ethical issues. To imagine an Australian nation which might take collective responsibility is, as Jennifer Rutherford (2000) points out, to imagine an Australian ‘good’, and hence is already to take up a position in which certain questions of ethics and of sovereignty become unthinkable. To understand this requires bringing the Holocaust ‘home’ as an issue in which Australia was involved, and more importantly in which Australia is, in the present, a significant contributor to remaining unfinished business. But this understanding also requires questioning the meaning of that national ‘home’ where ethical responsiveness is assumed to reside. For this is a ‘home’ that is already marked by racialised violence, displacements, appropriations, genocides, and policies of assimilation, and already defined precisely by its denial of responsibility for these acts of violence. In fact this is not so much ‘bringing the Holocaust home’, as recognising that the Holocaust has always been at home in Australia – but this also means recognising that
'home' signifies a stolen place and a place defined by policies of assimilation and of silence, by the failure to tell adequate stories, to give an 'account', to be accountable.

Accounts that Unsettle

What can I do, then, to render a more accurate account, one which does not begin on the assumption of the Australian nation, and thus from a point which already denies the truths it is supposed to tell? To begin with, I could attempt to put together a picture of my ancestors’ occupation of the Mid North in which Aboriginal people are present. This is not easy. My Hungarian grandmother’s omissions were embedded in a general fascination with the past, filled by romantic stories, heirlooms and exhortations to remember. The Scottish family, upright Calvinists, were not inclined to pass on any kind of story. Rod McLeod says ‘I undertook this research in a moment of madness or weakness – trying to get information from the member of the McLeod family when they are alive is difficult enough…’ (1992: 3). So my sources are from the historical record, rather than from familial memory.

To begin with, I can note that the fact of appropriation of Aboriginal land was well known. As Schlunke says, ‘I knew I was never the only one who knew. We all knew’ (2005: 12). It was known at the time, too. On July 26, 1865, John Bristow Hughes, former squatter of the Bundaleer run where my ancestors were working in the 1860s, wrote a letter to the South Australian Register about ‘Christian and Aborigines in the North’:

We white men, boasting our superior civilization, come to these shores and take possession of the lands of the natives without in the most remote manner treating for our intrusion, giving an equivalent, or in any way compensating them for the property and homes we deprive them of, or affording them the means or opportunity of identifying themselves with us, and so partaking of those blessings that we profess to have introduced into their land. The process that has so effectually extirpated the aborigines in our agricultural districts is still vigorously at work with the same fell result wherever our tide of settlement flows. The Government ruthlessly lets the entire surface of the country to its pastoral or mineral tenants. There is not a hill, a creek, or an area of any kind which the aborigines may retire to or look upon as their home or place of resort. If the country is let for a cattle-station the native owners of the soil are flogged, frightened, or driven away from the springs or waterholes that their presence may not scare away the horned cattle from drinking at them. In the sheep runs every waterhole or spring is so much frequented by the sheep that for miles around there is not in this year of drought a vestige of the natural food of those animals on which the aborigines have ever depended for their food and clothing (Hughes 1865: 2).

Hughes does not intend to suggest that this appropriation should not have happened – he makes self-aggrandising references to his own skill at managing Aboriginal station hands and shepherds when he ‘held’ Bundaleer run, and does not hesitate to write about ‘the superior white man’, thus repeating the very ‘boasting’ he decries above. But he describes explicitly the appropriation of land, in the process indicating the
importance of water and wells. Hughes held Bundaleer in the 1840s, when there was open conflict between the Ngadjuri and the colonisers in the area, including murders, massacres, and torture (Warrior et al 2005). Hughes’ station near the Broughton river was attacked in 1843, the retaliation resulting in the death of an Aboriginal person (Warrior et al 2005: 85). At Bundaleer he employed Aboriginal workers as station hands and shepherds, but paid only rations. In general, according to Warrior et al, rations were provided with the explicit aim of encouraging people to move off the best land and become dependent.

My family arrived in the area in the 1859, and Warrior et al (2005) say that by then the conflict was mostly ended, perhaps making it easier for settlers to claim ignorance of what they were doing. Hughes’ 1865 letter is describing the far North of South Australia, where appropriation was more recent. But as the name of the Fort bears witness, the process of appropriation was still ongoing in the Mid North in the 1860s and 70s, when my family took land as their own. There are documented murders in the area (Peterborough) in 1867. The Ngadjuri population declined throughout the rest of the century, due to smallpox and dispossession. Many people moved away as the country was occupied and land, food and resources were taken. But they still were visiting the Mannanarie hills in the 1920s, no longer a threat, merely ‘a curiosity to the women and children in the homesteads’ (Warrior et al 2005, p. 101).

I don’t know precisely what my own ancestors did or did not do to Aboriginal people during this process – except that I know that they participated in the dispossession, and that they knew what they were doing, for why else would they call their farmhouse a fort? The Ngadjuri were still making claims, still trying to stay. My own family are circumstantially but irretrievably implicated in the theft of their land, water and country. We are possibly implicated in physical violence. Warrior, Knight, Anderson and Pringle do not give a date for the time that Jemmy Wonga, apparently suffering from smallpox, was deliberately thrown into a hot tar pit by a Yongala shepherd (Warrior et al 2005), but there was a smallpox epidemic in the 1860s, and Malcolm and Murdock McLeod were shepherds at Yongala between 1865 and 1870 (McLeod 1992, Robinson 1971). Jemmy survived and stayed in the area until his death in 1882 (Robinson 1971: 86).

But in the newspapers I also find record of Aboriginal agency. My own great-grandfather John McLeod does not appear often in the historical record, but in 1893, when he was leasing land at Dust Holes in the County of Burra, he was called to testify at the Redruth Court (‘Redruth, March 3, Full Jurisdiction: Bald vs. Maslin’ 1893). McLeod’s neighbor, J. Bald accused John Maslin, owner of Bundaleer at the time, of grazing his sheep on Bald’s best land. Maslin was, however, acquitted, since it emerged during the case that the sheep in question had actually been sold to John McLeod some months before. It was a shepherd, named as ‘Gray’ by McLeod and Bald, but referred to by Maslin only as ‘a dark man’, who had spread the story that the sheep were Maslin’s and that Maslin would pay for the grazing. According to both Maslin and McLeod, Gray was working for both of them – but only McLeod was paying him wages and rations at
the time. The result was that the wrong man was accused and neither Maslin nor McLeod had to pay for the trespass, even though McLeod was not prepared to swear that the sheep had never been on the land in question (*Burra Record* (SA: 1878-1954), Wednesday 8 March 1893, page 3). Thus my great-grandfather was indebted to Gray. It is possible that Gray was not Aboriginal – he could have been ‘Afghan’, perhaps, or of some other heritage. Nonetheless, this story uncannily presents my great-grandfather as an illegal appropriator of land, whose appropriation is morally and materially reliant on the work of a black man. And it presents that black man as making his own decisions about ownership and responsibility, independent of settler law. In this brief court report, it is possible to read a history.

But the story that has resonated most strongly with me is that of Mary McLeod, wife of Murdock. As they grew more prosperous, Murdock had built a new home for the family, romantically naming it ‘Heather Glen’. But the house stood empty until Mary McLeod’s death – she refused to move in, saying that it was haunted, that she had heard strange sounds at the building site. Rod McLeod explains the sounds as ‘almost certainly caused by straying stock’, and her fear as a manifestation of Scottish superstition, but it is easy to position this story as having something to do with Aboriginal people, with some sense of prior habitation, of absent presences. And it is here that I start to feel haunted myself. This paper has had several titles, and the first of them - ‘nobody home,’ ‘no-one at home’ - were attempts to encapsulate something about Mary’s refusal to occupy Heather Glen: her unwillingness to inhabit a place that seemed to have been inhabited before, her stubborn clinging to a space defined by apartheid, by the exclusion of Aboriginal people. This was, I thought over sleepless nights in which images of ruined farms echoed in my dreams, an exercise in denial, a refusal to inhabit the space of responsibility, a paradoxical refusal to occupy the subject position of an occupier. We occupied the land, but when responsibility comes knocking, we pretend not to be home. Perhaps, indeed, we are here but not ‘at home’, not comfortable, not able to properly narrate our relationship to the place where we live.

But I had to change the title, because no matter how I tried to explain myself, it spoke too much of terra nullius, and because every time I saw it, I was overcome with dread. It is only since I renamed it that I have been able to write this paper. Something about the concept of home, in this context, has become traumatic, and still more the idea of a home occupied by someone defined as ‘nobody’. It is not Terra Nullius – Aboriginal people were and are still here. But the nobody who is at home in the old family properties is a palpable presence, and one that I recognise, perhaps it’s me. Perhaps I live there, perhaps I still live here, here in this country. And yet acknowledging this places me in a position of illegitimacy, of unwelcome occupier, illegal inhabitant. In being at home, I become no-one, no-one who matters, no-one who belongs. It might be me who is the ghost. Perhaps I too would rather not occupy this space, would rather tell a different story. In trying to tell this story, I find myself occupying Mary’s position – but it is a subject position that refuses narration, and so my story falters, I can’t find a home in it.
I am not telling you this so that you can feel sorry for me, but so that you can see how tenacious the myths of ‘home’ and ‘terra nullius’ are in settler remembrance; so that you can see what a confusion the subject position of occupier is. The process of thinking about this has not been easy or comfortable; it is not a matter of simply claiming my goodness by identifying badness in the family. My point is that we perpetrators, or beneficiaries of perpetrators, can’t tell such stories of atrocity in the past without reconfiguring who we are in the present, without putting into question our very identity as a person who is able to tell the story, who has a right to the story. This is not an autobiography, which is an exercise in building up the self, in celebrating its actions, in lauding the achievements of a sovereign individual. Instead this is a form of telling that does not so much construct an identity, as dismantle it, leaving me, its narrator, incoherent and partially undone. In telling the story, I un-tell myself.

So I have not yet reached a state where I feel I have the story right. But perhaps this very difficulty is the best performance of the problem. As Judith Butler has outlined, such failures in the process of giving an account of one’s identity, or one’s actions, are inevitable. Because the subject is never fully transparent to itself, because all of us are constituted in conditions not of our choosing, according to norms which preceded us, and by the impact of an external world beyond our control, the attempt to give a responsible account inevitably falters, marked by opacities and gaps in knowledge.

The point of this is not to justify my lack of knowledge, or to feel sorry for myself. Butler’s project is precisely to shift discussions of ethics away from ‘self-preoccupied moral inquiry’ (2009: 135) to questions of responsibility. She does this by noting that the failure to be able to give an ethical account (even in a genuine attempt to do so), while perhaps confusing or painful, is also an ethical opportunity – precisely because the failure reminds us that we are not isolated, sovereign individuals, but that we have always been and will always be in relationship to others (2005: 64). In other words, it is not in pinning down the actions of my ancestors that I find my responsibility, my implication in those actions. Rather it is finding myself undone by my inability to pin the story down – precisely because what undoes me is the discovery that where I might have expected to find myself ‘at home’ in my identity, I find no-one that I can recognise as myself, only a pre-existing relation, a beholden-ness, to others. My existence was preceded – by my ancestors, but also by those who were displaced by my ancestors, whose custodianship of the land enabled its use as a resource, and to whom, I am forced to realise, I am still indebted. In looking for ourselves, we find our relations to others: we find ourselves in the realm of ethics. Where we expect to find what is most intimate, most personal, we find history, politics, responsibility. We find that ‘our’ sheep have been eating other people’s land.

It is perhaps a refusal of this position of vulnerability and responsibility that entrenches silence so deeply in white Australian culture. Into this atmosphere my Hungarian grandmother was welcomed because she spoke English, had white skin, and strove always to uphold the values she...
associated with civilisation. She was not asked about her husband, just as she did not ask whose land she was occupying: in shared whiteness both sides had the answer they wanted. So from this perspective, it is easy to see why Holocaust perpetrators were able to assimilate so easily, and why questions about this are so rarely asked. It may not be possible to come to terms with the Holocaust in this nation, with the Holocaust as a part of the history of this nation, without being prepared to question the foundations of the nation. The silences enfold one another like a web: tug at one and the whole thing comes unravelled. The white child and Hitler co-exist, are part of the same story, and it is not a joke.

So where do I find myself now, standing on this appropriated land?
Known facts that appeared to have been the starting place for the story: identity, family, nation, have at its end become open questions. I find myself exposed, open, to the other in the present - or rather in a new, unfamiliar present, a presence to a different familiarity, a different family. This, I think, is useful. As Butler hopes, the process of accounting for myself leaves me not in an already resolved and inaccessible past, but returns me to relations to others in the present. Or as Andreas Huyssen reminds us, the point of remembering past atrocity is not to become fixated on ghosts and on the past, on melancholy losses that cannot be retrieved, but to find a space for ethics in the present.

The inner temporality and the politics of Holocaust memory ... even where it speaks of the past, must be directed towards the future. The future will not judge us for forgetting but for remembering all too well and still not acting in accordance with those memories. (Huyssen: 3, quoted in Balint: 303).

Crucially, what memories might teach us is to remember that this ‘space’ of ethics is not ours to claim: it belongs to the other. Ethics takes place because we are addressed by the other. This is abstract, but it is also concrete: without the ongoing efforts of Aboriginal people and of Holocaust survivors to remember, to survive, to continue to make claims, to pursue justice and to exist, it is doubtful that even this attenuated story would ever have been written.

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Notes

1 Pabbay is a small island in the Outer Hebrides off the coast of the Scottish Highlands, now uninhabited.

2 Nukunu people may also have been connected to this land: Warrior et al (2005) note that there is some dispute over boundaries around Jamestown.

3 According to Nicholas Grguric (2007), 'Fortified homesteads' were not uncommon in South Australia’s colonial settlement, and he also notes the
hypocrisy of settlers positioning themselves as defenders when they were actually invaders.
Book Review

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The Racial Politics of Bodies, Nations and Knowledges examines how place, identity and knowledge are shaped and affirmed by particular ways of understanding the world and by particular relationships of privilege and disadvantage. This edited collection brings together an important group of essays that explore these issues in both an Australian and an international context, providing discussions not only of how such relationships occur and what they look like, but also how they can be challenged and reshaped.

The book is divided into a number of sections that explore various aspects of these relationships of privilege and disadvantage. The essays contained in the first section of the book explore issues surrounding place and space. In this section we are introduced to the relationship between different aspects of place and race, racialization, and being. In particular, the chapters in this section point to the complexity of the impact of norms of whiteness on place, especially those places marked by colonisation. Authors in this section examine such complexities in relation to the influence of white healthcare services on the experiences of Aboriginal women attempting to use those services, the ways in which place and space are constructed through particular privileged narratives of history, and the ongoing ways in which whiteness itself is constructed as a signifier of purity and cleanliness, and the challenge this construction poses for the West in a changing, increasingly global, world. This section is appropriately concluded by a chapter posing the difficult question of how white people can most effectively support the struggles of Indigenous peoples around the world without simply reinforcing
their privilege as white people. This final chapter argues that white people must recognise and acknowledge their complicity in such relationships – a theme which reflects the essence of this entire edited collection which at every point requires those of us who are white readers to evaluate our own privilege and complicity in particular ways of viewing and enacting that privilege upon the spaces around us.

The second section of the book turns its attention to representations of race, and in particular to such representations as seen in various forms of media. This section of the book explores the positioning in the media of white people as both spectators but also as those who most often speak. The first chapter in this section examines the concept of photographs of the suffering of people in developing countries, arguing that such photographs position white people as spectators of suffering – a positioning which does not necessarily truly confront white people in ways which unsettle their privilege. As a corollary to this, the final chapter in this section discusses the ways in which white voices within the mainstream news media in Australia are privileged over the voices of those who are the subject of such stories – in this case asylum seekers in detention. Together, these two chapters examine the ways in which whiteness remains centred in dominant constructions of the world, with images of the suffering of disadvantaged people often functioning to only re-affirm white dominance and notions of white superiority. The second chapter in this section of the book also explores the construction of whiteness as the norm within media forms (including media forms that are explicitly set up to be inclusive), such as online communities for queer youth. This representation of whiteness as the ‘norm’ therefore locates white people as invisible in the stories being told, but as authoritative in their ability to tell those stories. Thus again in this chapter we return to the theme of a need to decentre the white subject; to shake the idea held by many white people that the world ‘belongs’ to them.

In the third section of the book the essays turn to a broader examination of diversity and ‘difference’, together with suggestions for negotiating and reconstructing normative understandings of belonging or constructions of space. These examinations of diversity take up a wide range of foci, including a discussion of constructions of ‘normality’ in children’s storybooks, an examination of the European Union and its treatment of minority countries, and a discussion of a mentoring program implemented within a university to increase participation rates of Indigenous students. This third section of the book thus examines how particular understandings and treatments of diversity are held, and what the outcomes of those understandings are. The strength of this section of the book lies in its discussion of tangible outcomes that result from particular constructions of ‘normalcy’ that marginalise some groups at the expense of others. Furthermore, the authors of these chapters offer constructive approaches to challenging and critiquing dominant accounts of ‘diversity’, thus suggesting ways in which those occupying dominant positions can appropriately address issues of inequality without assuming positions of authority.
Finally, in section four, the book turns its focus to the level of the individual, with a series of essays that examine identity and voice. In this section, the authors of the chapters examine how identity is constructed by both the individual(s) themselves, and by the broader societal level around them, highlighting the interactions between dominance and marginalisation and the effects of this interaction on the construction of identity. Chapters in this section consider the complex ways in which identity is constructed – with Chapter 1 examining a case study of the construction of identity by the state in relation to applications for citizenship (particularly in relation to constructions of racial superiority/inferiority), and Chapter 2 discussing the difficulties and intricacies of teaching about racial issues across cultures. Finally, Chapter 3 of this section provides an examination of how law can shape place and identity – specifically in relation to Indigenous laws in colonial Australia. Together, these final chapters provide a reflexive discussion of the nature of identity and the ways in which those in positions of power can attempt to create identities for those from marginalized groups – thus leading the book back to its starting point in relation to the ways in which place and space are shaped by dominance and the constructions built by those in relative positions of power.

As such, *The Racial Politics of Bodies, Nations and Knowledges* represents an important examination of understandings of whiteness and other forms of privilege that highlight the complexity and inherently diverse and difficult nature of this subject matter. In a world which is engaging with such debates every day in relation to issues such as the effects of climate change, the challenge of increasing numbers of refugees, and the results of globalization, this book makes an important contribution to our understandings of the relationships that shape our world, and suggests ways to better challenge the disparities and inequalities we see around us. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, by including a broad range of essays from a diverse group of writers and perspectives, *The Racial Politics of Bodies, Nations and Knowledges* challenges us as readers to consider our own relationships to race and place and the judgements and assumptions we bring with us to the issues presented within the book. In doing so, the book encourages us to not only think critically about the discussions raised in the book, but also to think reflexively about them and our own role in perpetuating or challenging inequalities.
Book Review

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Among the general population, as much as among academics, war is a contested notion. Nick Mansfield’s *Theorising War: From Hobbes to Badiou*, traces theories of war from the Enlightenment through to contemporary times. His assessment covers the dialectical conception of war from an anti-dialectical, and anti-humanist standpoint canvassing a cast of all-male theorists including Hobbes and Clausewitz, Freud, Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Derrida, Badiou and Zizek, to name a few. This book is useful because it outlines the evolutionary conceptualisation of war theory, and because it concludes with an argument for the rethinking of the way we as a polity conceptualise and talk about war.

How does war come into being? What is war’s other? Mansfield wants to turn our focus to these questions, and deflect our attention away from the highly naturalised ideal of war that dominates the polity. He argues that we must interrogate this dominant idea of war, and uncouple it from the traditional and idealised notions of human rights, peace, civilization, order or progression – its other. War emerges within an economy of meanings and in order to effectively denaturalise it we must understand what this idea is being used for.

The three parts of this book address and outline the conceptions, and use of, ‘war’ by different theorists taking as a starting point Hobbes and Clausewitz. A common theme that Mansfield draws on is the dialectics of war. He begins by posing the dialectic of divergence and convergence. Are society and war, for example convergent, or are they strictly opposite - divergent? Is war separate to peace, or are war and peace of the same weave?
The former position is represented through the work of 17th century English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes war is the antithesis of peace. For Kant, writing at the same historical moment “only through war can peace be achieved.” (38). Both imply that the state of nature is actually a state of war and that hostility is immanent. Hence, the social diverges from war, the social is war’s other.

Carl Von Clausewitz’, On War is a seminal work in the field of social and cultural studies of war and its agent, the military. Mansfield represents Clausewitz’ work as an evolution of this oppositional conception of war. “War is society in action”, argued Clausewitz (38). Peace and War are not opposites but elements of the same process. Mansfield describes this as theorising a continuation between peace and war. War and the social in this conception converge, they cannot be separated as in the ideas of Hobbes and Kant.

Part II of the book moves beyond the dialectic to describe the way that “...war and its other contradict but also produce one another” (39). Mansfield is interested in the productive potential of war, not a dialectical reconciliation. Mansfield wants us to understand that war has many others: peace, civilization, innocence, culture or order. The reader is led to identify those others and respond to the ways in which the tension between war and its other is deployed in contemporary political discourse.

In this section Mansfield covers a range of theorists from Freud through Bataille, Deleuze and Guattari, to Levinas and Derrida. This range allows Mansfield to move beyond the dialectics of Hobbes and Clausewitz drawing on ideas from “psychological ambivalence to deconstructive doubleness” (117). It is demonstrated that that the relationship between war and its other is characterised by entanglement rather than divergence or convergence. These theories of war focus on the instability of the ideal of war, its multiplicity and ambivalence, rather than the stability of the concept and its function in generating resolution.

While in the previous sections Mansfield has outlined the field, in Section III he outlines his own position. Here he engages with the idea that we live in an age of the global perpetuation of war. The Clausewitzean principle of society, that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means” is used to argue that the social cannot be opposite to war if it is part of the social, rather, “it is the offspring, the forthcoming of society” (29).

Outlining Foucault, Mansfield argues that everywhere there is always struggle. The local, habitual struggles for voice, recognition or distribution are the struggle of biopolitics. Mansfield calls this the social war. Of interest to critical race and whiteness studies is the argument by Foucault, deployed by Mansfield that his social war is “...basically a race war” (125). It is explained that history ceases to “laud and advance sovereignty” during the 16th and 17th centuries and becomes a history of the social division between races (125-6). We see this in the European dispossession of Indigenous and the scientific racism deployed around stadial, the Great Chain of Being or the Doomed Race theory. Indeed, the
very notion of Australian sovereignty is established upon white masculinist practices of dispossession.

Various manifestations of the same logic of possessiveness have, and continue to manifest over time as Indigenous sovereignty, or the latest threat of immigration threaten the imagined community of White Australia. Mansfield draws on Foucault to describe this social war as it morphs and mutates from the race struggle, to biological racism. In more recent times we can broaden this to the cultural racism that dominates contemporary subjectivities. Other theorists such as Virilio, Hardt and Negri, Baudrillard, Mbembe and Zizek contribute to theorizing the convergence of war with society.

The aim of *Theorising War* is to demonstrate that War emerges in relation to an other. Mansfield explains that while convergence and entanglement are present, and profound, recapturing the distinction between war and the social is not an adequate position. War must indeed continue to be understood in relation to its other, not only to define the relations of opposition, but to understand the range of contexts, historical and conceptual, that this othering creates and subsequently makes war possible.

The notion of civil war is an important omission in this book; particularly at this point in time as we see the Middle East under significant upheaval. Civil-military relations are implicit in many of the theorists he discusses across the book but not dealt with adequately. Moreover, the cast of theorists, as mentioned are all male and there is no attention given to feminist theories of war and militarism. These are significant omissions but nevertheless the text is articulate and comprehensive in the theories that are covered. It is particularly strong in the way it has traversed the many theories of war, unpacked their dialectical tendencies and arrives at a political and pragmatic solution: understanding war and its other, the contexts these relations create, and responding strategically to the circumstances that are produced.

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